Hamas’s Aims

Image: STRINGER / Anadolu Agency / AFP

What was the publicly stated aims of the Gaza border events?

The Gaza border events purportedly began as a civilian initiative, based on a general idea to establish tent cities in the vicinity of the Gaza border area as a form of protest against Israel for its alleged responsibility for the dire conditions in Gaza. According to the public statements of those civilians involved in trying to promote this general idea, the tent cities would deliberately not be set up in close vicinity to the fenceline so as to create security tension with Israel, and would not involve direct or physical action against Israel. Various dates were suggested for these events, including the possibility that they would continue for a number of weeks.

For more information about the development of this idea, see here and here.

Hamas and other organizations in the Gaza Strip declared their support, and stated that they would fund the initiative and provide the necessary logistics and resources. Together with this support, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad appointed representatives to a committee responsible for organizing public support for the event, which was established in agreement with Hamas and other organizations, and were involved openly in organizing the events.

As the basic idea developed within Gazan society, Hamas and others openly expressed diverging views regarding the events. While some continued to call for peaceful protests, Hamas increasingly called for violence and specifically to bringing about a mass infiltration by the Gazan population into Israel and into towns and cities in Israel to which Palestinians claim a historical right (known as the 'right of return'). Thus, the name ‘the Great March of Return’ was given to the events. Internationally, however, Hamas continued to espouse the purportedly peaceful nature of the events, and utilized the language of international law and human rights to promote this image.

Hamas also worked to expand the events to other arenas, including the West Bank, Jerusalem and other countries bordering with Israel. On 30 March 2018, and as the events progressed, Hamas made more explicit statements calling for violence, explicitly calling for a mass breach of the border and overrunning Israeli towns and cities (see below).

Israel's Security Agency has also uncovered efforts by Hamas during the period of the Gaza border events to conduct attacks against Israel from other arenas. These efforts have included exploiting residents of Gaza who have received permits to visit hospitals in Israel for medical treatment in order to provide information and materials to Hamas militants in the West Bank.

These efforts have also provided evidence that Hamas exploits the status of the Press to advance its military activities against Israel. During the Gaza border events, Palestinians posing as Press have also been involved in Hamas's military activities. A person identified as Muhammad al-‘Arabid, who attended the Gaza border events wearing a blue flak jacket marked 'Press', was responsible for coordinating communication between Hamas operatives and Palestinians in the West Bank for the purposes of carrying out a suicide bombing inside Israel.

Muhammad al-‘Arabid, from his Facebook page, 13 July 2018 (Source: Meir Amit Intelligence Information Center)

In another incident, a man identified as Musa Alian, made contact with a convicted Hamas operative in the West Bank in order to coordinate further terrorist attacks against Israel. Alian also allegedly attends the Gaza border events wearing a blue flak jacket marked 'Press'.

Alian's Facebook profile picture (Source: Meir Amit Intelligence Information Center)

For the Israel's Security Agency release on these cases, see here (Hebrew) For an English analysis published by an independent research center, see here. 

What were Hamas's true aims during the events?

Hamas's primary aim in the Gaza border events was to cause breaches in the security infrastructure and mass infiltrations of civilians into Israel, and to exploit these circumstances in order to allow Hamas operatives to penetrate into Israel and conduct attacks inside Israeli territory.

Hamas's secondary aims were to use the cover of civilians in the vicinity of the Gaza border area to conduct attacks against IDF forces and security infrastructure defending the border.

Hamas also sought strategic, political and diplomatic gains from the events. First, Hamas used the events to divert internal criticism of its governance of the Gaza Strip onto external actors, and to deflect anger in the street stemming from the crippling sanctions imposed by the Palestinian Authority on Gaza in its conflict with Hamas. Second, Hamas sought to weaken Israel politically by creating a constant heightened sense of insecurity amongst the population in southern Israel and requiring the security agencies and government to manage constantly the situation. Third, Hamas sought to create pressure on international actors to accede to various demands, such as the provision of funds and salaries to public employees that had been withheld by the Palestinian Authority in the months prior to the events in exchange for curbing the violence. Fourth, Hamas used the events to achieve diplomatic and legal harm to Israel by exploiting harm to civilians to generate criticism of Israel.

