How Did a Day of the Border Events Typically Progress?

How did a day of the border events typically progress?

1. Days prior

Along the length of the border, surveillance and intelligence efforts were conducted by Hamas against IDF preparations in the area. These efforts were conducted in a covert fashion and were intended to collect intelligence on IDF engineering operations to strengthen existing positions and create new ones, repair works to the security infrastructure, and the like. The following two videos show examples of intelligence gathering conducted in the border area prior to mass events.

Attempted infiltrations and sabotage to the security infrastructure occured throughout the week, both in order to make it easier to create breaches and penetrate into Israel during the mass riots, and also to test the IDF's response times and methods. This information was then used to adapt the tactics and methodologies of those involved in the violent riots and attacks, as described below.

Work was also carried out under Hamas’s instructions in the area of the riots in order to better facilitate reaching the fenceline and carrying out attacks. For example, tactical defensive positions were created by digging trenches and laying sandbags, so as to provide cover for units and people trying to reach the border fence. Barrels and other items were positioned tactically so as to provide cover as well.

These positions were created in concert with the deployment of tires and other objects designed to create smokescreens and block the forward movement of people towards the fenceline. Most of these actions were undertaken at nighttime so as to avoid detection by IDF forces.

Weaponry that cannot be concealed on a person's body during the events themselves was pre-positioned in the border area, so that it may be accessed quickly in the event that an order is given to execute large-scale attacks.

In this video, a person can be seen concealing an anti-tank missile in the area of border riots, prior to the mass events, near Khan Younis.

1. Morning and early afternoon hours

Transportation funded and organized by Hamas, brought people to the focal points, where various activities took place with the aim of enticing people to attend the events as well as to entice them to violence. These activities included providing free food and drinks, social activities, and free wireless internet and network connections. Sermons and speeches, provided mostly by Hamas employees, included incitement against Israel and general incitement to violence.

In the border area, steps were taken to create large smokescreens, so as to allow for people to approach the security infrastructure without being identified.

As the events progressed, women and minors have increasingly been used to bring tires and additional objects closer to the fenceline and to light them on fire, as well as to deploy means for sabotaging the security infrastructure, exploiting the knowledge that the IDF makes every effort to avoid using force against such persons. At this stage, high-velocity projectiles, such as marbles and rocks, were also launched at IDF forces and military infrastructure, using launch devices such as slingshots and catapults. The following videos demonstrate the types of activities occurring in the lead up to attempts to reach the fenceline, including the involvement of women and children in creating the circumstances which facilitate such activities.

1. Afternoon hours

By the afternoon, the riots generally managed to overcome the IDF’s efforts at keeping people away from the security infrastructure, and the riots moved into the immediate vicinity of the border fence. For example, once smokescreens from the burning tires adequately concealed movement by the security infrastructure, organized and orchestrated movements began towards the security infrastructure, and attacks were carried out against IDF forces and military infrastructure defending the border area. The following two videos include examples of the techniques used to approach the fenceline.

In often coordinated movements people worked simultaneously to reach the fenceline and create breaches. In order to do so, individuals typically attached wires to the layers of barbed wires, which was then pulled back by groups of people in order to provide access to the fenceline itself.

At the fenceline, holes were created in the security infrastructure, electronic sensors were removed, and explosives and burning objects were placed on the fenceline so as to further damage the fence and the technology which it holds. The following videos posted on Palestinian social media demonstrate some of these activities.

At the same time, IDF forces working to prevent the breach were attacked with high-velocity projectiles, grenades, improvised explosive devices and the like.

In the event of a successful breach of the security infrastructure, groups and individuals generally rushed towards IDF positions. Where such positions have been unmanned, they have often been set alight or had explosives placed within them. The following two videos involve breaches in the security infrastructure, infiltration into Israel and attacks on an IDF position. These videos demonstrate the speed at which the IDF positions may be reached once a breach occurs.

In some cases, these breaches occurred after a group of persons had split off from the main riot and moved north or south along the fence to where IDF positions were unmanned, and have attacked these positions and stolen military equipment and infrastructure. The following video displays a group moving quickly northwards along the border.

In other incidents, infiltrations have reached further into Israeli territory, and have resulted in damage both to civilian and military equipment as well as other civilian sites.

Under the cover of the smoke and crowds, mines and booby-trapped explosives were laid on the fenceline.

At the same time, kites bearing incendiary and explosive materials have been launched both from within the riots and elsewhere against IDF forces and military infrastructure in the Gaza border area, taking advantage of the general wind conditions in the area which blow from Gaza towards Israel, and which are particularly strong in the afternoon. These means were  used to cause harm to IDF forces in exposed positions on the border, to damage and destroy military infrastructure such as surveillance posts, and to divert IDF resources from defending the border to contending with the outbreak of fires behind their positions.

