The Façade at Senior Headquarters

Introduction

This article deals with a frequent pattern of interaction that takes place within the different senior headquarters in the IDF, which reflects a façade of harmony and obedience that exists between commanders/staff officers and their superior commanders. Façade is a term that describes the exterior of a structure, usually the structure’s front. This is a loan term to describe “a deceptive external appearance, a misleading impression, a habit which is intended to hide the truth,”[2] which is used for this purpose in many languages. The façade in senior headquarters is the manner in which subordinates tend to render certain aspects of the organizational situational picture in a more positive manner than exists in reality. This façade is also expressed through the presentation of greater consensus and conformity than exists, but only when the commander is present. I will emphasize that this ‘presentation’ does not reflect any deficiency in the monitoring of reality by those who create the façade.

It is actually an expression of their desire to gratify senior commanders as a part of the accepted behavioral rules in their headquarters.

The importance of describing and analyzing this façade derives from the fact that it clearly influences the patterns of discourse in the senior headquarters, including the organizational learning potential which is likely to be damaged as a consequence. Everyone is aware of the façade, but it is given minimal formal expression, and in general it is only dealt with in informal discussions. Even though there is a tendency to see the façade as a poor expression of conformity, this article is not intended to judge the behavior of the officers who present the façade. This is because the façade is directly linked to the organizational culture of the senior headquarters (as will be presented in this article) and is also similar to the organizational culture of other staff bodies which are not necessarily military.[3] Instead, this article will seek to investigate the connection between the façade phenomenon and the cultural ideas that characterize the senior headquarters, based on a belief that understanding the connections between elements enables those engaged in an activity to plan their actions with full awareness rather than by acquiescing to unclear behavioral rules.

In the first section, I will demonstrate the façade through quotes and anecdotes that were gathered during the research I conducted during my doctoral studies. The research was based on twenty-seven interviews with generals, with staff officers in the senior headquarters and with the bureau chiefs of the generals. Later, using senior level meetings as an example, I will show how the façade that exists during these meetings is an indication of the existence of cultural assumptions within the headquarters. I will achieve this by using terminology from the field of microsociology and the thought of Max Weber. Finally, I will describe the way in which senior commanders deal with the façade in their headquarters and what we can learn from this.

The Harmony and Obedience Façade

One of the most dramatic events that was described to the interviewer took place during a turbulent period from a security perspective, when Major General Tzuriel[4] was a senior commander, and was asked by his own commander, Abraham, to gather all the battalion commanders in his area of responsibility for a meeting. Tzuriel described the events as follows, after Abraham gave an irregular order which was unacceptable to Tzuriel:

Tzuriel: “… I understand that this is catastrophic, it was said clearly. I gave an order for everyone to remain after Abraham leaves, and to interpret Abraham’s [order] in a different manner: ‘Of course you are not to kill, he didn’t mean that, but rather we will increase the supervision’ - I gave a different interpretation to that insane order. And in this way, we let the battalion commanders off the hook.”

Me: “Why didn’t you say this in openly during the meeting in the presence of Abraham?”

Tzuriel: “The truth is that the first time I thought about a black flag [an illegal order] was during this event. It is clear to me that this was due to pressure from the upper echelons [Abraham’s superiors]. I saw my role in the army to do things the right way, and not to be contrarian. That was then. Today I think differently. Back then I didn’t care what happened to me. Promotion didn’t interest me, if in my actions there was something that clashed with my worldview. And I saw my role as helping Abraham manage his wars. He is under pressure from the [superior] ranks, he has aspirations, this doesn’t interest me at all. I do what is correct to do. You cannot act against Abraham. You overturn it […] with the battalion commanders. You can’t take action which is not smart.

Me: “Why?”

Tzuriel: “The significance of this would be an explosion to a certain extent, and the bottom line is that either you or Abraham would be thrown out. This is of monstrous dimensions.”

Tzuriel describes here a complex situation in which his commander Abraham gave an order to a broad forum of commanders (a gathering of battalion commanders) which ethically could not be implemented (a “Black Flag”). At the time of the event, Tzuriel was himself a senior commander, and as he described himself, promotion did not interest him. Despite this, he chose not to confront Abraham in the presence of the subordinate commanders, and instead waited for Abraham to leave, asked the participants to remain, and in practice canceled Abraham’s order.

