The Effort to Recreate the IDF

 

Introduction

When was the IDF established? At first glance, this is a simple trivia question with an answer: 26 May 1948, within the framework of the “Defense Army of Israel 1948” Ordinance, which was signed by the Head of the Provisional Government at the time, David Ben Gurion.[2]

However, if we accept that the legacy of the underground paramilitary organizations which existed prior to 1948 provided the basis for the fighting spirit of the IDF, then the IDF was really “established” at the time of the founding of these paramilitary organizations. These organizations left a legacy as Jewish defense forces, and therefore the establishment of the Haganah organization in June 1920 could be considered a reasonable answer to the question. In fact, the starting point of this article is not only that the IDF was not “founded in a day,” but also that it was not established just one time. Here are some additional relevant examples to demonstrate the IDF’s “age”: It is commonly accepted that the IDF is “the People’s Army.” In the modern age, the idea of establishing an army of the masses based on compulsory conscription (Levée en masse) took off after the French Revolution.[3] The idea was closely associated with the birth of nationalism, and was one of the principal tools Napoleon used to build the extensive French military force at the end of the 18th century. Consequently, one of the founding principles of the IDF, “our” people’s army, is over two hundred years old.

“The Chief of the General Staff is the sole operational commander within the IDF. He is the commander of all of operations conducted by the IDF, through the General Command.” [4]

The Commander of the IDF is the Head of the General Staff. Simply put, the idea of a General Command in charge of the combat forces was developed along the lines of two basic models during the 19th century in Germany and France. Both models use a division into Operations, Manpower, Logistics and other services. From there, these two models were adopted by all of the standing national armed forces. In short, the IDF General Staff is a development of the German model with adaptations from the French model (which trickled down through the US Armed Forces) with local adaptations (a legacy of the paramilitary organizations, in particular the Palmach) – therefore the IDF’s staff concept is 150 years old.

Moving on. Staff work in the IDF, like in all armed forces, is characteristic of work methods in the public sector across the globe, and is the outcome of the development of state bureaucracies and the creation of a management class within the financial sector in the 20th century after the expansion of the industrial revolution. The German thinker Max Weber and the American engineer Frederick W. Taylor are the fathers of modern bureaucracy and management. The IDF, therefore functions according to 100 year old norms.

“The IDF will provide a response to two types of demands from the political echelon: The first –the demand that the IDF achieve a full, clear and decisive military defeat [of its adversary] .” [5]

The decisive defeat concept of the IDF, as an organizing principle for managing an army during wartime (which in itself developed a “canonical,” ahistorical and almost holy significance in the pursuit of victory in major armed conflict between conventional armies of states), is also rooted in military thinking, mostly from the second half of the 19th century. The organizing principle for the management of the IDF is therefore 150 years old.

Continuing on. The traditional approach adopted by the IDF to defeat the forces of enemy states (by the way, has anyone seen any of these lately?) ‐ focused on the tactic of seeking a breakthrough based on artillery (and not the indirect approach) with the support of infantry and airpower (which matured prior to the 1967 Six Day War) – is just an adoption of the German lessons from World War I. This lesson (Blitzkrieg) was implemented not unsuccessfully during World War II, and was also adopted by different armed forces in the period after the war. Therefore, the IDF’s decisive defeat concept is 80 years old.[6]

Lastly, in practice, the combat approach utilized by the IDF in the last generation – a standoff warfare approach based on shifting the military center of gravity from maneuver to standoff fires – has its source in the vision of the Italian General Giulio Douhet from the beginning of the 20th century, a period when a new technology, the airplane, were being integrated into modern armies. The strategy was demonstrated (with improvements from the precision munitions era) during the first Gulf war in 1991 and during the American‐led NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999. The IDF developed its own original methods to implement the idea of decisive force from the air, and has implemented them (with partial success, it must be said)[7] over the last generation, from the Operations Accountability and Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon in the 1990s, during the Second Lebanon War, and including the frequent rounds of fighting against Hamas in Gaza. That being the case, the roots of the current prevailing key concept of operations in the IDF – the prevailing concept of standoff warfare – were set down by thinkers 90 years ago.[8]

In summary ‐ this introductory chapter was intended to establish two contentions that are the starting point for this article: The first contention holds that the IDF was not established close to the establishment of the State of Israel, and that its foundation date in reality, is an amalgamation of 150 years of history, during which ideas and experiences developed within the unique historical experience of Jewish nationalism under fire.

The second contention, and the more significant for us, holds that the IDF was not founded just once, and that the work of “founding the IDF” (and indeed any other armed forces) which takes place every generation or two, is a natural act that needs to be adapted to current and future challenges. This is a necessary process even if it is difficult and painful to achieve.

On the basis of these two contentions, I will present the central argument of this article:

Like any other organization, armed forces are not frozen entities, and they adapt themselves to the changing environment. While necessity is a sufficient condition for a limited process of ‘adaptation’ which mostly takes place far from the organization’s centers of power and is internalized, “re‐establishment” or fundamental change in the form of "transformation" is much more complex. It requires a considerable ongoing investment of surplus energy and effort from the senior command echelon to radiate change from the “middle to the outer edges” of the organization. Furthermore, in light of the close attachment of organizations to their strategies, an army that wishes to undertake fundamental changes to its strategy must initiate deep change within itself, such that a different approach to force design is a necessary condition for implementing a different force employment.

And in the case of the IDF: The coming decade must be dedicated to re‐establishing and rebuilding the IDF, in order to allow it to adopt a more relevant strategy for future challenges. The “Gideon” multiyear plan which has been publicized in the media in recent months, is the first step – and certainly not the last – on a long road in the right direction. In the coming years the implementation will require from the IDF leadership decisiveness, initiative and stubbornness – capabilities which might be called “organizational generalship.”

In this article I will try to make clear why wide‐scale reforms are needed in the IDF, in essence a "reestablishment" of the organization. This will be covered in the second part of the article. In the third part I will describe the reforms that the IDF needs to undertake in the coming decade (and possibly longer). The fourth part will present proposed principles to jump‐start a process of change and reestablishment[9] which will increase the chances that this long march will reach its destination – in order that in the future we will be able to look back and say that in the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, a new chapter in IDF history began. A chapter which will be assessed as a "reestablishment."

