“Ma’asei Aman”
Permanent Change in a Changing Reality

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“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most responsive to change.”
Leon C. Megginson

Introduction
Ma’asei Aman is a process of strategic thought and organizational change that has been taking place in the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) since 2011. The purpose of this article is twofold. First is informational. The article will aim to present readers with a glimpse, albeit limited, of the changes, past and present, which the Intelligence Directorate has undergone in recent years. MID Also, and perhaps primarily, it will give the readers a better understanding of how the Directorate’s senior staff perceive and interpret the changing world and the developing challenges facing the Israeli intelligence community.

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Second, is more philosophical. The article will discuss the concept of “change” in and of itself - as an existential need, an organizational thought process and a worldview. We do not purport to present a perfect process, nor do we believe that the Intelligence Directorate or any other organization can achieve ‘peace and prosperity’ through such a process. Change is constant, and it must be implemented routinely, wisely and according to several key principles. This is the central message of this article.

We hope that by presenting these facts, leaders and decision-makers will be encouraged to adopt elements of this approach, as reflected in the Head of the Intelligence Directorate’s Position Paper No. 1 from May 2011:

“Upon taking office, I emphasized the need to address the challenge of a changing reality. Sometimes changes are linear and in distinct directions, at other times chaotic, or seemingly so. Be that as it may, constant change is the most prominent feature of our reality. The nature of conflict changes, warfare takes on a new form, and alongside new threats, new opportunities arise.

"One primary goal that I have emphasized is the need for the Intelligence Directorate, like any modern enterprise, to be capable of permanent change in order to adapt to the changing reality. The ability to respond quickly to changes may prove more important than setting long-term goals, which will have to change soon anyway. Therefore, MID must be built to have the primary ability to change
rapidly, thus ensuring that the organization remains relevant, adapted to reality, and capable of influencing it.”

In light of these two goals, this article is divided into two main parts. The first discusses the process called “Ma’asei Aman” - the origins of our recognition of the need for change, the major changes, and the process’s principles. The second part discusses the concept of “change” itself, and in particular what enables an organization to conduct a successful process of self-examination and transformation?

Part A - Ma’asei Aman

The Background
Ma’asei Aman did not materialize out of thin air. Anyone following the developments in the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate in recent decades would have noticed the changes, thoughts and signs of discomfort that arose from time to time. For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000’s, MID decided that a focus on “strategic intelligence” was required (in the atmosphere of political peace accords that characterized the 1990s in general, the peace process with the Palestinian Authority in particular and the growing awareness of the emerging threat from Iran). Among the manifestations of this change included a decision to transfer intelligence collection units considered ‘tactical’ from MID to different organizations. MID transferred its Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(UAV) unit to the air force and some of its tactical surveillance and observation units to the ground forces.

Another change took place in the first half of the 2000’s. As happens from time to time, MID went through painful budget cuts, as part of an overall reductions in the Israeli defense budgets. Unlike previous instances of cuts, this time MID’s usual response – sounding the alarm at the impairment of MID’s early warning ability, considered one part of the “holy trinity” undergirding Israel’s traditional national security strategy – did not remove the threat. It suddenly became clear that early warning borne out of tactical military intelligence, until then considered a cornerstone of the Israeli national security strategy write large, no longer defined the relationship between the IDF and its Intelligence apparatus. These cuts motivated significant learning processes within the organization, leading to changes in MID and its units, under the headline ‘The Foundational Idea.’

Under this program, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (Malan) and a Systemic Intelligence Course were established, and a recognition of MID’s military-operational function within the IDF was sown. Thus, for example, a strategic thinking process held in Unit 8200, the IDF’s SIGINT collection unit, provided an indication of the importance of accurate intelligence for the operational levels, including in the context of the struggle against terrorism in the Second Intifada taking place during those years.

In 2007, following some reflection on the functioning of the Intelligence Directorate as a military service, a new administrative
body was established in MID – the Operations Division. The catalyst for the establishment of this entity was the Second Lebanon War and the understanding that MID required a staff body which could better coordinate and synchronize the employment of its various elements and better integrate the intelligence within IDF procedures.

The Second Lebanon War was a critical factor in generating an understanding of the required changes in the role of intelligence in the IDF's combat efforts. The war highlighted the gap between the quality of intelligence available to the senior levels, and its absence at the operational levels. It emphasized a gap in the MID’s production of detailed military intelligence - for the operational levels in general and the development of tactical, actionable targets for the Fires forces in particular.

In retrospect, a large part of the effort to change and redefine the mission of MID in recent decades related to the concept of the ‘intelligence cycle’ (defining key information needs - collection – analysis - distribution). This core organizing principle, upon which most of the world’s intelligence organizations relay, ceased to provide a sufficient response to the world's intelligence needs at the end of the 20th century. However, in 2011, few, if any, could define the problem as such and point to a new directions for the organization’s activities.

Be that as it may, in early 2010, different insights were already accumulating regarding the gaps between organizational performance and operational needs on the one hand. On the other
hand, MID’s Operations Division was already operational (albeit not fully realizing its purpose) and a number of joint teams from the different units were already engaged in ad-hoc and other ongoing tasks. Most of the senior officers in the MID regarded the organizational status quo as correct.

However, it was clear that separation, and occasionally even the alienation, between MID’s divisions and elements was more dominant than cooperation among them. Operational intelligence for the tactical echelons remained a substantial gap, significant opportunities were limited to select circles and often did not come to fruition.

Furthermore, the well-known ability of the powerful elements inside MID to ‘dissolve’ any changes or decisions dictated from above was palpable (by means of compartmentalization of special operations, organizational changes in Unit 8200, etc.), making it difficult, for example, for the new Operations Division to realize its full potential.

 Few at the time thought that MID required another fundamental change – or even local changes at most - and the few who were of the opinion a change was required necessarily believe it was actually possible.

The Initiation and Formulation of the Process

In the preparatory discussions before the entry of the new MID’s head to his position, a complex picture was presented, pointing out the need for a series of improvements on the one hand, but on the other hand also giving a sense of relative satisfaction about the
critical and fundamental issues among the directorate’s senior officers (colonels and brigadier generals). The officers who did point out significant problems requiring fundamental solutions tended to doubt MID’s ability to adapt itself in a comprehensive and thorough manner. Most felt that the organization was too cumbersome and divided among itself. MID had undergone several ‘strategic processes’ in the past, many of which left deep traces of distrust and cynicism regarding the organization’s ability to change.

Many in the IDF in general and the Intelligence Directorate in particular used to joke about the unity in the intelligence directorate. A ‘loose confederation’ was just one of the expressions used to mock MID’s organizational character. The organization’s complexity and the heterogeneity in its areas of responsibility created significant difficulties in defining its challenge coherently, and formulating the process to address them. All these were added from the simple reason that the Head of MID himself was in a process of personal learning and not yet sufficiently versed in all aspects and dimensions of the Directorate’s functions.

Still, an outside observer could not help but be impressed by the scope of work and innovation on the one hand, and on the other hand by the gaps in required output, the organization’s effectiveness and the opportunities waiting to be realized. The intelligence picture in the eyes of the combat forces, a theme much discussed following the Second Lebanon War, was far from satisfactory. Other core
intelligence tasks like accurate enemy missile and rocket detection systems, were neglected.
The results were as expected. Intelligence to foil enemy efforts to smuggle weapons, deep research on enemy society, research on tactical, operational and other issues all seemed insufficient. The different intelligence efforts seemed to manage themselves rather than being managed.
Due to these challenges and gaps it was decided, together with the heads of the various units of the MID, to embark on a strategic process based on the following principles:

**Jointly lead process by MID’s senior officers:** The process would be personally led by the Head of MID and a forum of senior commanders (the leadership forum). In this way, the process would both serve as a personal learning tool for the head of MID, and more importantly, provide the directorat’s senior leadership with an opportunity for common learning influence, within an integrated team (for the organizational structure of the process, see Figure 1).

**A broad objective:** The purpose of the process would be defined in the broadest way possible and would include analysis, practice and decisions about all four aspects of the organizational endeavor: MID’s mission and strategy, structure and organization, work processes and organizational culture. As a result, it was clarified that the process would start from a blank slate. Ma’asei Aman would first scrutinize and discuss MID’s mission and its roles, and examine their realization and relevance, in light of a systematic mapping of the changes that
had occurred in the strategic, organizational, technological and military environment since these missions and roles were last defined.

**Systemic learning:** An advanced learning process based on the theory of systemic learning. Its essence - a critical self-examination through the study of MID’s past, exposing the fundamental assumptions upon which the organizational concept was formed in the past and an examination of these assumptions as they relate to the present. The gaps in relevance which are exposed in this manner necessitate a progression from past and present toward the future. They also necessitate distilling the potential exposed by these gaps into necessary courses of action to define more relevant basic assumptions and working concepts.

