Operational Response

The framework for the use of force is delineated in Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOPs are operational documents that delineate the authorities available to forces and set out the rules for implementing these authorities based on the relevant legal framework.

These documents are maintained by the IDF’s General Staff Operations Directorate. Separate SOPs are maintained for the different geographical sectors in which the IDF operates, and each SOP addresses the various scenarios that may occur in each sector respectively.

SOPs are drafted and updated in coordination with relevant operational, legal, intelligence and other military authorities and are approved by senior officers on the General Staff. The rules and authorities governed by the SOPs do not permit the exercise of force beyond what law permits. SOPs are binding on all IDF forces.

The SOPs provide a framework for the use of force which reflects the IDF’s general policies with regard to each sector, and thus is not intended to change regularly. Commanders decide on the specific implementation of the SOPs to specific operational scenarios, and inject concrete content to the SOPs when they allow for command discretion. Commanders may also impose additional restrictions on the use of force as authorized by the SOPs in accordance with factors such as intelligence, time and the specific area in which the forces are operating. These additional restrictions may also be imposed for non-operational reasons, such as strategic or ethical interests. Temporary amendments may be made to SOPs if circumstances so require.

The SOPs are reviewed periodically, in light of factual developments in the relevant sector, lessons-learned processes, intelligence and more.

The IDF takes various steps to ensure that the SOPs are well known and well understood by the forces. With regard to the Gaza border events, for example, IDF commanders conducted briefings with their forces to review the SOPs, ran exercises training the SOPs and conducted scenario-based workshops based on the events.

Why has the IDF not published the Standard Operating Procedures?

The IDF’s SOPs are classified in line with accepted military practice worldwide.

SOPs include various operational details that cannot be disclosed. Nevertheless, Israel has published much of the essence of the SOPs relevant to the Gaza border events, and a detailed outline of the guiding principles that form the basis of the SOPs was provided in the context of a Supreme Court case concerning these events. For more information about these submissions, see below.

What were the Standard Operating Procedures applicable in the Gaza border events? 

Designated SOPs govern the manner in which force may be used in the Gaza border area, including in circumstances in which violent riots occurring in this area.

According to these rules, when a violent riot occurring in the Gaza border area presents a danger to civilians in Israel or to IDF forces, the danger must first be addressed using verbal warnings and then non-lethal means. Any force beyond this – that is, force that is potentially lethal – can only be used in exceptional circumstances. Specifically, where the threat from the violent riot reaches the level of a real and imminent threat to the life or bodily integrity of Israeli civilians or IDF forces, and all relevant non-lethal means have been exhausted, IDF forces may employ precise and measured fire against a “key instigator” or “key rioter”, in order to remove the real and imminent danger posed by the riot. The use of such force must be deemed necessary in order to remove the threat, and must be proportionate to the threat posed.

These rules also dictate that force may be employed with lethal intent where a person is participating in the ongoing hostilities existing between Israel and Hamas and other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip (for example, when a person is identified as a member of Hamas’s armed forces, or when a person is engaged in activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities, such as firing at Israeli soldiers).

The SOP's also acknowledge that potentially lethal force may be used as self-defense whenever a soldier is faced with a real and immediate risk to life or bodily integrity.

Contrary to allegations, these rules do not permit the use of potentially lethal force against individuals simply due to any presence in the Gaza border area or proximity to the security infrastructure, the mere fact of participation in a violent riot or the mere fact of support or affiliation with Hamas.

The SOP's were written in a manner that can be understood clearly by and implemented by IDF forces operating in the area.

For detail about the implementation of these SOPs during the events, see below.

Have the Standard Operating Procedures undergone legal review? 

As noted above, SOPs are drafted in coordination with the IDF’s legal advisers, who also review SOPs periodically and are required to authorize any changes to the SOPs.

In addition to review by IDF legal advisers, the SOPs applicable in the Gaza border events were also reviewed by the Attorney General of Israel. The SOPs were also the subject of petitions to Israel’s Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, filed by a number of non-governmental organizations, including a Gaza-based organization. These petitions claimed that the IDF’s SOPs do not accord with the applicable law.

In a decision given by the President of the Court, the Deputy President of the Court and another Justice of the Court, the Supreme Court rejected the petitions and found in favor of the State both with regards to the factual circumstances of the events and the State's legal positions. For a detailed overview of Israel's positions as submitted to the Court, see here.

