Military Advocate General’s lecture – A Law-Abiding Army at War: Challenges and Dilemmas

17.11.26
IDF Spokesperson

Military Advocate General’s lecture – A Law-Abiding Army at War: Challenges and Dilemmas (3.11.2026)

1. Opening  

Good morning. Thank you, Ben, for the introduction. I don’t know if Ben told you, but he is one of our top reservists when it comes to international law and the legal side of warfare, after having served as a legal adviser in the International Law Division of the MAG Corps for many years.

I would also like to thank the International Jewish Lawyers for the invitation, and all of you for coming to Israel at this sensitive time.

Before I start, I wish to honor our beloved Daniel Reisner, in whose memory this session is held: Colonel (res.) Daniel Reisner headed the IDF’s International Law Department from 1995 to 2004 and later served as Deputy President of the IJL, leading its work in public international law. We honor his years of service and his contribution to the State of Israel, to the IDF and to this organization. On a more personal note, Daniel was a dear friend of mine. When he began his career in the private sector, our offices were just next to each other and I had the opportunity to know and admire a sharp, witty, super-talented and kind person. We will all miss him dearly. 

Many of you spend your evenings and weekends defending Israel in your bar associations, your universities and your courts, trying to show a more balanced and complex picture than one-sided accounts that others promote, usually without being acknowledged and without being thanked. So let me begin by thanking you.

Yesterday you spent the day on lawfare and antisemitism. I want to spend my thirty minutes this morning on the other side of that coin: how the law works inside the Israel Defense Forces – in a war that has now lasted three years, on seven fronts – and what happens when something goes wrong. Because perhaps the best answer to lawfare is a legal system that works, and the facts to prove it. You are the people who can carry those facts home.

7 October changed the military task in front of us. However, it did not change our obligations under the law, or our commitment to the law, and specifically to the law of armed conflict.

2. The Military Advocate General’s Corps  

A few words about myself. I spent my military service as an infantry soldier and officer in the Givati Brigade.

After my military service I studied law and business administration, clerked at the Supreme Court of Israel, and later earned an LL.M. at Harvard Law School.

I practiced law in the private sector for many years, in Israel and in the United States. I was a partner at a a Tel Aviv law firm, and from 2017 I served as the Chief Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Defense, for over seven years under five defense ministers.

Nearly thirty years after my discharge, I did not expect to return to uniform as a General. I had very different plans. But when the Chief of Staff called, I felt compelled to answer – at this crucial point in time and in history – and last November I took office as Military Advocate General, at a particularly complex moment for the IDF and for the Corps.

In this lecture, I would like to give you a glimpse into the main war fronts we have dealt with in the MAG Corps over the last few years. After a brief introduction to our Unit and the International Law Division, I would like to start with Gaza, and as part of that, also say a few words about the film named NAZA. After that, I will move on to talk about Judea and Samaria and the challenges the IDF faces there. After that I will share with you brief observations from the military campaign with Iran from our perspective, and finally accountability in a law-abiding army.

Let me briefly describe the institution I lead.

The MAG Corps is responsible for the rule of law in the IDF. We do three main things: we advise IDF commanders; we enforce the law, by ordering investigations and prosecuting; and we teach it – to our own officers and, more importantly, to commanders and soldiers.

The Unit is completely independent. In professional matters I am subject to no authority but the law – and the same is true of the entire Unit: every legal adviser in uniform is professionally subordinate to me alone, and I to the law alone. No commander can tell a legal adviser what to advise, or touch their career for advice they did not like. 

3. The International Law Division – 7 October and the Law   

We have continuously provided legal advice to IDF commanders since the beginning of this war. The officers in the International Law Division, lawyers who are world-class experts in the law of armed conflict, sit inside the decision-making, from the Chief of Staff, where I take part myself, to the regional commands, the Air Force and the Navy, down to the divisions in the field: they help write the operational orders and the rules of engagement, take part from the early stages of the targeting process of pre-planned strikes, and advise on a range of thematic issues – warnings, legality of weapons, humanitarian access, and other core issues.

They sit outside the operational chain of command, and their advice is binding.