**A three-stage process:** The process was divided into three main stages - design, planning, and implementation. The design phase consisted of inquiry and learning, at the end of which principled decisions were reached concerning the desired end state and the key changes required to realize it. Figuratively, this was the architectural stage of a building enterprise. The planning stage was a practical phase, including a series of detailed steps, development of a Gantt chart for implementation and a division into task forces designed to develop practical content and enable the realization of decisions reached at the design phase. Figuratively, this was the detailed engineering design phase of a building project. In the implementation phase the plans were implemented and ideas put
into practice, with monitoring and control. Some of these ideas would be reevaluated or returned to the drawing board, as necessary. **Maximum participation:** Integrating the maximum number of officers, of various ranks and fields, in the process in order to be exposed to different analytical perspectives, to their rich knowledge and to enhance solidarity with the process among wider circles. This principle was realized through secondary committees established under each unit commander, within his jurisdiction (see Figure 1). Later, these teams presented their work to the Leadership Forum. In addition, throughout the process, a series of conferences, surveys, and group discussions were held. **Simultaneous internal and external observation:** The process was designed with the deep understanding that MID does not stand alone, but rather it is part of the IDF and the defense establishment. Its roles and functions within the defense establishment are key factors for self-examination. It was therefore essential to feed the process with cross IDF insights relevant to MID. Under this rationale, officers from the IDF Planning Directorate, Ground Forces, MAFAT (MoD R&D Directorate) and the Israel Air Force (IAF) were invited to participate in the process, in order to provide their unique observations of the Directorat’s thinking. The process was designed so that its products (their timing and content) could be integrated within the IDF’s multiyear force design processes and influence them. **Developing learning in an emerging reality:** Shortly after the process and its structure were agreed upon, turmoil broke out in the Middle
East. Despite this instability, it was clear that the process would be a lengthy one and that the areas and requirements would continue to change and evolve as the process continued. The principles included flexibility and the ability to continue changing even while the process was underway. Furthermore, an organization like MID could not stand still while its senior leaders were undergoing a strategic learning process. Clear objectives were defined alongside the planned thought process, such as preparedness for war, intelligence collection priorities in various theaters, and operational concepts to be realized. These provided a compass for focusing the intelligence work in all the Directorat’s units.
Figure 1: The Organizational Structure of the Process

Based on the insights accumulated in the working group at the Center for Intelligence Research (headed by Dr. Amos Granit) and the leadership forum discussions, ten research groups were formed around the following topics:

- Outlining and defining the changes in the strategic and operational environment (the change in the nature of conflict), led by head of the MID Research Division;
• Outlining the IDF’s existing and developing response directions in force design, headed by the Head of MID;

• Research and investigation of the technological potentials emerging in the realms of intelligence and the military, headed by a research and development officer;

• Systemic directions among the enemies and within the environment as objects for intelligence collection (i.e. challenges posed by our enemies in terms of intelligence), led by the Head of the Operations Division;

• “The Cyber Within Us,” or how the organization could better realize the potential of the internet capabilities of the 21st century, led by the Head of the Center for Intelligence Research/Computing and Information Systems Division (MALAN);

• Cyber as a new strategic and operational dimension, led by the Head of Unit 8200;

• The covert warfare field, led by the Head of the Operations Division;

• Social and economic trends and an outline of the resource situation affecting MID, headed by the Head of MID;

• MID and the wider intelligence community, led by the Head of Unit 8200;

• The need for change in organizational concepts and definitions, led by the Head of the Malan. Each leader put together a team that included colonels and lieutenant-colonels, from MID as
well as from the rest of the IDF, to assist in formulating their recommendations.

- The senior learning group - the leadership forum - convened from March to August 2011. The detailed work of the ten research groups was presented to the forum, often requiring more than one or two meetings. Occasionally the teams were required to amend their work based on questions and insights which arose during the discussions. The discussions themselves deviated from IDF’s customary protocol. The group held lively discussions, at times stormy, without keeping to the customary order of speakers.

An onlooker might have thought this was an argumentative and unproductive group, heading nowhere. In practice, the discussions progressed well and from time to time led to a breakthrough, creating new insights. The lively discussions not only helped to clarify and deepen understanding of relevant issues, but exposed internal organizational tensions, hidden basic assumptions about MID’s conduct, stories of missed opportunities characterizing any organization, and especially opportunities (and frustrations) noted by group members - arising from the gap between their desire to act and their ability to do so.

As time passed and the learning process progressed, we left our comfort zone and started formulating understandings regarding the gaps on the one hand and the desired reality on the other.
The Main Insights Formulated During the Design Stage and MID’s Organizing Concept

At the conclusion of the learning and design process, which was the result of hard work involving over one hundred hours of debates among senior leadership and hundreds of hours of work in the research teams, the insights were formulated in a directive that enabled us to proceed to the planning stage. It started with the major changes in the operational environment and their implications; the current challenges and tensions in MID regarding the identified changes; the enabling factors which had to be dealt with in order to face the challenges; and closing with the organizational and cultural emphases that stood out during the discussions and needed to be addressed.

The changes and their implications – The changes in the operational environment facing the IDF in general and the MID in particular included the following trends:

- Exponentially growing rocket threat on the home front, its scope, range, and accuracy, and the way it blends into populated areas in a way that threatens the home front and greatly expands the expected combat zones.

See Dudi Siman Tov and Lt. Col. Ofer G., “Intelligence 2.0: A New Approach to the Production of Intelligence,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 5, No. 3 (December 2013)
“Disappearance” of the enemy into populated areas and underground, intended to prevent our forces from detecting it and taking action;

Dramatic increase in the scope of the relevant theaters for intelligence and the tasks required of the MID. During the process, turmoil erupted in the region. This included Egypt and Sinai, Sudan, Syria, terrorist organizations, and other activities such as weapons transfers from distant countries to terror organizations. The regional upheaval required the focusing of attention not only on new theaters but on different communities and new players including the Arab public as a whole;

Networked nature of the enemy - the fact that terrorist organizations and their sponsoring states cooperate closely in tight networks;

Delegitimization and public opinion as Information Operations (IO) and political weapons used by our enemies;

The rise of cyber as an intelligence, military and organizational field of historic importance.

By mapping the major changes, we deduced a series of concrete implications with which MID would have to deal. The main conclusion we simply called "intelligence^{6^{th}}" (Intelligence to the sixth power). MID saw a sharp increase in the scope of the required intelligence, some of which were new types of intelligence with which we had
hardly dealt thus far. The intelligence needed to be more diversified, with an emphasis on intelligence sources, because of the great heterogeneity of the intelligence collection objectives and fields of interest. MID would have to put an extensive emphasis on operational and tactical intelligence. With regard to the latter, intelligence would have to be of a much higher resolution to be useful for combat. This would require the development of real-time intelligence. Intelligence would have to be accessible to the combat forces, to allow the maximization of time and space in a relevant manner to the battlefield at the tactical level.

Accordingly, we would have to operate through the tactical ICT systems, where we were not previously present. The accessibility and speed of information transfer must vary in relation to the tactical levels, but also with respect to senior officers. Another key conclusion was that by virtue of being the dominant and most experienced

For the purpose of Ma’asei Aman we had to define four types of intelligence which had not been properly defined until then. The summarized assessments were (full definitions of which can be found in the booklet Ma’asei Aman - The Design Stage): National Intelligence – for the level of grand strategy, designed to support national decision-makers; Strategic Intelligence - designed to understand the rationale of our enemies and adversaries and allow the formulation of military strategy; Operational Intelligence - required to identify the enemy’s strengths and vulnerabilities and additional definers that would enable the formulation of a concept to realize strategic achievements; Tactical Intelligence - to serve the forces' operations at the tactical level, such as targeting, precise enemy locations and the like.
entity in the field, MID would have to take the leading role in introducing the IDF to cyber activity.

The new emphasis on real-time intelligence, operational intelligence, the strategic entry into cyberspace, and the need to deal with the growing rocket threat and weapons transfers to the enemy, brought forth another important understanding. MID was required to go beyond the traditional intelligence framework, which was limited to describing the enemy, and would need to delve into the enemy’s broad realm of influence. MID would become a partner in the IDF’s decisive victory war effort, and in influencing the environment in the ‘campaign between wars.’

**The challenges** - Outlining the changes in the environment and their implications for intelligence has allowed us to grasp the challenges and the tensions created between the manner in which MID functions at present and the needs and changes we had identified. Among the challenges identified were the following:

**Operational intelligence** – In the past it may have been enough to provide the tactical level with the general position of enemy units in a given area and their basic combat doctrine. However, today, when the enemy is hiding and constantly disappearing, a general description of the location and nature of the forces is no longer enough. This meant that MID’s priorities and focus would have to

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This paragraph is based on the Summary Booklet of the design phase of *Ma’asei Aman*, Bureau of the Head of the Intelligence Directorate (October 25, 2011,) Document No. 509567. [Hebrew]
change (but not at the expense of traditional important intelligence collection subjects). The way that MID was designed to support the intelligence needs of the tactical levels would have to change. A deep technological, organizational and cultural change would be necessary, which will affect intelligence collection processes, distribution, and accessibility to the units. Out of this tension grew the concept of Intelligence-Centric Warfare - ICW (later defined as Intelligence-Utilizing Warfare).

**A networked and inter-theater enemy** - Over the years MID was organized mainly into regional desks (called “theaters”). This type of organization allowed more profound intelligence assessments of enemy states, and the development of a high level of professionalism among intelligence personnel in certain fields. The networked and coordinated characteristics of today’s adversarial axes (be it Hezbollah-Syrian regime-Iran in Syria, Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Palestinians in Syria or jihadist organizations throughout the Middle East), require a different outlook - inter-theater, dynamic and changing. However, shattering the structure of regional theaters to adapt to the new situation would take a heavy toll on basic intelligence coverage and the expertise of intelligence personnel in specific areas and organizations. We understood that this tension required a more flexible organizational structure that would permit the conservation of the advantages of a theater-specialized organization, but would also enable us to cope with the inter-theater
challenges related to the relationships between enemies and in inter-theater activities, such as different channels for weapons transfers. The tension between disciplinary professional specialization and Jointness - We were always required to combine different collection sources in order to learn about enemy elements. In the traditional world, we could feed the research system with SIGINT, HUMINT, and VISINT sources, and expect the research process to produce comprehensive intelligence insights. However, outlining the changes in the environment has taught us that the traditional way of combining sources is no longer sufficient. Contemporary enemies have become much more aware of the need to guard their secrets. These secrets, in turn, have also become widespread and decentralized (missiles, rockets, anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-ship missiles, etc.). Accordingly, the required intelligence resolution, the advanced counterintelligence capabilities that we operate against, the required timeliness of intelligence (e.g. in cases of weapons transfers or warnings of terror attacks), all call for an efficient, rapid and large-scale fusion of various collection sources into an overall picture. The organizational tension, therefore, relates to preserving the units’ esprit de directorat and the great professionalism of the disciplinary collection systems on the one hand, while enabling information fusion and breaking organizational walls on the other. Cyber - It was agreed that the cyber dimension holds infinite and unprecedented potential and that this potential will be a major
growth engine for MID. It was therefore decided that cyber is a key capability to be developed and intensified, from allocating the right personnel and resources to cooperation of all the relevant units inside MID. In addition, we realized that there exists a significant tension between the cyber intelligence expertise accumulated in MID units and MID’s core function as an intelligence agency. On one hand, no other IDF entity could lead the military into an era of additional and much-needed activity in this new domain (such as defense and offense, for example), however on the other hand, traditionally, intelligence agencies are by their nature not leading entities, certainly not in fields deviating from intelligence collection capabilities. This meant that MID would have to assume a new role going beyond its traditional vocation of merely collecting and evaluating intelligence, in tandem with maintaining its nature as an agency whose primary interest is intelligence.

