Networked Leadership and the General Staff: Insights and Next Steps

 

Introduction

This article will deal with military leadership in the General Staff environment. It assumes that leadership is contextual – leadership in the context of the General Staff environment will be different from leadership in the context of the tactical environment. The connection between the uniqueness of the General Staff environment and the seniority of the commanders creates a working context that demands a ‘different leadership’ that can provide a response to the specific complexity of this space.

Much has been written about leadership in the senior command in the IDF.[2] In general, there is an understanding that recurs as a common thread in the material dealing with leadership in the senior command: that senior commanders operate in complex environments. These environments are characterized by their dynamism and constant change; by a broad range of needs, constraints, considerations and interests and therefore also tensions, due to paradoxes and conflicts; of tangled networks of connections and reciprocal influences; and multiple processes that take place concurrently leading to a lack of linearity, a lack of certainty and a lack of stability.[3]

This complex military context also has additional and unique implications. Senior commanders are expected to achieve rapid returns in the operational, social, cultural and technological fields. They must deal with the full range of conflicts, with rapid and frequent changes between types of conflict and even with the difficulty of clearly defining the nature of a specific conflict and its characteristics. Additionally, they must deal with the high level of visibility of military actions, such that even local and isolated action may concurrently have immediate implications at the tactical, execution and strategic levels. Furthermore, they must deal with social and civilian involvement that generates varied demands, needs and interests in operational contexts and in contexts related to organizational routine (regarding issues such as the treatment of soldiers, recruitment and selection policy, budget management, etc.).

All of these characterize the General Staff environment. At the same time, additional processes, missions, needs and relationships exist that are unique to this environment and create even greater complexity.

The General Staff environment forms an arena for the meeting of different spheres of action (national and international, the war arena, the operational arena) with the different organizational functions (coordinating staffs and professional staffs); different military functions and professions; and of course, numerous missions, needs, constraints and interests. Within the General Staff, the organizational needs of the different services collide with budgetary constraints and General Staff directives. The tension between the Regional Command systems in their own arenas and the General Staff ‘system of systems’ are discussed, and the intentions of the political echelon become clear through constant friction and processes of clarification with them. In other words, the General Staff medium is a sphere in which different axes of action meet – the professional axis that includes the management and synchronization of reciprocal relations and the maximization and promotion of systemic and operational processes; the national environment axis which includes the societal and governmental perspective and the management of military – societal relations; the economic axis that requires the provision of an operational response while prioritizing and maximizing resources; and the broader IDF that includes strategic and systemic self-examination while interfacing with the services, directorates and regional commands; and of course the operational axis. All of these must be considered when General Staff commanders act.

These meetings – between the different execution spheres and axes and between the different organizational functions – create both overt and hidden reciprocal relations, interactions and dynamics between personnel and the different military functions. Furthermore, the multiple actors and spheres of action create a system that is saturated with tensions and even paradoxes, which are an inbuilt component of any complex system. That is, within the General Staff, as within any complex system, there are many forces that both compete and complete one another (for example, the operational alongside resources, force design alongside force execution, the local and sectorial alongside the systemic etc.). Moreover, the General Staff works as an open system, with permeable borders, such that each decision or action taken within the General Staff sphere influences broad systems within and outside the IDF, as well as the opposite: processes and developments in arenas that affect the General Staff influence the decisions and processes within the General Staff environment, which increases the complexity that commanders have to deal with.

This ‘double’ complexity created by the connection between the political echelon (the more senior) and the environment (General Staff) requires an additional ‘leapfroging’ by the senior command in the General Staff environment. This will be discussed later in this article.

The understanding that the General Staff is a complex system and that General Staff officers are required to deal with increasing levels of complexity, leads us to two assumptions about the military leadership required in this environment – at the personal level and the systemic level. At the systemic level, processes, structures and mechanisms must be developed to enable the generation of leadership through a joint process created by reciprocal relations and the joint activity of the General Staff officers (with their subordinates, colleagues and even equivalents in other organizations). At the individual level, officers in the General Staff environment are required to develop capabilities, skills and practices that will enable them to act based on a systemic understanding and a deep understanding of the complex dynamics of the system.

What is leadership for the purposes of this discussion? We will relate to leadership as a joint organizational process, which is created through reciprocal relations between different people in the organization. That is, leadership is a process of complex mutual influencing created by the interaction between individuals.[4] This interaction causes the creation of adaptive elements for the organization, such as new behavioral patterns or new methods of action, learning, creativity, vitality and opportunism. [5] This leadership model is based on the assumption that the complexity that characterizes organizations today (including military organizations) is dependent on the ability to include the knowledge and talent that are ‘scattered’ throughout the organization in the leadership process[6] and that an individual leader cannot generate all the required organizational processes and outputs on their own. According to this approach, leadership is dependent on organizational and cultural structures that enable these interactions, more than it is dependent on the leadership talent of any one individual.[7] With this approach, the primary function of a leader is not necessarily to lead, but rather to create teamwork and connections between people and units, sometimes from a position of secondary influence.

Leadership as a joint organisational process takes place alongside the individual leadership of commanders. Regarding individual leadership – commanders are required to possess abilities, skills and practices that enable them to deal with the challenges created by the complexity of the environment in which they work. In the General Staff environment, this means that: leaders are required to lead, plan and implement change processes and engage in cooperation, in a sophisticated manner, while maximising the organisational possibilities; they are required to adopt thought patterns that enable an understanding of dynamic complexity while focusing on change processes and not on ‘brief snapshots’ that freeze a particular situation; they must act based on an understanding of the reciprocal connections and relations between the different parts of the system and to act based on an understanding of the permanent inbuilt tensions in a complex system between forces that oppose and compete with one another while also completing one another.

In this article we will evaluate whether these types of leadership do indeed exist in the General Staff and what form they take; we will also evaluate which organisational forces could encourage or inhibit them; we will analyse whether the new approaches and terminology in the field of leadership (that were presented above) are relevant to the military context in general, and specifically to the General Staff; are they reflected in the leadership of senior commanders in the General staff and if so how? To conduct this evaluation, interviews were conducted with commanders in the General Staff environment and the end of position reports of some of the senior commanders were evaluated. From the interviews and documents, we can learn about the commanders’ concept of the role of a commander, about their approach to challenges and their coping mechanisms, about their approach to the environment in which they work and to the reciprocal relations with other commanders working in the same environment.

In general, we will argue that the commanders’ comments reveal that they have identified that the system in which they work is complex in nature, and accordingly they implement different elements of leadership as required in a complex environment, especially by creating networks of connections and action in a networked medium. However, it would seem that they are implementing the networked principle only at an elementary level – the implementation level, but not at the intellectual level. In other words, they are implementing networked modes of action – identifying partners, identifying the interests and needs of different actors in their environment, creating links between their subordinates and the different actors in their units and so on. Their actions are not based on a deep concept or a belief in a systemic idea on which to base these actions – the idea that joint learning and the creation of new and joint knowledge and modes of action is of greater value than that created through the action of one individual.