Have the Standard Operating Procedures been amended during the events? 

The SOPs applicable to the Gaza sector address the circumstances of violent riots in the Gaza border area, and thus the framework for the use of force as delineated in the SOPs did not need to be amended. This framework provided sufficient discretion to the commander to regulate the use of force in accordance with the relevant intelligence, time and so on.

There have been some specific changes which generally have been temporary in light of these events. For example, the SOPs address the wind conditions affecting the employment of force, in order to ensure precision. Due to expected changes in the wind conditions in the Gaza area on certain days, this section of the SOPs was amended in consultation with the relevant operational and technical authorities.

There have also been additional restrictions imposed on the use of force over and above what is authorized by the SOPs, but this has not required any changes to the SOPs. There have also been emphases distributed to the forces regarding specific elements of the SOPs, for example how to operate when there are smokescreens impairing vision.

What were some of the challenges the IDF has faced in implementing these Standard Operating Procedures?

The IDF faces many challenges in contending with the violent riots and attacks in the Gaza border area. These include contending with crowds consisting of civilians and operatives mixed together; the fact that the events occurred within the context of an armed conflict; the fact that these events occurred in an area outside of Israel’s control; and the changing nature of the events.

1. Contending with crowds consisting of civilians and operatives

The Gaza border events consisted of civilians, sometimes acting in an extremely violent manner, and operatives belonging to Hamas and other terrorist organizations. At Hamas's direction, these two distinct groups of people were mixed together, and operatives deliberately concealed their identities and activities from within the civilians surrounding them. Contending with such circumstances was extremely challenging.

Hamas’s efforts to appropriate civilian characteristics to conceal its military activities was reflected in its use of the civilian symbols which have come to represent these events, such as flags and wire cutters, and booby-trapped explosives designed to detonate on IDF forces. Here, Hamas took objects used by civilians, women and children during the events and turned them into deadly objects presenting a serious threat. Hamas has done the same with kites and balloons, exploiting their symbolism in order to cause harm. Public statements attest to this, for example: “We are using kites, just like the ones kids fly on the beach, but for something more important – as an explosive. Allah willing, it will light up and burn fields and houses” (see here at 05.00).

The President of the Supreme Court, Justice Esther Hayut, expressed this as follows in the Court’s decision mentioned above regarding the SOPs:

"These events present the Israeli security forces with one of the most significant challenges they must face. This is due to the complex state of affairs which the Hamas organization and the other terrorist organizations who are leading the events are – intentionally – creating on the ground. The complexity of the situation primarily derives from the intermingling of the terrorist activists among the civilian population, including women and children, participating in the events. This intentional intermingling is intended to blur and create difficulty in locating the terrorist activists from among the masses participating in the events, in order to allow those activists to commit the acts of terrorism that were described, under the cover of the civilian population."

This challenge was made all the more acute by the fact that Hamas intentionally used these civilians, including women, children, journalists and medical workers, as shields for its activities against Israel. Hamas incited the civilian population to create breaches in the security infrastructure, used them as cover for carrying out attacks, and exploited their actions to divert the IDF's attention and resources from neutralizing attacks to contending with the civilian masses.

This all occurred on a massive scale and at multiple points on the border simultaneously. It also generally occurred all in close proximity, such that operatives and civilians acting violently are next to, in front of, behind and alongside others participating and present at the events.

The IDF made every effort to avoid harm to these bystanders, with a special emphasis on women, children, journalists and medical workers. This was often made more difficult by their actions, and extensive video evidence demonstrates that journalists, for example, have often been present in areas of extreme violence, and were often completely concealed as a result of the crowds and large smokescreens. Medical workers and first aid volunteers were also often present at places of the greatest violence. More so, such persons were deliberately used by Hamas and other operatives to shield violence and attacks.

1. Existence of ongoing armed conflict and active hostilities

The Gaza border events were taking place in the territory controlled by a party engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with Israel. This party, together with other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip, has been conducting ongoing hostilities against Israel, up to and during these events, including from within these events, and following these events.

This required the IDF to constantly prepare for the full spectrum of threats that could occur as a part of these hostilities, at the same time as contending with the actions of violent civilians who were not a part of the hostilities.