To understand the military task our commanders faced, we need to recall the scale of the attack on October 7. More than four thousand militants from the terrorist organizations that operate in Gaza breached Israel by land, sea and air at more than 100 points. Three thousand eight hundred rockets and mortars were fired that single day – nearly as many as in all fifty-one days of the 2014 war “Tzuk Eitan”. 

The IDF fights under standing directives, drafted before the wars begin, that give effect to the law of armed conflict. These directives govern attacks, such as those against military objectives in or near sensitive sites, warnings and other core issues. They form the foundation of IDF operations. During a war, these directives are reaffirmed and reiterated to the forces, applied to the circumstances of each mission, and clarified where necessary – always within the confines of the law.

On the other side of the breached border fence, Hamas studied the law almost as carefully as we did and drew the opposite conclusion: the greater the protection the law gives a place, the better that place is for concealing a weapon, a command post or a tunnel shaft.

For them, a tunnel shaft beneath a child’s bedroom is not an accident. For them, a command post in a hospital is not a mistake. It is the premeditated military exploitation of the law’s own protection. 

We knew before the war there was a huge underground network of tunnels that Hamas had built in Gaza, whose sole purpose was to serve the military needs of Hamas. But what our forces saw in Gaza was bewildering. Think about it – a military tunnel network stretching for over five hundred kilometers beneath a strip of land about forty kilometers long and twelve kilometers at its widest point. It is truly hard to conceive. It was their strategic offensive and defensive weapon against Israel.

This tunnel network stretches throughout the Gaza Strip, running beneath the most densely populated areas, with most of its exit shafts emerging in homes, schools, hospitals and scout clubhouses. I am no historian, but given the density, sophistication and widespread nature of this tunnel network, I seriously doubt that the modern history of warfare has seen anything like it.

4. Gaza

So that was the battlefield and challenge our soldiers, our commanders and their legal advisers faced: a law we respect and value and were bound to uphold, and an enemy that built its war to misuse that law’s protections. 

Let me be clear about where I stand before I say a word about the allegations against the IDF. We take allegations seriously. We check ourselves. The IDF does not disavow the mistakes and errors that occurred in this war. 

But looking at it from above, there is one fundamental point that must be stressed. There are tragic consequences to this war – casualties, destruction and suffering. That is undeniable. But tragic consequences and legality are two different issues. Whether what happened was lawful depends on facts – who caused harm and why, what was known, what was decided, and what was carried out.

And the law was there all the way through. It does not only say what may be attacked; it also sets out the responsibilities toward the civilian population – feasible precautions, effective warning where circumstances permit, allowing and facilitating humanitarian relief, assessing expected civilian harm and avoiding attacks that commanders assess to be disproportionate. My officers advise on these issues and many more. 

The NAZA Film

Regarding this point, most of you have probably heard of or have seen the film NAZA.

This film claims that our strikes were approved with hundreds of expected civilian deaths, and accuses us of being indifferent to civilian casualties, or even of seeking them. But since my officers are involved in the targeting process and in drafting IDF directives, I can say that this depiction is divorced from reality. The IDF has published a detailed answer to the film, claim by claim – I encourage you to read it. 

At the heart of the matter, the film inverts the very thing it is named after. NAZA is the Hebrew acronym for collateral damage – the estimate of expected civilian harm. The whole point of making that estimate is to prevent, or at least mitigate to the extent possible under the circumstances, expected harm to civilians. This is why collateral damage assessments are a basic tool for law-abiding militaries throughout the world. It is how a commander knows how many people are in the area, whether the strike is lawful, what precautions are needed – whether to change the plan, or to cancel it, as happened many times in this war. The film takes that safeguard and presents it as indifference. An army that was indifferent would not count. It would just strike. 

The film is but one element in a broad campaign against Israel, carried across the world – in courts, in universities, on screens. Which brings me to the gravest and most outrageous accusation of them all: genocide.

Genocide

It was already on October 13, 2023 that Israel was accused of no less than, and I quote, “a textbook case of genocide” – six days after the massacre – before a single IDF soldier had set foot in Gaza – while we were still identifying our dead. This fact alone speaks to the emptiness of this accusation, but I will not leave it there.