Why did Tzuriel not confront Abraham, and instead canceled his order after he left? The reason is the significance of the public nature of the confrontation in Tzuriel’s eyes (“an explosion to a certain extent […] either you or Abraham would be thrown out […] monstrous dimensions.”). In practice, Abraham left the gathering of battalion commanders certain that the order he had given was valid and would be implemented. He had no indication from Tzuriel, his direct subordinate, that the order would not be implemented, because Tzuriel created a façade for him. Façade builds a permanent and ongoing situation that in the presence of a senior commander, no one appears to contradict his decisions or his authority to decide.

One of the more common expressions of the harmony and obedience façade is the behavior of participants during senior level meetings. I will delve deeper into an analysis of senior level meetings as a frequent practice in senior headquarters, to demonstrate the way that the harmony and obedience façade is anchored in their basic cultural foundations. The formal purpose of senior level meetings is to make decisions. In a survey conducted among students studying at the Command and Staff College, most of the respondents (65%) replied that senior level meetings are intended to make decisions. The anthropologist Helen Schwartzman conceptualizes meetings in her ethnography as “communicative events involving three or more people who agree to gather for a purpose which seems to be connected to the functioning of the organization or group.”[5]

Given the well-developed organizational mechanism of Major General (MG) level meetings (which will be described below) Schwartzman’s definition seems overly minimalistic. The researcher Mats Alvesson views meetings as a practical tool for meaning management in which an organization and its intellectual foundations exist and are reconstituted (hierarchy, organization, cohesion, communication, goals and means).[6] Meetings are intended to guarantee that the existing reality is perceived as natural, rational and problem free and that the leaders are good and worthy. The frequency of senior level meetings turns these meetings into a trivial phenomenon, in other words, questions are not asked about them and their goals are not doubted.

One can gain an impression of the importance attributed to the role of these meetings by evaluating the organizational mechanism for managing senior level meetings which includes many work stages, starting with analysis of the agenda of the senior leader, crosschecking it with the annual work calendar of the superior headquarters and the subordinate units, through to adding the events to the senior leader’s schedule and inviting meeting participants (including those who are excused and additional participants) and concluding with the meeting summary and oversight of implementation of the decisions. MG Vardi (a pseudonym) describes the way that meetings are run:

“The time is mine. Don’t drive me crazy over time. Every meeting starts on time and finishes on time. There are no extensions […] Don’t waste my time and I won’t waste yours. Meetings also have order – presentation of the issue, comments by the participants, whoever hasn’t read [the material for the meeting] beforehand shouldn’t come […] If it’s a decision-making meeting, be familiar with the material. If someone says, ‘I didn’t study, I didn’t read the material,’ I throw [them] out of the meeting […] And at the end of the meeting – a decision, and maximum 24 hours after the meeting, the minutes are sent, on the oversight and follow-up management system. Afterwards Actionbase [a database for monitoring decisions], and the decisions chase after [the staff officer] till death […] The system becomes efficient.”

MG Vardi presents his principles for meeting management, which match the prevailing concept for effective meetings. These elements, together with the meeting management mechanism described, indicate a rational system for decision-making and implementation. The presumption on which the system is based is that planning and making decisions before action enables the individual and organization to better control the environment and thus increases the chances of fulfilling its objectives. It is important to realize that this assumption is not an objective fact, but rather a cultural assumption in relation to reality, which is encompassed in the meeting mechanisms in the senior headquarters.

Despite the assumption outlined above, most meetings take place based on a different logic which will be described below, which is not necessarily related to decision-making. MAJ Dekel, a bureau chief, describes how his senior commander related to meetings in a manner that contradicted the decision-making logic:

“As a part of our organizational culture, for every item that arose [for discussion] there was preparation with him [the senior commander] prior to the meeting, so that he would not be surprised by anything. He studied in detail in order to discuss each issue with understanding, and at a level to approve the relevant PowerPoint slides.”

Dekel’s commander held preparatory meetings prior to each meeting that he would lead during which he would “study in detail” any issue which might arise, including viewing each slide before it was presented in the meeting. All of this was done, “so that he would not be surprised by anything.” ‘Surprise’ in military terminology reflects a problematic situation in which our forces encounter the enemy in the field at a time when they are not ready. This is a situation which should be prevented through professional and serious preparations. Preparing for the meetings enabled the senior leader to arrive ‘ready’ for the meeting, with the issue thoroughly clear to him and apparently with many of the decisions related to the meeting already formed in his heart. It is worth noting that the ‘readier’ a meeting chair is prior to the meeting and “prevents surprises in the meeting”, indeed in practice the level of freedom during the meeting is reduced. Similarly, MG Koren described the types of meetings that he chaired and characterized them by relevance to him:

“I argue that there are three groups of meeting conclusions. The first, when I know a lot about the meeting topic and when I conclude exactly what I had thought before [the meeting] with [differences of] nuance. In the second group, during the meeting, or [as a result] of the presentation or the discussion, I reach the conclusion that I need to rethink [the decision I had previously reached]. I sleep on it a little more. In the third, during the meeting I end up thinking differently than I had beforehand.”