How did Hamas intend to achieve these aims?

In order to achieve its military aims, Hamas worked both to bring about breaches of the security infrastructure and mass infiltration into Israel by the rioters, as well as to ensure that such incidents could be exploited in order to carry out military attacks inside Israel.

1. Breaches and Infiltrations by Rioters
   

In order to bring the general population to breach the security infrastructure and infiltrate into Israel, Hamas undertook a number of steps.

First, as noted above, Hamas took control over the organization of the events, providing funding, services and logistics with the aim of enticing the public to attend the different focal points along the border.

Second, Hamas incited the population through Hamas-run media outlets in Gaza and during visits by Hamas officials to the focal sites, calling for the destruction of Israel and the death of Jews, the ‘return’ to lands claimed by the Palestinians inside Israel and to Jerusalem, and breaking the ‘siege’ on the Gaza Strip symbolized by the border fence between Gaza and Israel. The theme of the ‘Great Return March’, promoting the return of Palestinians to lands claimed within Israel, helped promote Hamas’s aims of inciting the population to infiltrate into Israeli territory.

Third, Hamas acquired and distributed means for sabotaging the security infrastructure (such as large quantities of wire cutters and tires), allocated explosive materials and other military means for use during the events, and conducted physical preparations of the area of the riots so as to make it easier to reach the security infrastructure.

Fourth, Hamas removed all restrictions on presence and activity in the border area, including by gradually dismantling guard posts and ceasing patrols in the border area.

Fifth, Hamas interspersed its operatives amongst the civilian population in order to incite the crowds and instigate breaches in the security infrastructure.

1. Military Attacks  

Here too, Hamas and other terrorist organizations took a number of steps in order to exploit breaches in the security infrastructure and the cover of the population to execute attacks.

First, weapons were embedded in the border area ahead of the mass events, so that they could be accessed quickly in the event of a mass breach.

Second, Hamas and other organizations interspersed their operatives (including specially trained operatives) amongst the crowds, and maintained additional combat units in the back lines further away from the fenceline, which could be activated in the event of a breach in order to penetrate quickly into Israel.

Third, Hamas and other organizations maintained readiness of its other military capabilities, so that they could be used as a supporting military effort in the event that units and operatives successfully penetrated into Israel territory (including priming rockets and mortars for launch and deploying snipers).

Fourth, Hamas and other organizations conducted largescale military exercises, training rapid penetration and abduction scenarios that could be executed in the event of a breach in the security infrastructure.

Why has Hamas not stated its true aims publicly?

As noted above, Hamas has been waging an ongoing armed conflict against Israel, which has included continuous hostilities up to and during the border events. In accordance with its interests within this armed conflict, Hamas deliberately conceals its military aims to reduce the ability for Israel to respond and prepare accordingly.

Hamas also conceals its aims in the knowledge that these aims would not be supported by the international community. Indeed, by promoting the image of peaceful protests and utilizing the language of international law and human rights, Hamas sought to secure ongoing international support for the events and discredit Israel simultaneously, including by promoting international condemnation of Israel.

Hamas has undertaken such practices in the past, deliberately concealing military objectives within civilian sites and disguising operatives as civilians so as to avoid attack and exploit any resulting civilian harm to generate criticism of Israel. For example, in the 2014 Gaza Conflict, Hamas's Interior Ministry called on the Gaza population to avoid identifying militants in the media, and to declare that anyone killed in the conflict was a civilian (see the Annex here, and see Chapter IV here). Similarly, in the 2021 Gaza conflict, the Head of Hamas, Yahya Sinwar openly discussed the transfer of military assets into civilian buildings.Here, too, in the context of the Gaza border events, Hamas called on people to conceal their identities and wear civilian disguises, assumedly so that Hamas operatives could not be identified by the IDF either before or after the events.

In response to shooting attacks on the IDF while contending with violent riots on the border in January 2019, including one incident in which an IDF officer was wounded, the IDF targeted a Hamas military position in the border area, killing a Hamas operative. This operative was involved in different activities in the Gaza border events.