The Map is No Longer the Territory – The Changes in the Environment that the IDF Operates in[10]

Firstly, with regard to continuity vs. change, it is important to clarify that not everything in the environment has changed, and of the actors that have changed, some may turn on their heels and return to what they were in the past. For the purposes of this article I would like to highlight ten changes. They will be described very briefly, and their entire purpose is to make clear the situation in which the IDF has been operating for some time – a state of incongruence between it and the environment that it operates in.[11]

The international environment – when regional conflicts meet global competition

Fear, honor and interests, opined the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, are what drive the history of mankind. Everything that has been written since in the field of international relations is a development and expansion of this analysis. If we accept Thucydides’s argument, then the international relations system is indeed contains contradictory elements. The specific appearances of conflicts or the collaborations which are influenced by them, changes in accord with social, economic, geo‐strategic and technological characteristics of the time, place and spirit of the particular period.

The collapse of the Soviet Union which took place in the previous generation was a blinding and exceptional event. So were the September 11 attacks which took place a decade later. The supremely dazzling nature of these two events made it difficult for us to recognize the tectonic processes that shaped the current global system – the United States, still the strongest world power, has had its fill of long wars, and the technological gap between it and its competitors on the global and regional playing fields (China, Russian and Iran) is eroding. Moreover, the global economic system which was shaped in the mold of the United States is being weakened. The superpower is evaluating its interests with regard to these changes, and the importance of American interests in the Middle East.

The System of Norms and Value – What is Possible is no Longer Advisable

“Force shall be activated in a determined manner to achieve the political goals, while operating in accordance with international law with an emphasis on the Rules of War while preserving the legitimacy of the State of Israel.”[12]

Israel, including the IDF, has been engaged for over a decade in a diplomatic‐legal battle which was initiated by the Palestinians and is being led by them. The struggle against the construction of the security barrier was a sign of the beginning of this battle in the form we are familiar with today. The struggle against this separation fence, as well as against the Goldstone Report which was written after Operation Cast Lead, and the manner in which the IDF conducted the two military campaigns and the legal battle which accompanied them, all demonstrate the deep change which has taken place at the global level with regard to battlefield norms and values, which Israel finds itself in the middle of. The level of expectations of the IDF has risen dramatically, and is therefore relevant to an article about changes in the external operating environment of the IDF and the entire defense establishment. These changes requires significant adaptations by the IDF.

Extensive criticism of the Israeli government and the IDF was voiced, for the alleged lack of conformity with the basic principles of international law such as ‘distinction’ and ‘proportionality,’ for damage caused to UN institutions, and the alleged use of banned armaments. Criticisms of these types form the foundation for the enemy’s diplomatic‐legal “counter‐attack,” which begins on the day the kinetic warfare ends. This counter‐attack – in doctrine – damages the IDF and Israel in the present, limits its diplomatic freedom of action and the ability of the IDF to maneuver in the next clash, and occupies the attention of the IDF leadership during periods of routine operations.

Also, while Israel has significantly improved its defensive capabilities in this battle, there exists an underutilized offensive potential which Israel could use against its enemies within the international system of norms and values. More so, there is a wide gap in the use of national resources and the mobilization of external resources to deal with this phenomena.

The regional geo‐strategic environment – when a superpower meets a non‐state actor

The Middle East suffers from a long list of chronic problems (weak or one‐dimensional economies, weak infrastructure leading to limited accessibility to electricity, water, food and education etc.). For many decades, these problems have compounded without almost nothing getting in the way. This is due to a wide range of factors including repressive authoritarian regimes, social passivity and relative isolation between the problems which prevented the development of significant political unrest which could be converted to political power and drive change.

The upheaval which has gripped the region over the last five years is a reflection of an awakening to these problems and a destabilization of the region. This is the result of the convergence of several processes ‐ an accelerated process of urbanization and increased pressure in cities which are natural environments for protest movements; rapid growth in the penetration of technology in the region (in particular satellite TV and cellular phones) which increased awareness of the polarization between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’; weakening of national identities which even after a century were not sufficiently deep‐rooted; strengthening of competing identities to the national identities – tribal, ethnic, ideological and religious.

If these trends are consolidated, one would presume that the region’s stagnation would naturally end. However, one also cannot ignore the contribution of the two ongoing American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the contribution of the drawdown of thousands of American soldiers from Iraq to the public energies that were required to destabilize the region.

This is how the relatively solid foundation which characterized the Middle East for the last two to three generations, was replaced by a fluid and dynamic foundation of continuous competition for control, influence and legitimacy between a number of actors – ethnic minorities, veteran national establishments, political movements inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Sunni Salafist‐Jihadist stream and Shiite movements supported by Iran. External actors have also entered into this turmoil, especially non‐state actors and regional and international powers, who make use of both military and non‐ military tools to promote their interests and influence. External actors are joining forces with local actors to tilt the scales in the competition and to shape the region in a way that best suits their interests. In practice the region has become an arena for violent struggle in the service of a global competition between diplomatic agendas, economic interests and spheres of influence.

Civilian and Military Technologies – When Augustine’s Laws meet Moore’s Law

“The IDF’s technological edge is challenged.”[13]

In 1964 the founder of the chip‐manufacturing giant Intel, Gordon Moore, predicted that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit would double every year (later he updated it to every two years; historically the actual number has been in the middle). The significance of the statements is that computing power and storage capability would increase exponentially. Moreover, the costs of computing and storage would plunge at a similar rate. Consequently, computing’s center of gravity has moved from hardware to software, and from software to applications.[14]

Roughly a generation later, Norman Augustine, former CEO of Lockheed Martin and former Under Secretary of the Army in the US Department of Defense published 52 insights and diagnostic conclusions about budgeting and management in the security sector. They were all expressed as aphorisms. According to Augustine’s Law no. 16:[15]

“In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3‐1/2 days each per week except for in a leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day.”

If we translate this insight into a basic rule, we can say that, the rate of cost increases for military platforms is exponential, while increases in the defense budgets are linear, meaning that states are able to manufacture fewer and fewer platforms. Analysis of the costs of military platforms over the last hundred years shows that this rule is valid.

The meeting of these two technological phenomena is fascinating as a research topic, but also a recipe for catastrophe from a practical military perspective. While organizations prefer to create networks of cheap application in larger quantities (networked app. centric), states still prefer power based on expensive platforms (platform centric). Furthermore, alongside the constantly increasing costs of developing and purchasing advanced weaponry, the routine maintenance costs of these new systems also keeps rising.