In the first category of meetings that MG Koren spoke about, he had already reached a decision. That is, the decision was not reached during the meeting itself based on the arguments presented by the meeting participants, but was reached before the meeting based on prior information and the ‘preparation process.’ There are also likely to be other cases where the decision is made in the meeting, but even if it was expressed by the senior leader, it was not completely formulated by ‘him alone,’ but rather was the result of a coalition which began to develop among the staff, as Col. Moti, a staff officer explains: “Any decision that you want the Major General to make, especially heavy decisions, are formulated and reached, not in meetings, but rather in private conversations.” He adds:

“When you want a decision to be reached that is contrary to the commander’s position, you need to do that in a private conversation. You need to recruit anyone who is influenced by the decision before you present it. In order to arrive [to the commander] after most of the people have been recruited, those that haven’t been – you need to make sure that you are not surprised. If you are surprised, you won’t get [the decision] passed.”

I would propose, this being the case, that a distinction be made between an open meeting which is based on a rational logic of information gathering, weighing the information and decision-making characterized by a genuine process of considering the different options; and a closed meeting which is theoretically based on a similar logic, but is characterized by decisions which were already reached by the senior leader prior to the meeting.

What, in this case, is the purpose of a meeting where a decision has already been made by the senior leader?

MG Yaron proposes a purpose for a closed meeting (author’s emphases):

“The meeting is an opportunity to think, to learn, to reach conclusions. And there are meetings whose results are known beforehand, even if not completely, but the general direction is clear, and the meeting is used more to market the issue, to convince. I never conclude a meeting without trying to convince: I deal with their arguments [the staff officers], give answers, and this is also important for ensuring that the people will exit the meeting and implement what was decided. At least they will receive answers.”

Yaron distinguishes between meetings that are an opportunity to study the issue in order to reach a decision and between meetings whose results are known beforehand and whose key role is to convince the participants to implement the decision. That is, the purpose of a closed meeting is to increase the chances that the decisions (which were made, as noted, before the meeting) will be implemented in practice.

Closed meetings are not an infrequent phenomenon in senior headquarters. On the contrary, most of the interviewees noted that this is a common pattern for senior level meetings. It is worth asking, if so, what is the purpose of holding a meeting where the arguments of the participants are known beforehand (because the presentations were sent to the participants beforehand), their positions are known and in most cases the decisions have already been reached. Is this not an outrageous collective waste of time? Would it not be more efficient to publicize the senior commander’s decision in a document and to relinquish meetings whose results are known beforehand?

Senior Level Meetings as a Social Construction Process of the Senior Leader's Status 

Our starting point for analyzing this question is that the existence of an organization is not a tangible object (such as a chair, car, building or a fork), but rather the result of social construction by its members.[7] The organization, according to this approach, is the fruit of a ‘common imagination’ which develops through a series of repeated daily practices, of which the meeting is an important one. These practices are an ongoing effort to interpret the social order and to validate it. Money is a good example of this.[8] Everyone believes in the power of money to procure goods or services. This is despite the fact that it is clear that on its own, without a common social belief about it, money is worthless.

What is the social order that arises from senior level meetings? We can learn about it through a process of elimination. Imagine meetings taking place in senior headquarters in the following format: a meeting chaired by a general in which the participants were not required to arise when he entered; a general-led meeting in which the participants do not wait for him to enter and instead, enter the general's office as they arrive and wait with him for the start of the meeting; a meeting in which after the general's conclusion, the participants continue to make additional arguments about the topic; or a meeting chaired by a lieutenant-colonel to which generals are invited.

It is reasonable to presume that an officer reading this list of ‘strange’ meetings above would chuckle. Why? Because the unwritten rules about the ‘correct’ or ‘natural’ way to conduct meetings create for senior headquarters officers an ‘obvious’ social order. It is obvious that one arises when the general enters the room; it is obvious that one refers to them as ‘the commander’ (even though they can refer to the meeting participants by their first names); it is obvious that when waiting for a meeting to start this is not done in the company of the senior commander, but rather separately from them and together with the other participants; it is obvious that one does not object (out loud) to the general’s conclusion; and is obvious that an officer will be invited to a meeting chaired by an officer senior to him and not the other way around. Through the daily participation of staff officers in the ceremony of meetings, they learn to accept the authority of the senior commander as fitting, justified and natural, and primarily as evident. This acceptance increases the chances that the senior commander’s decisions will be implemented by them. Additionally, meetings are based on important collective values within the senior headquarters, such as hierarchy, rationality, control and discipline of action, professionalism, resource maximization, and ongoing learning and improvement, among others. According to this approach, even though meetings are not a system specifically intended for decision-making, they have ceremonial importance in the framework of an ongoing effort to strengthen and validate the existing social order.