Hamas also concealed its military aims from the Gaza population in order to secure their participation. It is reasonable to assume that had the Gaza population known that Hamas intended to exploit them as cover for conducting large- and small- scale military attacks, there would have been less willingness by the population to endanger themselves towards such an effort. Here too, Hamas has exhibited the same behavior in past hostilities – in the 2014 Gaza Conflict for example, Hamas's Interior Ministry called on the local Gaza population to ignore the different warnings provided by Israel of impending attacks, claiming that such warnings constituted "psychological warfare" by Israel and that no such danger existed (see page 177 here). Hamas could not explicitly admit that it wanted civilians to avoid evacuating these areas so that they could serve as shields from attack or be used for political gain in the event they are harmed in an attack, due to the likelihood that civilians would be less willing to do so.

Here too, in the context of the Gaza border events, Hamas could not explicitly call on the Gazan population to act as its shield in order to conduct military attacks against Israel. Rather, Hamas used the political narrative of the ‘Great Return March’ to incite the population to breach the security infrastructure and infiltrate en masse into Israel, and refrained from stating that it intended to exploit these actions towards its military aims.

Indeed, as the events progressed over the months, public criticism of Hamas has increased within the Gaza Strip, with claims that Hamas is sending civilians – and especially minors and women – into harm’s way at the border for its own political and military purposes.

However, opposed to its concealed military aims, Hamas has been open in expressing its political and diplomatic aims. Hamas has repeatedly praised international statements criticizing Israel’s conduct, including by UN officials, and has openly supported the UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry into the events.

Hamas has also called for the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to investigate the IDF’s conduct. Further, Hamas has openly declared its willingness to curb the violence in exchange for accessions by Israel and other international actors, and threatened to increase the violence if its demands are not acceded to.

On what basis does Israel say that these were Hamas's aims?

Israel’s understanding of Hamas’s true aims in the Gaza border events is based on a wide range of sources, both open and classified; on operational analysis, based on knowledge of Hamas’s methods of operations; and on intelligence held by Israel. Examples of materials and analysis which reflect and support this assessment are included below.

1. Statements and Actions 

On 30 March 2018, it was already clear that these were not ‘peaceful’ protests intended to support a political message. As detailed below, the events in the Gaza border area (as opposed to the focal sites) have involved substantial acts of serious violence and attacks against Israel, including continuous attempts to sabotage and destroy the security infrastructure. Other types of violence have included shootings, grenades, improvised explosive devices, mines, high-velocity projectiles and more. Such acts have continued to characterize these events until today.

Words complement these deeds, and publicly available videos of participants attest to the influence of Hamas’s incitement and make clear that they were not there to make political points. For example, the Hamas-run Al-Aqsa TV station screened a statement by the ‘Fence Cutting Unit’ on 27 April 2018, during which masked members holding wire cutters and firebombs declared that “Today is the day we march towards our occupied and robbed lands. Today we cut the Zionist enemy’s main fence on the border, today we shall enter our occupied lands and ignite a revolution against the Zionist enemy” (see here at 03:30).

Public statements by Hamas officials themselves attest to their desire to have the civilian population breach the security infrastructure and infiltrate into Israel, and to their incitement of the population to do just that. For example, on 6 April 2018 Yahweh Sinwar, Head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, made a speech at one of the focal sites, stating “Our people will surprise the whole world with what we have for them. They should wait for our big push – we will tear up the border and tear out their hearts” (an Arabic saying which roughly translates to ‘we will destroy them’).

Another Hamas official declared in a speech in July at one of the focal sites that “We are coming for you, oh Netanyahu! We are coming for you, oh Lieberman! We are coming to chop your head off your necks! We are coming to chop off that entity and to destroy that army, which our Prophet informed us that we would defeat.” Naturally, such statements are not made internationally, and Hamas continues to present the events outwardly as ‘peaceful protest’.

Other public statements by Hamas officials demonstrate that the organization views the Gaza border events as part of the armed conflict against Israel, and that the events constitute one tool in Hamas’s arsenal of weapons that it can launch against Israel at its choosing. For example, on 14 May 2018, Hamas figure Khaled Mashal made a speech at one of the focal points intimating that the Gaza border events are not separate and distinct from other violent efforts in the conflict with Israel:

"…the Palestinian history shows that our people surprise their enemies, their friends, and everybody else. At every stage, we have been capable of inventing the appropriate means. For one hundred years, we have been moving from one revolution to another, from one Intifada to another, using resistance, suicide missions, martyrdom operations, popular resistance, stones, knives and firebombs… Our basic message is that we have more than just one means at our disposal. If one measure achieves a certain level of success, other measures will be added to the struggle."