As noted above, Hamas viewed these events as connected to the armed conflict against Israel, and created the real risk of leading to largescale hostilities. For example, on days where significant violence and attacks occurred and thus the number of injuries increased, Hamas came under increased pressure both from within the organization and from the general public to carry out military attacks against Israel.

These tensions were not limited to the Gaza context, and terrorist organizations in Gaza have conducted operations in the context of the Gaza border events at the behest of countries such as Iran, who operate against Israel from other arenas, and in particular Israel’s northern arena.

1. Events occurring in area outside of Israel’s control

The IDF does not have any control over the territory in which the events took place, and thus was limited in the means and methods available. Most of the means and methods employed by law enforcement agencies in situations of riots or border incidents were simply ineffective or irrelevant to this scenario.

The effectiveness of means available to the IDF has also been impaired by the existing conditions in the area. The wind direction and speed that typically exists in the Gaza border area limited the effectiveness of the IDF’s non-lethal means and hampered the ability of IDF forces to operate. The security infrastructure, including the physical fence, can have an adverse impact on IDF means such as affecting the trajectory of non-lethal rounds and live ammunition.

The security infrastructure and the topography of the area provided cover behind which individuals may conceal themselves.

Video via: Facebook  

1. Changing nature of the events

IDF forces have had to contend with shifting and developing behaviors within these crowds, often deliberately intended to frustrate IDF actions.

This has included the introduction of new means, such as lasers and mirrors against IDF soldiers, the shooting down and jamming of drones delivering tear-gas, and the extensive use of burning tires to create smokescreens. Other developments have included the adoption of kites and balloons to deliver incendiary and explosive devices, endangering IDF forces and their equipment and requiring a diversion of resources for fire-fighting purposes.

As noted above, actions on the border have also increasingly occurred at points on the border far from the focal sites, in an effort to more easily breach the security infrastructure where the IDF has less forces present and where the IDF has built less sand berms and other defenses forces who arrive at the area.

The longer these events continued, the more Hamas and others involved were able to learn about the IDF’s methods for contending with the events and change their behaviors accordingly. As a result, the IDF became more limited in the means and methods available to it, and the threat of attacks and infiltrations increased.

The exploitation of these events for Hamas’s political interests also impacted the IDF’s activities. When Hamas increases the level of violence according to its interests, it was in order to draw a more significant use of force by the IDF and exploit the inevitable consequences as leverage against international actors. Where the IDF endeavored to reduce its resort to force, it generally resulted in people and crowds being bolder, and made it easier to reach the security infrastructure in order to sabotage it.

Did the IDF change its conduct during the events?

The IDF is a learning organization, and conducts lessons-learned processes during and following operational activity. The purpose of such processes is to improve how the IDF contends with the threats posed, to reduce the use of live ammunition, and to better protect IDF forces.

Such processes also assisted in contending with the developing tactics of Hamas and behavior of those involved in the violent riots, and the fact that the threat of these events was evolving (for example, due to sniper fire against IDF forces).

The operational experience gained from contending with these events through the involvement of many commanders and officers, the number of places in which these events took place and the time for which these events have been ongoing, allowed the IDF to draw lessons-learned. These commanders were constantly conducting assessments and reviews at different levels of command – from individual units to Division level and higher – and there were designated officers whose responsibility was to compile lessons-learned and translate them into actions that could be implemented by the forces.

Lessons-learned were also generated by the General Staff Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism from its examination of incidents and general conduct of the forces (see below for more information), as well as from reviewing materials published by external sources and in the media.

The lessons-learned relate to various aspects of operational activity – from infrastructure, equipment, policy, implementation of policy, record keeping, training and more. Some examples of lessons-learned that have assisted the forces in contending with these events and reduced the harm to Palestinians have included increasing the amount of barbed wire on both sides of the border, raising sniper positions higher to reduce deflection when firing through the fence, establishing additional positions to contend with the increasing spreading out of the riots along the border, and the development of new non-lethal means to increase the effectiveness of their use. An example of lessons-learned that has improved the defenses of the IDF is physically reinforcing sniper positions to defend from explosives and fire.

In addition to these lessons-learned, and as noted above, IDF commanders issued individual instructions to IDF forces regarding the manner of implementation of the SOPs in accordance with changing circumstances and the threat assessment at a particular time.