The social construction approach, therefore, analyses the way in which human institutions (such as family, state, hospitals and others) are created through an analysis of daily interactions. This approach researches society through the micro-social aspect. One of the most frequently quoted researchers in this field is Erving Goffman. His well-known book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life describes the way in which individuals leave a positive impression on others, while giving a performance that includes the suppression of negative feelings and reactions to others and the presentation of positions that others will be likely to agree with.[9] This behaviour is very important in working groups in which the members contribute to the creation of a working consensus. They do this through a temporary non-identification of conflicts, which is not a reflection of genuine agreement about the topic under discussion, but rather an agreement about the needs of those who must be respected regarding the issue.[10] This consensus enables the team to feel a sense of belonging and harmony that enables joint work.

We can learn about the importance of consensus for work needs from the following example of COL Shlomo, a staff officer, who discussed in his interview a case in which he felt a dramatic gap during the summation of an operational debrief with his commander (a MG), when two of the officers who were subordinate to the commander (BG Reuven, a division commander, and COL Shimon, a brigade commander) were assessing the functioning of the brigade during the event being debriefed using completely opposite terminology:

“Shimon described the action in a completely open, painful and real manner. He described the decisions and actions that he personally undertook as a series of mistakes. One really takes one’s hat off to him, I wanted to hug him due to the depth of regret he displayed. Afterwards, Reuven read from the page, ‘the Brigade functioned as appropriate, sadly the results of the event were this and that.’ I and the other staff officers were surprised at this gap. And then the MG began his conclusion ‘I accept Reuven’s remarks and define the functioning of the brigade as being without fault,’ and I couldn’t restrain myself and interrupted him to ask, ‘How can you say these things after Shimon described all his mistakes? Perhaps there is something that I don’t understand, and need made clear, but there is a gap between the statements made by the commanders […] maybe it is superfluous that all of us came here to the meeting if in the end we do not understand what happened.’ And what do you think happened? The MG looked at me, asked ‘Have you finished?,’ I answered ‘Yes,’ and he said ‘I’m continuing,’ and simply picked up where he left off.”

Shlomo describes a dramatic incident which involved the interruption of the concluding statements of a MG in which despite the title ‘debrief’, which should indicate a functional expectation of learning and drawing of conclusions that could lead to better operational results, in reality the debrief was not able to determine anything, and certainly not to engage in organizational learning. Despite the gap between the functional expectations and the management of the meeting, in reality, all of the participants refrained from expressing discontent, apparently to maintain consensus for work needs. Shlomo’s choice to stop the MG in the middle of his conclusion and to comment on the gap was an unusual step, and every officer who has participated in a meeting chaired by a MG can attest to this. It is actually Shlomo’s unusual behavior that attests to the prevailing custom in senior level meetings, which is maintaining the consensus for work needs, in other words – façade.

Charisma of the Office

Goffman’s explanation of the need to maintain consensus between people for work needs is important, but is not sufficient given that it does not explain why the consensus, or the appearance of consensus that consistently forms is based on the direction taken by the senior commander. Additionally, Goffman’s approach struggles to explain the power of the consensus that is presented (silence when there is clear disagreement) such as the behavior of the staff officers in the example that COL Shlomo brought above.

To explain this, I will use a concept developed by the sociologist Max Weber, who coined two terms that are frequently used in military language: bureaucracy and charisma. According to Weber these two terms are connected to the way in which authority is organized within society.[11] Rational authority is organized in bureaucratic structures which include supervisory authority figures based on talent and formal training who fulfil defined roles within an organizational and hierarchical structure. Charismatic authority is not organized in a formal manner, but is granted to a person by those around them based on an exceptional talent (‘God’s gift’) that is ascribed to them. These ascriptions, in their typical form relate to superhuman capabilities, as in cases where individuals are believed to have a connection to God (Moses, Jesus, Mohammed and others) and in a less typical form relate to characteristics such as unusual vision (David Ben Gurion, Steve Jobs) or unusual capabilities to command during war (Alexander the Great, Ariel Sharon). As noted, these capabilities are not necessarily ‘genuine’ in their positive sense, but are ascribed in a process of social construction. For example, MAJ Peretz, a bureau chief, describes an ascription of this type regarding his senior commander:

