IDF Use of Non-Lethal Means

As discussed above, the IDF made substantial efforts to prevent people from encroaching the Gaza border area at all in order to avoid having to employ the use of force. These efforts have been unsuccessful, due to Hamas’s incitement and coercion of the Gaza population, the removal of Hamas’s restrictions on presence in the Gaza border area, and the actions of Hamas operatives in the area itself.

As a result, when crowds began to encroach on the Gaza border area in a manner that constitutes a threat to Israel and its security forces, IDF forces initiated force continuum procedures in accordance with the SOPs. This generally occurred only at the point in time when crowds have begun to approach the security infrastructure from the focal sites.

These procedures first involved providing verbal warnings to the crowds, using megaphones and sound projection systems. However, such means were generally ineffective in the face of the incitement and crowd dynamics.

The IDF then employed non-lethal means, primarily the use of tear gas, in an effort to distance the crowds from the security infrastructure, so as to avoid higher risk situations which necessitate other uses of force.

All soldiers employing these means were required to be specially accredited and trained. Forces deployed to the Gaza border during these events have undergone training at designated IDF bases, during which individual soldiers responsible for employing non-lethal means underwent training in order to be able to employ these means in the context of the violent riots and attacks.

The use of tear gas and other non-lethal means is regulated under IDF procedures, which include rules regarding the manner of use of such means, including considerations such as wind and firing direction.

Why the IDF did not use only tear gas to disperse the violent riots and contend with the threats they pose? 

Tear gas did not provide a sufficient operational response to the violent riots and attacks in the Gaza area.

First, the areas in which these events occurred are open and spread out across the border, such that tear gas dispersed quickly and rioters could quickly move out of its range.

Second, the existing wind conditions in the area meant that tear gas blew back into Israel, and quickly. This not only lessened the effectiveness of the tear gas, but also resulted in adverse effects on the IDF forces in Israel.

Third, Palestinians have developed various tactics for contending with the tear gas, including covering tear gas canisters, launching them back into Israel, and wearing makeshift gas masks.

Fourth, tear gas was not always effective against a crowd incited to violence and against operatives with strong motivation to reach the security infrastructure and sabotage it.

In order to contend with these challenges, the IDF took a number of steps when using tear gas. First, enormous amounts of tear gas were employed by the IDF, for hours and across each sector during the riot. Prior to and during these events, the IDF redirected large quantities of non-lethal means from other areas of IDF operations and undertook expedited procurement of additional inventory to ensure sufficient quantities.

Second, IDF forces tried to maximize the distance of such means, both so that the unfavorable wind conditions would still make the tear gas more effective and so as to keep the riot as far as possible from the security infrastructure (and thus minimize the necessity to use other means). In order to do so, IDF forces regularly came as close as possible to the fenceline, leaving protected IDF positions and vehicles and exposing themselves to risk. This also required balancing with other interests, most notably the fact that as the distance at which the tear gas was employed increased, the ability to predict where gas canisters will land was reduced, sometimes resulting in unintended harm to persons present in the area.

IDF forces employ megaphones and other means to provide verbal warnings to rioters.

Tear gas is limited in its effectiveness for a number of reasons, including the open areas resulting in dispersal, and the wind direction.

Did the IDF try other non-lethal means besides tear gas?

Where relevant, the IDF also employed other non-lethal means in use by IDF forces in other riot-related contexts, such as rubber and sponge-tipped rounds. However, these means were only effective in very limited circumstances, and in the context of the Gaza border events were mostly completely ineffective.

First, the light weight of these rounds can result in their trajectory being altered from the intended target, endangering bystanders and others present at the riots. In the Gaza context, the strong wind conditions and the fact that such rounds were sometimes shot through the fence itself increased the risk of deflection.

Second, because of their light weight and other factors, the range of such means is limited (typically to a maximum of 70 meters depending on wind conditions). Thus, these means could typically only be used when crowds were right at the fenceline or when they were present in Israeli territory, at which point the ability to repel the threats posed by the riot could require a considerable use of force.

Third, their short range meant that IDF soldiers employing these means also had to come right up to the fenceline, endangering themselves from the violence and attacks emanating from Gaza.

Nevertheless, the IDF constantly reassessed the possibility of employing such means, and they were used when circumstances permitted, such as when individuals approached the security infrastructure and the commander’s threat assessment allowed for the exposure of IDF forces.

Other means the IDF has assessed include water cannons to push back rioters from the border area. However, the narrow focus of these cannons and their limitations in range (of approximately 60-70 meters depending on wind conditions) meant that these means were ineffective against a crowd spread out along the border in open areas.

The same would apply for other platforms, such as the water trucks used by Israel’s Border Police during riots in the West Bank. Such means are effective when operating in relatively narrow areas framed by buildings, which limit the ability for people to avoid such means. In contrast, rioters on the Gaza border could easily move out of the path of the water. Further, the range of the water hoses on such trucks is generally approximately 30 meters, and the sheer scope of activities along the length of the border would make having even a number of these trucks limited in their effectiveness. Civilian fire trucks would be even less effective, due both to the shorter range of their hoses as well as the exposure of fire fighters to unreasonable risk of attack from Gaza.

The IDF also trialed the use of industrial-sized fans and even wind turbines to disperse the smokescreens created by mass burning of tires, however these means were ineffective in the face of the sheer amount of smoke along the border.

The IDF also tried using water cannons to extinguish tires, however the narrow focus of water cannons could not contend with the sheer number of tires burning at the same time along the length of the border. Further, due to the wind conditions, tires could be placed out of range of the cannons and still have the smoke blow across the fenceline, and the fans’ power could not override the wind conditions blowing the other way. Finally, the IDF did not possess the requisite resources that would be required in order to deploy a large number of such means (as noted below, fire trucks and other mobile firefighting units were transferred from elsewhere in the country to contend with the fires in southern Israel).

Did the IDF try to acquire or develop new non-lethal means?

In addition to means available in Israel, the IDF made efforts to assess other means in use and in development around the world. However, no means that could provide operational benefits beyond the means already available to the IDF were found.

The IDF has also prioritized the research and development of new means to try and develop means to contend with the unique circumstances of these events. These efforts began prior to 30 March 2018 .

As noted above, one of the IDF’s main efforts was to keep people as far away from the border infrastructure as possible, in order to avoid situations that would necessitate greater use of force and to prevent damage to the security infrastructure.

Thus, the IDF sought to develop means that could deliver tear-gas and other non-lethal means (such as foul smelling ‘skunk’ water) at greater distances. This effort involved various engineering and research and development units throughout the IDF. Further, the IDF also turned to the civilian sector, calling on the private sector and individuals to propose solutions and develop ideas.

For this purpose, the IDF set up a dedicated testing area in Israel, where different means could be tested in a controlled environment. Each means adopted by the IDF were required to undergo the standard procedures for testing and accreditation in the IDF, including legal reviews and dedicated rules and procedures for employing each means.

As a result of this process, a number of innovative means were developed. Most notably, delivery systems were developed so that rotary drones could carry and deploy tear-gas and ‘skunk’ water at greater distances than previously available. These means were used extensively by the IDF during the events; however, they did not provide a response to all the challenges described above (such as the fact that the riots occur in open and wide areas). As the events progressed, the effectiveness of these means has also been impaired due to the increasing number of incidents in which drones were shot down or jammed electronically.