The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing

This article was last updated September 14th, 2026.

Executive Summary: Technology Supporting Intelligence Analysis

The IDF continuously develops new tools and technologies in order to improve its processes and capabilities. As part of these efforts, the IDF uses modern technologies such as big data processing, a technique used by militaries and organizations worldwide.

The effort to constantly develop and improve processes extends to the IDF's intelligence processing capabilities. The IDF constantly seeks to improve intelligence gathering and analysis to make military activity more precise and effective.

Two tools used by the IDF have recently received significant media attention: ‘Habsora’ (‘the gospel’ in Hebrew) and ‘Lavender’. Media reports – relying on unidentified sources – have claimed that (a) these are systems that employ artificial intelligence to autonomously select strike targets, and (b) they are used to strike targets inconsistently with international law. Both claims are completely false.

Processing and Cross-Referencing Intelligence

Rather, these are merely tools that help intelligence analysts cross-reference existing intelligence sources comprehensively and effectively. Their purpose is to focus the intelligence analyst on information that is likely to be relevant to their ongoing research.

Supporting Analysts, Not Replacing Them

The identification of targets for strike is always done by the analyst, who is subject to clear and defined procedures while doing so (see Section A below for more detail on these procedures). Further, the target identification process is but one part of a broader targeting process, and intelligence officers who identify targets are not the ones who also decide to strike those targets.

This broader targeting process is comprised of officers from different professions and results in a decision by an operational commander, which is subject to the rules of international law (see Section B below for more detail on the targeting process).

Human Responsibility in the Targeting Process

The aforementioned tools serve the analyst as an aid in the intelligence distillation process; they cannot constitute the sole basis for identifying a target, let alone select or generate targets on their own (see Section C below for more detail on the tools themselves).

In direct contradiction to what has been claimed in the media, these data analysis tools do not replace the intelligence analyst.

Indeed, they help to facilitate accessibility to relevant information by the intelligence analyst, and result in intelligence analysis being more informed and precise, and less prone to errors. The IDF’s approach to these tools is an example of how to use modern data technologies in a responsible manner.

Section A: Regulation of Intelligence Processes in the IDF

The IDF's regulation concerning the use of intelligence to identify targets for striking requires that all targets meet the international law definition for a lawful target.

The IDF's Standard Intelligence Directorate

The primary source of this regulation is a robust standard operating procedure (SOP) of the IDF Intelligence Directorate. This SOP binds all intelligence officers in the IDF, is reviewed and updated as needed, and is an integral part of the training and education of relevant IDF personnel. IDF intelligence personnel are familiar with, and are required to operate according to, this SOP.

In accordance with international law, the SOP defines ‘military objectives’ eligible for striking as objects that by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and persons identified as members of an organized armed group (like Hamas’s military wing) or who directly participate in hostilities.

The SOP and other related instructions provide clear requirements on when and how to designate an object or person as a target in accordance with these legal definitions.

The basic premise of the SOP is that this identification process must always be done by a human intelligence analyst, who is trained and authorized to carry out such work.

Analyst Review and Independent Assessment

Another requirement is that a target identified by an intelligence analyst is subject to approval by an authorized intelligence officer. All tools and aids developed, acquired or utilized by the IDF as part of this process – including technological tools – are in furtherance of these regulations and subject to these requirements.

The IDF's intelligence regulations in force do not permit for any technologies to make target identification determinations in place of humans. These regulations also clearly require that targets proposed for attack accord with the relevant definitions under international law.

Section B: Target Identification as Part of an Entire Targeting Process

Target identification is only but one part of a wider targeting process, that results in a decision by an operational commander. The full targeting process includes assessments from different professionals, and is subject to additional IDF procedures concerning targeting actions. As part of this process, intelligence and other information regarding the target are presented to the relevant professionals for their analysis and input.

Commanders Make the Final Decision

The decision whether to strike is made by the commander after considering this information and input, as well as operational, policy, humanitarian, and legal considerations. A commander's discretion to approve a strike is always subject to the constraints of international law as well as to additional restrictions set out in binding IDF regulations and orders.

Once a target is approved for strike, IDF targeting procedures dictate the steps required in the targeting process before carrying it out. These include the obligations to apply feasible precautionary measures and conduct a proportionality assessment.

In each attack, IDF procedures require conducting an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and the incidental damage expected to civilians and civilian objects. Such assessments are to be made in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically.

Why Does the IDF Assess Collateral Damage?

The assessment of the collateral damage expected from a strike is done in view of all reasonably available information, in order to achieve the most accurate assessment possible.

In the IDF, operational commanders are those who approve strikes – not intelligence analysts, and certainly not technological tools. Further, the IDF's targeting procedures do not permit carrying out strikes on a category basis, without conducting individual assessments per strike.

Section C: The use of 'Habsora' and 'Lavender' by Analysts

Intelligence used to identify objects or persons as military targets may come from a range of sources – including geospatial intelligence (such as satellite and aerial imagery), signals intelligence (such as communications interceptions), human sources, multi-sensor platforms (such as aerial assets and ground-based sensors), enemy military documents and open-source information.