“[Senior commanders] are people whose composure is different […] I remember events requiring presence of mind, that I wouldn’t expect of anyone at all. I saw him [the senior commander] in the operations room speaking with his wife in a night-time chat of ‘Hi how’s it going,’ when he was in the middle of an operations room during a special forces ambush operation to catch a cell [of terrorists on the border] and there was a friendly fire incident in which a tank fired on the special forces. And his son [was the commander of the special forces]. He saw this [on the screen in the ops room] and his voice didn’t shake. He gave orders with ice cold level headedness. Everyone was aware of the situation. For us, this was a rock, not a human being.”

Peretz describes an incident after which he ascribes superhuman capabilities to his senior commander (“not a human being”). The combative nature of the army turns it into an organization in which charismatic ascriptions are frequently applied to commanders and combatants who have functioned well despite the terror of battle.[12]

Weber describes the two types of authority (the rational-bureaucratic and the charismatic) as two distinct and separate archetypes, but he leaves an opening for the understanding that in human reality there is a connection between the two. Using the term ‘charisma of the office’ he describes the combination of the two where an individual is ascribed unusual capabilities thanks to their bureaucratic position. He argues that charisma of the office is created when a charismatic leader who has united a group around him passes away and leaves a question of succession. Weber describes different methods for solving this question of succession. One of which is through a ceremony which transfers the charismatic capabilities from person-to-person. A person who receives the ascribed charismatic capabilities through a ceremony enjoys the charisma of the office. In the Catholic Church, the ceremony begins with a Papal Conclave of the College of Cardinals who elect the new Pope and concludes with the crowning of the Pope. In modern bureaucracies the transition ceremony is in the process of appointment, and in armies the ceremony is realized through the handover ceremony.

That being the case, senior commanders in the army enjoy charisma of the office. The significance is that their immediate environment ascribes to them personal capabilities (charismatic) by virtue of the fact that they have been appointed to a senior position (bureaucratic authority). Although Weber described the circumstances for the creation of charisma of the office, he did not sufficiently develop his analysis of the significance of the term. The sociologist Edward Shils attempted to develop this aspect, and argued that the power of charisma of the office is influenced by the degree of proximity the position holder has to the symbolic center of the organization (or society) in which they are active.[13] This term, ‘symbolic center’ constitutes the order of symbols, beliefs and values that control society. This is the center because of its totally irreplaceable nature, and due to the fact that it is perceived as such in the minds of many individuals, who are unable to openly express the fact that it is irreducible.[14]

The symbolic center of the army is encompassed within two rationales: the combat rationale and the promotion through the ranks rationale. The combination of these two rationales takes place in the heart of military functioning. A brigade commander, for example, is an experienced war fighter as well as an officer who has risen to a senior rank. Accordingly, senior commanders in the army benefit from being a powerful symbolic center that grants them enormous charisma due to the fact that they hold a senior position. Senior commanders are aware of this, as can be seen from an example brought by MG Ron in relation to a terror attack that took place in his AOR in the community of ‘Anana’ (a fictitious name):

“When there was a terror attack in Anana, the first report was that [there were Israeli children killed]. The report from the brigade commander was: he said ‘Bro listen,’ no in fact he said ‘listen commander,’ in a tense voice, ‘terrorists are running around in the field […] There is fire on Anana’ and you [the senior commander] are receiving a blrak picture. I told him to ‘close the border, so that the terrorists can’t escape. I will bomb them using the air force.’ Until the picture becomes clearer. In moments like these your people understand you, that you are not feeling under pressure, that you give orders in a measured manner, that you project control. Therefore, you must develop the leadership of those who have these characteristics in the reality of combat. From that moment you are what you say you are, you are God.”

Ron presents a deep understanding of the influence of the successful and measured management of the event on his image (that is his ascription) in the eyes of his personnel (“From that moment you are what you say you are, you are God”). Accordingly, there is an awareness among commanders of the influence of effective functioning during combat command on the level of charisma that is ascribed to senior commanders further down the track.

Problematization of Senior Leader Authority

A person who read this article just to this point would likely receive the incorrect impression that the mere appointment of a senior commander with successful command experience is enough to enable them to successfully and easily lead the subordinates under their control due to this charismatic ascription. In reality, we know that this is not the case. The subordinates to senior commanders in the army are themselves senior commanders who have accumulated experience and developed worldviews and positions in relation to their roles, and in many cases, these are not consistent with the decisions of their senior commanders. In this case, senior commanders will need to invest great effort to convince them to implement their decisions. MAJ Tzadok, a bureau chief, presents this in a colorful manner:

“The strongest feeling that I experienced in the position, and you see this in a thousand and one versions: if the body [the army that imposed the mission on him] does not believe [in you], it won’t happen, and it doesn’t matter who gave the order and who wanted it and how much of a ‘bastard’ he is. You find yourself every day convincing and explaining and threatening so that things will happen in the end. You have to convince people you are right. There is no such thing as ‘Give an order, next’.”

