IDF Use of Potentially Lethal Force

In what situations were IDF forces permitted resort to live ammunition? 

As detailed above, IDF forces employed various non-lethal means in order to contend with the threats posed by the events. Due to the limited effectiveness of these means in negating the threats detailed above, the IDF has also been required to use potentially lethal force as a measure of last resort.

According to IDF Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), in contexts such as the Gaza border events, potentially lethal force could only be used in circumstances in which there is a real and imminent danger to human life or bodily integrity. Dangers that are not as serious could not be dealt with by the use of such force. Moreover, the use of potentially lethal force must be a measure of last resort, and thus could only be used when non-lethal means have been exhausted, when it was necessary to use such force in order to address the danger. In addition, the use of such force must be proportionate in relation to the danger.

Thus, potentially lethal force could only be used as a last resort in order to address a real and imminent danger to human life or bodily integrity, and in such a case the force had to be used in a proportionate manner and to the minimal extent necessary.

The SOPs applicable to the Gaza border events translated these rules into clear instructions for IDF forces. The SOPs expressly forbid the use of potentially lethal force against rioters save for exceptional circumstances. Potentially lethal force was permissible only where a person or the mob posed a real and imminent danger to the life or bodily integrity of civilians or IDF forces, as a measure of last resort and subject to stringent requirements of necessity and proportionality.

When employing potentially lethal force, IDF forces aimed to wound and not to kill. In order to achieve this, IDF forces were required to aim below the knee and not to aim live ammunition at the center of body mass.

In addition to these situations, IDF forces were authorized to use live ammunition with lethal intent where a person is participating in the ongoing hostilities existing between Israel and Hamas and other terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip (for example, when a person identified as a member of Hamas’s armed forces, or when a person engaged in activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities, such as firing at Israeli soldiers).

How were the Standard Operating Procedures implemented in practice? 

Senior commanders in the field constantly assessed the threat to Israeli citizens and to IDF forces posed by the riots occurring in areas under their responsibility. Where a commander identified an increase in the danger, he or she would order their forces to employ the means at their disposal to repel this danger. As long as there was no need to do so, the commander would not move to the next means on the force continuum. Where the means used were successful in repelling the danger, the commander would again move down the force continuum, thus always utilizing the means that correspond to the level of threat posed and never beyond what is required.

In practice, this situation  continued for many hours over the day of a violent riot. For example, if the mob was at a distance, and individuals tried to come forward in an attempt to lead the mob towards the security infrastructure, the commander  had the ability to order the use of non-lethal means to repel this danger. If this was successful in stopping the mob, the commander would cease to employ these means until the level of danger rose again. If the mob was pulled after the individuals towards the security infrastructure, the commander would reassess the level of danger posed by the crowd.

If the commander assessed that the level of danger reaches an imminent and real threat to life or bodily integrity, the commander had the ability to  authorize the use of potentially lethal force against specific individuals in order to repel the threat posed by the mob. The use of such force had to  be in accordance with the rules described above, including only as a last resort where all other means have been exhausted.

The fact that these riots occurred over long hours, and consisted of different groups and activities spread out across a commander’s area of responsibility meant that the level of threat rose and fell constantly throughout the riot. Commanders were required to constantly assess the threat level and order their forces to use force corresponding only to the commander’s threat assessment.

A commander’s assessment of the threat was dependent on many factors, including individual acts occurring from within the crowd, the nature of the crowd dynamics, the topography of the area which may restrict the means available, and the time of day. This meant that in some cases commanders would assess that a real and imminent threat occured only when a crowd was already at the fenceline and about to infiltrate as a group into Israel, and in other cases did so when the crowd was further back from the fence.

In many cases, IDF commanders have refrained from using potentially lethal force even when individuals and crowds have been at the fenceline, sabotaging the security infrastructure, and even launching explosives and other projectiles towards IDF forces.

This video shows how IDF forces may use non-lethal means even when groups are at the fenceline, and the limited effectiveness of such means in keeping people away from the security infrastructure.

As noted, where soldiers or commanders identified a clear military attack being conducted, or were faced with a real and immediate risk to their life or bodily integrity, they were permitted to employ force with lethal intent.

Where the commander assessed that the use of potentially lethal force was required to repel the real and imminent danger posed by a crowd, the commander would order such force to be used only against “key instigators” or “key rioters”. Live ammunition was not used against bystanders or those who are not assessed to be “key instigators” or “key rioters”.

If this use of force succeeded in repelling the imminent and real threat, the commander would cease the use of live ammunition and go down the force continuum.

Who was considered a “key instigator” or a "key rioter" according to the Standard Operating Procedures? 

As explained in Israel’s submissions to the Supreme Court, the purpose of identifying “key instigators” and “key rioters” was to neutralize the threat posed by the mob by acting against those who contribute centrally to creating this threat.

Thus, “key instigators” were be persons who direct or order activities within the mob, such as coordinating the tactical placement and setting on fire of tires, coordinating people to contribute towards pulling back parts of the security infrastructure and so on.