Hamas official Mahmoud Al-Zahhar made a similar statement in a television interview, exhibiting the Hamas view that the Gaza border events are connected to, and supported by, Hamas’s military efforts in the conflict against Israel: "When you are in possession of weapons that were able to withstand the occupation in the wars of 2006, 2008, 2012, and 2014... When you have weapons that are being wielded by men who were able to prevent the strongest army in the region from entering the Gaza Strip for 51 days, and were able to capture or kill soldiers of that army – is this really 'peaceful resistance'? This is not peaceful resistance. Has the option (of armed struggle) diminished? No. On the contrary, it is growing and developing. That's clear. So when we talk about 'peaceful resistance,' we are deceiving the public. This is a peaceful resistance bolstered by a military force and by security agencies, and enjoying tremendous popular support."

On 5 April 2018, Hamas-run Al-Aqsa television aired a lecture by a Hamas-affiliated cleric, equating the Gaza border events with other violent efforts and attacks in the conflict against Israel, and stating that they are all means by which to achieve the destruction of Israel:

"We have a right to our land, and we must return to it. We must return to it – above ground, underground, by means of demonstrations, bombs, weapons, explosives, explosive belts… We must return to our land."

Official statements by Hamas declaring the affiliation of many of those killed during the events also provide an indication of the high level of involvement of Hamas operatives in the most violent elements of the events. Hamas officials have also admitted publicly that many of those killed during the events are affiliated with Hamas, including in an interview with Hamas official Salah Al-Bardawil, apparently in response to public criticism of Hamas for sending Gazans into harm’s way for its own political benefit:

"In the last round, there were 62 martyrs… 50 of the martyrs were from Hamas, and the other 12 were regular people… I am giving you an official figure. Fifty of the martyrs in the recent battle were from Hamas. Before that, at least 50% of the martyrs were from Hamas."

It is also worth mentioning that Palestinians who have been detained after entering Israeli territory have also attested to the role that Hamas plays in organizing and promoting these events. See for example this release by Israel's Security Agency.

1. Operational Analysis 

Hamas has been waging an armed conflict against Israel for almost two decades, with the stated purpose of killing Jews and destroying the State of Israel. Throughout this conflict, Hamas’s main effort has been to attack the Israeli civilian homefront, shifting the means and methods by which this is achieved in response to Israel’s efforts to defend itself.

In the early 2000’s, this was achieved through suicide bombings in Israel population centers. In response, Israel increased its intelligence capabilities, conducted military operations and built a security fence making it more difficult for terrorists to infiltrate into Israel.

To overcome these defenses, Hamas turned its focus to rockets and mortars, firing tens of thousands of projectiles indiscriminately into Israeli population centers. In response, Israel increased its homefront defense (such as requiring each home to have a bomb shelter, financing public shelters, and implementing emergency procedure throughout the country), conducted military operations and developed active defense systems including the Iron Dome designed to intercept incoming projectiles.

To overcome these defenses, Hamas turned its focus to cross-border assault tunnels, investing tens of millions of dollars and substantial resources in building an array of tunnels with the aim of reaching into Israel civilian areas. In response, Israel conducted military operations to uncover these tunnels and developed technology that could detect tunneling activity underground. Thus, by the start of 2018, Hamas’s strategic military assets have had their effectiveness curbed by Israeli defenses both in the aerial domain and underground.

In such circumstances, the mass gatherings in the Gaza border area provided an operational opportunity for Hamas to obtain access to the Israeli homefront through another domain. By inciting the general population to create mass breaches in the security infrastructure that functions as a defense from attacks emanating from Gaza, Hamas could create opportunities to move armed operatives rapidly into Israeli territory unimpeded and execute military attacks. At the same time, Hamas could bring about harm and damage to Israel by masses of Palestinians surging into Israeli communities in the Gaza vicinity, and facilitate further detriment to Israeli in the international arena.