The accusation was never true and is still untrue. The war’s key objectives were defined in the days after its outbreak: dismantle Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, and create the conditions for the return of the hostages. It was never about harming the civilians of Gaza. To the contrary: countless directives, orders and actions have sought to protect them to the extent feasible – whereas Hamas deliberately embedded its weapons and military activity among civilians, in utter disregard for their lives.

My officers helped to write many of these directives, which distinguish Hamas from the civilian population. The IDF facilitated humanitarian relief on a huge scale – more than 3.9 million tons of supplies since October 2023. 

Alongside that – and I say this as the head of the military justice system – this is why we investigate our own soldiers, while the war is being fought, for suspected misconduct, as difficult and gut-wrenching as this may be. This is a law-abiding army.

And of course, the IDF sent its soldiers into Gaza on the ground to fight a terror organization – and lost more than four hundred of our finest young men and women doing it. This is not what genocide looks like. 

Merely raising this accusation is nonsensical and outrageous. War is not genocide. And this war has not ended – Hamas has not disarmed, it is rebuilding, and it has stated its intention to carry out more October 7ths over and over again. It has said so publicly, and this is what our hostages heard from their captors again and again. The IDF fights a terrible enemy, in the hardest conditions an army can fight in. The genocide claim is a libel: untrue when it was first made, untrue every day since, and untrue today.

5. Judea and Samaria   

From Gaza to Judea and Samaria. The situation in Judea and Samaria is extremely complex. As you all know, the fight against terrorism – including terrorism originating in Judea and Samaria – is a difficult, sophisticated and bloody struggle. In recent weeks alone, we have seen several murderous terror attacks that have cost innocent lives.

The IDF as a whole, and the Commander of Central Command – who is the governing authority in Judea and Samaria – must do everything in their power to keep Israel’s citizens and the Palestinian residents of the area safe, while fighting terrorism with determination and resolve. That is our foremost mission, and the context matters.

Alongside this, the Commander of Central Command also has powers – and a duty – to maintain public order and civil life for everyone in the area, Palestinians included. Our Supreme Court has enforced that duty for decades.

Recently, we have been seeing attacks by Israeli extremists against Palestinians. The terror we face absolutely does not justify attacks on innocent people. For me, this goes beyond the law. It is a matter of morality and values, including Jewish values. 

The Chief of Staff said it last month, and I say it as well: harming innocent people or property “does not reflect the Israeli spirit or the Jewish values”. These acts must be rooted out with every tool, authority and ability we have.

Since 1994, as a matter of legal policy, Israeli citizens who commit acts of violence in Judea and Samaria are investigated by the Israel Police and brought to trial before Israel’s civilian courts – exactly like any other Israeli citizen.

But that does not take away from the army’s role: to prevent the violence, to be the first to respond, and to hand the suspects over to the police.

Let me be clear: the fact that arresting and investigating are the police’s job does not release IDF soldiers from their duty to act in real time, on the ground. Our orders say so plainly: soldiers who encounter violence must not stand by. They must intervene, stop the violence, detain the suspects and hand them over to the police.

We do not shy away from our own responsibility. The Commander of Central Command has used the powers that the law and military orders give him. The officers of my Unit helped draft his orders, such as a ban on face coverings in public places, because masked attackers could not be identified; restriction orders, with electronic monitoring, against those who use violence; closed military zones that bar Israelis from friction points, and more. With our support, the Commander of Central Command will continue to use these powers. That is our duty.

And where soldiers are involved in violence of this kind – including reservists serving in the regional defense units – the policy is unequivocal: their reserve service is stopped, their weapons are taken from them, and in appropriate cases the matter is referred to the competent authorities – the Military Police or the Israel Police. We will not hesitate to use every means available to us, including enforcement measures, where a case calls for it.

And yet, despite all of this, we have not yet managed to stop this violence. A great deal of work still lies ahead of us, and we will work tirelessly to fulfill our mission and responsibility.

6. Iran  

The next issue that I would like to refer to is Iran. The armed conflict with Iran is the front where the legal questions are the oldest in the book: an inter-state conflict.