Figure 1: A visualization of a social network[8]

Furthermore, the commanders utilized networked modes of action in a practical manner, based on practical considerations such as enlisting the support of subordinates and colleagues, creating consensus and preventing opposition, but not in an attempt to create relevant learning and knowledge through connecting different actors in the system. We will argue here that commanders in the General Staff environment struggle to ‘relinquish’ leadership patterns that are suitable for leading a unit framework (taking the lead, enlisting support, inspiring) but do not serve the primary mission of commanders in the General Staff – creating new IDF systemic knowledge that could enable the IDF to adapt and coordinating the activities of subordinate units to face a shifting reality, all from within a joint networked learning environment.

Our evaluation of leadership in the General Staff enabled us to gain a better understanding of this environment. In other words: this article will illustrate how the characteristics of the General Staff space shape the General Staff’s leadership and the system of relationships between commanders in the General Staff as well as with different actors in the units, and how these systems of relationships in turn shape the General Staff environment and the work done within it.

 

Method

The article is based on 20 structured interviews which were conducted, half of them with staff division heads in the General Staff (current and past) and also with the heads of the different corps (current and past)[9] as well as an analysis of end of position reports written by General Staff commanders. The officers who were interviewed were asked open and general questions about their approach to challenges and their coping mechanisms, about their modes of action and that of their colleagues, about the dilemmas that they dealt with, about the modes of action in the General Staff and about their success in their position etc. This was done to reveal the deeply held concepts and assumptions that shape the leadership and actions of senior commanders in the General Staff.

Primary Conclusions

In this section we will evaluate leadership in the General Staff in two layers: leadership of the system – leadership as an organizational process created through reciprocal relations between commanders in the General Staff and with additional actors in similar roles; and leadership of the individual – the capabilities, skills and practices of General Staff commanders.

The Systems Level – Leadership in the General Staff as an Organizational Process

The complexity paradigm, as noted above, proposes that we relate to leadership as the combined influence of several individuals who make a contribution – each one in their own way and in their own field of expertise – to a group or organization. That is, every individual in the organization brings their expertise to the leadership process such that the product of their joint actions is greater than the sum of their individual contributions.

In order to evaluate the feasibility of developing joint leadership we need to evaluate the organisational forces that could encourage or impede leadership of this type and we needed to evaluate the ‘social hierarchy’ of the organization – the norms and expectations that shape the way that group members connect and manage reciprocal relations. Our assumption is that identifying norms that could help create a psychological space that would enable learning is important to understanding the feasibility of joint leadership. Lindsay and his colleagues[10] identified three central norms that influence the existence of joint leadership: (1) The division of power within the organization; (2) psychological security; and (3) a learning orientation.

The division of power within an organization refers to the values that shape the way that power is shared between members of the group or organization. Norms of a greater division of power enable an unequal division of power between members, with specific group members holding greater power thanks to their rank, status or role definition. A lesser division of power, however, promotes a more equal division of power and accordingly increases the chances for joint leadership to exist. Psychological security refers to learning in which the group members feel comfortable taking interpersonal ‘risks’: to admit mistakes or misunderstandings, to challenge assumptions or arguments made by group members. This norm is based on the presumption that learning is an interpersonal context that requires a basic level of trust between the group members. A learning orientation refers to seeking challenges that develop capabilities, taking chances in a responsible manner and accepting mistakes if they promote learning.

The interviews with General Staff commanders allowed us to evaluate whether these norms were reflected in the General Staff environment and how they transpired. The interviews also helped evaluate the influence of these norms on the development of joint leadership, which is created through an organizational process and reciprocal relations between different actors in this environment.

Creating Networks as Key Action Mediums

A practical indication of the existence of a model of leadership as a joint organisational process is the creation of networks within the organization and with other organisations including the creation, identification, evaluation, analysis and characterisation of networks; use of networks for systemic influence; use of the knowledge that is created through different interpersonal meetings and connections within the organization; creation of networks for consultation; identification of knowledge centres within the organization; promotion of communication between one another; and the creation of close connections and mutual influence between organisations.

Evaluating the approaches taken to the above by commanders in the General Staff leads us to several understandings. Firstly, it seems that commanders in the General Staff have a good understanding of the importance of creating networks of connections to initiate processes and to implement their missions. Consequently, a network of connections within the organization that they head as well as outside the organization is a key characteristic of their activity:

“This is my command approach – when you share, and people participate. When you impose decisions, people drag their feet and circumvent you. Therefore, you need to share your dilemmas […] Share that leadership […] Even if I have a brilliant idea – without doing staff work it won’t succeed. They are your agents, working together with you if you can convince them.”

(Corps Commander)

“I asked myself: who are my partners in the environment? I understood from this analysis who needs me? Commands, authority, the services […] When the head of the Operations Division calls a meeting, mostly majors arrive. When the head of the Logistics Division calls a meeting, the colonels will come because he solves problems for them, they need him. If they need him, they will cultivate a relationship with him.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“How do we manage this? Each one with his organisational politics, organisational policy. It’s not easy to get to the places you want to. Do I arrive at the right solutions? The right solution is through agreement – power is an agreed solution […] To tell the air force that is incorrect that for them to attack is very difficult. When you think that something is incorrect you cannot just think about agreement, about the unpleasant. It isn’t simple in a forceful place like the General Staff. So how do you work in synergy, how do you harness the actors inside and outside one’s home? How do we realize this? I cannot realize this without the air force and they can’t without me […] Joint interests also enable joint work.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“We live with the difficult challenge that command does not equal authority. It is expected of a Corps Commander to go to the services and influence them even if you don’t have the authority to do so. The capability to harness and galvanize people from outside. If you don’t know how to harness them, you can’t live. Planning Directorate, Technological Directorate, Manpower Directorate, Financial Advisor to the Chief of Staff.”

Nevertheless, a further evaluation of the commander’s statements shows that for them, the primary importance of working through networked interactions is the creation of authority. That is, the network for them is a key and significant tool to create authority or to reduce opposition to their decisions and to harness colleagues to implement their decisions, their ideas, and the missions and the processes that they lead. On the other hand, we will see that the additional function of a network – joint learning and knowledge development – is not of foremost interest to the commanders in the General Staff.

