

Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas
Palestine
The Mayan resistance movement
President
paternal uncle
thigh
Office of the President of the Movement in the Gaza Strip
Worksheet about
Map of interests - Common interests.
What do we want from them - What do they want from us - The position - Suggested activities

2019 January Jumada
al-Awwal 1440 AH

Population: 80 million.

❖ **Country-specific determinants**

- Praising Iran's role in supporting the cause and the resistance, specifically the financial support provided (especially in meetings with the Iranian press or public meetings, given the protest of a segment of the Iranian people against the financial support for movements outside Iran, which they claim has affected the economic conditions there).
- Reviewing the movement's position on various issues related to the Palestinian cause referred to in the general determinants of the content of the discourse with countries, and its developments.
- To clarify the Iranian position on the developments in the Palestinian situation, and ways to strengthen the relationship.
- Briefing the Iranian leadership on Hamas's political efforts to protect the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people, Hamas's efforts to protect the resistance project, and its success in gathering the resistance factions around it, including the main PLO factions.
- Clarifying Hamas's ongoing efforts to develop its military and intelligence infrastructure (details are preferable), and presenting the movement as the most successful investment entity, by presenting its dominance in the arena, and by presenting the proportions of fighters, equipment and activists, and presenting the conditions of the military cases in terms of numbers, equipment, level of experience and control.
- This clarifies Hamas's efforts to sponsor armed wings, build the joint room, and seek to develop the room so that it becomes a national Palestinian army, and work to have Iran adopt it, so that support for these cases is through the movement.
- He pointed out the efforts of the movement and its partners in the continuous pursuit of mobilizing the Palestinian people in the masses, as in the return marches, as it succeeded in mobilizing about 200 thousand citizens on Land Day, and a quarter of a million on the day of the embassy transfer, and it also succeeded in mobilizing tens of thousands every Friday for eight months. There is a plan to mobilize the masses and transform them into a popular reserve force in need of financial support, and to follow up on the generous Iranian announcement to adopt the martyrs and wounded of the return marches and agree on mechanisms to deliver their special support.
- The enormous amount of Western support for the occupation requires confronting it with all possible efforts, Arab, Islamic and international, which requires maintaining good relations with the largest possible number of countries and entities, and following a policy of disassociation, to provide this support. Accordingly, relations between countries are separated, and viewed from the perspective of Palestinian interests only with each party.
- Giving them an idea about the enemy's intelligence work in other countries and its risks by referring to the results of the investigation into the Khan Yunis operation within the available scope, and referring to the possibility of cooperation and providing them with experience in their work methodology, investing in the available specific information in particular within the framework of intelligence cooperation).
- It is to give Iran the right to be thanked and praised and to point out the depth of the relationship and its strategic dimension, as it was built on the foundations of revolutionary Islamic intellectual consensus.
- They sought to put Iran at the top of the visit agenda, so that their visit would come directly after their visit to Russia, to show interest, and to extend the visit to no less than a week.

Presenting symbolic gifts to the Iranian leadership (a model of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the key to return).

❖ Warnings:

- Media locator: In case of media inquiries about files related to the Syrian crisis, respond through:
Interlocutor:
 1. The movement's permanent position of commitment to the policy of non-interference in the affairs of states.
 2. Hamas movement hopes to resolve the internal Arab crises and maintain its security and stability.
 3. Hamas is a national liberation movement against the occupation, and its positions are based on achieving the interests of the Palestinian cause and supporting it.
 4. In the event of a question about accusing Hamas of supporting the Syrian opposition and fighting in its ranks, and referring to Hamas's previous positions in particular, the response is that despite the state of fluidity and ambiguity that accompanied the beginnings of what was known as the "Arab Spring," which led to different estimates, Hamas distanced itself from interfering in internal Arab affairs, especially the Syrian crisis.
- If asked about the movement's position on Gulf normalization, the response would be to condemn all forms of normalization, and express regret and surprise at the statements of the Bahraini Foreign Minister regarding Jerusalem, which do not reflect the position of the brotherly Bahraini people.
- In the event of a question about Qatari normalization, the response is that the movement condemned the reception of an Israeli sports delegation in Qatar, as well as the reception of the so-called Zionist Minister of Culture in the Emirates, and that the movement's position is principled on the issue of normalization, with reference to Qatar's great role in supporting the Palestinian people.
- He avoided the "Syrian crisis" instead of the "Syrian revolution".
- In case of a question about establishing Husaynias in Gaza or preventing Shiism (the "Sabireen Movement"), the response is that there are no Husaynias in Gaza and this matter is understood and clear to all parties and friends and that there is a diversity of religions, sects and places of worship in the Strip, and broad religious freedom for them.
- Terms such as "Arabian Gulf", "Persian Gulf" and the use of the term "Gulf" singularly.
- Map of interests in the region:
- Iran seeks to enhance its regional influence in general and in the areas of its conflict with its enemies in particular (the Palestinian arena, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, energy corridors, etc.), by strengthening and diversifying its relations with powers, especially non-state actors, to implement its policies and project, which has proven its effectiveness and progress over the actions of competing powers, "Türkiye in particular" (there is a Turkish trend to benefit from these tools recently, especially in Syria).
- To enhance its influence on the Zionist entity and its security through the arenas of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.
- To enhance its presence as an "Islamic force supporting the nation's issues regardless of the sectarian dimension," and to use that to spread its project and doctrine to the masses.
- H. Dismantling the Gulf position against Iran and enhancing its ability to confront it by strengthening the relationship with Qatar and Oman and occupying its opponents in various crises (Yemen, the Shiites of the Gulf, the security of energy supplies, etc.).

