Outcomes of the Gaza Border Events

As noted above, Hamas has not been successful in achieving its primary military aims of breaching in the security infrastructure and infiltrating en masse into Israel in order to conduct military attacks inside Israeli territory. Still, there have in practice been significant ramifications to Israel’s security as a result of these events.

The substantial damage to the security infrastructure has resulted in heightened risk to the communities living in the vicinity of the Gaza Strip and to Israel more generally. Damage to the technology and physical elements of this infrastructure left entire sectors of the fence inoperable, thus impairing the IDF’s ability to detect and respond quickly to attempted infiltrations into Israel. Damage to engineering equipment in the area has resulted in delays in completing the underground obstacle and technology designed to detect cross-border tunnels.

In this video, posted on Palestinian social media, explosions on the security infrastructure can be seen, causing serious damage, as well as sabotage of the technology that the infrastructure contains.

Damage have also been caused to civilian property, including in one incident where a Palestinian infiltrated into a community near the border and set alight a greenhouse. The Palestinian was caught by security forces before he reached the residential area of the community.

During the events, thousands of incendiary kites and balloons have been launched into Israel, and while many have been successfully felled by the IDF, over 2,000 separate fires have been ignited inside Israeli territory, resulting in over 35,000 dunams (approximately 8,500 acres) being burnt. This has included over 13,000 dunams (approximately 3,200 acres) of nature reserves, and over 11,000 dunams (approximately 2,700 acres) of forestry. Balloons carrying explosive devices have also landed in residential areas, including playgrounds and kindergartens, posing a serious risk to the lives of civilians. The practice of using incendiary kits and balloons has continued even after the Gaza border events.

The events have also caused significant psychological harm primarily to sectors of Israeli society residing in southern Israel. This population has been subject to over a decade of increased threats and attacks from the Gaza Strip, including infiltrations, rocket and mortar fire, and in recent years the threat emanating from the cross-border assault tunnels. The increased threat of infiltration and military attacks from these events have compounded the psychological effects on this population.

Specifically, the use of balloons to deliver incendiary and explosive devices, often attached to objects designed to appear as children’s toys, have had a severe psychological effect on children in Israel.

Israeli authorities required educational institutions to move all classes and gatherings to protected spaces during the mass events, in anticipation of infiltrations and supporting mortar fire.

The violent riots and attacks have also resulted in the death and wounding of IDF soldiers defending Israel in the Gaza border area.

On Friday 20 July 2018, Staff Sergeant Aviv Levi was killed by gunfire conducted under the guise of violent riots on the southern Gaza border. The incident occurred while Staff Sergeant Levi was operating on the Gaza border against a violent riot which included explosive devices thrown at IDF forces. In response to these events, the IDF targeted a number of Hamas military positions in the vicinity. Following the launching of rockets and mortars into Israel, Israel Air Force fighter jets conducted attacks on Hamas military objectives throughout the Gaza Strip.

In January 2019, an IDF officer was wounded by gunshot also conducted under the guise of violent riots. The incident occurred while IDF forces were contending with a particularly violent riot being held at a point on the border at which riots had not been regularly occurring, and which also involved the presence of many minors, including some who entered Israeli territory through a hole made in the security infrastructure.

A number of soldiers have been wounded by shrapnel from grenades (such as here) and other explosives, as well as by high-velocity projectiles such as ball bearings launched from slingshots and catapults.

It is once again worth mentioning the killing of Border Police solider, Sgt. Barel Hadaria Shmueli on a later violent riots of a similar nature on August 2021.

During the Gaza Border event, over 1,300 rockets and mortars have been launched towards Israel, resulting in death and injury, property damage, psychological injury and economic harm. Other attacks during this period have included anti-tank fire on a bus carrying IDF soldiers in southern Israel, as well as machine gun fire hitting residential structures in the Gaza vicinity (for example, on 12 April 2018 machine gun fire from Gaza hit a home in Shaar Hanegev, and on 16 May 2018 heavy machine gun fire hit residential homes in Sderot).

The violent riots and attacks have also resulted in significant damage to the crossing points between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Violent riots in the Kerem Shalom and Erez crossings have resulted in the closure of these crossings for repairs, as has mortar fire which directly landed in the Erez crossing.

Damage caused to a crossing during one of the violent riots.

How many Palestinians have been harmed as a result of the events?

Israel is unable to verify how many people were harmed as a result of the events, due to the fact that Israel has no control over the territory where the events occur, and because medical records and information are held by the Hamas-run Ministry of Health. As Palestinians who were injured were often immediately surrounded by crowds and then evacuated from the area, the IDF was often unable to determine the nature of the injury or what happens once they were evacuated (whether they were taken for medical treatment or not; to which hospital or clinic; what medical treatment they receive; and so on).