Tzadok describes the fact that in reality, a senior commander’s authority is not to be taken for granted. It is constantly challenged, given that senior headquarters have varied agendas and conflicting interests. If the most significant achievement of an army is to cause a normative individual to act against their instincts and to charge at an enemy under fire,[15] then the most significant achievement of a senior officer is to cause other senior officers (subordinates, superiors and colleagues) to recognize their authority and to act according to their words.

How does one senior officer cause other senior officers to recognize their authority? Through daily ceremonies of which the most important one is the senior level meeting. That is, the places in which the institution of the senior commander take shape, in which their authority takes form and in which the significance of the subordination of their personnel is made real through ceremony. These ceremonies include: a senior commander visit to the field, the seating of a commander at a ‘reserved table’ in the dining hall, the fact that other officers arise when the senior commander enters, referring to senior commanders as “Aluf” [Major General] or “The Commander” (while they can refer to others by their first names), and primarily because they can summon others to meetings and control their time as they see fit.

It is worth noting that the senior commanders do not themselves manage these daily ceremonies, and in practice they participate in ceremonies that are managed by their bureau chiefs. This fact constitutes a ceremony in and of itself, given that the existence of a bureau chief as a coercive and (usually) the sole conduit between the senior commander and his environment (subordinates, colleagues and commanders) generates aggrandization, which is reflected in the way people relate to the senior commander, as COL Benjamin, a staff officer testifies:

Benjamin: “For me, the bureau chief is a way to transmit messages to the general […] The shortest path to the general… He [the bureau chief] is familiar with the general’s schedule and his filters.”

Me: “What are your criteria for items that should be communicated via the bureau chief and those that should be communicated directly to the general?”

Benjamin: “Most items I communicate via the bureau chief’s […] At a personal level, I feel that I have much less recognition of my own status to connect directly to the general when he is available and not attempting to filter. I always feel uncomfortable, perhaps I’m disturbing him. I don’t yet recognize my own status […] updates are for the bureau chief.”

The way that Benjamin presents his fear of ‘disturbing’ the senior commander characterizes the approach of many staff officers to updating their senior commander. The preference is generally to update the bureau chief, who “knows the daily schedule of the senior commander”, and who would best know how to update them. The bureau chief acts as an essential daily conduit to the senior commander, this glorifies the status of the senior commander, given that speaking with him and his attention are marked as scarce and requiring special effort.

The Façade's Double-Edged Sword 

I will summarize the arguments made in the article to this point. The senior commander is located at the symbolic center of the senior headquarters and benefits from charisma of the office. That is, exceptional capabilities are ascribed to them (decision-making capabilities, level headedness under fire, strategic vision, political understanding etc.) due to the mere fact that they hold the position of senior commander. Their status as the symbolic center of the senior headquarters does not guarantee that their decisions will automatically be implemented by their subordinates or accepted by their colleagues. The practical conversion of a commander to the symbolic center of the senior headquarters and the maintenance of this position is an ongoing achievement which requires a series of daily ceremonies (such as senior level meetings) which cause senior commander’s subordinates and colleagues to recognize their authoritative capabilities. These daily ceremonies emphasize behavior that expresses the conformity of the officers. This is done in a way that frequently prevents them from presenting conflicts that do exist between them and reduces the readiness of officers to present their commanders with positions that might be interpreted as in disagreement with the commander’s own position.

All of these create a façade of harmony and obedience. However, the façade is a double-edged sword given that alongside the confirmation of the status of the senior commander, it prevents them from knowing what is really going on in the headquarters and the body which they are responsible for. This is because their officers, due to the façade, refrain from revealing opposing views in their presence, just as MG Tzuriel refrained (see quote at the beginning of the article) from revealing his opinion about the ‘catastrophic’ order given by his commander. In John Kotter’s (a renowned researcher in the field of senior management) terminology, the façade makes the existence of an open dialogue (which must be based on a network of connections between the senior commander and his environment) difficult and damages the senior commander’s capability to formulate an organizational agenda and to implement it.[16]

Senior commanders are aware that some of their orders are not fulfilled. This awareness constitutes a riddle for senior commanders given that they can never be completely sure that the harmony and obedience that they feel among their subordinates is authentic, ie. whether the senior commander really does know and understand his organization; or whether there is a cover-up of the lack of harmony and obedience, ie. – façade alone. From the interviews arose a wide range of approaches arose that allowed the senior commanders to deal with the façade riddle. These can be divided into two key approaches: circumventing the façade and dismantling the façade.