According to the complex systems approach, in a large and complex system leadership power is not retained through the traditional forms of authority and hierarchy. There is therefore great importance to the actions of senior commanders in general, and in the staff environment in particular, through negotiation, creating authority and compromise.[11] However, using networks primarily in an instrumental manner, as a tool to create authority, without using them as a tool to develop knowledge, to create solutions and for joint learning, is an obstacle to the realization of joint leadership. In this context, the state of mind of the commanders who were interviewed was primarily instrumental and did not reflect an approach of joint leadership as required by the complex environment. The repeated use by commanders of the term “harness” testifies that they see themselves leading in a personal manner, through the strength of their leadership, the processes and missions using the existing tool at hand, the ‘traditional’ tool of leaders – influencing others and motivating them (harnessing them): “how to harness the regional commands even when my recommendation does not match theirs.” (Staff Division Commander)

The primary explanation for this can be found within the commander’s remarks – their concept of the General Staff as a forceful arena saturated with different interests that creates distrustful relationships. And indeed, a crucial condition for promoting joint leadership is the existence of trusting relationships – the psychological security of group members to take interpersonal ‘risks’ and to admit to mistakes or a lack of knowledge, to challenge assumptions or arguments made by other group members[12] and to recognize the knowledge and capabilities of others while recognizing the limitations of the power, control and expertise of a single commander:

“Sometimes one needs to reach agreement and sometimes to arrive at the correct solution. How does one reach the correct solution without killing the next event for yourself? […] It isn’t easy in a forceful place like the General Staff.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“Staff Division Commanders that respect each other’s professionalism understand one another’s constraints. This doesn’t always happen due to a lack of trust. The struggles sometimes go off the rails on a personal manner […] and cannot work with the residue of the past [… In the General Staff] there are more cases of personal honour, status, intrigues.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“In force generation, a culture took root where it would legitimate not to tell the truth, to engage in manipulations, to greatly exaggerate in a sit. rep. Sadly, this is a phenomenon that the senior ranks closed their eyes to in different bodies. The way to find relief in coping with this phenomenon, is to find comfort in the fact that the money that is freed up or received remains in the organization and can be used for good and important purposes.”

(Staff Division Commander)

Low levels of psychological security that can block processes of joint learning are common in the senior command arena in the IDF, as can be learned from the remarks of the senior commanders who have retired from the IDF. Many commanders argued that an approach that says that commanders are supposed to be ‘all knowing’ prevented many of them from consulting and engaging in learning processes among the ranks and across them. They feel that the position of senior commanders in the IDF causes many of them to project a public image of proficiency and expertise, which then makes it difficult for them to learn from others and with them.[13] The need to be perceived as all knowing, reflects a traditional approach to leadership under which the leader needs to and can possess all the relevant knowledge needed to complete their missions and to reach correct decisions, which contradicts the idea of leadership as the property of the collective.

 

Of course, these characteristics (low psychological security, an approach that commanders know all, a lack of openness to consult and to engage in processes of joint leadership) does not begin with the arrival of commanders to the General Staff arena or the ranks of the senior command. All of these are related to the characteristics of a military organization in which the commanders were trained and developed from the beginning.

One of the characteristics that blocks the development of joint leadership is the dominant leadership structure in the army based on rank and a chain of command that creates inbuilt barriers to the idea of joint leadership. Rank and the chain of command represent a burnished reflection of the power structure in military organizations that creates an easy and clear response to the question of who the leader is. That is, the leadership is clear and certain members of the organization hold much greater power thanks to their rank, status or position.[14]

In the General Staff, the tension that is found between a deep understanding of a content area and subordination to a commander who makes the final decision on policy, is strengthened. Thus, for example, Gal argues[15] that the hierarchical structure in the General Staff creates an automatic preference for the opinion of the commander, misses a significant component of the central and original purpose of the staff – coordination and oversight through joint thought and brainstorming.

It is important to note that some commanders believe that one of the roles of the General Staff is knowledge development:

“I completely agree [that the role of the General Staff is knowledge development]. How does this happen? Firstly, through inquiry – what did I learn? What was? Even in an event where the air force took the lead, I will be there for the debrief. I expect that the staff will do it, but through connecting the field [Northern and Southern Commands] to this.”

(Staff Division Commander)

Nonetheless, relevant mechanisms and methods are not necessarily created, nor are leadership patterns that would support processes of joint knowledge development. It would seem that General Staff commanders, despite the fact that they understand the unique role of the General Staff and the complexity that they are required to manage and in within which they work, struggle ‘to be liberated’ from leadership patterns and leadership modes of action that are more effective in the junior ranks, but less so at their current rank and in the arena in which they work. More importantly, it seems that they do not work with a deep awareness and understanding of the importance and inherent potential of cooperation:

“People miss a huge amount in their understanding of cooperation. In the civilian system I understand that better things are developed through the question of how cooperation can be achieved. This is not sufficiently alive in the military system. Each one goes to his own world.”

(Staff Division Commander)

Organizational Discourse

An additional organizational process through which we can evaluate the existence of models of joint leadership, is the process of organizational discourse. An organizational discourse presents a significant reflection of the existence of joint leadership and is also an essential infrastructure for its creation.[16] This understanding is based on the presumption that a key element in the leadership process in general, and especially in leadership as an organizational process is communication with others. Therefore, in this context, leadership is created and exists through the practice of discourse.[17]

Organizational discourse has several key functions that are relevant to the required action in the General Staff environment. First, organizational discourse brings together a range of fields of expertise that are dispersed among many different people in the organization (where each actor in the organization brings their expertise to the leadership process). Second, organizational discourse constitutes an infrastructure for shaping the context in which commanders work and for the changes and development that are required in a dynamic environment. This is based on an approach that sees organizational change as a process of changing the discourse.[18] Finally, organizational discourse and dialogue enable the promotion of communication between commanders. Good and talented commanders are a necessary but not sufficient condition. If the same talented commanders do not know how to discuss, think, plan, act and learn together, it is likely that systemic failures will take place.[19]

The interviews with the General Staff commanders show that an organizational discourse does not necessarily take place. This is in two senses: First, there are those that argue that there are no platforms, spaces and opportunities for organizational discourse:

“Everything depends on process. Sometimes you work with everybody separately, sit separately with the head and explain to him and build the logic and sometimes you write the minutes beforehand.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“The division of work between the different General Staff directorates is problematic. It doesn’t enable the maximization of the army’s potential. There is a high level of isolation, checks and balances do not exist in a good form.”

(Staff Division Commander)

Second, and perhaps more importantly, according to some of the commanders who were interviewed, the conditions to enable a significant discourse that could create learning and development do not exist. These conditions, as noted, are trust in the other and a recognition of their professionalism, knowledge and capabilities alongside a recognition of the limitations of the power, control and expertise of a single commander.

And so, in addition to commanders who argued that in the General Staff there are good relations between commanders that enable joint work and a discourse that promotes learning, there were also those who argued that intra-organisational and interpersonal relationships in the General Staff do not enable this:

“Joint interests also enable joint work. I considered organising an evening for all the division commanders but there was really no need because there were very good connections between the people. In the past this was not the case.”

(Staff Division Commander)

 “Interpersonal relations and mutual regard that are acquired through years of joint work. As time progressed, cooperation improved. The fact is that they are able to sit together and move things forward. Good things happened because I brought things to the table without ego.”

Staff Division Commander

And in contrast:

“I can bring you notes with curses that were sent around during discussions in the General Staff – ‘the work that you did looks very bad’.”

Staff Division Commander

“Many times, meeting did not take place or minutes were not produced so that there wouldn’t be anything, they are paralysed and unable to say anything. The politics is paralysing.”