With regards to harm caused by live ammunition, Israel is aware of figures published by the Hamas-run Ministry of Health, which were not validated by an external neutral party (while various UN agencies cite these figures in their publications, they do not appear to have independently verified them). Israel is likewise unable to verify these figures. Requests by Israel to the Palestinian Authority in order to obtain medical records and lists of fatalities and wounded have been expressly rejected.

Without access to medical records, the IDF is unable to verify whether all wounds reported as occurring from live ammunition fired by the IDF actually occurred from such (as documented by videos published in Palestinian social media, some of the injuries, and possible fatalities, have occurred as a result of actions inside Gaza, such as explosives detonating prematurely or high-velocity projectiles aimed towards Israel).

It should be noted that these figures include Hamas and other operatives killed or wounded while carrying out military attacks, as well as persons harmed during the time of the events outside the immediate context of the mass violent riots and attacks in the Gaza border area.

The amount of live ammunition employed by the IDF, leading to injuries and unintended deaths, is a direct function of the level and scope of violence in each event. Where Hamas has restricted attendance and the level of violence at the border events in accordance with its political interests, the IDF has been able to use less live ammunition in order to contend with the reduced threats. On days where the level of violence and attacks has been high, such as 14 May 2018, the IDF has had to employ larger amounts of live ammunition. The total number of injuries and unintended deaths is also a direct function of the fact that these events took place over a long period of time, with varying frequency and at multiple points along the border, each event taking place for many hours and involving thousands of people, many acting in a violent manner giving rise to serious threats.

Why on some dates there appear to be many wounded by live ammunition, and on other days less? 

As noted above, IDF forces were authorized to employ live ammunition only when there was a clear and imminent threat, as a last resort only when all other means have failed, and only at specific individuals who are identified as “key instigators” or “key rioters” following senior command approval. Thus, on days where IDF commanders of the relevant sectors along the Gaza border did not assess there to be clear and imminent threats, or where alternative means were effective in negating these threats, this resulted in no or less use of live ammunition.

Whether these threats exist, and whether non-lethal means were effective in negating the threats posed by the riots and attacks, was dependent on the nature of the events on the particular date. As noted above, Hamas exhibited control over the level of violence during these events, and increased or decreased the violence in accordance with its interests. Thus, on dates of political importance for Hamas, such as the opening of the US embassy in Jerusalem on 14 May 2018, Hamas facilitated the participation of over 45,000 people at the Gaza border events and organized and facilitated a particularly high level of violence. In contrast, at times when Hamas had purportedly agreed to curb the violence in the context of dialogue with international actors, the level of violence in the Gaza border area diminished, and in turn, the need to use live ammunition was reduced accordingly.

Why are amongst the harmed some journalists, medical personnel, first aid volunteers, women and minors?

The IDF did not intentionally use potentially lethal force against bystanders or persons who were not assessed to be key instigators or key rioters. Specifically, the IDF did not intentionally target journalists, medical personnel, first aid volunteers, women or minors with live ammunition.

IDF forces were constantly briefed on the SOPs, and IDF commanders in the field repeatedly instruct forces to take steps to avoid harm to such persons.

Indeed, in many instances IDF forces cease all activity when medical personnel or first aid volunteers approach the security infrastructure, despite the fact that this was often exploited so that others may approach the security infrastructure without being harmed.

Nevertheless, there have been incidents where such persons have unintentionally been harmed by IDF forces. This could occur as a result of a deflection of a bullet’s trajectory, ricochet, a bullet passing through the body of a person and hitting someone else, or professional error (such as miscalculating the range of the intended target). Where the IDF was aware of such instances, the relevant forces conducted after-action reviews in order to assess any potential lessons-learned. For more information about the investigation of individual incidents, see above.

Bystanders and other persons could also be harmed unintentionally by other means, such as tear gas canisters, the premature detonation of explosives or high-velocity projectiles aimed towards Israel.

It should be noted that during these events, journalists, medical personnel and first aid volunteers repeatedly placed themselves in great danger by operating close to the security infrastructure, often concealed by the smokescreens created by burning tires.

The following two videos show examples of journalists amongst violent rioters on the fenceline, behind thick smokescreens blocking all vision from Israel's side of the border.

In some cases, medical personnel have also been observed undertaking activities that give rise to concern about their contribution to the dangers posed by the events.

With regards to minors, including the very young, there is clear visual evidence that in many instances they have been used to deploy tools and objects for use in the violent riots and to act as shields for those encroaching on the border infrastructure. Some minors have also been active in the immediate vicinity of the border infrastructure. Different terrorist organizations in Gaza have publicly stated that some of these minors – typically 16 or 17 years of age – have been operatives in their organizations.