Circumventing the façade is an attempt by the senior commander to create alternative information channels to the subordinate officers that retain the façade but enable them an additional viewpoint on the organization. Circumventing the façade demonstrates that, to a certain degree, the senior commander accepts the façade is an indisputable fact. The significance of accepting the façade is taking a position of a lack of faith in the personnel around the senior commander. For the senior commander, the façade covers up the differing agendas among their subordinate officers, which they do not want to share with him/her. For example, MG Vardi tells about the range of methods that he developed to circumvent the façade:

“Visits are a work tool. You don’t see what you want to, so you develop techniques […] I had a team that would survey the units in the IDF. I took three people, and said to them ‘you don’t have an office, only a portable computer.’ I would give them issues to check. Three career officers, a[n inspection] team. And they would constantly tour the army, checking what was going on with the purpose of preparing a situation report. I understood that the distance [from the field] is endless at these levels. You receive the reports that they want you to receive. And then you sample them. And this is not a standard visit. Or surprise visits, or you send a team with a camera.

And you receive a report: several units were surveyed [and for example] the purpose of the team was to help. That you would have contact, that they couldn’t make up stories. The staff tells you ‘everything is perfect.’ And you want an unmediated picture, you can see for yourself or someone can photograph a situation report for you. And they [the inspection team] worked well for a good number of years […] [And I also made] informal visits. For example, I would sit in a post with soldiers in the evening and ask them how they trained, what their missions were. At first it was always a little strange for the soldiers to speak with the general, but after a few minutes this would pass. I wouldn’t come with a full orchestra. It was always just me, my bureau chief and someone else […] I couldn’t stand entourages, a waste of time, people not working.”

Vardi tangibly described his approach. Given that his staff would communicate “reports that they want you to receive” (“tell stories”, “reports that ‘everything is perfect’”), the senior commander had no choice but to create “contact” on his own with “reality” in order to receive “an unmediated picture.”

The second approach for senior commanders to deal with the façade conundrum is to dismantle the façade. In as similar fashion to the circumventing the façade approach, the senior commander also understands that the façade of harmony and obedience does not really serve him. However, in contrast to the first approach, here the senior commander is not ready to accept the existence of the façade and tries to remove it. Through this approach, he/she believes that they can bring to a joint discussion their agenda together with the agendas of staff officers. Through dealing with the gaps which certainly exist between them, a joint agenda can be created, which will be more balanced and accurate for the organization, in contrast to the single dimension agenda of each of the officers. When a joint agenda is created, the senior commander believes, all of the partners to it (both the senior commander and the staff officers) will feel a sense of responsibility to implement it. Senior commanders who are characterized by this approach, attempt to create with their subordinates and colleagues, meetings in which it is possible to speak freely. These commanders prefer short meetings, work meetings and one-on-one meetings over multi-participant discussions. In addition, these commanders try to create an enabling atmosphere by shattering standard conventions, such as choosing not to sit at the head of the table, creating dialogue during the meeting and avoiding a set ‘order of speakers’ etc. One of the methods mentioned by commanders belonging to this style was the holding of a ‘strategic workshop.’ A strategic workshop is a technique that senior commanders regularly use at the start of their positions, which enables an open dialogue in a forum that is senior and large enough to influence the entire body. MG Yaron tells about the strategic workshop that he held the beginning of his position:

“Firstly, there is a ‘package’ (ideas for change) that you come with. Afterwards, if you are not an idiot, you hold a strategic workshop and you learn […] what they (the commanders and the staff that are subordinate to) think, because you need to recruit them. On the basis of what you brought and what you learned in the workshop, you need to formulate your strategy as quickly as possible.”