**MID’s information systems and ICT organization** - In order to realize insights such as those mentioned above, a substantial change was necessary in how we build our main intelligence weapon – our information systems. In the past, each unit of MID was responsible for the development of its own information systems and dedicated infrastructure. Now a different architecture was called for. Here, the organizational tension was among the worst we’d come across. MID units’ specialized IT systems were tailor made to serve specific purposes and essential to their sources of power. We realized that we had to continue to permit this independence in developing targeted
professional capabilities and on the other to set up joint IT standards, promoting much needed fusion and integration. This tension was retroactively revealed to be the most complex to mediate, not only because of technological challenges.

We need not review all of the challenges, tensions and opportunities identified in the process, but we will mention some of them. We found that MID needed to improve its organization in order to serve the warfighting efforts that gradually increased between wars, and serve as a key factor in their initiation. We also found that we needed to change certain elements in our processes and organizational culture, which had become hierarchical, stiff, and slow over the years, and we needed to implement principles of agility and flexibility. We realized that the IDF’s rebasing to the Negev was a strategic opportunity for MID to implement cultural and organizational changes that in another context would require investment and efforts beyond our capabilities. This understanding developed during the process, although MID’s move to the Negev was not initially recognized as a major subject for analysis. We decided to make the most out of this strategic opportunity and therefore decided that designing and planning the transition would be an outcome of the Ma’asei Aman decisions, and be influenced by them.

The Enablers: Beyond these issues, we designated five areas that we defined as ‘Enablers.’ Without the fostering and strengthening of each of these, it would be very difficult to put into practice the decisions made during the design stage. Each of these Enablers had
its own purpose, but simultaneously also accelerated all other change processes.

"(1) Networked intelligence – Creating a joint cyber environment characterized by a central ICT architecture (communications protocol) enabled the development of dedicated knowledge and weapons in the various units, as well as functions and information sharing and fusion among MID units.

(2) Strengthening MID units and their organization - Strengthening the primary source of power in MID - (the professionalism of the individual units and the development of their knowledge - thus improving their abilities for more effective internal conduct.

(3) Strengthening and re-organizing MID Headquarters⁵ - Improving MID’s ability to operate and coordinate the directorat’s unity and efficiently maximize the usage of resources, directing the power structure and the outputs in light of tasks requiring integrative vision and employment of MID.

(4) Supra-Theater- the ability to organize and conduct cross-theater and regional intelligence efforts without giving up the benefits of regional expertise in the existing MID theaters.

(5) “Flexibility- Availability- Agility” - Taking advantage of the structural organization into different administrations⁶ alongside a

Adoption of the term ‘MID Headquarters,’ in distinction from the customary term ‘Chief Intelligence Officer Headquarters’ speaks for itself. One solution that we formulated for inter-theater function management involved the organization of thematic administrations, which are integrated mission teams of officers from different arrays and theaters.
profound change in the MID’s command and management culture, reflected the directorat’s improved ability to respond quickly to circumstances and adjust its operations when faced with ad-hoc tasks. It also reflected the need to change focus or to reallocate effort and engage in reorganizations, which vary from time to time, all this within short time constants, and with a dynamism that characterizes the environment.”

Other highlights: In addition to the five ‘Enablers,’ we highlighted three mainly cultural, topics which required attention and care:

Outward openness – Over the years, MID adopted a self-perception focused on its role as the ‘National Intelligence Appraiser.’ We realized that a deep cultural change would be necessary within the organization, through which the various units and personnel would internalize the essence of MID as an intelligence enabler of IDF operations in their entirety and hence, the necessity of connecting with various IDF units. At the time, we realized the uniqueness of the regional commands’ intelligence departments as sources of knowledge which could not be generated from the viewpoint of the General Staff and the necessity of direct relations between MID’s units and other units in the IDF (in practice, up to the brigade and division levels), without mediation or barriers.

From Ma’asei Aman, the Design Phase. [Hebrew]
Personnel - MID is based on the best human resources the country can offer. From surveys of officers and interviews conducted during behavioral science studies, we realized that this is not enough. Alongside the professional ethos, which is still very dominant, we need to more intensely cultivate a culture of leadership and more systematic and individual care of our people.

Resources - Although all these changes and expansions in functionality within MID required additional resources, we realized that we could not hope for a one-to-one ratio between the scope of the tasks, the extended missions we would undertake and the required investment in the organization on the one hand, and on the other hand the additional resources that would be granted. Therefore, it was decided that aside from the issue of cyber, all changes would be executed using existing MID resources, through the diversion of resources, streamlining processes and practices, and changing priorities.

The broad scope of endeavors, insights, tensions and opportunities forced us to bring together, as much as possible, all the necessary centers of gravity to allow the implementation of all the processes and changes that were taking shape during the design stage. To this end, we formulated the elements within the framework of an overall ‘organizing idea.’
The Organizing Idea

After mapping the environmental changes and identifying the gap between them and the organization’s functionality, we were ready to discuss the mission and functions of MID, and the broad idea that would organize our continued work. Figure 2 reflects, within the required limitations, the principles of the organizing idea as formulated. The inner circle depicts the additions that we undertook to the missions of MID (in red - the traditional mission of MID. The changes are highlighted as follows, in green - our new interpretation of MID’s traditional mission; in blue – the new mission and responsibilities undertaken by MID), in addition to the missions and functions as defined until then. The second circle reflects the five enablers whose implementation would accelerate and pave the way for most of the other changes we intended to implement. The outer circle reflects the conceptual and organizational changes to deal with. Around the edge of the slide are the contexts that define the organizing idea. Above - the strategic changes in the environment; on the bottom right - MID as we would like to see it at the end of the process, in nature and outputs; and around the slide - the values, opportunities, and management principles that would help us move forward.

The organizing idea included not only the abstract ideas we were aiming to achieve, but also the practical directions which could be derived from the ideas. In other words, the process’s structure dictated that the design phase should be completed with concrete understandings, which would enable in turn the practical planning phase and the execution thereof.
Figure 2: The Organizing Idea, a summary of the design phase of Ma’asei Aman.

- Definition of the scope and individual management of cyber activities in different campaigns while hedging resources for cyber activities undertaken under a broad IDF perspective.

- Emphasizes for the Management of MI:
  - Management based on inputs and outputs
  - Evaluation and oversight of outputs
  - Decentralization of authority to the level of Brig. Gen., Col. and the arrays (guided by centralized policy)
  - Dual commitment by officers – to their position and the Authority

- Changing Nature of warfare and combat (fine"), disappearing enemy etc.
- Intensification of threats in many arenas
- Turmoil in the Middle East
- Extension of combat to depth areas
- The emergence of the cyber dimension
- The delegitimization phenomenon
- Hybrid wars
- The scope of missions has grown

Additional points:
- More intelligence at a higher resolution in real time
- Establishing an Administration
- Concept and doctrine
- Information and weapon systems
- Structure and organization
- Operational processes
- Continuous functioning

- Updated Methodology for Collection and Research
- Redefinition of the model of deterrence in MI
- Broadening to new arenas of interest

- Flexibility-Availability-Agility and a system for maximizing opportunities
- Intelligence Based Warfare (IBW)
- Leading the Cyber Dimension
- Operational Efforts – Bridging Routine Periods
- Researching Publics and Communities
- Strengthening MI Headquarters
- Supra-national

- Intelligence About Publics and groups
- Establishing a Joint Mission Administrations and inter-organizational cooperation against cross-arena phenomenon
- A relevant and influential organization
- Ability to change
- Provision of intelligence that enables the management of policy and operations
- Improving the effectiveness of combat actions
- Permanent MI missions
- Creating improved conditions for success in conflicts
That being the case, in addition to its traditional purposes of providing national, strategic, operational and tactical intelligence, MID undertook to develop and establish a concept which we called ‘Intelligence Based Warfare’ (our revised interpretation of the ‘Operational Intelligence’ concept, and a conscious effort to regiment its handling, turning it into a system), to lead the IDF’s entrance into operations in cyberspace; to play an active role in the ‘campaign between wars’, and to develop intelligence about different publics. The extended definition of the mission and the organizational roles would be realized through the five operation principles (enablers) described above – networked intelligence, supra-theater, strengthening MID’s central headquarters, strengthening the arrays and “Flexibility-Availability-Agility” – creating flexibility and availability mechanisms in the organization.

In order to be clearly understood, we expressed the organizing idea in another graphic form. This form reflected a change in emphasis, although rendering the idea in a simplistic fashion, has great power in clarifying ‘the spirit of the organization’ to the most distant units and junior levels.
The Contribution of the Design Stage

In the previous paragraph, we seemingly summarized the products of the design phase. However, looking at this phase purely in terms of its content-related contribution is to miss the point. The design stage is the constitutive and driving component of the change process in more ways than one: First, before the design stage, the concept
driving the fundamental change required in MID was only shared among a few. The design discussions in the teams and the senior steering committee presented to MID as an organization a clear and common ‘mirror’ that reflected, for the first time for everyone, the gaps between what was and what should be.

Second, the understanding that a gap existed between MID’s conduct and outputs, and the sharp debate regarding the origins of this gap, forced us to quit our comfort zone both as individuals and arrays.

Third, only by quitting these comfort zones could we expose and discuss some of our basic assumptions, some which were not even known to us then. An example was the seemingly obvious assumption that every collection system in MID should have its own IT and applications unit. Some of these basic assumptions were changed.

Fourth, the joint process, through which the organizational gaps became clearer, created a sense of urgency in the senior steering group, and the need for change propelled further processes. One expression of this was the beginning of independent thought processes in the arrays. Thus, alongside the progress of Ma’asei Aman, the Research Division developed a strategic thought process of its own, called Change², dealing with the concept of intelligence research. This process drew from Ma’asei Aman but also contributed to it. Similar processes took place in the special operations unit, in Unit 8200 and elsewhere. Finally, the design phase concentrated all
the viewpoints of the various arrays for the first time into a joint thought process, creating new understandings among and within the arrays. The organization’s senior echelon jointly formulated a mutual and well-examined interpretation, both as to where MID was at the time, and to the direction in which it should be headed.