In this video, for example, a man wearing a blue shirt and a keffiyah on his head can be seen moving through the crowd while talking into a radio. In a second video, the same person can be seen pulling wires attached to parts of the security infrastructure together with a group of people. These are activities which could be assessed by IDF forces as contributing centrally towards the threat posed by the mob.

Likewise, "key rioters" were those who by virtue of their actions incited the mob, influenced their behavior or provided the conditions for which mass breach or infiltration could occur. For example, a person who successfully breached the security infrastructure and carried out attacks on IDF positions, exciting the mob into following his lead. Another example could be a person who worked to connect wires to the security infrastructure so that it may be pulled backwards and made ineffective by the crowds.

The influence that individuals had on the collective in such highly-charged and tense situations was clearly identifiable in numerous videos published in Palestinian social media.

The IDF’s experience, in other contexts as well as the context of these events, was that this was an effective method for contending with the very real threats posed by violent crowds. By acting against an individual who contributes towards the actions of the crowd, the IDF was often able to repel the threats posed by the collective without having to use more substantial force against the crowd itself. This can also be seen in publicly available videos.

In this video, a large mob runs towards a group trying to breach the security infrastructure across from an IDF position. After IDF forces fire one shot in the direction of the group, the entire group runs back towards Gaza.

In this video a group move towards an IDF position on the border in a concealed fashion, and explosive devices are thrown over the fenceline. When IDF forces fire in the direction of the group, the entire group retreat backwards quickly towards Gaza.

In what circumstances was a threat considered real and imminent according to the Standard Operating Procedures? 

The SOPs did not provide an exhaustive list of situations in which a threat may be considered real and imminent, such that commanders do not employ potentially lethal force as an automatic reaction to a set of circumstances prescribed by the SOPs. Rather, commanders – senior in their rank, and possessing significant operational experience – were required to constantly assess the factual situation and make a determination based on their knowledge and experience whether the threat posed at a particular time is real and imminent.

Such threats could be posed by individuals, and could also be created by virtue of the mob as a whole. When a violent riot took place, a danger posed by its many participants to human life or bodily integrity is exponentially greater than that posed by a single individual or a small group of individuals. Additionally, crowd dynamics render the materialization of that danger particularly volatile. In certain situations, a violent riot instantly escalated and posed an imminent danger to human life or bodily integrity.

In such cases, potentially lethal force could be used immediately in order to remove the danger, and any delay would necessitate, from an operational perspective, the use of greater force which would likely lead to more casualties.

In the context of violent riots occurring on Israel’s border, in close vicinity of civilian areas and national infrastructure, and from which attacks were carried out by operatives belonging to armed groups, these threats were even greater.

Commanders were required to assess these threats, whether they could be repelled by the use of less lethal means, and the likelihood of their materialization if live fire was not employed.

For example, when a violent mob reaches the security infrastructure and acted in order to sabotage it, an imminent threat could exist as a result of the destruction of these defenses and the possibility of infiltrations by violent multitudes of rioters, individuals or operatives.

Such a threat could also exist as a result of the high number of grenades, explosives and other objects launched towards IDF forces who were operating to prevent breaches of the security infrastructure. These means had the potential of harming IDF forces and military infrastructure, and in some cases civilians as well, and when conducted from amongst a violent mob, could justify the use of potentially lethal force. Where a real and immediate threat to life and bodily integrity existed, live fire could be used as a first resort.

However, as evidenced during the events, the IDF did not use live fire when a ‘cold weapon’ such as a knife was identified within the crowd, or even every time a grenade or other ‘hot weapon’ was used. Here too, the commander was required to assess whether there was a real and imminent danger, and to use discretion in the use of force.

How did the IDF regulate the use of live ammunition? 

In the context of the Gaza border events, highly-trained snipers were deliberately deployed by the IDF in order to increase accuracy and restraint in the use of such fire. These snipers were coordinated by professional officers, who were responsible for their deployment, training and conducting after-action reviews. Snipers generally operate in teams, typically consisting of two snipers and an observer.

These teams were under the command of senior commanders who were responsible for the sector to which they are deployed, and who were required to approve the use of live ammunition by each sniper. Thus, a sniper did not operate individually but rather as part of a team and chain of command, with coordination and review by professional officers.

Before deployment to the Gaza border area, snipers  were prepared in dedicated training sessions designed to recreate the conditions of the events, including operating under conditions of smoke, tear gas, high wind and long hours.

The IDF maintained detailed professional regulations regarding marksmanship, including the manner in which factors such as wind, distance, nature of the movement of the intended target and distance to others must be considered. “Key instigators” and “key rioters” were often conducting activities within the violent riots for a lengthy period of time, and snipers faced a challenge in identifying a time which provided the necessary circumstances for carrying out their fire while reducing the risk of hitting above the knee or hitting someone else. For example, snipers could act when a person temporarily moves away from the crowd or rests before continuing his activity.

What ammunition did the IDF use? 

Snipers during these events used industry standard 7.62mm ammunition, in use by many state militaries including NATO members.