The tactics used by Hamas in this context accord in the same way with established Hamas doctrine and ideology. During largescale hostilities with Israel, Hamas has consistently used the civilian population in Gaza as shields from military attack and the urban terrain as military defenses. Such practices are reflected in Hamas’s military doctrine, as evidenced for example by this training manual recovered by IDF forces operating inside the Gaza Strip (see pages 153-4 here). The Gaza border events clearly reflect this doctrine. Hamas has not only been using the civilian population as a shield and cover for executing attacks, but has been using the civilian population as a key component in its military operations.

There are other examples. Hamas uses motorbikes as a mode of transport for its operatives, and during the 2014 Gaza Conflict, the IDF recovered motorbikes hidden in cross-border assault tunnels intended for providing rapid access to the Israeli homefront and quick retreat (see page 51 here). Such motorbikes are used by Hamas’s special forces, who are trained to fulfill specific roles in the event of an infiltration, including blocking off transport routes and providing covering fire. During the Gaza border events too, numerous motorbikes and other high-speed vehicles, including with armed operatives, have been operating in the backlines, ready to initiate attacks.

Another longstanding modus operandi of Hamas is to embed its operatives within the civilian population and take steps to avoid distinguishing between the two groups. Here too, in the context of the Gaza border events Hamas has again explicitly called on the population to conceal their identities, thus avoiding detection of its operatives.

As noted above, Hamas had its military assets primed, ready and aimed towards Israeli civilian population centers, evidencing its intention to activate such assets with short notice. This too, reflects Hamas modus operandi. Cross-border tunnel attacks during the 2014 Gaza Conflict were supported by other military efforts, including increased mortar and rocket fire to suppress responding IDF forces; surveillance and field intelligence to direct the operatives infiltrating into Israel; covering fire from anti-tank squads; and command and control to coordinate and synchronize these supporting efforts. In the Gaza border events, Hamas had these assets ready to provide similar support in the event of operatives successfully penetrating into Israel territory.

The activities in the Gaza border area prior to the mass events also intimate Hamas’s plans for the events. The fact that there was a significant spike in individual infiltration and border attacks in the months before 30 March 2018, demonstrate Hamas's testing of IDF response times and methods. By planting booby-traps on the fenceline using symbols of civilian protest such as flags (as was done in February 2018), Hamas demonstrated its intention to use the characteristics of protests as cover for military attacks. The concealment of weapons in the area of the riots prior to the events, so that they may be easily accessible during the events themselves, also attest to Hamas’s intentions to use such weapons during the events.

1. Intelligence 

As noted above, Israel has been engaged in an armed conflict with Hamas for many years, and as part of this conflict maintains a substantial and dedicated intelligence effort towards this conflict. These efforts are managed by the IDF and other relevant agencies.

The assessment of Israel based on the intelligence and operational analysis conducted by all these agencies supported the above description of Hamas's aims in the events.

Naturally, Israel cannot disclose the substance and sources of such intelligence. This is particularly so considering that the disclosure of such information would allow Hamas to alter its operations in order to make it more difficult for Israel to prepare and respond to attempted attacks. Further, considering that there is an ongoing armed conflict between Hamas and Israel, disclosure would likely harm Israel’s military and strategic interests in the context of future largescale hostilities.

Did Hamas have the necessary control over the events in order to achieve its aims? 

As the sole governing authority in the Gaza Strip, Hamas is responsible for public order and safety and has complete control over movement and access within the Gaza Strip. Hamas has demonstrated its ability to prevent or disperse public gatherings on multiple occasions, including during 2018, when it carried out largescale arrests of members belonging to different political factions in order to prevent political events, and employed widespread violence to disperse public gatherings.

Thus, the Gaza border events could only occur – at all and on each particular day – with the consent of Hamas. In practice, as noted above, Hamas openly supported the mass gatherings in the border area from the start, and invested considerable sums in providing logistics and other resources towards this effort, including selecting and preparing the main focal sites.

Specifically with regard to the Gaza border area, as noted above, Hamas has enforced restrictions on access through patrols and establishing infrastructure such as guard posts. Prior to 30 March 2018, Hamas ceased to enforce these restrictions, and people could approach the Gaza border area as a direct result of Hamas’s overt and tacit approval of presence in this dangerous area.