**The Planning Phase**

The conclusions of the design phase included not only the MID organizing idea and an updating of MID’s purpose and roles, but also, and maybe chiefly, a path that could bridge between the idea and its realization. The insights accumulated in the design phase taught us that the depth and scope of the change process called for change in all dimensions of the organization. In fact, if we wished to truly implement changes in the organization, we needed to make not only conceptual changes in the organizational strategy, but also practical changes to the organizational culture and to the way the organization perceived its personnel and vice versa.

All these dimensions of change relate, of course, to the concrete operational-strategic context we perceived and to our insights regarding the four levels of intelligence required from us. This was, therefore, multi-dimensional change, whose different dimensions we compared to Rubik’s cube - only handling it in its entirety, in all of its dimensions, could generate the required whole.

A mistaken shift of one side would impact and affect the rest of the cube. The opposite was true too - a decision regarding one side,
or part thereof, must include intended changes to the other sides. Simply put - a change in strategy cannot take place without affecting the processes and culture, and a change in the processes or structure will affect both strategy and culture.

Figure 4: The Rubik’s Cube of Organizational Change

To this end, following the completion of the design phase, the way in which we would manage the practical planning was defined. Thirteen planning teams were created and were tasked with transforming the principles, directions, and ideas that had been formulated into practical plans. In order to ensure progress towards implementation, we defined clear principles for the planning stage:
Plan with a broad vision - The teams were instructed to plan with complete freedom of action, to recommend changes and solutions for all elements of the organizational change (organization, processes, culture, organizational structure and even new missions).

Learning - The teams were instructed to hold their own learning processes, rather than relying only on processes carried out during the design stage. In this way we could ensure control and various enriching viewpoints while promoting the processes.

Jointness (Synergy) - The planning teams were comprised of selected delegates from all relevant MID arrays and some included relevant representatives from outside, such as combat brigade commanders who were integrated in the IBW (Intelligence-based Warfare) team.

Integration - The planning took place within a tension that exists between having the teams focus only on their respective fields and the implications and joint ideas of the different teams. For example, the team working on new collection methodologies was both influenced by and influenced the team handling up-to-date research methodologies. We solved this complexity by emphasizing the need for continuous meetings of heads of teams and for integration meetings led by the Head of MID.

Seniority - All teams were led by senior commanders in MID, Colonels, and Brigadier Generals. The ability of senior officers to conduct their work by both integrating and subverting conventions, was of course different than for junior officers. Furthermore, the
direct and intensive involvement of MID’s leading forum in the planning, conveyed to the organization a message of determination and harnessed more people from different levels and positions. All teams were instructed to present their recommendations in a clear and practical manner, combined with a detailed plan (Gantt chart) for implementation, including the resource implications of the plan.

The detailed plans, a product of the teams’ work, were discussed on several occasions in the MID steering forum. The planning outputs were presented by the teams and by the Head of MID himself on several occasions, both to the General Staff forum and to a forum of MID officers from the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. The commanders’ feedback was heard and studied and following corresponding changes and updates made within the teams, detailed plans for the required changes in MID were presented in a summary booklet in February of 2013.⁸

The plans presented included changes in structure, organization, and the key processes within MID, as well as to culture and approach. Among the plans approved in the planning phase were the establishment of a central headquarters in the MID research division, as a response to a need identified for a deeper fusion of research related areas of expertise. Other plans included the establishment of

From the Head of the Intelligence Directorate’s presentation to the General Staff Command Forum, Ma’asei Aman - Head of MI Summary (August 3, 2011). [Hebrew]
a new theater in the research division, which was the conclusion of an understanding of the need for continuous handling of cross-theater issues; the establishment of an MID war room which would coordinate the collection and research arrays and operate on a 24/7 basis, in response to the need for available and flexible intelligence; new approaches and methods of intelligence collection in the cyber and SIGINT fields; establishing an IBW administration headed by a colonel, which would implement the concept that MID must produce and furnish the tactical levels with up-to-date intelligence at a resolution that would improve the forces’ effectiveness; the establishment of a MID Information Systems Department (*Marom*), and included a presentation a completely new network architecture reflecting changes in structure, organization, processes, and culture; changes in the structure and policy of MID’s cyber activity; establishment of a regional theater in the Operations Division; defining a new training approach for continuous officer training within MID; creating a service framework agreement for those serving in MID, including principles and emphases for personal advancement and fostering of personnel alongside structured service trajectories, promotion channels, etc. The list also included other changes which have not been listed here due to space constraints.

**IBW:** To illustrate the relationship between design, planning, and implementation, we will outline the IBW concept in greater detail in this paragraph. One of the meaningful processes in MID was the change in the status of what we called Operational Intelligence and
its place in our mission concept and duties. MID understood that the
IDF could not maximize its strength when fighting against enemies
who adopt disappearing tactics while employing significant fire
capabilities, unless very specific and detailed intelligence was
available to the forces at the micro-tactical level. This required MID
to change its employment dimensions and among its collection tasks
to prioritize tactical intelligence purposes over other tasks.

From 2011, MID gave top priority to collecting and researching
intelligence on various enemy warfare arrays, resulting in a sharp
surge in the scope of relevant and accurate intelligence. In order to
implement the Intelligence-based Warfare (IBW) concept which was
shared with the ground forces, a series of steps were planned,
including adapting sources, developing specific accessibility to
operational intelligence, integration of information systems,
participation in brigade and divisional exercises, aligning OPSEC
definitions etc.

As mentioned before, it was decided to that an IBW
administration be established, led by a colonel with IBW
representatives placed in all military services. The plan included a
series of practical, organizational and procedural changes. Staff and
intelligence personnel were added to divisional headquarters.
Augmentation of intelligence personnel was also planned (and later
implemented) in the maneuvering brigades’ headquarters. The
intelligence information systems were changed to meet the new
operational requirements, and were connected to the ground forces'
command and control systems, while creating new and complex solutions to the OPSEC challenges. The MID field research unit was calibrated to meet the new requirements, based, among others, on an understanding of the centrality of field research for the new tactical needs. Later, in the implementation phase, the IBW concept was jointly exercised by MID and the ground forces during the main IDF exercises in recent years, where hundreds of Unit 8200 people, the directorat’s VISINT unit and field intelligence personnel participated in preparing and overseeing each exercise.

We also had to align our force design to the new concept. MID now invests more resources in real time intelligence collection projects, aimed at providing the tactical forces with the most up-to-date information about the enemy forces in the field at a high resolution.

The IBW concept is no trivial process, not for the intelligence personnel nor the ground forces. The concept raised, and continues to raise issues such as the tension between the need for enabling intelligence and the understanding that friction and uncertainty are constant elements in the battlefield, and the tension between allowing combat forces maximum accessibility to the highest quality intelligence and the basic need in the intelligence world to ensure information security and to protect sources. There is also the fear of creating too strong a dependency among the combat forces on intelligence as a condition for taking action. These and other tensions
need to be the subject of further development, joint thinking and experimentation by MID and the Ground Forces.

The Implementation Phase

Design ideas and detailed plans can go to waste if mismanaged and led improperly. In order to succeed, as we had in the design and planning phases, each implementation task was headed by an unit chief or a brigadier-general, required to run it as a project for all intents and purposes and to periodically present a progress report to the Head of MID. Progress reports on the main projects were presented periodically to the steering forum as well and occasionally further thinking was dedicated to the linkages and reciprocal relationships that existed, or were required, among the different projects and the way in which they should be conducted. At the same time, MID and the Heads of the Planning and Logistics Directorates oversaw the practical and detailed consequences of the implementation of the different projects and the connections between them.

For major projects like IBW, networked intelligence and cyber, presentations and discussions were held very frequently with the Head of MID. In order to enrich the learning process and improve project management, seminars and learning groups were conducted throughout the projects’ progress.

Additional projects that were born along the way, such as the ‘intelligence paradigm’ (which will be elaborated on below), were
allocated special attention, experimentation labs and test periods and were later improved on in different forums, including the steering forum.

Two main principles guided the implementation stage. First, dedicating time to follow-up discussions and showcasing products, and second, flexibility, adaptability and change during project development.

The second principle included information dissemination, implementation, and impartation of insights in different forums – General Staff, commanders, general and specific conferences, lectures etc., conducted by unit chiefs and the MID chief. During most conferences, time was allocated for questions, criticism, and general discussion. In cross-unit projects (which constituted the majority) and in those maturing to cross-service and cross-command (such as IBW, and networked intelligence) quarterly cross service status discussions were conducted (in IBW for example, a ‘Three Generals’ forum was established, including the Chief of the Ground Forces Command, Head of the C4I Directorate and the Head of MID and relevant position holders, who met and jointly agreed upon directions for development and force generation).

Management oversight was performed for the majority of tasks using the “control and monitoring officers” procedure, both by the Chief Intelligence Officer and the Bureau of the MID chief.

The very existence of these follow-up discussions, the time and attention dedicated to them and especially the message: “We mean
what we say,” created momentum (as opposed to endless discussions).

As in the planning phase, during the implementation phase we remained open to new ideas and criticism of vectors already agreed upon. Nothing was perceived as ‘too late.’ Thus, misgivings, criticisms and new insights which were heard at this stage produced a new chapter in the process Ma’asei Aman 1.2. We will elaborate on this chapter later on.
Part B – On Change

Ma’asei Aman was a comprehensive and deep process. But to what extent has it been successful? How then does one examine the success of change? If the criterion is in our ability to change, then the scope of the organizational changes, changes in structures, processes etc., can serve as a witness to our success. If it relates to the changes’ compatibility to a changing reality, then only continuous functioning under the delineated organizational principles can teach us whether most changes yielded a positive contribution to the organization’s functioning with regards to its purpose and role in the new strategic environment.

The question of success in achieving and adapting to changes is an important one. However, Ma’asei Aman was born not only from understanding of the need to adjust the organization to the current times. The origin of the process lies in a basic philosophy that recognizes that circumstances - namely the strategic, social, military, technological, economic environment, etc. - in which the organization operates, are constantly changing. Change is the only constant.