Additionally, in order to derive the maximum from these new technologies, training and exercises are required for the users of these platforms. An army with a fixed budget needs to shrink in order to rearm. In order not to shrink, and to continue to engage in a technological build up, in the past the IDF chose to impair force design in the areas of training and exercises. Now, the IDF must strengthen the personnel element in force design, even at the costs of reducing manpower.[16] Without adjusting military force design to the wider implications of the convergence of these two trends, traditional state armed forces will struggle to adapt to the future technological environment, and will continue to experience firsthand the erosion of the huge advantages that they had enjoyed in relation to the new networked enemies who now embody the majority of the threats to national security.[17]

The Nature of the Threats – When the Arab Spring Meets the Syrian Storm

“The Islamic 'resistance' movements seek to replace nation‐states, and have relentlessly been trying to establish themselves in low‐ governability frontier areas.”[18]

You only need one grain from the sandstorm that enveloped Israel in September 2015 to describe the change in the nature of threats to Israel’s security. That grain of sand is a metaphoric spark for two factors that have converged to revolutionize the nature of the security threats to Israel.

The decline of Syrian agricultural land, due to a range of factors, is one cause of the sandstorms. The Syrian civil war which uprooted over 10 million people from their houses and carved deep furrows into that land is a second cause.[19]

In the near future Israel will continue to deal with the security implications of the incomprehensible gap between its strength in the fields of economy, energy, water, food and governability and the weaknesses of its immediate and more distant neighbors.

The war in Syria, a kind of “implosion” of international relations, is a global event which is draining into one corner of the globe; it exacerbates the above gap, speeds up the entry of weaponry to the region, reduces the threshold for the use of chemical weapons, causes a massive humanitarian disaster and allows new types of actors to blossom. [20]

The new threats are evading the old classifications of the security organizations. They blur the term and institution of “borders” and thereby obscure the difference between external and internal, they distort the boundary between civilian and military, they erase distinctions between friend and foe, and place complex obstacles to the use of force: If I hit too hard – I’ll break, and if I am too restrained – I radiate weakness and invite trouble. They are too large to be dealt with independently, but they also seep into the region in such a way that it is difficult to define the borders of a coalition that could effectively deal with them.

The Syrian dust that covered Israel is also a metaphor for a new security threat which is developing “on the other side of the hill.” This is the threat of precision armaments being developed by the Iranian arms industry which are making their way to Israel’s enemies, firstly Hezbollah. The precision threat, as distinct from the statistical threat, is a serious challenge to the State of Israel, whose geography increases its sensitivity to damage to national and economic infrastructure or symbols of the state. The precision threat to the entire territory of the state requires new thinking about different potential responses – diplomatic, doctrinal and technology, to note only three of them.

The Nature of War – When Weight meets Lightness[21]

Military history is interwoven with clashes between heavy, slow and concentrated forces and light, fast, and dispersed forces. The Jewish underground paramilitary organizations in pre‐state Israel were light forces that fought the heavy British forces and the equally light Arab forces. “Light” does not defeat “Heavy,” but rather exhausts it or helps achieve diplomatic goals using diverse tools in spite of the lack of heavy power. The change in the nature of the Hebrew defensive forces, which was initiated by Jewish Agency leader David Ben Gurion, after a seminar which took place in April 1948, was intended to develop a heavy force that could defeat similar heavy armies. IDF efforts to maximize weight reached their peak in the mid‐1980s, and since then enemy heavy forces have gradually left the playing field and been replaced by light forces. With these external changes, question marks developed with regard to the paradigm of defeating the enemy, which was then the key factor shaping force design in the IDF.

In the past the challenge facing the IDF could be expressed through the question: How to mobilize the maximum force in as short a time frame as possible in order to defeat the heavy armies of the enemy? Since then, the enemies have changed shape and combat doctrine on the basis of their understanding that they have no chance of defeating the IDF in a broad scale conventional war. The doctrine with which the IDF must now deal is that of a network of small tactical and operational units which are flexible and adaptable and whose goal is not necessarily to defeat the IDF, but rather to attack the weak points of Israel and the IDF – the civilian home front and infrastructure – and extract as high a price as possible from the IDF. Their strategic concept is to cause physical damage to the army and infrastructure, to exhaust the Israeli public and to “blacken” Israel’s reputation in the eyes of the international community. While Israel thinks of war primarily in military terms, its enemies have learned to use all of the tools available to them during war.

Consequently, contemporary light forces experiment with a wide range of combat ‘startups’, and adapt today’s technologies and exploit our sensitivity to armaments and build state like capabilities, all without becoming a heavy state force. Technological – hybrid adversaries generate challenges of a different type for the IDF that are unlike the conventional challenges for which the IDF was prepared,[22] and are even different from the asymmetric challenges for which it trained in the previous generation.

National Prioritization – When Quality of Life Meets Defending Our Existence

The changes in Israel’s security environment have strengthened the public feeling that Israel has risen a level and moved from a reality in which it was defending its very existence to a state of defending the quality of its existence. This feeling has been translated over the years to a trend of changing national priorities, a certain degrading of the motivation of different sectors of Israeli society to accept the experience of full service in the IDF and a reduction in the resources made available for defense in order to free up resources to reduce social and economic gaps.

The reduction in the Israeli defense budget is a trend which requires the defense establishment “to do differently with less” and not to “do more with less,” as armies are wont to declare after the axe of budget cuts has fallen. To do “differently” means to make more efficient use of resources – budget, manpower and armaments – and generate more efficient productivity for defense. In business terms, the IDF needs to become an exemplary company within the public sector battles in order to provide security for the state and its citizens, and at the same time to be attractive to and a source of pride for those who serve in it, and the society that they come from.[23]

Israeli Society – When the Army Meets the Nation

The IDF is still one of the foundation stones of Israeli society and one of the state institutions that enjoys the highest level of public support and sympathy during peacetime and war. Still, military‐society relations have undergone significant changes in recent decades. In the age of wars of choice, society expects the IDF to attain significant achievements on the battlefield with a minimal number of losses, not just in the civilian home front, but also among its own ranks. The IDF is opening its ranks to new population groups and is expanding professional horizons to diverse population groups who serve in it. However, the experience of serving in the military is turning into the birthright of a shrinking percentage of the population.

The IDF continues to serve Israeli society, not only as a defensive force, but also in the implementation of projects with national and societal significance. There are numerous examples of this which include IDF educational projects in schools, involvement in police‐type actions including enforcing law and order, and of course, compulsory service which unites the disparate groups in Israeli society. In this field the IDF has many significant challenges in integrating large numbers of soldiers from ultra‐orthodox communities, updating the framework for recruiting members of the Druze and Bedouin ethnic groups, broadening the range of professional roles available to women and training new recruits for the increasing number of professional roles needed in the IDF.