Staff Division Commander

A strengthening factor for this argument can be found in the situation assessments that were produced by the IDF’s Behavioural Sciences Department, reflecting the perspective of the senior command, in which some of the officers who were interviewed criticised the limited conceptual and design discourse that took place in the General Staff and the lack of an overall systemic picture. From their perspective, the existing discourse between directorates and the services is very limited and when it does take place, it does not constitute a space for conceptual inquiry. Thus, for example, the limited conceptual dialogue about directions for IDF action led to the fact that the work on force generation for the IDF multi-year plan led was conducted by each body without an integrative perspective: “There is no discourse between the directorates, there is no design discourse – there is no place where the Operations and Planning Directorates sit together, the Operations Directorate and the Ground Force Command. The General Staff does not work as a team in the areas of planning and design.”[20]

If so, it would seem that the characteristics of the General Staff environment indeed create the potential for discourse, while at the same time they also block the creation of a discourse that could enable learning that might lead to the shaping of new and joint concepts. On the one hand, the General Staff is the primary environment within the IDF in which different organizational bodies meet, with each body having a different expertise and the connection between the different fields of expertise and knowledge enabling the broad and overall perspective required from a coordinating body. On the other hand, the differences between the bodies that make up the General Staff, those that are not just reflections of their knowledge and expertise, can also block the practice of discourse created by joint leadership processes. Gal (2012), for example, emphasizes the differences between the different bodies in terms of the culture that characterizes each one of them. The intercultural meeting is indeed fascinating and instructive, but it can also be emotionally loaded and threatening, and sometimes reveals a struggle in which each culture tries to cancel and reduce the value of the other. Intercultural meetings also include the potential for concessions about organizational concepts, values and organizational norms and possibly even resources. All of these obstruct the meeting and the joint discourse that should have been created.

The differences between bodies in the General Staff also reflect the strength and potential influence of each one of them. Bodies that are perceived as large and possessing resources with influence on the mission can define discourse patterns. They can foist their professional concepts and positions and impose them and can even exclude from the discourse other bodies that are likely to challenge their hegemony. In addition, differences between bodies create complexity with respect to the ability to include (or in IDF language to ‘integrate’) the broad knowledge brought by the bodies. The difficulty in including sometimes also creates a hegemonic discourse and the need for a body to control the discussion or joint staff work. Finally, each one of the General Staff bodies strives for greater freedom of action and wants to ‘dictate’ to others and not be dictated to.[21]

The Individual Level – the knowledge, expertise and thought patterns and modes of action of commanders in the General Staff

As noted, leadership in the General Staff environment requires modes of action and thought patterns as well as abilities and capabilities that can enable commanders to lead the systems that they are entrusted with, in light of the challenges created by complex systems (as discussed at the beginning of the article). In general, it can be said that commanders in a complex environment require multidimensional thinking that can encompass the systemic complexity. If and how are these thought patterns and modes of action reflected in the General Staff space?

The perspective of the organizational entirety and managing open systems

From the interviews it was clear that the key response of commanders to the complexity of the environment in which they work is viewing the system as a whole. This is in the sense of understanding all the parts of the system; understanding the mutual influences of bodies and units within the system and outside it; understanding the range of considerations, constraints, needs and interests of different actors within the system and outside it; as well as understanding the inbuilt tensions and paradoxes that this variety creates in a complex system. The commanders in the General Staff perceive thinking of this type as essential because they have the responsibility and commitment to create broad systemic thinking for the IDF as a whole. In the terminology of Yip, Ernst and Campbell,[22] they describe this pattern as “leadership boundary spanning” in which the senior command of an organization works outside its boundaries in order to create joint direction and commitment with others in the implementation of a vision or a lofty goal:

“Each service looks at what is good for it. A corps commander is the only actor that sees the whole picture, the complete operational process, that in order to implement it, one needs to make sure everyone is speaking the same language.”

(Corps Commander)

“You need to look at the national level – infrastructure, social aspects, economic aspects.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“How do you manage the relationship with Israeli society? There are dilemmas with the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Defense, and other security bodies. There is an understanding that there is a national resource pie not just for the army. For example, with the Ministry of Education – we achieved a revolution in technological education. In return for cooperation with the IDF, I ‘collected’ a curriculum that would match the IDF’s curriculum.”

(Staff Division Commander)

From this last quote we learn that viewing the whole picture forces commanders in the General Staff to adopt a mode of action for managing the system that they head as an open system. An open system, on the one hand, includes a greater level of differentiation in comparison to other systems, and on the other hand, has an openness to other systems in the sense that it influences them and is influenced by them. As an open system, an organization creates a border that is partially permeable between it and its environment. In other words, in complex systems, complex reciprocal relations are created such that movement or change in one of its elements creates highly significant changes in the remaining elements, such that a new whole is eventually created. Therefore, in managing open systems, the leader needs to understand how a new systemic entirety is likely be created as a result of changes that might have a positive effect locally, to evaluate possible unintended consequences and to manage the border between the system that they head and the other systems that are influenced by it and influence it.[23]

As noted, it seems that the interviewee in the last quote based his actions on a broad understanding of the implications of his actions on Israeli society and the reverse. In this sense, he perceived the IDF and Israeli society as open systems that maintain reciprocal relations of mutual influence. The interviews show that other commanders also understand the close relations and permeable borders between the IDF and Israeli society and even act based on this understanding:

“We are authorized to nationalise everything. Buses, petrol stations, vehicles. I said, let’s take the minimum necessary. In this role, you have to look at the broad aspects. Civilians for example.”

(Staff Division Commander)

This pattern characterises the Brigadier General level, which is required to have learning capabilities, the ability to interpret and environmental analysis at a national level.[24] Indeed, as can be seen from the interviews of commanders in the General Staff, different operational routines, resource decisions and decisions related to the recruitment of soldiers are also made based on broad social considerations. From their perspective, they cannot be satisfied with a military understanding alone, and they must expand their understanding to include the national aspects that influence and are influenced by their decisions.

As opposed to relations with Israeli society, similar comments about mutual influences between systems within the organization hardly arose. As noted above, the relations between different systems that comprise the organization are conceptualised and perceived by the commanders primarily in relation to interests. In this sense, staff commanders understand that there are mutual influences, but these are primarily influences based on interests and there is no deep or complex analysis of these influences.

It seems unlikely that staff commanders do not understand the complexity and the power of the existing influence between the systems they head, and other systems in the General Staff. The explanation is intrinsic to the characteristics of the General Staff and the relations between commanders as discussed above: the lack of a clear orientation for joint learning, lower psychological security for taking chances, minimal organizational discourse, acting in an environment saturated with politics and interests that encourage action based only on a sectoral orientation and blocks the ability to act based on broad and systemic needs.

If so, it would seem that for commanders in the General Staff it is easier to maintain an open system with actors outside the IDF (social and civilian) and to act based on an understanding of their interests, needs, goals and considerations. This is despite the fact that the social and civilian logics of action and thought are in many cases different from those used in the IDF and may even contradict them. On the other hand, action based on an understanding of the needs of other systems within the organization is perceived as highly ‘threatening’ – likely to lead to a loss (of resources or prestige) or concession (about approaches, needs or autonomy).