Ma’asei Aman, successful as it may be, could not forever guarantee the relevance of intelligence in a changing environment. The ultimate test of the success of the process, therefore, lies in the question of whether MID, as an organization, has adopted that elusive quality - the ability to continue changing on the one hand, and
to maintain an ongoing stable operational performance, with full output on the other.

Nothing lasts forever, so it is clearly impossible to ensure the success of Ma’asei Aman in this broadest sense. However, the very learning of the process as a practical case study, may provide a number of principles and insights regarding the conditions that would enable a significant change process in other organizations as well.

**Leadership brings change**

“Leadership brings change” is a well-known principle. In practice, commanders often voice a desire to carry out strategic thought and change processes, conduct an initial discussion, formulate a process, define working groups and reappear only for the concluding phase. Sometimes that’s enough, but often it isn’t. Ma’asei Aman was not only a multi-branch process in a large and especially complex entity, it was also conducted in an environment, one of whose main characteristics was suspicion and a low level of trust in the ability to change.

MID officers, who are critical by nature, were wary of past strategic processes that left only a limited imprint on the organization. One of the toughest challenges was to mobilize people to join the process and persuade them of its seriousness. The only way to overcome this mindset was to have the Head of MID personally lead the process with a team of the most senior
commanders. The steering committee, which was chaired by the Head of MID and included four brigadier-generals and an equal number of colonels, invested more than a hundred hours on the design stage, between March and August 2011, all dedicated to the process. In addition, each member of the Steering Committee led a team whose work involved many more hours. The intense involvement of the senior commanders, the questions forwarded from the discussion rooms to the units and arrays, played not only a crucial role in promoting the thought process, but also in clarifying the degree of seriousness and level of commitment of the senior echelon to deep and meaningful change.

Even more importantly, the learning process by the senior team served not only to mobilize the organization. MID’s unit commanders historically regarded each other as separate and sometimes competing entities. The intensive joint learning molded the organization’s management into a group with a shared experience and as the process progressed – sharing a common willingness. In other words, not only did we formulate a system of learning, but also a system through learning. In other words, the very process created the conditions for an integrative military intelligence system with an increasingly shared picture of reality, a common picture of the gaps, a vision (i.e. an idea constituting a response to these gaps) and a joint language whose commonality constantly increased.

Constructing a Learning System
At the beginning of any process of change, a comprehensive and deep strategic thought process should be carried out, - a learning process. We integrated two complex learning challenges into Ma’asei Aman with an inherent tension between them. On the one hand - the personal learning process of a new commander entering a large and particularly complex organization and on the other, a critical learning process of a group of senior commanders who recognized the need for change in their organization, to meet the changes in the environment. Understanding the learning challenges required constructing a unique learning system tailored to their needs. As we noted in the previous paragraph, a small learning team of senior officers was one solution.

Another challenge concerned the tension between MID and its external partners, which was mapped at the beginning of the process. In order to handle this tension we didn’t just invite representatives of the General Staff, MAFAT and the regional commands to join the process. MID’s relationship with its broader field of activity - the IDF and the intelligence community - were among the topics explored by the junior teams. Intelligence directions within the IDF’s employment concept and their implications for MID, for example, were developed by a team led by the Head of MID and which included officers from the General Staff, ground forces and other entities.

Later it became clear that this work constituted not only a platform for clarifying the role of MID in relation to external
processes, but also a source of reference and inspiration regarding the development of a strategy for action that MID should adopt. The structure of the learning process had a vital influence on the awareness of the importance of MID’s external interface (an interface which MID was not always good at), and on increasing our customer awareness, those being assisted and those assisting.

The awareness that the learning system of Ma’asei Aman was a part of a wider system, an IDF one, dictated the need to create an ongoing process of connection and coordination between Ma’asei Aman and the broader IDF. Ma’asei Aman was only launched after a preliminary discussion between the Head of MID and the IDF Chief of Staff, who was also briefed on the process and its progress every few weeks. Towards the completion of the process, its products were also presented to the Deputy Chief of Staff and a round of briefings and updates was conducted with the relevant generals. These talks were designed not only to harness the generals to the process, but first and foremost to obtain from them different perspectives and to benefit from their views. These talks also proved beneficial in reducing at least some of the skepticism exhibited by many IDF commanders with regard to the new approach being introduced by MID. Equally important was to begin working with other IDF entities in implementing the new ideas, such as IBW together with the ground forces, or networked intelligence.

Another aspect of structuring the learning was to identify challenges related to different stages of the process. Thus, at the
design stage, an external officer served as secretary for the process, both due to his abilities and also to gain a critical external viewpoint. The challenge during the planning and implementation phases was a more practical one and the Head of the Planning and Organization Department in MID served as a key factor in leading the process. The choice proved very successful, not only due to the talent and acumen demonstrated by the planning and organization staff at MID headquarters, but also due to the clear organizational engagement which characterized the shift from the planning to implementation stages.

An intelligent structuring of the learning process – an appropriate team and a learning method tailored to meet any concrete challenge – were a key tool in its success. An important part of this structuring was the recognition that Ma’asei Aman was not the only learning system in existence. There were also ongoing and strategic learning processes taking place in the General Staff, as well as in other services and within MID itself. The ability to design the process so that it related to these other processes, whether in terms of time (planning the integration of our products in the multiyear planning process designed to begin in the summer), or in terms of sharing the outcomes with representatives of other units, was discovered as an essential and valuable factor to its success.

Extending Collaboration
A critical element in structuring a learning system is the recognition that systemic learning, which was our goal, is not a personal process, but rather a group, team and organizational process. The Head of MID may acquire a deep understanding regarding strategy and organization, but his personal learning potential will always be limited compared to the inherent potential harbored of a learning process that integrates all senior officials in the organization, certainly in light of the scope and depth of the topics dealt with in MID.

Furthermore, the Head of MID alone, while he may wield authority and power, cannot influence all the complex organizational levels and make them act with determination by virtue of his authority alone. He must influence them, harness them and cause them to act based on internal motivation.\(^9\)

We have already discussed the tradition of officers’ decisions evaporating into thin air in MID. Management theories distinguish between blind obedience and vision as well as between merely joining something and being committed to it.\(^{10}\) To ensure success, we had to attain a deep level of personal commitment to the vision, which meant involving MID personnel in its formulation in the broadest sense possible. This was done for two main reasons. First,
the need to involve broad circles of officers to include varied viewpoints and to ensure a comprehensive learning process in which the opportunity to influence the process was given to the maximum number people. Second, engaging the participants within the process and augmenting the power of the group is impossible for someone who is not a part of the group.

On the matter of extended collaboration - we did not see it as a burden or a waste, though it meant investing a lot of energy in expanding the learning circles. Quite the contrary. We perceived mid-rank MID officers as an asset to the learning system, whose knowledge should not be overlooked. But how does one involve hundreds of officers in such a learning process?

The first sharing circle included all of the subgroups from the design stage. As noted, each topic of investigation was handled by a sub-committee of 7-10 officers, led by an MID unit chief. Ten topics for investigation during the design stage, thirteen planning groups at the planning stage and others in the implementation stage, led to the direct involvement of hundreds of lieutenant colonels and colonels in the process.

The second circle was an organizational survey conducted as part of the design stage which was intended to provide a comprehensive organizational diagnostic. Nearly two thousand questionnaires were filled in by various Directorat personnel, who evaluated the organization and its functioning in the broadest sense, assessed the soldiers’ satisfaction rate and other aspects related to
MID’s image in the eyes of its personnel. The work was led by the Directorat's Behavioral Sciences Branch Head, LTC Hagit Kaplaner-Matzliach and her team. The findings were collected and presented to the steering committee for in-depth analysis.

More than one hundred personal interviews were also conducted by the directorat's behavioral sciences officers. These enabled the personnel to openly express their opinions, to present their analysis of specific fields within the organization and to offer solutions, with no ‘closed questions’ included. In addition, over twenty interviews were conducted with senior officials outside MID. Focus groups within the process shed light from a different perspective on the relationship between the organization, its personnel and the direction in which they believed the organization should be heading.

For the third circle, we held conferences of forums of senior officers and the Directorat's arrays in which we presented the results of the process and asked the participants to provide input. The Directorat's colonels were convened before the design stage was concluded. At that meeting, the Head of MID and the unit commanders presented their major insights and heard the officers’ comments. These comments were then seriously discussed by the process’ steering forum, some were accepted and influenced the formulation of the idea.

During later stages, similar conferences were held for lieutenant colonels. Furthermore, the Directorat’s lieutenant colonels were
obliged to provide written comments about the product presented to them. All comments were read and taken into consideration, implemented, or discussed at the steering forum. Other meetings, all led by the Head of MID, were carried out within the arrays. These rotating conferences were held at every stage of the process: design, planning, and execution and at the conclusion of each stage.

The fourth circle was personal meetings were held between the Head of MID and MID’s colonels and lieutenant colonels. Broader meetings regarding Ma’asei Aman and its conclusions were conducted by the Head of MID with a group of colonels and lieutenant colonels from each unit. These meetings contributed not only to a mutual commitment, but also gave rise to quite a few ideas and thought processes. The ‘intelligence paradigm’ for example, was born in one of these meetings, when an officer remarked that the thought process which had already taken place on intelligence analysis was flawed, because of the very fact that separate teams were established for the development of information collection and research methods, instead of one integrated team. The integrated team that was established as a result of this remark gave rise to a new concept of intelligence collection, an approach embodying a closer integration between the collection arrays and the research staff. During the learning process we named this approach “the new intelligence paradigm,” in light of the insights raised in the discussions.
The fifth circle was regular and direct updates about the process to all mid-level and senior MID officers, and through the “Head of MID Update” informed MID officers of the process' progress and its content. It also informed these officers through briefings and educational programs in the arrays and through additional briefings given by the Heads of arrays and brigadier-generals in the Directorat.

**The Value of Teams and Group Learning**

The section above can also teach us about the power of group learning. It is likely that we would not have set up an integrated team (for collection and research) to improve intelligence analysis processes and later fully developed a “new intelligence paradigm” without the aforementioned officer’s remark. On the other hand, his comments would not have been possible without the preliminary work which provoked it.

This is also the case in more intimate learning groups. New knowledge cannot be learned or developed without creative friction between members of the group, bringing different, often conflicting, approaches to the table. In order to maximize group learning, the appropriate conditions had to be created. This meant giving up the hierarchical military discourse patterns that are familiar to us.  