National Planning Agreement ‐ When the Master Plan Meets Ben Gurion’s Vision

“The State of Israel cannot tolerate the reality of a desert in its midst. If the State does not destroy the desert – the desert is likely to destroy the state. The thin strip between Jaffa and Haifa which is only 15‐25km wide and which includes most of the people of Israel, will not survive in the long term without extensive and fortified settlement of the Southern region and the Negev.”[24]

The combination of the demographic‐economic reality in the State of Israel with our developing understanding of the threat around us, validates Ben Gurion’s analysis. As a direct consequence, the State of Israel decided to develop the Negev, and in 2011 the Israeli cabinet decided (Resolution 3161) to instruct the IDF to move units from the C4I and the Intelligence Directorates to the Negev region. As in the past, the IDF is being used as the executive arm of the government to promote national social‐economic goals, including increasing the supply of land for housing in the center of the country and development of the Negev.

The transfer of so many bases to the Negev presents the IDF with challenges, but also opportunities. The challenges include the difficulties in financing such a major effort and retaining existing highly motivated and quality personnel, who may see the move to the Negev as a degradation of their conditions of service, as well as the risk of deterring others from joining the ranks of the career army. The opportunities include the possibility of renewing and upgrading infrastructure within the framework of the historic efforts to build new bases in the Negev. Another opportunity for the IDF is the possibility of fulfilling additional social functions based on the understanding that the IDF serves the society that created it.[25]

The Inauguration of Training Base 13 at Camp Ariel Sharon (City of Training Bases) (Photo Credit: IDF Spokesperson)

The Organization’s Conceptual Outlook and Management – When the Chimney Sweep Meets the Systems Administrator

“Interconnectivity of various capabilities, measures and knowledge. [...] Jointness of the IDF’s arms to maximize its capabilities.”[26]

The classic organizational outlook which developed in the last century tends to be equated with an assembly line, where each employee has a small and well‐defined role to perform. The role of the manager is to supervise the system to ensure that each part of the manufacturing process works as efficiently as possible. In popular culture, this organizational method was accurately depicted in Charlie Chaplin’s movie “Modern Times” (the image most identified with the movie appears on the cover of this volume). This management approach is based on the hierarchical reporting structure (the chimney method) which characterized armies in the modern period, and which was developed over the last 200 years.

There is a deep connection between the ability to effectively collect and distribute knowledge and the management and command approach with regard to delegation of authority and responsibility. One can follow this connection by analyzing the development of governmental mechanisms and the modern bureaucratic organization and the development of armed forces in the industrial age. In general, the command approach and management during the industrial age was based on the model of a “central brain” with one manager at the head of the organization, who would give orders to the sub‐units under him/her and they would in turn provide feedback up the chain.

The expansion of the battlefield brought about an enlargement of armed forces, in which horizontal (between units) and vertical (between unit and command levels) communication become more complicated. Armies were forced to deal with the command‐management challenge of maintaining accurate situation assessments, analysis and decisions on the next steps, delivery of commands and supervision of implementation. The German army in the 19th century, for example, overcame these difficulties by developing an approach for command‐mission functionality. Briefly, the essence of the idea is that if the commander cannot implement an OODA Loop[27] during combat, he must take the initiative (before it is too late) in order to create the conditions that will allow effective functioning of the force, even without him, through intensive training and by encouraging initiative. The IDF adopted this approach with great effectiveness in many of its wars.

The development of information technology, from the invention of the telegraph to the most recent generation, encouraged and validated the “controlling central brain” approach, which enabled the “brain” to separately and effectively command, control and supervise, strengthening the bureaucratic model. During the last generation, armies worked energetically to leverage information technology to strengthen the “brain’s” capability to oversee and direct, or in other words – to improve the capability to implement the traditional hierarchical approach.

However, the competitive business environment forced commercial organizations that at first adopted the bureaucratic model to quickly respond to changes and to develop different management models which better maximize the inherent potential of information technology to improve organizational effectiveness. They developed a “flat” model, networked and more dynamic, based on the understanding that the “central brain” should be one organizational brain to which all of the subunits are partners and can contribute. They also realized the need to tighten as much as possible the learning‐implementation loop described above.

Naturally, the public sector was late to the game in identifying the changes taking place in the link between the ability to know and the ability to act. Armies, as a part of the public sector, also suffered from the same deficiency. Three central factors accelerated the understanding in the IDF of the need to change: The enemies that armies are facing – non‐state organizations which operate in an efficient networked manner; the over‐bureaucratic nature of military headquarters which increases the inefficiency (especially when compared to commercial organizations); and the dynamic, rapid pace of change which requires constant learning, fast decision making and great adaptability. These qualities demand serious changes in the communication protocols within military organizations, based on the addition of a systematic‐networked non‐hierarchical communication protocol.[28]

A New Environment: New Forms

With regard to these ten profound changes in the strategic, security, social and organizational environments I will present five campaigns[29] to change the basic structure of the IDF which are needed to adapt the IDF to the challenges of the future. The IDF has already formulated their characteristics within the framework of the “Gideon” multi‐year work program, the result of a year’s intensive work in 2015. In this chapter I will detail each of these five campaigns that embody the IDF's understanding on how to adapt to current and future challenges.

The Campaign to Change its Territorial Deployment

IDF bases are effectively time capsules that preserve the recent history of the Land of Israel over the last two centuries. The practical approach of the Ministry of Defense with regard to “pre‐ existing” buildings and infrastructure preserved the Templer structures in Tel Aviv (The Kirya, the historic Prime Minister’s office and the Sarona complex), British buildings across the country (for example the Ramle bases, Haifa, Tel Hashomer and Tzrifin) and the Jordanian buildings from before the Six Day War (for example Camp Schneller in Jerusalem).

The IDF has a significant influence on the geography of Israel. It controls large areas of the state used for bases, storage and training, and has further influence over master plans in other areas due to factors related to intelligence “line of sight”, the ability to maintain constant communications over military channels, and of course the capability to defend the country. As a result, changes in army infrastructure, deployment and in the characteristics of the IDF’s organizational structure have a considerable influence on Israel.