Iran has waged war against Israel for years: through its proxies, and directly. It has launched against Israel the largest ballistic missile attacks in the history of warfare. It has been demonstrating aggression in different ways alongside the regime’s publicly declared objective of destroying the State of Israel. Both Operation Rising Lion, launched in June 2025, and Operation Roaring Lion, launched in February 2026, were part of this ongoing armed conflict, and were directed at countering the threat posed by Iran to the very existence of the State of Israel.

During these campaigns, the IDF has struck many and various military objectives – including the facilities of the nuclear weapons program, the missile corps and its launchers, air defenses, the wartime headquarters of Iran’s armed forces, and the IRGC and its subordinate forces, including the Basij, which under Iran’s own law is part of those armed forces. 

In the more recent operation alone, the IDF struck thousands of such targets, with my officers providing legal advice throughout. Here too we made every effort to refrain from attacking the innocent – by warnings, by the choice of munitions, by using intelligence and data and more. And here, again, the contrast is stark: while the IDF directed its strikes at military objectives, Iran fired ballistic missiles deliberately at Israeli cities and Israeli civilians. Many of them carried cluster sub-munitions, intended to maximize the chance of harming Israeli civilians. 

7. Accountability  

Lastly, I want to address the concept of accountability. 

I truly believe a law-abiding army is a better army, a stronger army and a more resilient one. Calling out and addressing misconduct is, for me, not only a legal obligation – but a moral value. 

In practice, every report, complaint or allegation that suggests misconduct – from our own commanders, who are under a standing duty to report, from a family, a lawyer, an organization or a journalist – is immediately reviewed.

Where it raises a reasonable suspicion of a crime – for example, a detainee abused, or property looted – a criminal investigation is opened at once. Where the question is operational – for example, what happened in a strike – a prior factual assessment serves as the basis for deciding whether to open a criminal investigation. In the context of Gaza, carrying out such assessments is the task of the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism – a professional inquiry body headed by a major general in the reserves and independent of the chain of command it examines. Such factual assessments are required because civilian casualties in combat, while always a tragedy, are not of themselves evidence of a crime.

Justice is not measured by counting indictments. It is measured by what is in place – the mechanisms, their independence, the resources behind them – and by whether each file is professionally decided on the evidence, the merits and the law. And no army I know of has examined its own conduct at this scale while the war was still being fought.

Since the war began, dozens of criminal investigations into alleged incidents that took place in the context of Gaza have been opened, most of them still ongoing, and a fair number of indictments have been filed with the military court. 

The fact-finding mechanism has initially listed more than a thousand incidents of interest, completed more than 150 factual assessments, and is working on hundreds more.

In Judea and Samaria – a different legal environment, where the governing paradigm is mainly law enforcement – we have opened many criminal investigations in the context of IDF activity during the war. So far, more than 12 cases have ended in convictions, others are still at trial, and more decisions are pending after pre-indictment hearings.

Criminal investigation is not the only tool, and it is not always the most suitable one. Commanders have additional tools – disciplinary proceedings and command measures, up to permanent removal from command. They are used. During this war there have been many such proceedings that ended in sanctions.  

8. Closing   

In closing, my task, and the task of the men and women of my Corps, is to make sure that the law is never silent: that it speaks in the orders given before the battle, in the advice given during it, and in the questions we ask when it is over.

The law of armed conflict does not promise a war without tragedy. It requires restraint, respect for human life and accountability for our decisions. An army can meet those obligations and act morally even when war brings terrible loss. The tragedy of war does not make lawful and moral conduct impossible. It makes it essential. 

This also applies to the issue of criminal enforcement. Yet civilian death or injury in the course of hostilities is not of itself an indication of misconduct: it may be, and frequently is, the consequence of lawful operational activity. And I’ll even go further and say that not every mistake on the battlefield is a criminal act. The legal analysis is complex and delicate.

The war is sadly not over, and neither is our work. There will be more missions, and more legal advice to provide. The men and women of my Unit will go on providing it – to a moral army, the IDF, under the most intense and complex challenges an army can face. That is what the law asks of us, and what Israel expects of us. Upholding the rule of law.

Despite the challenges, regardless of who our enemies are and how they act, we will continue our work and our historic mission. It is part of being the army of the free and democratic Jewish state.

Thank you.