An additional impediment to a systemic approach arises in the interviews with corps commanders. They argued that while they engage in thought and contemplation about the whole, the relevant staffs do not use this type of thought and contemplation and do not enable them to exert influence from a systemic position. They attributed this primarily to an increase in the dominance of the resource discourse over the professional discourse in the General Staff. This discourse, from their standpoint, limits the systemic perspective and their capability to achieve influence based on their systemic position:

“I didn’t meet with the Chief of Staff in my position. I would have expected that the Chief of Staff would ask a corps commander to present systemic issues. My general would go with the Head of the [Corps] Planning and Organization Department to the General Staff because the resource axis is dominant over the professional axis […] and visits to the General Staff were primarily to seek clarification and present explanations.”

(Corps Commander)

It is also likely that a discourse of this type is related to a limited familiarity with the professions of each of the bodies. Familiarity, or even a limited recognition of the professions of the bodies, as noted, creates an incomplete and frequently shallow discourse about the issues that they deal with (as we saw above):

“With the length of the meeting and the number of participants, you don’t manage to achieve depth. Comments by all the participants in 30 minutes. There is no discussion in the army, there are meetings.”

(Corps Commander)

Managing the edges of tensions

An additional mode of action that is required from leaders working in a complex system environment, is a capability to connect between the edges of tensions. This is based on an understanding that complex systems include within them, in a structured manner, tensions and paradoxes that make up a part of the whole. And indeed, the commanders in the General Staff noted the range of tensions within which they are required to manage and with which they must deal. These are created within the demands space and reflect the constraints and actors that they must take into account.

In general, one can identify within the interviews two key characteristics of the General Staff environment that require commanders in this arena to manage the edges of tensions. The General Staff environment is characterized by many action axis including: the professional axis that includes the maximization and promotion of broad force generation processes and managing and synchronizing reciprocal relations; the operational axis that includes preparation for emergency and crisis situations, maintaining and improving combat readiness and fitness; the economic axis that includes a response to the missions while prioritizing and maximizing resources in an era of budget streamlining and organizational change; the human resources axis that includes fostering the sector of the Israeli population that serves in the IDF within a framework that can develop it, maintain it and strengthen it; and the national environment axis that requires a national and social outlook, understanding and the management of army-society relations. The meeting of each of these axes creates a space saturated with paradoxes and complexity.

In connection with this, action in the General Staff environment requires commanders, to concurrently engage in thought and action on different levels, which also creates tensions. While doing so, commanders in the General Staff clearly note the tensions between systemic thought and sectoral thought; between long-term and short-term thinking; between strategic and tactical thinking; between an understanding of the parts and seeing and understanding the whole; and between a General Staff orientation and a service, directorate or command orientation.

In the interviews with the commanders, one can identify two patterns for dealing with the tensions created when working in the General Staff environment. There are commanders who point out that they work at the two edges of the tension – both the tactical level and the strategic level or for both the long-term and the short term, etc. This is done while finding a balance between the two edges and utilizing a flexible approach that enables them to maneuver between the edges – in certain contexts to place a greater emphasis on one edge of the tension, and in other contexts on the other edge. Furthermore, some of the commanders worked based on a ‘complimentary opposing assumption,’ according to which opposing forces exist in order to complement one another. For example, there are commanders who maintain that the tactical and local actions that they implement (which are reflected in “a connection to the field”) are those that enable a strategic understanding and the ability to plan for the long-term:

“Division commanders also have different elements of action, this one connects you to the staff, this one to the field. When you deal only with planning, it is hard to continue. When you continue to visit the commands and the services and you understand the tensions – this is the connection to the field.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“The game is in between bringing solutions now and the value in future investment. These are decisions that have influence from the routine to the strategic – everything is mixed together.”

(Staff Division Commander)

Nevertheless, even commanders who do not choose a particular direction for action within the tension, feel that they are expected to decide. From their perspective, their colleagues in the General Staff frequently do not understand that a tension exists and that there is a need to balance and even connect the edges to create systemic and complete action.

“You can’t tell the General Staff that there won’t be enough soldiers in [a particular infantry brigade…] because the recruits don’t want to serve there. On the other hand, we promised the new recruits that each one would be given an assignment out of their first three priorities, and this creates no small amount of tension. There was great friction in my period when there were human resource gaps and the defense budget was cut. There was tension with the Deputy Chief of Staff and with the Planning Directorate on how to improve the human resources response. We were told, see how many soldiers there are in the Kirya (IDF GHQ), why are there so many soldiers in the adjutancy?”

(Staff Division Commander)

And indeed, some of the commanders who were interviewed chose to make decisions and to emphasize one specific vector in their work:

“The head of the Planning Division in the Planning Directorate, also in the Operations Directorate, and the head of the Planning and HR Administration Division – their primary efforts in life were dealing with routine. They would be transgressing against their functions if their second challenge was not the strategic perspective of several years forward and they were only drawn into the day-to-day.”

(Staff Division Commander)

“The focus of a Corps Commander is too little on the professional and too much on resources. We look at what is done with the shekel that we have. Instead, we need to say that we have a profession – how the future battlefield should look, and in light of this where should we place our shekel.”

(Corps Commander)

On the other hand, Gal (2010) argues that multi-functionality and redundancy characterize the General Staff and generate tensions (between force generation and employment, and between the service headquarters and the coordinating and integrating body) that reflect the complexity of the General Staff environment, and he proposes that one does not necessarily relate to these redundancies as a disadvantage, but rather as an advantage or at least an inherent characteristic of the General Staff as a complex system.

Enriching the Connections within the Organization and Creating an Organizational Culture of Learning

The pattern of creating organizational agreements ‘from above’ is also reflected in everything related to the creation of networks and connections within each unit. As we showed at the beginning of the article, leadership in a complex environment requires action within a networked space and the creation of networks of connections for implementing the organization’s missions. It is not enough that commanders create networks and work within them. Leaders need to enrich the connections within the organization – to shape new connections where they don’t exist and to improve existing connections. Enriching the connections within an organization is one of the most significant ways to plant seeds of creation that can enable, encourage and awaken bottom-up processes and encourage significant organisational initiatives and processes through connecting knowledge and expertise spread throughout the organization. In other words, enriching the connections within an organization encourages the creation and self-organization which are important infrastructure for achieving broader influence within the system.

From the interviews with the commanders, we can see that they devote time and effort to creating networks by themselves. On the other hand, they deal less with creating and enriching the connections among their subordinates. As can be seen from the quote above, and the remarks of additional commanders, the connections are made primarily by the commander at the head of the organization. In the words of the interviewees: “at the commander’s table.”

“The challenge is to create a staff of division commanders who work together around the table of the Deputy Chief of Staff.”

(Former Staff Division Commander)

“All of the engineers, field personnel – everyone sits at the table. These are different populations and it is no small challenge to create partnership. I worked on this because there is enormous added value to the ability to connect between these people.”