In the coming years, the IDF will undergo major changes in its deployment, and will consequently help drive the momentum to settle the Negev. The process can be described as a national awakening to the importance of settlement outside of the country’s center. The process of concentrating IDF bases, reducing their number and moving to high‐rise building will bring about more efficient use of land and allow for the clearing of large land reserves suitable for the building of thousands of housing units. New and advanced sustainable planning and building methods will allow for large energy savings. The transfer of IDF units to the Negev and changes in their deployment in the Galilee will be an impetus to strengthen the periphery and to implement Ben Gurion’s vision, and will allow for better preparations for war. The geographical reforms will also help stimulate a process of making IDF procedures more efficient and even improve the “user experience’ for future recruits and those currently serving.

The Campaign to Change the Structure of the IDF

The IDF is currently on the threshold of a broad structural reform. One of the first steps in this direction, from the last year, was the sensitive decision to close the veteran Druze battalion. Additionally, a gradual multi‐phased process was begun to create a cyber service in the IDF to focus all the IDF’s activities in this field with all its components and layers. Much has been written about cyber as a new dimension in combat along with ground, naval and air, which requires suitably tailored and structured preparation. Today, cyber missions are conducted by the C4I Directorate and IDF Intelligence, and in light of the lack of experience in the field the process of forming the service will be done with extra care, while engaging in a closely supervised learning process.

In addition, the IDF will relinquish units that are currently part of the military, and transfer them to civilian bodies, or reduce the number of career personnel in units that are not a central component of military activity. This is planned, for example, for the Military Advocate General, the Financial Advisor to the Chief of Staff, the behavioral sciences department, the Education Corps, the IDF Rabbinate, IDF Radio, and the IDF boarding schools etc.

Also, the makeup of the IDF’s order of battle is slated to change. The IDF plans to retain only five German Dolphin submarines and to relinquish the oldest submarine when the sixth arrives in the coming years; the air force base at Sde Dov is also set to close.

The reduction in the size of the forces will be offset by, among others, closer coordination between the different services and territorial commands and the General Staff. All the IDF’s capabilities and high level intelligence will be fused into a single consolidated network. The fusion trend and networked nature will strengthen the military “brain” and at the critical hour allow the “muscles” to also function better.

The Campaign to Reorganize the IDF

The IDF intends to reduce by dozens[30] the number of career officers from the ranks of Lt. Col. to Brig. Gen. from headquarters and command staffs in order to increase their effectiveness and to reduce bureaucracy. In addition, a new approach was formulated and implemented for the planning and management of the budgets of the directorates and services. This new approach will increase their responsibility for expenditures, including manpower; increase their flexibility; allow them to manage their missions more effectively; and encourage efficiency. The fusion and networked trend are planned to be reflected in combined arms force design processes – within this framework the services and directorates will work together to develop new systemic capabilities for the IDF in the different combat fields.[31]

In addition, the IDF will reduce the number of reservists by approximately 100,000. Aside from these changes, the number of career personnel will also be reduced. However, the IDF does not see this as purely an economic issue, but as a spur to change in the organizational culture and a reduction of the bureaucratic nature typical of a public organization. One of the ways to achieve this goal is to reduce the more senior ranks in order to broaden the span of control to a ratio of one to five. In this manner, for example, a department head (Colonel) who would usually command three officers of the rank of LTC would, after the completion of this process, command five (an additional implication of the process is that if it succeeds, everything in the IDF would no longer be divided into three, but rather five...).

An additional significant change planned for implementation is the merger of the Technology and Logistics Directorate with the Ground Forces Command. This move is intended to strengthen the Ground Forces and to improve the capabilities of the service to ensure the preparedness of the forces for combat in a short time period as well as force design over the long term. An additional change which is planned within the framework of the plan is to strengthen the capability of the General Staff to serve as a Strategic Command which directs force design with a view to the future and the engagement of force from a combined‐arms, multi‐dimensional and interdisciplinary perspective.

The Campaign to Adopt a Relevant Theory of Victory[32]

The IDF Strategy Document defines three key strategic diplomatic objectives for the use of force: a) Deferral of the next conflict through routine operations; b) Maintenance or improvement of the strategic situation after violent action initiated by the enemy by changing behavioral patterns and intentions; c) A dramatic change in the state of affairs, potentially including a change in the strategic balance through the neutralization of actors or causing fundamental changes in their capabilities or standing.

During the second half of the twentieth century traditional armed forces encountered the irrelevance of their traditional approaches to the use of force in combat ‐ in which national regular armed forces faced the need to effectively deal with new types of armed foes who enforced a range of asymmetrical warfare. To paraphrase British historian John Keegan, the “techno‐war” cannot be the “socio‐war.”

After publishing the IDF’s doctrinal response in the form of the “IDF Strategy” document, the IDF will continue to reformulate an updated theory of victory against potential opponents which will make the best use of its technological, personnel and qualitative advantages over its enemies.

The Campaign for Quality Manpower

The IDF requires high quality personnel who are proud of the organization in which they serve, and feel a sense of duty to take part in the defense of the state. Within the framework of the multi‐ year plan, the IDF understands that it must translate these fancy words into practice with regard to the different groups who serve – soldiers completing compulsory service, career officers of different ranks, NCOs and reservists.

The IDF career officer corps is the experienced and professional kernel of the IDF which is expected to lead the organization in dealing with the challenges it faces. The new model of career army service for IDF officers is intended to prevent a “brain drain” and a decline in morale among young officers of a junior rank. The model determines that captains, majors and lieutenant colonels can remain at the same rank for up to seven years, at which point they will discharged if they have not been promoted or given exceptional permission to continue to serve without promotion. This will mean a younger career army which will stand for excellence. Those who do not find their place within the army’s ranks will be discharged earlier than is customary today, and will be more easily integrated into the civilian job market.

Compulsory service for male soldiers will be shortened, training courses will be shortened and made more focused, and women are expected to continue to increase their involvement in military roles that were closed to them in the past. The plan will also deal with the level of early discharges of enlisted personnel. These and other processes for soldiers engaged in regular service are intended to strengthen the notion of the “people’s army” which despite all the changes will remain relevant even in the coming years.

How to Guarantee Substantive Change (Transformation and not Adaptation)

It will not be easy to realize all of the campaigns for change outlined in the previous chapter, even though they are all essential. Given the constantly changing strategic environment, military organizations live in constant tension between the need to institutionalize the current military strategy and to maximize its effectiveness through structures, procedures, exercises and training on the one hand; and on the other hand the need to maintain organizational and operational flexibility which would allow critical changes when needed. Most of the changes made by militaries, are made within their existing paradigmatic frameworks. They tend to prefer to enhance the way missions are conducted over adopting new missions.

