The Connection Between the Gaza Border Events and Other Events in Gaza

While Hamas has established five main congregation points as the focal sites for social activities, the violent riots and attacks were not limited to occurring within their vicinity.

First, these five sites were increased to 13 for the riots and attacks on 14 May 2018, and additional focal sites were established in Zikim and in the maritime arena in August 2018, and across from the Kerem Shalom community at night in the second half of 2018.

Second, Hamas operatives exploited the IDF's positioning of its forces across from the largescale gatherings in order to simultaneously carry out military attacks at other points on the border where there was less or no IDF presence. Such attacks were timed to occur during peaks of violence so as to maximize the possibility that IDF forces may be distracted and occupied in defending from mass breaches and infiltrations.

Third, riots were increasingly spread out along the border area, at times constituting activity occurring along two kilometers continuously.

Fourth, large groups sometimes broke away from the main mass of people encroaching on the border area, a practice that increasingly occurred as riots progressed. These groups, led by key instigators, moved quickly north or south of the main masses in order to exploit places in the fenceline with less IDF presence and defenses.

This video demonstrates a group moving quickly northwards along the border.

Fifth, Hamas increasingly directed groups to conduct violent riots and attacks at different points along the border, in order to exploit the fact that IDF forces coming to those sites did not have pre-prepared defensive positions at such points. The incident in which an IDF officer was shot in the head in January 2019 (the bullet piercing his helmet), occurred during a violent riot taking place in an area which had not been the site of violent riots previously and where the construction of IDF positions had not been completed.

As noted above, Hamas has used the violent riots as another means for carrying out military attacks against Israel using the cover of the Gazan population. Thus, Hamas directly connects these events with its other military activities, including military activities in the border area. Hamas’s Ministry of Health, which publishes regular statistics regarding deaths and injuries occurring during the ‘Great Return March’, includes the names of operatives killed during military attacks against Israel as well as the names of persons killed outside the immediate vicinity of the mass violent riots in the border area. Operationally, activities generally on the border provided Hamas with information that may be applied during the violent riots and attacks – for example, information gathered about the IDF’s detection and response times to infiltrations may be used to plan the timing of attacks during the violent riots. 

Were the border events related to other attacks from Gaza, such as rocket and mortar fire?

As noted above, Hamas’s efforts to attack Israel’s civilian population through the air and underground have been challenged by the development of different defenses by Israel. As a direct result, Hamas appropriated the civilian initiative to gather at the Gaza border in order to obtain another method for gaining access to Israel’s homefront and carrying out attacks against the civilian population.

As noted above, public statements by Hamas officials demonstrate that the organization views the Gaza border events as part of the armed conflict against Israel, and that the events constitute one tool in Hamas’s arsenal of weapons that it can launch against Israel at its choosing. For example, on 14 May 2018, Hamas figure Khaled Mashal made a speech at one of the focal points intimating that the Gaza border events are not separate and distinct from other violent efforts in the conflict with Israel:

“…the Palestinian history shows that our people surprise their enemies, their friends, and everybody else. At every stage, we have been capable of inventing the appropriate means. For one hundred years, we have been moving from one revolution to another, from one Intifada to another, using resistance, suicide missions, martyrdom operations, popular resistance, stones, knives and firebombs… Our basic message is that we have more than just one means at our disposal. If one measure achieves a certain level of success, other measures will be added to the struggle.”

Hamas official Mahmoud Al-Zahhar made a similar statement in a television interview, exhibiting the Hamas view that the Gaza border events are connected to, and supported by, Hamas’s military efforts in the conflict against Israel:

“When you are in possession of weapons that were able to withstand the occupation in the wars of 2006, 2008, 2012, and 2014... When you have weapons that are being wielded by men who were able to prevent the strongest army in the region from entering the Gaza Strip for 51 days, and were able to capture or kill soldiers of that army – is this really 'peaceful resistance'? This is not peaceful resistance. Has the option (of armed struggle) diminished? No. On the contrary, it is growing and developing. That's clear. So when we talk about 'peaceful resistance,' we are deceiving the public. This is a peaceful resistance bolstered by a military force and by security agencies, and enjoying tremendous popular support.” 

On 5 April 2018, Hamas-run Al-Aqsa television aired a lecture by a Hamas-affiliated cleric, equating the Gaza border events with other violent efforts and attacks in the conflict against Israel, and stating that they are all means by which to achieve the destruction of Israel:

“We have a right to our land, and we must return to it. We must return to it – above ground, underground, by means of demonstrations, bombs, weapons, explosives, explosive belts… We must return to our land.”

Hamas’s other military capabilities served as an ancillary and supporting effort that were meant to be =activated in the event of a successful penetration of operatives into Israeli territory.

The correlation between the Gaza border events and rocket and mortar fire can also be seen in the fact that most of these launches occurred on Friday and Saturday, immediately after mass violent riots and attacks occurring in the Gaza border area. In many cases, launches were stated by Hamas to be in response to IDF attacks on incendiary and explosive balloon launches from Hamas positions that were conducted during the violent riots and attacks on Fridays.

In other cases, launches have been conducted following border incidents. For example, on 8 August 2018, IDF tanks returned fire towards Hamas operatives who carried out sniper fire towards Israel from a Hamas border post. In response, Hamas launched a large barrage of rockets and mortars into Israel.

Other terrorist organizations in Gaza besides Hamas have also carried out rocket and mortar fire towards Israel during this time.