(Former Corps Commander)

“In my understanding, the expectation from senior commanders in the General Staff, with an emphasis on the rank of colonel and above who deal with different content worlds (force generation or operational), is to be involved in and to influence the overall product and on the aggregate effectiveness and not just to represent the areas that are under their direct responsibility. Given that this expectation is almost never realised, the Chief of Staff has very few officers with the capability for objective observation who could constitute for him a genuine ‘Board’.”

(Staff Division Commander)

It appears that commanders understand the importance of creating links and the contribution of connections to implementing the mission, to organisational processes and to the professionalism of the organization. And indeed, as we have shown, new approaches to leadership emphasise that the key role of the leader in a complex environment is to create connections. Nevertheless, enriching the connections and links (within a unit and between units) requires the creation of additional mechanisms and processes aside from joint meetings at the commander’s table. Senior commanders are responsible for the creation of an organisational culture that provides the context in which their personnel work. As a part of shaping the organisational culture, they are required to create conditions that enable the formation of networks of connections and joint efforts through the local initiatives of various personnel within the unit (and not just the commander). If we return to the understandings of the beginning of the article, indeed, in order to succeed in a complex environment, a lone commander cannot be the sole generator of processes, initiatives and work patterns. Consequently, they also cannot be the only one generating links and connections between the different people in the organization.

Military leaders, primarily at the senior level and in complex work environments, need to shape the values, positions and practices that enable connections and cooperation. While doing so, they need to build trust in the ‘other’ and recognition of their professionalism; and to recognize the limits of power, control and expertise of the individual (even if they are the commander). They need to encourage discourse between different actors within the organization, even if it isn’t directed, controlled and supervised ‘from above’; and they must not relate to a discourse that develops ‘from below’ as irrelevant, superfluous or even ‘subversive.’ In addition, commanders must engage and promote consultative processes, to enable themselves and others to be in a position of ‘not knowing’ without feeling that a lack of knowledge is a weakness or damages their command authority and professionalism.[25]

Enriching the connections within an organization also provides the infrastructure for creating a learning organization. A learning organization is one in which the personnel continually learn how to learn together and how to cultivate new thought patterns that broaden opinions and consequently improve the ability to create the desired outcomes.[26]

Conclusions and Implications

The assumption with which we began this research was that in the General Staff environment, leadership is required that could provide a response that would enable commanders to cope with the characteristics of a complex environment. In other words, leadership patterns and leadership practices are required – at the individual level and the systems level – that enable coping with varied actors, interests, considerations and needs; with networks of interactions that create complex patterns of conflictual constraints, of tensions and reciprocal relations; with a dynamic environment that changes frequently and rapidly; with an organisational world that is not linear and is characterised by a lack of stability and uncertainty; and with processes of self-organization and spontaneity that are created by the dynamism of reciprocal relations in a complex system.

As arose in the interviews with the commanders in the General Staff – staff division commanders and corps commanders – the commanders themselves identified the system in which they worked as a complex system with all the characteristics of one. Accordingly, they implement different elements of the required leadership in a complex environment. The most prominent practice that they identified is the creation of a network of connections that constitute, in essence, the primary space in which they work. Additional practices that the commanders identified were: working based on a systemic understanding and seeing the whole picture; working based on an understanding of the mutual influences between different systems that are open systems with permeable borders; and an understanding of the tensions created in the complex and complicated environment in which they work.

Nevertheless, there are additional elements of leadership in a complex environment that were not identified by the commanders who were interviewed, and it appears that they are not part of their leadership repertoire. Consequently, we can identify a number of implications for the process of leadership development for senior commanders in the General Staff.

At the structural level – the key response that is required is the creation of training programs for those assigned to General Staff roles at different ranks, especially for officers who arrived from the ‘field’ and for whom this is their first role in the General Staff. The existing trainings are mainly for higher ranks (LTC and Col) and not for the middle ranks. These trainings should include several elements that arise from the understandings about the General Staff environment as presented in this article.

Leadership development processes need to focus on the development of networked leadership. The assumption is that over the years, commanders in the General Staff have participated in leadership development processes that focused on developing personal leadership capabilities, expertise and skills (‘classic’ leadership development). Therefore, upon arriving at the General Staff these require less emphasis, and instead the focus should be on developing the ability of commanders to work with others; the ability to recognize their own weaknesses and as a result to build teams based on personnel with the complimentary capabilities; and the ability to learn how to benefit from difference and diversity among the personnel in the organization.

While we have shown that creating networks of connections is a key practice that commanders in the General Staff implement, the primary use made of these networks is to enlist different actors (commanders, colleagues and subordinates) to support the commander’s decisions on the path that they have chosen. There was almost no use of these networks to create joint leadership or networked leadership that would enable the development of reciprocal relations and connections from which initiatives, knowledge, creativity, directions for action and learning might develop. To do this, networked leadership development is required at three levels: the conceptual level of an individual’s interpretation of reality (organizational, operational, social); the experiential level that relates to the way in which an individual perceives themselves in their encounter with reality; and the behavioral level that is comprised of behaviors that can help lead an organization to genuine change.[27]

As can be seen from the commander’s remarks, at the conceptual level they do understand the characteristics of the complex environment within which they work and know how to map and identify every direction for action in the General Staff as well as the constraints, tensions and paradoxes that they create. At the experiential level is important to develop and strengthen elements that can create stability and capabilities such as ‘not-knowing,’ trust, extended responsibility[28] and the ability to influence from a position of partnership (and not necessarily as a leader). For example, in order to deal with unknowns there is great importance to developing ‘empty capabilities’ – the ability to live with the doubts and unknowns without giving into the immediate urge to fill them with action and information. Of course, this is alongside the development of ‘complete capabilities’ that cover the spheres of knowledge, experience and expertise that are needed to fulfil a leadership role.[29] In addition, in order to develop extended responsibility (derived from the extended sphere of influence of commanders in the General Staff) a commander needs to develop a sphere of interest that is much wider than their immediate or potential sphere of interest. This can be done, for example, by researching the modes of action of foreign armies and with assistance from other organizations.[30] In the unique context of the General Staff environment, it is also necessary to develop a positive stance towards the meeting created in the General Staff space between different bodies, based on a recognition of the benefits derived as well as the inherent difficulties.[31]

In addition, development processes need to include the conceptual development of the characteristics of the General Staff as an organizational asset, despite its inherent difficulties. There should be a focus on the advantages of connections made not just on the basis of interests and not just from a position of power or alternatively an inferior position. That is, commanders should develop the ability to ‘exploit’ and maximize the characteristics of the General Staff environment, especially the potential for meeting and connections in this environment for learning, new knowledge development and the creation of solutions. At the behavioral level, it is necessary to provide relevant and significant tools that can enable the creation of networks of sharing and cooperation, the enabling of disorder, personal and organizational resilience and creativity.[32]

All of these require us to grapple with questions and dilemmas, which are worth delving into and being dealt with through leadership development processes. These include, authority over people “who are not mine,” cooperation where the benefit for me is not clear, the ability to influence from the position of a partner, questions of commitment and working when faced with different interests, etc.