The IDF has also assessed alternative ammunitions, including the 0.22 gauge, in use in Israel and in the use of other security agencies internationally. However, such means were not found to be suitable for use in this context for a variety of reasons, including the higher energy of some bullets (and thus increased likelihood of more significant damage caused to the body), the higher velocity of some bullets (and thus increased likelihood of passing through the body and harming others), or the lighter weight of some bullets (and thus more likely to have their trajectory deflected in the conditions applicable in the Gaza context).

The IDF did not use any proscribed variants of “expanding” of “explosive” bullets.

Why Israel did not use Border or Riot Police instead of the IDF forces stationed on the Gaza border? 

The border between Israel and Gaza separates two parties to an armed conflict, engaged in active hostilities, and as such, the responsible entity for defending the border is the IDF.

Specifically, the Gaza border area has been a flashpoint in this armed conflict. Due to the risks, including the threat of sniper fire, anti-tank and other ground-to-ground missiles and abductions, as well as the real danger of the Gaza border events leading to largescale hostilities, police units would be placed in unreasonably high risk of harm and without the requisite means and capabilities for contending with these risks.

These violent riots took place at the same place that attacks were conducted against Israel, at the same time that ongoing hostilities were occurring, were led by the same organization that is waging an armed conflict against Israel, were attended by operatives of this organization, and included acts of violence that constitute clear military attacks. These attacks occurred under the guise of the riots conducted by operatives and violent civilians, some of whom acted in a manner that posed a real and imminent danger to IDF forces defending Israel. In such circumstances, the IDF could not view this situation as it would a violent riot occurring in another context, such as occurs in the West Bank regularly.

The nature of these events is incomparable to that of other violent riots either inside Israel, the West Bank or worldwide. The threats posed by the events – to civilian communities near Gaza and further into Israel, to security forces and military infrastructure – are not threats typically dealt with by Police. Contending with the means used during these events – guns, military grade explosives, improvised explosive devices, high-velocity projectiles, and the like – also typically require military capabilities rather than policing methods.

Police are typically deployed in situations where the state controls the territory in which the riot is taking place. In this context, however, Israel has no control in Gaza, and thus did not have access to many of the means and methods typically available to Riot Police. This includes the ability to close areas to civilian presence, set up roadblocks and conduct containment operations, question, detain or arrest specific persons following each event, detain key instigators or rioters during or prior to each event, conduct searches for weapons or other tools, and so on.

However, police and other internal security agencies did take part in contending with these events, primarily with regards to enforcing closed military zones inside Israel and taking authority over Gaza residents who infiltrated into Israel and are detained by security forces.

Independent military professionals with relevant experience and knowledge of the Gaza border events have also assessed that these events are incomparable to other situations of violent riots.

Why Israel cannot allow people to breach the security infrastructure and arrest them once inside Israeli territory? 

A sovereign state is obligated to prevent the violation of its borders and illegal infiltration into its territory.

Due to Hamas’s aims, Israel could not risk masses of Palestinians infiltrating Israeli territory, whether at multiple points on the border simultaneously or at individual points. Considering the proximity of the border to civilian communities, national and commercial infrastructure, military positions and military infrastructure, the security infrastructure is a vital defense against infiltration into these places. If this defense was to be removed, the likelihood of such persons reaching these areas increases dramatically.

These events continued for months. There was no indication that once having penetrated Israel's security infrastructure and infiltrated into Israeli territory, such persons would cease their activity and wait to be arrested by IDF or police forces. The opposite is the case. There was also no indication or evidence that persons involved in violent activity in the border area were there with the sole intention of participating in political non-violent protests. Here, too, the opposite is the case. Indeed, the visual evidence and statements made by Palestinians participating in the events indicate their intention to partake in violent activities. Considering the time that these events have continued, it is reasonable to assume that persons approaching the Gaza border in the context of these violent riots were aware of the dangers and the activities occurring in their surroundings.

It is important also to consider ‘mob mentality’ and crowd dynamics. These highly charged events were typically characterized by mass incitement, and replete with anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment expressed both by the leaders of these events and by participants. In such circumstances, the unpredictability of a large crowd of persons, fueled by these sentiments, could very likely be uncontrollable when fueled further by success of breaching Israel’s security infrastructure and entering Israeli territory.

In addition to the threat from the masses, Hamas and other operatives were able to exploit any breaches in the infrastructure to traverse the open topography towards these areas rapidly and without impediment. This would be even easier if done under the cover of mass infiltration of crowds through the fenceline.

Further, as noted above, the risk to IDF forces coming into close contact with people who have exhibited violence in infiltrating into Israel was significant. This was compounded by the fact that Hamas and other operatives were disguised as civilians within these crowds.

Why Israel did not build a bigger and stronger fence to withstand sabotage and attacks? 

Israel’s security infrastructure on the Gaza border is sophisticated and multi-layered, and provides a sufficient response to many of the threats emanating from Gaza.

At the same time, Israel constantly worked to increase its security in response to Hamas‘s developing means and methods. As noted above, Israel recently completed the construction of a more substantial security infrastructure on the border between Israel and Gaza which provides an increased operational response to the underground threat and the threat of infiltration.

However, no obstacle is completely immune from attack, and especially when efforts to damage it are conducted and led by a terrorist organization with military capabilities, such as Hamas.