However, sometimes, given dramatic changes in the external operational environment (changes such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or the spread of information technology), militaries are forced to undertake substantive paradigmatic change in their organizational patterns, thought and action to shape a new military organizational strategy. Sometimes, militaries face a challenge and instigate deep change, but mostly internal forces block the change and limit it to minor adjustments in behavioral patterns. The IDF cannot be satisfied with local adjustments (adaptation) in the way it conducts its missions, but rather needs substantive transformation. To succeed, excess energy will be required to overcome internal obstacles to change and to promote rebuilding as the IDF was able to do in the past.

Over the last generation, severe crises of identity befell many armies, certainly the Western ones, due to political, social, economic and technological changes which influence – each in its own way – the nature of the enemy and of armed conflicts. This is one of the reasons for the bourgeoning number of “White Papers” which have been prepared by the security establishments in many countries and the significant development of research into the theory and practice of change in military organizations, primarily in the United States. This field of knowledge drew on experience from tangential areas such as military history, industry and management, organizational change, leadership and others.

The current century (and less so the previous one) provided much written documentation of successful and less successful change processes in military establishments – changes of military strategy and the systems that implement them. For example, many serious researchers have evaluated the histories of the armies of the great powers between the two world wars. In this period, there were several military organizations that made a quantum leap, such as the American Navy, which adopted the aircraft carrier and developed a matching strategy; or the German Army which developed the Blitzkrieg doctrine. There were also armies that stagnated, such as those of France and Poland. The British army did not realize the latent systemic potential of the new platforms that it itself had developed (the tank and aircraft carrier) and failed to implement the deep changes it needed.

The research on change in military establishments leads to one sharp conclusion: Deep change in military strategy requires deep change in the military establishment itself. In fact, organizational change is a necessary condition for a change in strategy. Not only is does this insight provide a deep connection between the use of force and force design, it clearly defines which of the two are the center of gravity of military strategy. If an army wishes to use force “differently,” it has no choice but to design force “differently.” In current terminology, without substantive change in the firmware, hardware and software, all improvisational efforts will merely amount to new niche applications to provide a diversion through the use of force.[33]

Despite agreement on the priority of force design over the employment of force, there are disagreements on how change takes place in military establishments. This chapter will present the three primary approaches accepted in the academic literature to describe the keys to success in implementing long‐term and sustainable change in military establishments. Each approach emphasizes a different key actor. Finally, we will recommend the approach that we see as most relevant to creating the required change in the IDF of today.

Looking outside the Box

\According to this approach, militaries change as a reaction to an accumulation of change processes in the external environment. In this manner, changes in the security environment, changes in the nature of conflict and the character of opponents, significant technological developments, social and economic changes and new demands from an assertive political echelon above the army[34] ‐ all produce substantial external incentives for military establishments. According to this approach, the interesting events take place outside the military box, and they determine the degree of change, which is nothing but a necessary adaptive reaction, a kind of refocusing.

This approach is based on the premise that armies do not generally initiate future‐focused deep change on their own, but rather react to external stimuli, and only do so when they cross an “activation threshold.” Sound logical? Perhaps in theory, but things are not exactly like this in reality. In actual fact, external changes occur through gradual processes which allow militaries to remain indifferent or to make minor adaptations to their behavior. Furthermore, these small adaptations and the improvisations themselves contribute to the perpetuation of the paradigm, and prove to the army that it is standing on firm ground in terms of doctrine, operations, technology, structure and organization.

The historical research finds no clear connection between failure in war and deep change in militaries. The British army, as noted above, did not undergo a revolution after the failures of the First World War. Later, American ground forces, who were focused on preparing for a war with the Warsaw Pact countries on the European Front, finished the Vietnam War beaten and battered, but after the conclusion of that war, they locked their difficult experience away in a safe under the title, “A Deviation from Military History,” and returned to planning for a war between conventional armies (our Yom Kippur War contributed to this approach). These same ground forces then had to relearn the same lessons as the Vietnam War during the years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the impressive structural‐organizational‐ operative innovations at the start of the Afghanistan War which were based on combined operations of special Forces, CIA units and aerial capabilities, did not withstand the scope and duration of the war and the patterns of use of armed force returned to familiar procedures.

The IDF also experienced failure during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. After the war a hasty process of evaluating operational and technological adaptations took place. This process only came to fruition as an effective operational response at the end of the 1990s, by which time the army had impressive capabilities for repulsing a surprise armored attack from one of its enemies. Nothing ‘prevented’ the IDF and the Israeli government during the 1980s and 1990s from building an army that could win “anew” the Yom Kippur War. Not the external environment which had changed so as to be unrecognizable, nor the new type of war that the IDF encountered in Lebanon in 1982 and which it has faced without a break ever since.

Thinking “Inside the box”

Which forces drive change within military establishments? The research has identified two potential sources of incentives that could create the necessary conditions for deep change in an army – the material‐beneficial source ‐ the ongoing competition for compensation and resources ‐ and the ideological‐cultural source.

Material‐beneficial forces can drive change through a diverse range of means – promotion of “Young Turks” to senior positions which expands the sphere of influence of those individuals and thereby create conditions for broad change; the deliberate generation of competition between units can refresh patterns of thinking and action; a process of preferential treatment for one organization over another over time can initiate significant cumulative change which can reshape the organization, not in “one blow,” but as the results of numerous small local decisions. The IDF underwent several changes of this type in the transition from being based on infantry to being based on armor; and in the transition from a preference for using ground forces to a preference for the use of air‐power (a process, which was partly subconscious, and changed the face of the organization – perhaps excessively).

Material incentives to individuals and to sub‐organizations that display flexibility and daring in the search for alternative paths to fulfill their old missions and even invent new missions can be used; at the same time “punishments” can also be used that in essence dry up the resources and attentiveness from the senior commands for individuals and sub‐organizations that continue to stagnate. All these constitute an accepted explanation for driving significant and ongoing change in defense establishments. The message is clearly communicated and internalized, appropriate behavior is strengthened and improper behavior is reduced.

Cultural‐consciousness incentives are based on the premise that individuals and organizations are motivated by the basic personal need for recognition. In this way, open and trusting “vertical” communication from the command level can increase the motivation of the subordinate level to initiate a flood of new ideas without fear of dismissal or exclusion. Free and trusting “horizontal” communication between units and organizations can increase cooperation and create a comfortable climate for the free flow of ideas without fear of being copied, taken advantage of or the stealing of credit (sound like a fantasy?). Thus, a command level that cultivates a climate of experimentation, will in exchange received a unit which accomplishes old missions in new ways and creates new missions to fulfill the goals set by the command level.