Thus, Hamas held complete control over presence of persons within the Gaza border area. Hamas had the capacity to restrict, limit and entirely prevent any presence in this area, certainly en masse, as well as restrict and regulate the items and objects brought by people to the events.

Indeed, Hamas has demonstrated this ability, increasing and decreasing the level and means of violence over the year in accordance with its political interests. Such, in the weeks when Hamas has been in talks with international actors regarding the Gaza Strip, such as during the end of August 2018, the level of violence at the border has dropped drastically, and certain means have ceased to be in use, such as incendiary and explosive balloons.

Most notably, in November 2018, after Hamas and other organizations fired over 400 rockets into Israel in one day, Hamas declared that it would curb the violence on the border in exchange for concessions, and the level of violence again dropped drastically, and the use of means such as burning tires on the border ceased.

Conversely, in weeks where talks failed to provide concessions to Hamas, such as in September and October 2018, which also included particularly bad animosity between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, the level and frequency of violence on the border rose considerably.

Besides inciting the population to breach the security infrastructure and infiltrate en masse into Israel, Hamas also exercised a large degree of control over individual activities occurring during the events.

Dedicated units, established with the active support of Hamas, were responsible for particular activities, such as the ‘Nighttime Disturbance Unit’, the ‘Tire Unit’ and the ‘Balloons Unit’. These units openly include Hamas and other operatives.

Hamas also purchased and distributed tools for sabotaging the security infrastructure, such as large quantities of wire cutters, and provided military grade grenades as well as tools and elements for creating explosives for use in the border area. Hamas operatives were also responsible for preparing the areas of the riots beforehand, digging defensive positions and deploying protective items such as drum barrels.

As noted above, large numbers of Hamas operatives, including specially trained operatives, were present during these events, and played active and leading roles in inciting the masses, sabotaging the security infrastructure and carrying out attacks. Hamas operatives also worked to gather intelligence on IDF positions prior to mass events and to prepare the area so as to further facilitate the achievement of Hamas’s aims (see below). Hamas operatives have also launched incendiary and explosive balloons from within the riots and from nearby Hamas posts.

Hamas also demonstrated its ability to exercise control over individuals during the events. Thus, when it accords with Hamas’s political interests and Hamas’s commitments to international actors, Hamas operatives have exercised control over the movement of individuals in the border area.

Is there evidence of success by Hamas in fulfilling its aims?

Fortunately, Hamas was unsuccessful in facilitating mass breaches and infiltrations into Israel by the Gaza population, and was unable to conduct follow-through military attacks inside Israeli territory against civilian communities. This has primarily been due to the IDF’s defensive measures at preventing mass breaches of the security infrastructure.

The IDF has also succeeded in thwarting military attacks carried out under the cover of the violent riots. Thus, for example, in an incident that was made public by the IDF, on 14 May 2018, the IDF, on the basis of prior intelligence information, intercepted a coordinated military attack by a cell of Hamas operatives that was carried out from within the crowds in the Gaza border area. The presence of the riots, and the attention of the IDF towards them, has also been exploited to carry out attacks nearby, such as on 30 March 2018 when operatives opened fire on IDF forces from next to a violent riot.

Despite thwarting these attacks, there have been numerous instances of successful breaches of the security infrastructure and infiltrations into Israel during the events, both by Hamas operatives and by civilians. There have also been lethal and other attacks on IDF forces, as well as grenades, improvised explosive devices and other dangerous means used to attack IDF forces and military infrastructure. Thousands of incendiary and explosive airborne devices have been launched in order to kill and harm persons, cause widespread economic damage and psychological terror and divert security resources from the border area.

These incidents have resulted in harm to IDF forces and serious damage to military infrastructure and to nearby civilian communities, and in other instances have constituted a serious threat. For more information on the nature of these threats, as well as information on the results of these events, see below.

Despite the IDF’s success in repelling the violent riots and attacks, Hamas continues to try and achieve these aims. The IDF will continue to defend Israel and her civilians from these threats; for more information regarding the IDF’s response to these events, see below.