Balloons carrying incendiary and explosive materials were launched further into Israeli territory, also from within the riots and elsewhere and also making use of the available wind conditions. As noted above, these means have created a risk to the lives of Israeli civilians and caused extensive damage to agricultural and nature areas in southern Israel. In most cases, these means have been launched by Hamas operatives, often from within or adjacent to Hamas military posts.

Drones used by the IDF to deliver teargas have been felled both using electronic jamming as well as by shooting them down from the sky.

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The mass events generally came to a close in the evening at the instruction of Hamas, using different means such as whistles to indicate to the crowds that activities in the border area have ceased and that the transports back to the population centers in Gaza were due to depart.

1. Night and following day

After each of these events, numerous unexploded grenades and explosive devices remained in the area on both sides of the fenceline. Mines and other explosive devices were also concealed along the fenceline, often as civilian objects such as flags and wire cutters, with delayed detonation or other triggering devices.

Sections of the security infrastructure that were destroyed or stolen, and barbed wire removed from the area, required replacing or repairs.

Besides the risk to IDF forces, not just of detonations, but also from the threat of fire from Gaza when undertaking these activities, the increased threat of infiltration remained for as long as the fence was not repaired. Thus, IDF engineering and other forces carried out these activities immediately after the end of each of these events. This further exposed IDF forces to risk as the time and location of their activities could be predicted in advance.

How did the nature of these events change over time?

While the above represents a typical progression of these events, and refers to common elements of the events over the months, there have been significant developments that have occurred in a number of respects as the events progressed. These changes attest both to Hamas's control over the events generally and with regard to specific actions, as well as to the fact that Hamas has increased and decreased the level of violence in the events in order to seek political gains.

First, the timing and frequency of events on the border has changed over the months. When the mass encroachments on the border began on 30 March 2018, largescale events were typically held on a Friday, with smaller scale riots and attacks occurring during the week. Over the months, Hamas increased the frequency of these events, such that largescale events occurred during the week as well.

Violent riots and attacks also increasingly took place at nighttime (and, as noted above, a dedicated unit was assigned to these activities called the 'Nighttime Disturbance Unit'). For example, during January and February of 2018, activities in the Gaza border area occurred on an almost nightly basis. Their activities included laying explosives in the border area, burning tires, and launching projectiles at IDF forces. Specially formed units led, supported and directed by Hamas and by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, were provided with explosives and other tools and operate under the cover of darkness to increase the effectiveness of their activities.

The violent riots occurring on the northern border of Gaza, and the events in the maritime area, typically took place on a Monday. On 14 May 2018, specifically, Hamas established an additional eight focal sites to the existing five, and over 45,000 people massed at the border on this date alone.

The increased frequency of these events resulted in increased incidents of harm and damage to military infrastructure, necessitated additional resources to be provided by the IDF, required its forces to be deployed in their border positions for longer periods of time, and reduced the amount of time that engineering forces had to repair sabotaged sections of the security infrastructure. The increased frequency also increased the threats to the civilian communities and Israel more generally.

Second, Hamas introduced activities to increase the psychological impact on the communities in the vicinity of the Gaza border. For example, a few months after 30 March 2018, Hamas began nightly riots across the border from the Kerem Shalom community. These riots included different tactics in order to wage psychological warfare, such as largescale use of loud explosives, the heavy use of smokes and the use of megaphones to project death threats in Hebrew.

Third, the tactics and practices by persons participating in the violent riots have also developed, in a large respect in response to the IDF's methods for contending with these events. This has included introducing new means such as the use of lasers in an attempt to blind IDF forces and makeshift gas masks to neutralize the use of tear gas.

Fourth, Hamas adopted the initial civilian use of kites, using it as an ancillary military effort and to increase harm inside Israeli territory.

This was then augmented by the use of incendiary and explosive balloons, which have threatened the lives of Israelis within their range and created widespread harm and damage inside Israel.

Fifth, Hamas has increased and decreased the level of violence, and means employed during the events, in accordance with its political interests, and particularly its efforts to achieve concessions from international actors. Such, in the weeks when Hamas has been in talks with international actors regarding the Gaza Strip, such as during the end of August, the level of violence at the border has dropped drastically, and certain means have ceased to be in use, such as incendiary and explosive balloons.

Most notably, in November 2018, after Hamas and other organizations fired over 400 rockets into Israel in one day, Hamas declared that it would curb the violence on the border in exchange for concessions, and the level of violence again dropped drastically, and the use of means such as burning tires on the border ceased.

Conversely, in weeks where talks failed to provide accessions to Hamas, such as in September and October, which also included particularly bad animosity between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, the level and frequency of violence on the border rose considerably.

In this regard, there is no complete correlation between the number of people attending the riots and the level of violence. In fact, in many instances, while substantially less people have attended the social activities occurring at the focal sites, the number of people partaking in violent riots and attacks in the border area itself has risen or stayed the same, and in many instances the level of violence and attacks has increased in accordance with Hamas’s interests