Yaron describes the strategic workshop is a process that enabled him to learn his subordinates’ agendas (“to learn what they are thinking”) and also to “recruit” them to the expected change process. Strategic workshops are structured as special meetings, a ceremony whose purpose is to dismantle the façade of harmony and obedience, in order to enable the participants to freely present their agenda without fear. In order to enable this, it is customary to hold the workshop outside the headquarters base and around a round table (without a “head of the table”) with a significant investment of time from the participants (a full day and sometimes two) and with signs of festivity (gourmet food). The discussion is structured to enable the participants to express themselves without a ‘prepared proposal,’ in contrast to what is customary in meetings chaired by a MG. However, the senior commander is still expected at the end of the workshop “to conclude,” that is to reach strategic decisions, among them to formulate a joint agenda for the headquarters and its units, in a document referred to as “the objectives of [the senior body]” or “the vision and objectives of [the senior body].” This document, whose length is limited to one page, is printed in color, framed and hung in the offices and meeting rooms of the senior commander, his staff and subordinate officers. This conceptualization of the simplified ideas behind the agenda of the senior commander and his team, is broadcast to the entire headquarters and its units and creates a broad symbolic partnership around the center as symbolized by the senior commander.

Conclusion

In summary, in this article I have attempted to present and analyze a prominent pattern of communication in senior headquarters between senior commanders and their subordinates, which is the façade of harmony and obedience. Much has been written about the phenomenon of conformity in the army,[17] which is of a similar nature to the criticism that has been expressed of all bureaucrats.[18] Despite the temptation to criticize this behavior by senior commanders within the framework of the façade, I believe it is correct to see the conformity phenomenon within a social context that exalts the senior commander as the symbolic center of the headquarters. This exaltation not only radiates a shallow mutual comfort level among the officers in the headquarters, but rather reflects an underlying cultural principle that this façade is genuine proof that “the unit is working correctly,” based on the thesis that “If the commander is happy, it is a sign that we are all effective.”

The above statement is not deterministic. That is, culture is not necessarily a deep structure that cannot be changed. Organizational culture develops and changes over time in light of intentional actions taken by the organization’s senior leadership.[19] The stated objective of this article is to present the readers, most of whom are active players with influence in senior headquarters, with the phenomenon of façade, in order that they can take action based on an awareness of its roots and the way it influences them. Consequently, they can choose when to accept it and when to challenge it.

More concretely, for example, one can choose the topics for which to summon multi-participant meetings or alternatively hold meetings in a smaller forum; when is it correct to encourage an argument between the participants (and how is it best to do so) and when is it correct to work within “the ceremonial rules” of the façade; what is the optimal timing for a strategic workshop; when one should insist upon the presentation of a position, even if it contradicts the position of the senior commander; and additional decisions that relate to the shaping of discourse patterns in a headquarters.

 [1] LTC Dr Michael Seng is the head of the Officer Assessment Branch in the IDF Behavioral Sciences Department. This article is based on his doctorate which was undertaken under the supervision of Dr Israel Katz and submitted to the Sociology and Anthropology Department at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

[2] From: “Milog – The Free Online Hebrew Dictionary,” http://goo.gl/vSZPQ1. [Hebrew]

[3] Henning Bang. “What prevents senior executives from commenting upon miscommunication top management team meetings?” Qualitative Research in Organizations and Management, 7 (2), 2012. pp 189-208.

[4] The names used for all the interviewees in this article are pseudonyms to preserve their privacy.

[5] Helen B. Schwartzman. The Meeting: Gatherings in Organizations and Communities, New York: Plenum, 1989. p. 7.

[6] Mats Alvesson. Communication, Power and Organization, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996.

[7] Karl E. Weick, Making Sense of the Organization, New York: Blackwell, 2001.

[8] See for example: Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Harper, 2015.

[9] Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Anchor Books, 1959.

[10] Peter K. Manning, “Goffman on Organizations,” Organization Studies, 29, 2008, pp 677-699.

[11] Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968.

[12] Edward Shils, “Charisma, order and status,” American Sociological Review, 30 (2), 1965, pp 199-213.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, “Charisma and the Construction of Institutions: Max Weber and the Sociology of Modernity,” Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 21: 1-2, 1970, p.16.

[15] Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, New York: Russell Sage foundation, 1959.

[16] John P. Kotter, The General Manager, New York: Free Press, 1982.

[17] See for example: Amir Aboulafiya. “The Bravery to Present Your Own Opinion,” Ma’arachot No. 433, 2010, pp. 20-27. [Hebrew]; or Paul Yingling. “Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2007.

[18] Robert K. Merton. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York, Free Press, 1949.

[19] Mats Alvesson, Understanding Organizational Culture (2nd edition), Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2012.

Bibliography

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• Alvesson, Mats. Understanding Organizational Culture (2nd edition), Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2012.
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• Kotter, John P. The General Manager, New York: Free press, 1982.
• Manning, Peter K. “Goffman on Organizations,” Organization Studies, 29, 2008, pp 677-699.
• Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure, New York, Free Press, 1949.
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• Yingling, Paul. “Failure in Generalship,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2007.