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By June 2014 a total of 30 Updates had been issued by the Head of MI. Regarding the distinction between power, influence and authority and the need for their integration (CAPI) - See Dr. Issac Kalderon Adizes, *What is Management: The Adizes Doctrine for Modern Management*, Ministry of Defense (Tel Aviv, 2010). [Hebrew]
In the familiar hierarchical military discourse, each participant comments in turn on the work that was presented and the commander then concludes, whereas during the ‘think tanks’ that we held, we broke that linear and hierarchical pattern. At least during the thought process, the goal was not to reach easy decisions regarding complex problems, but rather to expose the complexities and reach deeper understandings about them. The knowledge was developed only through debates and heated discussions among participants.

To avoid productive discussions becoming unproductive bickering, mutual trust and a clear definition of group discussion rules were needed. For example, the understanding that we all share a common responsibility for the success of the process. We had to get used to leaving behind bad habits like sarcastic comments and hiding presumptions about ulterior motives. These two things took time.

Creating a learning group is not purely dependent on meeting rooms and discussion habits. A sense of a common vision and strategy are directly related to the way that we perceive ourselves as a group. One of the characteristics of MID was the high cohesion within the arrays, in which soldiers could grow to become officers, alongside alienation and a lack of familiarity between the arrays and between each unit and headquarters.

Gradually, through stormy meetings in discussion rooms and social gatherings initiated for that purpose, the heads of arrays
formed into a group. Noticing this necessary process, we took it to even wider circles. Colonels (!) in the Directorat could serve in their position for years without knowing many MID colonels outside their arrays. Thus, developing human resources and directing them along training paths, a significant part of which was mixed gatherings of officers from the various arrays, became an essential part of Ma’asei Aman. We created a routine of professional and cultural encounters among senior staff several times a year, and built a service program that encouraged officers to take positions outside their parent units.

**Critical Discourse**

Critical discourse, in the context of operational and strategic thought processes, is a more serious and systematic matter than the mere ability of a community of officers to level general criticism at the organization. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for an effective learning process that will ultimately change and improve organizational relevance. Being critical of others is easy. Critical thinking about ourselves is a difficult process. The prevailing tendency is to justify our difficulties by the existence of an external factor. In doing so, we repress the need to recognize the dissonance in our own behavior. In that respect, MID was no different than other organizations and its leaders were no different than many others.

In the beginning, some of the MID senior staff did not recognize the need for a strategic process like Ma’asei Aman. Only during the development process, as insights and the gap between reality and ideal became apparent, acceptance and solidarity were created and
most importantly - openness to self-criticism. Moreover, even after going through a thorough and educational process like Ma’asei Aman 1.0, and implementing many of its conclusions, parts of the forum didn’t think a continued process or additional critical discourse were necessary. We of course engaged in an additional process which became Ma’asei Aman 1.2. In both cases, the processes themselves brought the senior forum to recognize that what seemed healthy and satisfying, was merely a false comfort zone which hid the gaps and the need to improve.

As long as the organization and its senior commanders were in this comfort zone there was no real incentive to change. Therefore, the ability for critical self-examination is a prerequisite for any real change.

To ensure our ability to engage in critical self-examination, we used two tools. The first tool was the idea that “today’s problems arise from yesterday’s solutions.”\(^\text{13}\) According to this philosophy, in order to lay the conditions for critical self-examination, we must first find the sources of our present rationale and ‘solutions.’ To do that, a genealogical\(^\text{14}\) investigation method was developed, aimed at unravelling the failures of our hidden basic assumptions and discussing them critically. Using this method we looked at the

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development of our organizational logic over time and engaged in a systematic investigation of the gap created between the circumstances in which the organizational rationale was designed and current circumstances. To overcome this we had engage in a future facing examination - forming a concept of potential development directions which would improve the relevance of the organization in light of its challenges.

For example, the rationale we applied until recently in collecting and assessing intelligence was rooted in the times when MID’s main priority was to provide intelligence warnings prior to a war. In these contexts, an intelligence process was needed to assemble a large quantity of raw data and process it carefully, while including intelligence officers from different disciplines and conducting in-depth research discussions. Ultimately, we would end up with a quality evaluation product, carefully worded alongside a minority opinion. So far regarding investigating the past. Next we moved to defining the gap - all this was relevant when challenges were focused on the strategic point of view and the decisions required were relatively few, were highly significant and not necessarily immediate. This principle was also valid for terror attacks at a low frequency (although in this area too, a gap was created, and remained, over the years).

However, reality changed: missiles and rockets, a hidden and decentralized enemy, multiple weapon systems and large, ungovernable, territories in which terror organizations sprouted, all
led the steering forum to understand that another type of intelligence must be provided, and that it had to be developed in a different manner. In other words, the genealogical investigation served as a mind ‘trick’ forcing us to observe ourselves from the outside, and to realize that over time, a gap, a shift, was created between the way we operate and the altered environment.

All the teams involved in the design phase were instructed to follow this methodology (self-examination from the past to present and future), developed by the Intelligence Research Center and including a critical genealogical investigation of this kind. The product did not let us down. Investigating the shift by going back in time, in order to develop and form a future potential - is one of the principles of advanced strategic and organizational learning, according to the principles of the systemic approach.
Figure 4 - Genealogical discussion as a critical tool for investigating the shifting reality and future potential

- The Future: What do we want to happen? What is the alternative? What are the Possible Basic Assumptions?
- The Present: What is happening? What defines the way that we work? What are the Basic Assumptions (or Actions)
- The Past: What is our organizational heritage - how were our concepts formed, when and why? What Were the Basic Assumptions (or Actions)
- Clarification of the circumstances which led to our organizational and conceptual patterns of behavior today
- What is the potential for an alternative? (For example - networked intelligence enables us to break the serial intelligence process)

Defining the Shift: The gap that was created between the current reality and the last logical source for the current concept (for example “In the past early warnings for war dictated the serial intelligence process, today the challenges are immediate and multi-disciplinary”)
The second tool was simple - encouraging free and critical discourse, totally in opposition to the familiar, formal military rules of discourse. We were surprised by its success. As it turned out, there was a clear need for such a discourse, to begin with in the senior forum, but later among mid-level officers too. It is possible that the critical materials which were developed through teamwork, played a part in encouraging that debate. Perhaps holding the meetings, some outside of regular working hours and outside the Head of MID’s offices, also played an important role. In any case, the transcripts of these meetings indicate an open but fierce debate, free of the restrictions of hierarchy and an artificial forced round of comments.

**Personal Influence**

In order to reach this level of critical discourse, each member of the organization, at least at the mid to senior levels, was required to develop new types of personal skills. In *Ma’asei Aman* we literally demanded of every lieutenant colonel in the organization to write down their comments regarding the process and its outputs and to participate in different forums to discuss the issues. The intention was to make the officers acknowledge their part as members of the organization’s wider management and to encourage them to take initiative and express ideas, even if they may sound radical. In the past, the custom in MID was to encourage independent thinking in matters of intelligence content. Now we demanded from officers to take the same independent line of thought regarding the basic beliefs and concepts on which the organization was based.

At the more senior levels, it was possible to maintain the ever important channel of informal discussions, which we did. This turned Fridays, late nights and other openings in the schedules into a fertile arena for face-to-face conversations between the Head of MID and various officers over subjects on the agenda, with an emphasis on *Ma'asei Aman*. The learning experience through an open
conversation between two people, sometimes three to five, is like no other process and is as free and as uninhibited as can be. Many ideas sprouted from these talks and many improvements and new directions were made clear. A belief that you as an individual can have influence, is a condition for the existence of a learning organization in the broadest sense. Personal and small forum conversations greatly contributed to this.

Three Parallel Levels of Awareness
From everything we have said so far it is clear that leading Ma’asei Aman involved not only a process of delving into the changes in the environment in which we collect intelligence. In fact, to the best of our understanding the success of such a learning process depended on the ability of the process leader and the senior learning group to simultaneously explore three different thought levels. Constant awareness of these three levels and management of the process accordingly was a condition for its success.

The first level of awareness was discussing the content. This level included the changes in the environment, the changes required in the organization, constraints, needs, etc. The fact that the enemy is improving its fire capabilities (launching missiles and rockets) for example, and that this requires us to collect more intelligence in differing ways, is an example of content awareness. This is the most basic level of awareness. Most of us are dealing with content and understand it, therefore we don’t find it difficult to describe and develop understandings about it.

The second level of awareness is more complex. This is the constant awareness that is required to steer the learning process to the intellectual dimension. As described, the structuring of Ma’asei Aman as a learning system was conscious. It was designed to relate to the organizational, conceptual and mental challenges that we identified when we started.
For example, the understanding that a conscious thought exercise (the genealogical debate from past into the future) is required in order to create the conditions for critical discourse is at the second awareness level. Just as on a dark night a good navigator checks his position and makes adjustments from time to time, it is necessary to check periodically if our learning system is still working as planned. Is team learning still built in a way that allows effective learning in relation to the challenges? Do the teams still serve us in the process? Is there a need to establish new teams? Which personnel were missing in previous discussions to better complete the learning system? We dealt with such questions in the frequent sessions of the steering forum.

The third level is a basic awareness of the existing principles of the organization’s concept – both MID and the IDF as a whole. In a conceptual paraphrase on Archimedes’ famous dictum, Peter Senge writes: “Give me a lever long enough ... single-handed I can move the world.” That is, the organizational concept is not always worded and written to enable critical discussion. Sometimes a conscious effort is required to put it simply. Siman-Tov and Lt. Col. A. did this for us when they described the common intelligence paradigm in short, simple words as the traditional “Circle of Intelligence.”

Another example of the creation of awareness at this level was in describing the unit system of MID as an organizational paradigm. Regarding the IDF as a whole, a sub-team led by the Head of MID was needed, which presented its version of the principles of the IDF’s combat concept as a convenient basis for discussion of the development of MID’s concept and its contribution to the IDF. On the one hand, ensuring awareness of the IDF concept allowed MID a

16 Siman-Tov and Ofer G., "Intelligence 2.0." *Military and Strategic Affairs.*
clear point of reference for inquiry. On the other hand, it allowed MID to develop new knowledge regarding the broader IDF context. The result of the effort aimed to develop a mutually formulated awareness for the whole thought process (regarding the principles of the broader IDF concept) and was intended not just to allow a better match between the intelligence process and the IDF, but also to enable a real contribution by MID to changes and improvements in this IDF concept.