Encouraging organizational learning and a critical approach will strengthen the willingness of individuals and sub‐organizations to engage in self‐examination and change without fear of showing weakness or of admitting an error, and without barricading oneself within the institutional comfort zone.

This approach generally identifies the internal mechanisms that drive substantive change in a military establishment, but it suffers from two problems. The smaller problem is the one‐dimensionality problem. Neither the material source alone nor the cultural source alone can create the energy needed to cross the elusive “activation threshold,” and a combination of both incentives is required.

Nevertheless, a bigger problem is the non‐identification of internal forces that can block change, which, as we learn from the historical research, are stronger than the drivers of change. Without a combined strategy to maximize the latent potential of dynamic forces and the neutralization of blocking forces, the chances for deep sustainable change remain low.

This point brings us to the third approach that penetrates to the micro‐organizational fabric of the military establishment.

Thinking about “Micro‐organizational Dynamics”

During the Second World War, the British used old field artillery pieces attached to carts which could be moved with the forces. Operations research was called in to evaluate ways to increase the rate of fire. They identified an unexplained three-second delay between each discharge. A deeper analysis showed that the British army had retained a procedure of waiting until the (now non‐existent) horse that was tethered to the artillery piece could calm down.[35]

American research has evaluated obstacles to change in militaries during two periods between wars: 1872‐1914 and 1920‐1939. The research showed the following results – excess bureaucracy; intellectual laziness; a reluctance to attempt to reevaluate basic assumptions and operational approaches; a dwindling of quality military education; and hyper‐focus on enhancing existing missions over attempting new missions. Organizational and structural roadblocks included – not promoting “Young Turks”; dispersal of army units; underfunding which prevented maintenance of existing resources, and all the more so, prevented innovation and change; translation of existing approaches to dogma, which prevented the learning of lessons and adaptation, even during combat; and underestimation of the strength of the enemy.[36]

The research conclusion that strengthening dynamic forces does not guarantee innovation and change directed attention to the need to identify factors that block innovation. The literature shows that, at any point in time, both the individual and the unit are subject to competing incentives – to innovation and to stagnation. Thus, a group of interested parties within the organization are likely to work energetically to block change, given the potential for them to lose prestige or resources as a result of organizational change. Other groups of interested parties are likely to see the change proposed from above as an opportunity to promote their own narrow parochial interests which may differ (in some way) from the national interest which the leadership is working to promote. These groups navigate the change process for the good of their local objectives and not necessarily for the greater good. Additionally, the level of vertical trust between the ranks or the horizontal trust between the units, is not identical in each local environment, and generates different responses to changes processes.

At this point, an analysis from the world of organizational behavior becomes relevant to the challenge of driving change in a defense establishment. This analysis is called in the professional literature the “Principal‐Agent Problem”[37] – the problem of the built‐in tension between a manager and an agent. In general, the literature dealing with this question indicates that between the two levels of management, there is an asymmetric relationship.

This lack of symmetry is reflected in two key ways:

1. The command level, which is close to the leadership, tends to focus on objectives and directions which promote the organization and therefore their world view is mainly shaped by the question: “What is needed?” While the subordinate level which is responsible for implementation, lives in a world of tools and resources and tends to cling to familiar assignments and existing routines, and therefore its viewpoint is shaped by the question: “What is possible?”

2. As opposed to the prevailing conception that “upstairs” the picture is more complete and clearer, in reality, the entire concept of the chain of command and the reporting channels create a situation in which the upper command is fed by and depends upon information provided by the subordinate level. Accordingly, the subordinate level has a perpetual advantage over the command level. They decide what, when and how to report.

The unchanging nature of the relationship between the levels of command gives an agent the freedom to choose how to respond to each “stimulus” which the upper command provides. In a more tangible manner, when the upper command proposes an agenda of substantive organizational change, the subordinate level can respond obediently or with resistance, and each of these responses can be expressed actively and openly or passively and secretly.[38] In light of this, it is not enough for the heads of an organization to formulate a vision, demonstrate leadership and place incentives to promote change. They must actively and constantly work to neutralize blocking forces by overcoming the inbuilt lack of symmetry in their relations with their subordinates.

In order to do so, the senior command must balance between three essential core missions for the duration of the change process, even though they will compete for the limited resources of command time and attention and demand strategies which are sometimes opposed to one another. They are:

1. Personal involvement in promoting innovation and change;

2. Engaging efficient oversight mechanisms and obtaining reliable information about the responses of the subordinate level to the dictates of change;

3. Providing appropriate rewards to subordinate levels depending on whether they promote change or block it.[39]

It is clear that in addition to looking inward, which the whole army, and the senior echelon in particular, must do, it is critical to look outwards and to maintain an appropriate level of readiness for the security challenges which the constantly changing external environment may present, and to never let the army focus entirely on itself.

Conclusion

When we evaluate the level of change that has taken place in Israel’s external environment over the last four decades – global and regional changes, political and ethical changes, social and economic changes, and technological and management changes – and compare them to the level of change which has taken place in the IDF over the same period, we reach the unavoidable conclusion that the IDF is chronically slow in adapting to its surroundings.[40]

Indeed, comparative research arrives at the conclusion that this is a common phenomenon among defense establishments and not a unique Israeli phenomenon. However, the many dangers that this delay presents for Israel do not convert this common misfortune to a partial consolation.[41]

Transformation demands-resources of two types – material capital to enable the IDF “to bring what is needed,” and organizational capital to enable the IDF “to reorganize what is needed.” The second type of capital is more important but tends to be forgotten. The practical significance of the above is that there are no magical formulae and no decisive processes or simple technical solutions, and therefore substantial intellectual and organizational effort is required. The IDF must discover sources of internal energy for change and to create the mechanisms to precede change, and not make do with faith that necessity is the mother of all invention. Furthermore, the heads of the army must recognize that the key to the success of efforts to drive change involves an approach that combines material, intellectual, ethical and cultural incentives to promote change, together with a working strategy to neutralize blocking forces, as is clear from the research on the complexity of Manager‐Agent relations during a period of organizational change.

This is a unique model of organizational generalship, which is vitally critical in a multi‐dimensional campaign to change the shape of the military establishment.