It aims to strengthen its relations with Türkiye on several levels: economic cooperation, the Kurdish issue, and settling the Syrian crisis in a way that serves its interests. Iranian-Egyptian relations have had their ups and downs.

❖ **Common interests:**

Hamas and Iran share a set of interests, given their shared principle of resisting and exhausting occupation. Strengthening the resistance forces politically, popularly and militarily, unifying their efforts in one front, and increasing their ability to influence the entity and confront its aggression against Palestinian and Arab rights. Opposing Arab parties that support policies of rapprochement and normalization with the occupation at the expense of the rights of the Palestinian people, and combating the idea of a peaceful settlement based on relinquishing the rights of the Palestinian people.

❖ **What do we want from them:**

Building a strategic alliance with Iran, through strengthening frank and in-depth strategic dialogue and agreeing on more solid parameters for the nature of the relationship and its dimensions to reach a four-party alliance (Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and Syria) that resists the occupation and opposes its supporters in the West to restore rights, through:

Iran (Hezbollah) is adopting a strategy to develop the Qassam force (training, armament, expertise), taking into account the time needed for this until the end of the current leadership cycle).

Enhancing cooperation and intelligence exchange between the enemy and its adversaries, and contributing to providing the necessary tools and knowledge for this purpose, in order to achieve the general objectives of the Alliance.

- Providing the basic requirements for construction in terms of increasing financial support and establishing periodic allocations, in addition to special funding for major military projects.

Iran's assistance to Al-Qassam in building intelligence stations abroad with the aim of expanding the horizon of intelligence activity and contributing to carrying out intelligence strikes against the enemy abroad.

Coordinating the efforts of media and tactical political work in the field of distracting and occupying the enemy, and reducing pressures from one side to another, through limited tactical military escalations, media threats, popular pressure on the borders...) with the aim of building the pillars of the alliance, and in a manner that takes into account the circumstances and capabilities of each party.

Partnership in efforts to strengthen resistance in the West Bank and the (48) territories to exhaust and occupy the occupation, which changes the enemy's priorities and strategies.

The aim is to restore relations with Syria and find a military foothold in southern Syria and the Golan Heights in cooperation with Iran and the party as an element of strengthening the alliance outside Palestine by taking advantage of the energies of the Palestinian people in the refugee camps there to achieve a strategic goal of creating forces affiliated with the military apparatus in the surrounding countries extending from Lebanon to Syria and then Jordan and the West Bank, to maximize the movement's strengths and prepare for advanced stages of resistance action (especially in light of what the Arab Spring revealed about the fragility of the Arab countries).

Reaching a joint defense alliance agreement that includes the Quds Force, Hezbollah and Hamas to prepare for the war to liberate Jerusalem and activate all fronts against the common enemy, Israel, and prepare a

timetable and an operational plan that ends with launching

An attack that surprises the enemy from all sides

Opening the way for popular funding for relief goals to enhance the steadfastness of the Palestinian people, especially in the Gaza Strip.

Strengthening and consolidating material support, whether financial (raising the value to \$10 million per month), or military (arming, training, developing manufacturing capabilities), in a way that contributes to dismantling the financial movement's crisis and overcoming the measures of its opponents in fighting supply lines.

To obtain Iranian political and diplomatic support for the movement in international forums (the United Nations) and in the movement's relations with other countries (Russia, Latin America), and to coordinate political, media and public efforts to confront normalization, especially at the international level.

(Work to enhance the cultural dimensions of the relationship with Iran in the field of language, arts, cinema and education by allocating high-quality scholarships, some of which are in the Persian language).

Opening a permanent office for Hamas leadership in Iran.

Studying the possibility of moving the Palestinian camps in Lebanon to the border with Israel, and playing a role in convincing Hezbollah of this.

What do they want from us:

E. Restore the political and popular momentum provided by its relations with Hamas as the largest Sunni resistance movement in the Islamic world and in its central issue, by praising Iran and its role in supporting the Palestinian cause. E. The movement adopts political positions supporting Iran's orientations in the region and in confronting its international and regional opponents, specifically in Syria and Yemen.

To restore relations with Syria to restore the image of the axis that was shaken after the Syrian crisis.

Keeping the southern front hot (as well as the West Bank front) to distract and exhaust the enemy, with the aim of strengthening its positioning and building its sites and military capabilities in Syria, without being exposed to the enemy targeting it and obstructing its plans there.

Suggested activities during the visit:

To work on holding mass public meetings under the title of supporting the return marches and breaking the siege or confronting normalization and supporting Jerusalem with the aim of obtaining popular and political support and collecting donations for the benefit of the Palestinian people by launching popular donation campaigns.

Meeting of the Leader of the Revolution, the President, the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts and the Chairman of the Shura Council.

Revolutionary Guards Command (Commander-in-Chief: Mohammad Ali Jafari, and Commander of the Quds Force: Qassem Soleimani)

Visit some important shrines and landmarks according to the brothers' discretion there.

Lecture at Tehran University.

Lecture at the Center for Political Studies of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Meeting with media and journalistic elites, meetings with Al-Mayadeen, Al-Alam and Al-Jazeera satellite channels in Iran, foreign press representatives in Tehran, and one of the reformist newspapers, "Etemad Newspaper."

Meeting with civil society institutions interested in the issue.