The concept of IBW is an example of this. Placing the “age of fires” (enemy rockets and missiles) at the center of the threats and the IDF’s response is another. Along the way, concepts created through *Ma’asei Aman* became a direct basis for the concepts and concrete actions of the IDF. The term “age of fires” became a collection campaign and was also implemented as an IDF campaign, as decided by the Chief of Staff. IBW became an official IDF concept and it too was approved and became a General Staff concept.

**The Existence of a Previous Systemic Discourse in the Organization**

We have already discussed the contribution of the Intelligence Research Center to the formulation of *Ma’asei Aman*. During the seven years prior to the beginning of the process, a type of laboratory was created in the center. Through courses, war games and the different experiments conducted there, a laboratory for the development and testing of new concepts was created.

This laboratory, headed by Dr. Amos Granit, formed the first insights about the differences between MID as it was and MID as it should be, and also a procedural concept of the right way to drive change in the organization. The experience and knowledge gained there formed a solid basis of content and methods that allowed *Ma’asei Aman* to be set in motion relatively quickly, with a clear direction for the process, even when some of the discussions that took place seemed unfocused.
The importance of organizational preparation in the lab was great. MID was able, at the beginning of the past decade, to establish for itself a small and seemingly insignificant organizational component, whose sole interest was the development of thinking around the question of how to learn in the broader organizational sense of the word. This was an important element in the success of Ma’asei Aman.

Practical Implementation Processes
To turn the profound understandings born during the process into results, practical processes of detailed planning, implementation, monitoring, and control were required. Furthermore, the practical implementation of new ideas, in whose formulation great efforts were invested, has a critical role in building the organization’s trust in the change processes themselves. The follow-up discussions led by the Head of MID had a great influence on the process’s progress, but equally important was the fact that each of the implementation teams was headed by a brigadier general or a colonel who was the head of an unit.

Indeed, Ma’asei Aman 1.2 (a second learning process which was initiated concurrently with the Implementation Phase of the original Ma’asei Aman) was met with resistance. Nonetheless, it can be assumed, that had we not been in the midst of the practical implementation of the first Ma’asei Aman at that time, the second process would not have been met with resistance, but rather something worse, cynicism and a shrug of the shoulders. The fact that we spent time formulating, presenting, consulting, and most importantly doing, caused widening circles in the organization to shed their initial mistrust and join the circles of learning and action. This is one way of understanding the case involving the remark that led to the establishment of the “intelligence paradigm” team. The combination of ‘command determination’ to oversee and monitor
the practical progress, together with a broad and comprehensive identification with the need for change, especially among the senior officers, was a key factor in bringing the process to fruition.

“Having It Both Ways” - Breaking the Binary and Linear Discourse

“We have to prioritize.” “Decide what to include and what to leave out.” Any senior manager has often heard these phrases. A significant part of the discourse in MID tended in this direction. Resources are always in short supply, while the requirements for intelligence output are continuously increasing in terms of scale, pace, availability and complex integration. A national intelligence organization cannot avoid responding to the growing demand on the one hand, but it also cannot expect that the available resources will increase at the same rate to meet these requirements (although it must be admitted that the General Staff recognized the need and increased MID resources). Frequently we found ourselves needing both - increasing both the pace and the volume of our output, and operating in new theaters while deepening our activity in the current theaters.

It is important to remember that the ‘both ways’ concept is for large systems, not small entities. This concept is always true at the highest levels (organizational strategy, the main arrays, etc.). When ‘both ways’ is broken down into tasks, they are set in a concrete manner and prioritized for the lower echelons. A team working on a specific operation focuses on that task only. A particular ‘desk’ can handle more than one task, and so on. Alternatively, the products of a particular team can serve another team as well as between desks, branches, etc. This is the culmination of the ‘both ways’ concept.

So, what was cynically called by some people the “both ways doctrine” is not merely a pragmatic need but a fundamental principle as well. Thinking about MID’s work as a closed box of resources and outputs is to think inside the box, based on the premise that the
organization is conducting itself in an optimal manner. It is to think of the large MID system as if it were a small organization.

In fact, one of the strongest incentives for rethinking, critical self-examination and creative streamlining is a shortage of resources. Indeed, once the organization recognized that it did not intend to relinquish any substantial or relevant areas of MID’s output and more importantly, that new tasks were about to be added to the workload with no significant addition to its resources, then creative solutions began to emerge.

Under the concept of systemic learning, the need to do more within a given resources framework is not a contradiction, but a tension which needs to be resolved through inquiry and learning. This tension enabled us to reexamine our assumptions and behavioral patterns that we had come to take for granted. Converting dichotomous choices into tension is, therefore, a principle of systemic learning. Insisting on the ‘both ways’ concept did not reduce the effectiveness of the process, but was an important underlying principle for taking action.

Changes That Generate Change

Ma’asei Aman created a movement within the organization and generated currents whose influence went beyond the specific decisions taken during the process. In the spirit of IBW, in the spirit of the need to improve the handling of regional and inter-theater issues, in light of the directions decided upon in the networked MID or the covert campaigns between wars, suggestions for innovation and improvement arose from below. In the Research Department it was Change², the strategic process launched shortly after the

¹⁷It is worth noting that in the cyber field, the IDF recognized MI’s need for a significant addition of resources, recognizing that this was an emerging field, essentially constituting a significant force multiplier.
completion of the *Ma’asei Aman* design phase. The process, led by Research Division Head BG Itai Brun, complemented the *Ma’asei Aman* principles on the one hand, while bringing about many changes of its own on the other.

In the Special Operations unit, the decision to consolidate the units into one single unit generated its own dynamic process. Engagement with the issue, with the appointment of Brig. Gen. L. as commander, led to a series of discussions (design and planning), which gave rise to significant changes exceeding the concrete decisions we took in the MID process.

At the GEO-VISINT unit, with the appointment of Col. Yossi as commander, an intensive process in the spirit of *Ma’asei Aman* began, where the link to the needs of the field units in general and IBW in particular became a magnet for a major internal strategic process that began in the unit. The process was later expanded and developed into many issues related to *Ma’asei Aman* ideas and to advanced technological realms.

*Ma’asei Aman* found Unit 8200 in the midst of its own strategic process, led by BG Nadav, which began long before the MID process. Again, it turned out that the *Ma’asei Aman* projects - the concept of IBW with all that it represents - presented a new conceptualization for Unit 8200 and enabled its personnel to interpret reality and the needs more clearly and accurately. The IBW concept genuinely prodded Unit 8200 to complete certain processes which had begun in the unit earlier, but IBW provided a focused direction which translated into a series of changes and new work practices.

Like IBW, networked intelligence and the idea of a ‘campaign between wars’ (one of the more sensitive subjects in *Ma’asei Aman*), generated learning processes and professional-operational achievements which cannot be detailed here. The changes gave legitimacy to engage in self-examination, and provided direction for sequential changes, which created favorable conditions for further
fundamental change in Unit 8200, this time led by BG Ehud (who of course had ideas of his own).

The Inet project was an example of an idea born as the result of the atmosphere of change which in itself was a significant engine of change. During Ma’asei Aman, we identified the need to make intelligence accessible to consumers in conformity with the 21st century - immediate online intelligence (Internet), edited in prominent headlines and accompanied by illustrations which are available with current intelligence, such as photos and videos.

The steering committee generated the principle, the Head of the Research Division created the idea and thus was born the Inet. This is a MID networked site that draws its inspiration from other mass media outlets (hence the name, inspired by Israeli news site Ynet, using the letter "I" for Intelligence). The site utilizes representatives in the various theaters of the Research Division and in the different collection units to pass on intelligence reports of particular interest or importance. The site, which currently serves as the home page for most army and intelligence officials, highlights breaking news, points to in-depth analysis of various topics, provides media glimpses of hot issues and utilizes a user experience familiar to every user of popular news sites on the Internet.

At first glance, this is a nice change that makes intelligence more accessible. In practice we found it to be a powerful change engine on its own. The research officers, as well as other personnel in the collection units, discovered the site’s power while understanding the reduced relevance of the more traditional distribution mechanisms. Thus, while conducting long and tedious discussions on achieving flexibility and immediacy in our production and research processes, we discovered that the new media is a critical incentive to speed up the pace of the arrays’ operations and to accelerate research.

Furthermore, if in the past, we had to create complex mechanisms to ensure that information was accessible from the
various arrays to other actors within MID, we found that the power of this new tool drove the creation of new mechanisms in the Research Division and collection systems. These new mechanisms enabled the presentation of relevant products in close temporal proximity to the relevant event and allowed in-depth discussions and different approaches to compete with each other on the platform.

Inet as an example, and the other change processes taking place in the arrays, are an expression of the fact that the mere existence of a strategic process, projects and generates movement and dynamism, creates lively discussions, disagreement and consensus, debate and solidarity, all of which stimulate thought and creativity and give birth to their own ideas and innovations.

**Immediate Accomplishments (Quick Wins)**

Every organizational change process, and certainly profound change that takes time, should preferably also show immediate results, demonstrating the feasibility of the process to the organization and the environment and producing the desire and motivation to continue promoting it. Furthermore, not every subject and every field require a long process of design, planning and implementation. In issues where there is a readiness, the desired goal can be decided on in a short time (weeks or less) and a plan of action and start date for implementation can be decided upon.

Defining the campaign to deal with missiles and rockets was an example of this and indeed in the short span of a few months, the nature of the achievements changed dramatically. In the research and collection fields, teams organized for the new tasks began operating and generating results. The most immediate and significant achievement could be seen during Operation Pillar of Defense. Tools, methods and processes developed as part of the IBW concept were used during the operation, and the improvement in intelligence led to a fundamental improvement in the effectiveness of fire employment, and in the quality of preparing the maneuvering
forces to battle. Beyond their substantive contribution, the achievements had two aspects: one, illustrating the potential of the process and injecting more confidence and energy to pursue it. The second is equally important, conveying a message of “intention leads to execution,” a principle that was not apparent in MID for many years. The last aspect was doubly important for the continuation of the process.