Networked leadership is also a significant infrastructure for the development of the adaptive leadership that is needed to lead complex systems. This is because in a complex environment, leading significant changes that can enable an organization or army to undergo change in a shifting environment and retain its relevance, can only be achieved by the actions of many. It is not enough to have personal authority or charisma to create significant change.[33]

Following on from the development of networked leadership, leadership development processes need to include the development of a concept of the commander’s role that also includes responsibility for shaping the organisational culture in their units and the General Staff environment in a manner that enables the process of learning and creating connections – their own, their subordinates and their colleagues. Commanders should be given tools to shape the context in which they and their subordinates work and in so doing also the positions, values, objectives and practices that shape the organization over time. To do this, leadership in the General Staff environment needs to be based on commanders’ self-confidence; the capability and commitment of their subordinates to ongoing learning; a lack of fear of making mistakes, building trust and recognising the professionalism of the other; engaging in consultative processes without perceiving a lack of knowledge as a weakness; assisting subordinates to see and to understand their unit from a systemic perspective; and the constant and joint evaluation of the fundamental assumptions of the organization. In this sense, we are expanding on the argument that we have made up till now, that commanders in the General Staff environment need to implement a strategic perspective and to lead from that perspective. It is not enough for leaders to think and act this way by themselves, rather they also need to develop the capabilities of their subordinates to think and work within a systemic prism and within the complex dynamic of the system.

An additional element for leadership development processes of General Staff commanders is the development of systemic thinking and action. As a rule, there is great importance that General Staff commanders lead the system for which they have responsibility based on a systemic concept. This would allow them to succeed in leading their missions in a flexible manner, adapted as a complete and more effective system and based on a broad and long-term understanding of the implications and consequences of their leadership actions. The use of systemic ‘glasses’ enables commanders to analyse every organisational event at every level of complexity. Consequently, there arises the need to develop systemic thought tools and systemic action as a component of leadership development processes.

Firstly, commanders should develop the ability to integrate two thought patterns: linear thought – analytical thought based on breaking issues into components; and process and non-linear thought that is based on the principles of dynamism and movement. Process thought is abstract thought based on the ability to identify reciprocal relations between processes and subsystems and on the capability to identify expected developments, based on logical connections, above and beyond specific events and developments. This type of thought enables, for example, the correct identification of optimal pressure points through multidimensional reflection encompassing systemic complexity.

Furthermore, the development processes need to include the ability to be inclusive and to deal with a reality comprised of opposing forces in competition with one another, but at the same time complementing one another. This should, first and foremost, be through the development of concepts and thinking among commanders about managing tensions and creating connections between the edges of the tensions (and not just through divisions and distinctions between different elements in leadership action). For example, from the interviews we can learn that commanders in the General Staff environment are required to create connections between long-term thought and action and short-term thought and action; between sectoral thinking and systemic thinking; and between strategy and tactics. Likewise, they need to create connections between the different axes that comprise the General Staff environment, and in which the meeting point between these axes creates tensions that are built into the commanders’ actions: the professional axis, the operational axis, the resource axis and the social-national axis.

The development of systemic thinking also includes the development of an understanding of the importance of relationships within the system. From the interviews with the commanders we can see that they have a good understanding of the importance of relationships and their influence on the work and action patterns in the General Staff. An expression of this can be found in the argument that was cited repeatedly in the interviews, that in the General Staff “everything is personal.” Consequently, a transition is required from thinking about the components of the system to thinking about the quality of the interactions between the components. The ability to understand the behaviour of one actor is frequently dependent on the ability to understand their relations with the other. Accordingly, the leadership capabilities of commanders in complex environments should be developed, especially in the General Staff, in a manner that would enable them to primarily focus on the quality of the interactions between the different parts of their organization and on managing the interface between them.

Developing an understanding of relationships in the General Staff environment also requires the development of a deep understanding of the connection to organisational politics and how to act in light of this. As can be seen in the remarks of the commanders in the General Staff, most identify the General Staff as a political environment. Indeed, while action in a political environment is the domain of senior commanders in the IDF in general,[34] it is intensified within the General Staff in light of the great difficulty in creating influence. The occasional overlap that exists between the different fields of responsibility of the different bodies in the General Staff intensifies the question of the relevance of each one of the bodies and challenges their scope of influence over processes, results and decision-making. Additionally, the autonomy and power of the directorates, services and regional commands also reduce the ability to influence and to generate organisational power.[35]

All of these intensify the power relations within the General Staff and in practice, the organisational politics. And indeed, the characterisation of the General Staff as an environment saturated with politics repeatedly arose in the remarks of the commanders in different contexts. Many of them, as with IDF commanders in general, attribute negative connotations to the term organisational politics, especially those of power, inappropriate decision-making, a lack of courage to express an opinion and the creation of ‘subversive’ coalitions.

However, if we accept the systemic assumption that there is great importance to understanding the relations between the different elements within a system, indeed there is also great importance to understanding the organizational politics (which are an inherent characteristic in any system of relations). In order to generate organizational power, commanders in the General Staff environment should be assisted to identify, recognize and map key figures in the organization and its environment, their sources of power, connections between people and groups, the interests of individuals and groups, coalitions of interest groups and open and hidden conflicts. Consequently, commanders should be assisted with leadership development processes to develop practices and modes of action such as creating connections, promoting initiatives, maximizing opportunities, standing out, and communicativeness etc.[36]

It is important to emphasise that dealing with organisational politics does not suggest that commanders work only to promote their personal interests. Rather, as ‘players’ in the organization, they act based on a number of assumptions and in a number of ways: each one works in his field, according to the rules and procedures of the organization and the orders of their superiors. That is, they act in a rationalistic manner that enables the organization to produce results. In parallel, they work in an emotional manner, based on utilitarianism and a desire to increase their personal utility. In addition, they use their influence on other actors in the organization to gain control of resources and to ensure desirable outcomes.[37]

Finally, developing systemic thought and action requires the development of an identity among the commanders in the General Staff as ‘general command senior staff’ and as General Staff officers. While those at the rank of Brigadier General are defined as the ‘general command senior staff,’ aside from this definition, there are no identity shaping processes to increase their cross-IDF identities. For example, even the unit tag worn by General Staff officers is the tag of their directorate and not the General Staff (as happens in the Operations and Planning Directorates). Additionally, many officers only arrive at a position in the General Staff at a relatively advanced stage in their careers (LTC/COL ranks) and therefore, initially, they identify more strongly with the needs of their directorate than with the cross-organizational perspective required of the General Staff. Linked to this, we propose that processes that are intended to shape a systemic concept (and in so doing to shape a General Staff and cross-IDF identity), for example training courses for new colonels, take place jointly with the participation of all senior officers.

Additionally, we recommend that training on specific topics be run in joint forums that could enable a broad General Staff perspective among key functionaries in the General Staff. A good example of this is the training of staff division commanders that took place several years ago and the Corps Commanders Forum, which is headed by the Head of the Manpower Directorate.