The amount and detail of such information may be vast, especially when considering adversaries such as Hamas, which maintains tens of thousands of militants and holds numerous military assets which it tries to embed and conceal within the civilian environment – in a manner often requiring a significant intelligence effort before determining that a person or an object is indeed a valid target.

Israel is also facing additional terror organizations in Gaza, including Islamic Jihad, which maintains separate capabilities and manpower. As such, in order to operate effectively against these groups, the IDF must collect, manage, and review large amounts of data.

As a result, the IDF is required to process large amounts of intelligence in an effective manner. To do so, intelligence analysts may use different processes and tools, including technological tools, that help to compile and fuse different layers of intelligence in a more comprehensive and efficient manner than manually doing so.

The use of these tools is based upon existing intelligence sources that have previously been gathered, assessed, and categorized by intelligence analysts. Their ultimate purpose is to focus the analyst on information that is likely to be relevant to his or her ongoing research.

How Habsora Supports Intelligence Analysts

One such tool is the 'Habsora'. As previously published by the IDF, this system was first utilized in an operational setting in 2021 during a previous operation against Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza. It functions as a technical tool that fuses large amounts of data from across disparate datasets, and suggests to the intelligence analyst to focus his or her research on certain physical objects with greater potential of a military affiliation with a terror group.

After considering the suggestions by the system and independently examining their basis and validity, in light of the sources the suggestion is based on, as well as additional information (to the extent additional sources are relevant) – the analyst can determine whether the object in question can be identified as a military objective in accordance with the aforementioned SOPs.

Under these SOPs, a suggestion from 'Habsora' cannot be solely relied upon to identify a target without being thoroughly explored by the intelligence analyst, and approved by an authorized intelligence officer.

How Lavender Supports Intelligence Analysis

‘Lavender’ is a general-purpose database that organizes and cross-references layers of several existing intelligence sources. It serves as a technical tool to help efficiently organize and connect data points relating to operatives in terror organizations in the Gaza Strip.

This database is regularly updated and its data verified. Contrary to claims that appeared in certain reports, this is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack. Its use complements existing processes for identifying terror operatives and distinguishing them from civilians during military operations. In other words, the inclusion of a person in the database cannot be solely relied upon to identify him as a terrorist who can be targeted.

The use of these tools does not change the obligatory principles and rules in the Intelligence Directorate's SOP and related instructions. They do not generate orders for strikes. They do not generate new intelligence that could not otherwise be accessed by an intelligence analyst. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to strike – regardless of how accurate they are.

On the contrary, these tools improve the quality of the intelligence process outcome. They facilitate the accessibility of the analyst to relevant information, and help the analyst be more informed of the most up-to-date and relevant intelligence sources, making the analyses more precise. They reduce the risk of errors that may occur in intelligence analyses.

Both tools help intelligence analysts review and analyze existing information. They do not constitute the sole basis for determining targets eligible to strike, and they do not autonomously select targets for attack.

Conclusion

The IDF intends to continue using modern technology in a responsible and lawful manner, to provide both military and humanitarian benefits. As a modern, responsible, and professional organization, it is incumbent on the IDF to assess and utilize such technologies, in order to contend effectively and precisely with the contemporary threats that non-state armed groups pose. Doing so helps to both achieve the military aims more effectively and reduce the unintended harm and impact on civilians in the battlefield.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the IDF use AI to select targets in Gaza?

No. Technology is designed to assist intelligence analysts by helping them process and cross-reference information. Human personnel remain responsible for assessing intelligence and proposing targets in accordance with established procedures.

Who makes the final decision to approve an attack?

The decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander. The commander considers the broader operational picture, including operational, policy, legal, and humanitarian considerations.

How are legal and humanitarian considerations incorporated into the targeting process?

The targeting process includes assessments of distinction, proportionality, and feasible precautions. These considerations form part of the broader professional assessments conducted before an attack is approved.

What is the difference between intelligence analysis and targeting?

Intelligence analysis involves collecting, organizing, assessing, and cross-referencing information to understand potential threats and military activity. Targeting is a broader operational process that incorporates intelligence alongside operational, legal, policy, and humanitarian considerations before an attack is approved.

Why does the IDF use technology to support intelligence analysis?

Modern military operations involve very large volumes of information from multiple sources. Technology can help analysts organize and cross-reference this information more efficiently, allowing human personnel to focus on assessment, verification, and decision-making.

Does Habsora generate targets automatically?

Habsora does not independently determine that an object is a target. It helps analysts identify information that may warrant further examination. A human intelligence analyst must assess the available intelligence before a target can be proposed for approval.

Does Lavender automatically mark Palestinians for assassination?

No. Inclusion in Lavender does not by itself establish that an individual is a confirmed military operative or identify that person as a target. Lavender does not independently generate attack orders or determine that an individual should be attacked.

Is the IDF's targeting process fully automated?

No. The targeting process is not fully automated. Technological tools can assist with processing and analyzing intelligence, but target identification, assessment, review, and approval involve human personnel and established procedures.

What safeguards does the IDF have for AI-assisted targeting?

The IDF's targeting process includes human intelligence assessment, review and approval by authorized personnel, and consideration of operational, legal, and humanitarian factors. Technological systems are not treated as independent decision-makers or as the sole basis for selecting a target.