**Conduct During a Continuous Learning Cycle - Moving ahead with Ma’asei Aman 1.2**

The most important principle for implementing the insight that there is a need for constant change is very simple - mean it. During each stage of Ma’asei Aman, we declared and emphasized that we would revise our decisions in light of new demands, changing conditions, or field diagnosis during any step in the process. Indeed, as the circle of people dealing with the thought and change processes widened, first with the transition to the detailed planning phase, and then the implementation thereof, new insights, initiatives, and proposals continued to arise from the field. We then realized that sooner or later we would need another thought process and sooner won.

The implementation process was underway, and the friction produced by the activity soon gave rise to insights, methods and gaps. The ‘campaign between wars,’ for example, appeared not to be developing at the rate and in the way intended; the ‘intelligence paradigm’ was also advancing slowly; the engagement with targets in the context of developing and perfecting IBW and enhancing of other capabilities required improvements; and above all, the networked intelligence process was not taking off.

During the most recent implementation status meetings on networked intelligence, the Head of MID publicly called the first implementation year a lost year.
The use of this terminology was not incidental - it was intended to highlight the sharp discrepancy between the vision and reality. It was intended to prevent covering up the situation and to generate a profound recognition that there was indeed a gap (a shift) between design (and need) and execution.

All these raised the need to stop, to recalculate the route, and to inject new energy into a number of the processes. This process was coined *Ma’asei Aman 1.2*, reflecting a change, a version update, an improvement of the process, but not an entirely new process.

*Ma’asei Aman 1.2*, by its very existence and name, embodied the deepest organizational recognition that the essence of change is permanent, so the main activity of a learning organization is changing. We were not so enamored with the structure of the knowledge we had so painstakingly developed that we wouldn’t open it to critical review. The new process also embodied the understanding that one change leads to the need for further change.

Setting another strategic thought process in motion was at first met with reluctance among the senior commanders in the Directorate. *Ma’asei Aman* - which by then involved hundreds of officers, demanded attention and long working hours and already affected thousands - was perceived as successful and worthy of effort, but only at a satisfactory level. The resistance to putting an additional process into motion related not only to the understandable unwillingness to repeat a process requiring large investments of time and attention, but also a natural tendency to protect the way we were already operating. The feeling was that we had just agreed on new practices, that most things were working well, and that whatever gaps remained could be handled by regular staff work.

Accordingly, in addition to becoming another thought process covering specific issues, 1.2 became a test of our ability to make learning a regular organizational habit, defying the convention that a
strategic thought process was a concentrated, one-time learning effort.

Based on an understanding of the limitations of time and attention and in order to re-ignite a process of motivation and identification with the goals, we defined *Ma’asei Aman 1.2* as a debriefing, intended to review the progress of the implementation of *Ma’asei Aman*. It was allotted a short time period compared to *Ma’asei Aman 1.0*. Four key subjects were reviewed by teams led by a brigadier general, and were responsible for implementing the debriefing and presenting possible actions. The most outstanding issue, networked intelligence, can serve as a good example of the necessity to make organizational learning continuous and constant (for which typical staff work is not a substitute). The team investigating the subject under the Chief Intelligence Officer revealed and poured content into the term ‘Lost Year.’

Among the findings of this investigation, we learned that despite the vision of networked intelligence, the different arrays were continuing to routinely develop software in isolation from one another. We found that in different respects, MID software was lagging behind what was available on the Internet, partly due to the way that we rewarded personnel and units for immediate operational successes, which in effect negated the requirement that they implement our long-term vision. We also learned that various MID databases were incompatible, that there was no overall vision of operational-critical applications, and that a series of previous decisions could not be implemented, simply because the organizational structure would not allow it.

‘*MID in Color*’: Indeed, only a year after we had made the decisions and seemingly set out on our path (we even established an Information Systems Department for this purpose) this fundamental examination made clear the concrete reasons why we were not
progressing towards the vision we had set for ourselves. The conclusion of this investigation was that, in a stark contrast to the position with which most of us had held when beginning the process, a radical reorganization of the MID’s IT system was required, as well as a substantial change in the way we develop our human resources and measure the output of units and commanders. The Directorate’s C4I units, and those in the various arrays were dismantled. They were replaced by five C4I units, each with a specific designation and areas of professional expertise under a broad MID outlook. In this way, instead of each unit being fully supported by its own ICT unit, each reorganized unit would specialize in providing unique professional services to all the arrays, thus achieving compatibility of standards, communications and applications within all arrays and between them and headquarters units. Each C4I unit would be subordinate to a different unit in the Directorate, according to its traditional professional orientation and all the units’ work would be coordinated by a new C4I department set up in MID Headquarters.

The idea included the establishment of a Blue Unit which took responsibility for the Directorate's C4I infrastructure (IT and continuity of operations). A Green Unit took a cross-directorate responsibility for application development, joint application infrastructure, development of joint inter-unit work spaces and information accessibility. A Purple Unit was given responsibility for the execution of applications for IBW, field applications and connection to the IDF fire cycle. Our VISINT and field research unit was entrusted with continuing to develop its own unique areas of expertise. The Marom Unit would serve as the staff body to supervise and coordinate all joint networked activity in MID.

MID in Color was just one of the comprehensive re-organization processes which MID undertook (referred to by some ‘Ma’asei Aman 3.0). Under the new organizational configuration the SIGINT unit, for example would be supported by the VISINT unit for certain
teleprocessing aspects and support the former in others. i.e. - not only was the redundancy in the activity of the various C4I units in the arrays eliminated, but an ecosystem like interdependence was created, leading to new interactions among the different arrays and their commanders.

**The Intelligence Paradigm:** In *Ma'asei Aman* we discussed in depth the question of intelligence utilization and outlined processes and organizational structures designed to enable a more complete analysis of raw intelligence materials produced by MID. The essence of the Intelligence Paradigm is in replacing the old Intelligence Cycle concept, whose main characteristic is its serial nature (definition of required information – collection – research - distribution), with an intelligence approach whose main characteristic is to break down the barriers between collection and research and the automation of intelligence processing and research. This idea is based on the introduction of translation engines, thus breaking deeply rooted organizational assumptions and making them accessible to collection and research personnel alike. At the same time, advanced data mining capabilities, based on ever improving networking between the arrays and units, should be developed. A researcher at the Research Department would at once have a collection capability, or more specifically, access to raw materials and the capability to process (translate) them, thus improving his work and making it more precise.

Formulating the new Intelligence Paradigm was a realization of a process that began with an attempt to develop new methods of collection and research, was refined by the need to link these two domains to improve analysis and which gave rise to a new paradigm. Literally.
Conclusion
As demonstrated throughout this article, both the operational and the strategic environments have undergone radical changes in recent years (the use of fires, asymmetric warfare, decentralization, disappearance, reduced IDF superiority, underground warfare, multiple relevant theaters, changes in the theaters, the challenge of the public in the Arab world, low governability areas, etc.). Alongside these changes, technology is developing at an exponential rate, basic intelligence capabilities are improving and the operational response of the IDF is undergoing a process of change (the ‘campaign between the wars’, response to enemy fire, etc.).

All these were the main motivations for launching Ma’asei Aman. On the other hand, and as became clear, many of the changes were not identified before the process and most certainly the need for substantial organizational change was not internalized. Furthermore, even internal gaps in the functioning of MID as an organization (the lack of a unified communication network, gaps in cyber information systems, etc.) were not identified in full before the strategic process began.

As serious as the motivation for the process was, a framework and an enabling platform are required to ensure a thorough, continuous (non-declining) and practical process, which would not only allow the organization to survive, but to change and maintain its relevance. Any strategic process faces a double challenge - determining the destination towards which it advances (the ‘what’) and laying stable rails on which the process can move and advance without deviation or stopping (the ‘how’). As described here, we strived to incorporate the following principles in an attempt to meet this challenge:
● Establishing a study group, which developed common knowledge in a deep, methodical and thorough way, constituting the driving force for all stages of the process.
● Defining three main stages: design, planning, and implementation.
● Dealing with all parts of the organization: strategy (policy and practice areas), organization and structure, processes, culture, context and people.
● Analyzing reality, analysis of the organization in context (reality, opportunities and the defense echelon) and placing a mirror to the organization in order to force it out of its personal and organizational comfort zones.
● An investigation and study system that produced conditions for critical debate on the basis of historical inquiry, investigation of the present and of future prospects.
● The broadest possible inclusion of the different echelons within the organization during each stage (and from outside MID).
● Critical and open discourse at all stages.
● Analysis and implementation of all fields, holistically and as an ecosystem (IBW, cyber, collection methods, networked intelligence and other interconnected elements).
● Formulating a clear vision which was explained, embedded and permeated into all echelons.
● The need to maintain, while changing, multiple levels of self-awareness – content-related, procedural, and conceptual.
● Shifting the discourse from binary patterns of “either-or” to patterns of tensions, enabling innovation, therefore ‘both ways.’
● Engagement, personal leadership and involvement by commanders in general, and senior officers in particular, and demonstrations of personal commitment to the process by senior officers.
Creating learning and change processes to inject energy into the organization and its arrays that could provoke a chain reaction and a lively dialogue and generate ideas for further changes.

Producing immediate achievements, as far as possible, in order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the change process.

Revisiting from time to time, to clarify reality and all its components, and driving a similar process, in whole or in part, long or expedited, to establish a constant learning process in a changing reality. Returning to the ‘mirror,’ critical analysis, placing ourselves in a zone of discomfort, and driving further change.

Reality keeps changing. As these lines are being written, new forms of functioning are developing within the arrays; the IBW 2020 team and the Hezbollah 2020 team are hard at work. Both are trying to deal with a changing and changeable reality. Only a culture that encourages change and renewal can allow an organization to adapt.

But culture is not enough - mechanisms, tools, and processes operating systematically and regularly are required. The purpose of this article is, as stated, to propose principles and methods for learning and managing change, and to share an attempt, which in our eyes and to paraphrase Darwin, is an adequate organizational response to a changing reality. Change, not only in order to survive, but in order to grow stronger, be relevant and when possible – to stay ahead of reality.