 

In summary, we have seen in this article how the General Staff environment demands leadership based on ideas and principles within the systemic paradigm: leadership that works within a medium while also creating it. This is based on an awareness and understanding that knowledge created in a complex system is not only developed within the different organizational bodies, but also in the medium between them – the ‘in between’ sphere.[38] This is how the knowledge, expertise and leadership skills that we have outlined throughout this article are derived (creating connections between the edges of tensions, creating connections between people and bodies within the organization, flexibility of thought and action, understanding the existing relations within the system, promoting individual and joint learning, etc.) However, of no less importance is the implementation of a model of joint leadership, leadership created and formed through the reciprocal relations between commanders in the General Staff. In this manner, based on these connections and the relationships between the commanders in the General Staff, leadership products of new and joint knowledge, initiatives, solutions, organisational processes, extended responsibility and innovation can be created.

Leadership of this type focuses on sensitive missions that are more important than those associated with a sole leader under the traditional approach. While the traditional approach to leadership assumes that leaders dictate direction, make the key decisions and develop the esprit de corps, in reality leaders and leadership in the General Staff cannot suffice with just leading people. They need to base themselves on creating the ‘seeds of formation,’ and harnessing the knowledge of individuals and bodies for the good of the joint mission and creating a learning organization. Therefore, this is not the end of leadership but rather a new path for leadership.

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• Tobi, S., Cohen-Rosenberg, G., Zomer-Blitzer, A., Principles for Developing Military Leadership, IDF School for Leadership Development, 2012. [Hebrew]
• Tobi, S., & Padan, C., “Military Leadership in an Age of Complex Systems,” Mirrors on Leadership, Vol. 3, 2011. [Hebrew]
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• Yip, J., Ernst, C. & Campbell, M., Boundary Spanning Leadership, Center for Creative Leadership (CCL®), Organizational Leadership White Paper Series, 2011.

 

 

[1] Ms. Sarit Tobi is the Head of the Research Desk in the IDF School for Leadership Development, and Major Rom Liraz serves as an organizational advisor to the Central Command.

[2] See for example: A. Kuppershchmidt, From Developing Commanders to Developing Leadership: A Proposal for a concept of Leadership Development for the Senior Command Echelon in the IDF, IDF School for Leadership Development, 2007 [Hebrew]; H. Jaeger Zelinger, S. Della Pergola, K. Shachaf, The Brigadier General as a Specific Case of Senior Command in the IDF – Challenges, Characteristics and Understandings, IDF School for Leadership Development, 2011 [Hebrew]; H. Jaeger Zelinger, K. Shachaf, S. Della Pergola, “Looking from the Gallery – the Phenomenon of Military Seniority through the Lens of Senior Civilian Leaders Who Retired from the IDF,” Mirrors on Leadership, 4, 2011, pp. 72-84 [Hebrew]; M. Seng, Leapfrogging at the Level of Brigadier General: A Proposal for an Integrative Model, IDF Behavioral Sciences Department, 2011 [Hebrew].

[3] E. Razi and P. Yehezkeally, Real Life is Not Linear: Introduction to Complex System Theory, Israel National Defence College Research Centre, 2012, https://bit.ly/2RxB0QK. [Hebrew]

[4]  M. Uhl-Bien, R. Marion & B. McKlelvey, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era,” The Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 18, pp. 298-318.

[5] R. Marion & M. Uhl-Bein, “Leadership in Complex Organizations,” The Leadership Quarterly, 12(4), 2001.

[6] P.C. Nelson, D.J. Van Ameijde, N. Van Merus & J. Billsbery, An Empirical Study of the Factors Influencing the Emergence of Distributed Leadership, 2006.

[7] D.R. Lindsay, D.V. Day & S.M Halpin, “Shared Leadership in the Military: Reality, Possibility, or Pipedream?” Military Psychology, 23, 2011, pp. 528-549.

[8] Source: Martin Grandjean, goo.gl/D1xvQp

[9] The interviews with the heads of the different corps were conducted for a research project which dealt with leadership challenges faced by the heads of IDF corps as a specific case of senior command in the IDF (Liraz and Tobi, 2014). For this current research, the interviews were analyzed again.

[10] D.R. Lindsay et al., op. cit.

[11] M. Seng, op. cit.

[12] D.R. Lindsay, et al., op. cit.

[13] H. Jaeger Zelinger, et. al., “Looking from the Gallery…,” op. cit.

[14] D.R. Lindsay et al., op. cit.

[15] N. Gal, “Where did the Supreme Command and the General Staff Directorate Disappear?” Ma’arachot, Vol. 431, 2010, pp. 9-15. [Hebrew]

[16] S. Tobi, G. Cohen-Rosenberg, A. Zomer-Blitzer, Principles for Developing Military Leadership, IDF School for Leadership Development, 2012. [Hebrew]

[17] A. Kuppershchmidt, op. cit.

[18] F. Ford, “Organizational Change as Shifting Conversations," Journal of Organizational Change Management, Vol. 12, No. 6, 1999, pp. 480-500.

[19] A. Kuppershchmidt, op. cit.

[20] R. Liraz & D. Omer-Avital, IDF Assessments from the Perspective of the Senior Command: Strategy and Force Generation in a Changing Social Economic Reality, IDF Behavioral Sciences Department, 2014. [Hebrew]

[21] L. Gal, Between Dialogue and Hegemony –Intercultural Discourse and the General Staff, IDF Behavioral Sciences Department, 2012. [Hebrew]

[22] J. Yip, C. Ernst, & M. Campbell, Boundary Spanning Leadership, Center for Creative Leadership (CCL®), Organizational Leadership White Paper Series, 2011.

[23] R. Marion et al. “Leadership in Complex Organizations,” op. cit.

[24] M. Seng, op. cit.

[25] S. Tobi & A. Alphia-Diment, Developing Military Leadership - Professional Doctrine, IDF Behavioral Sciences Department, 2014. [Hebrew]

[26] P. M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, Crown Publishing Group, 2010.

[27] A. Shrift & A. Eisenberg, “Leadership in the Post-Modern Age,” Ma’arachot 462, 2015, pp. 48-55. [Hebrew]

[28] Ibid.

[29] A. Kuppershchmidt, op. cit.

[30] H. Jaeger Zelinger, et. al., The Brigadier General…, op. cit.

[31] L. Gal, op. cit.

[32] A. Shrift & A. Eisenberg, op. cit.

[33] R. Heifetz, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership: Tools and Tactics for Changing Your Organization, Harvard University Press, 2009.

[34] H. Jaeger Zelinger, et. al., The Brigadier General…, op. cit.

[35] L. Gal, op. cit.

[36] A. Levy, Consultation, Change and Politics, Presentation to the I.P.A. Israel International Police Association, 2011. [Hebrew]

[37] Y. Samuel, The Political Game: Power and Influence in Organizations, Kinneret, Zmora, Bitan, Dvir Publications, 2002. [Hebrew]

[38] E. Razi and P. Yehezkeally, op. cit.