[1] Col. Alon Paz serves today as a head of a department in J5. This article is based on broader research published in: Alon Paz (2015), "Transforming Israel’s Security Establishment". The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The author thanks Cpt. Lior Lebed from the Dado Center, and First Lieutenant Eyal Horovitz from J5 for the help in editing and printing the article.

[2] “Defense Army of Israel Ordinance”, Order No. 4, 1948 of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel. See:https://www.idfblog.com/blog/2012/05/25/the‐israel‐defense‐forces‐turns‐ 64/

[3] It should be noted that compulsory conscription was already introduced at the time of the Greek city states.

[4] IDF Strategy Document, (2015), p31. The document can be found in English at https://www.idfblog.com/s/Desktop/IDF%20Strategy.pdf

[5] Ibid, Page 15 (Hebrew)

[6] Finkel, Meir, (2013) Challenges and Tensions in the Force‐Building Process, IDF internal publication, Tel Aviv: Maarachot, [Hebrew].

[7] See for example, Tamir Yaday and Eran Ortal (January 2013) “The Rounds of Deterrence Paradigm – Strategic Patterns and Doctrine in a Dead End”, Ashtanot, Volume 1, Israel National Defense College [Hebrew].

[8] Ibid, pp. 67‐68.

[9] Incidentally, research into fundamental change processes in organizations and armies in particular show a success rate of less than 50%.

[10] The heading is borrowed from: Michel Houellebecq, The Map and the Territory, 2011.

[11] The IDF Strategy document as well as other publications about the development of the force design plan for the coming years. The “Gideon” multi‐year plan, allow a broader peek into the way that the official IDF understands its current and future operating environment.

[12] IDF Strategy Document, 2015, p10.

[13] IDF Strategy Document, 2015, p15.

[14] Nissim Hania (2016), “Changes in the Israeli Development and Manufacturing System and the level of Adaptation to the Current Age”, The Dado Center Journal, Volume 6, pp. 85‐86. [Hebrew]

[15] Augustine N., (1997) Augustine’s Laws. Reston: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

[16] Finkel, Meir (2013), Challenges and Tensions in the Force‐Building Process, IDF internal publication, Tel Aviv: Maarachot, [Hebrew], pp. 197‐198.

[17] In the case of Iran, despite the fact that it is a state actor which is affected by the rising cost of military technology, the rise in costs will be offset by its expected economic recovery. This will happen after the signing of the Iran nuclear agreement and its return to the international fold.

[18] IDF Strategy Document, 2015, p13.

[19] Starr, S (2015). “The Struggle to Produce Food in Syria” (Electronic Version).http://modernfarmer.com/2014/09/food‐war‐syria/ downloaded on 30 January 2016.

[20] Dekel Udi, Boms Nir and Winter Ofir, (December 2015), Syria: New Map, New Actors – Challenges and Opportunities for Israel, INSS Memoranda [Hebrew]. See also Paz, Alon “The Rise of the Feral Adversary”, downloaded from warontherocks.com/2014/11/the‐rise‐of‐the‐feral‐adversary

[21] Kundera Milan, (1985), The Unbearable Lightness of Being, pages 10‐11.

[22] F. Hoffman (2007). "Conflict in the 21st century – The Rise of Hybrid Wars", Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December; Arguilla, J (2007). "The End of War as We Know it?", Third World Quarterly, Vol 28. No 2 PP. 369‐386

[23] The Israel Democracy Institute (2011), Editorial, Parliament, p. 71. (Hebrew)

[24] David Ben Gurion, “The Significance of the Negev”, Sde Boker, 17.1.1955. (Hebrew)

[25] Israel Ministry of Defense, Moving South, Making the Negev Bloom, (Hebrew) downloaded on the 30.1.16 from http://www.mod.gov.il/society_economy/pages/idf‐moving‐south.aspx

[26] IDF Strategy Document, p23.

[27] Observe, Orient, Decide, Act – An idea developed by Col. John Boyd, who was interested in approaches to war as a competition between the learning‐action loops of the two sides of combatants. The side which had the tighter loop would have enjoy a significant systemic advantage in creating the necessary conditions for victory. For an expansion see: Frans P.B. Osinga, (2007) Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (London: Routledge).

[28] For more detail on strategy of management see the chapter “Strategy from Above” in Freedman, L (2013), “Strategy and History”, Oxford University Press, NY.

[29] It is common practice to use the term campaign in its military context with regard to the combined efforts over time to change the reality and balance of forces between the IDF and its enemies. In this article, the term is being borrowed for use in the military transformation field, with the loan word intended to highlight the systemic nature of the challenges inherent in changing the structure of the IDF and the extent of effort which will be required to overcome numerous obstacles which any “Champion of Change” will face in their path.

[30] The exact numbers are sensitive and cannot be published.

[31] With regard to the need for these changes see: Eran Ortal (2013) “Paradigmatic Innovation in the IDF? On learning with regard to force design, the use of force and what is in between”, Ashtanot, Volume 2, National Defense College (Hebrew).

[32] Tamir Yaday and Eran Ortal (January 2013) “The Rounds of Deterrence Paradigm – Strategic Patterns and Doctrine in a Dead End”, Ashtanot, Volume 1, Israel National Defense College [Hebrew].

[33] Earl H. Tilford (1995). "The Revolution in military affairs: prospects and cautions." Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

[34] The relationship between the political echelon and the army are described in Elliot Cohen, (2002), Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Free Press.

[35] Morison E., (1950). "Gunfire at Sea: A Case Study of Innovation."

[36] Murray, W (1997). Transformation and Innovation: The Lessons of the 1920s and 1930s. From: IDA "Lacking at Two Distinct Periods of Military Innovation: 1872‐1914 and 1920‐1939.”

[37] For further reading on the Strategy of Management, see the Chapter “Strategy from Above” in: Freedman, L (2013). "Strategy: A History", Oxford University Press, NY.

[38] For analysis of the phenomena, see Martin Van Creveld (1985), Command in War.

[39] Heifetz R. and Laurie D., (2011) "The Work of Leadership", Harvard Business Review; Alon Paz (2015), "Transforming Israel’s Security Establishment", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, pp. 32‐39.

[40] See also Eran Ortal, (2012) “Is the IDF Capable of a Paradigmatic Quantum Leap”, Ma’arachot, Vol. 444. (Hebrew)

[41] Har Even Yoav, (2014) “The General Staff Learning Systems – Between Conservatism and Change – Operational Concept as a Case Study”, The Dado Center Journal, Vol. 2, pp. 85‐86. (Hebrew)

Bibliography

Hebrew Sources