Intelligence for Force Design

Introduction

The question this article asks is: “How should we work in order to actively integrate intelligence assessments into force design decision making?” As a starting point for our discussion, I propose to assess the current situation and to compare the place of intelligence in force employment and its place in force design processes. My conclusions from my personal observations over many years of IDF processes from three different perspectives – intelligence assessment, force design and force employment – is that the influence of intelligence on force design decision making processes is greatly limited when compared to its influence on force employment. I am not purporting to back up this argument with a comprehensive comparative analysis and am adopting this conclusion on the basis of my personal experience and numerous conversations I have held over the years.

Is it important to integrate intelligence into force design? In my opinion, the answer is yes, given that if the intelligence assessment infrastructure is missing from force design decision making, a central layer in our understanding of the enemy will be missing in the force design processes.

In the first section of this article I will present a number of examples which will help clarify my argument about the current limited space for intelligence in force design and I will also provide several positive examples from fields in which intelligence assessments clearly and consistently do influence force design processes. Further on, I will propose a number of answers to the question of why this is the situation, while analyzing the differences between the characteristics of force design decision making and force employment decision making. After the discussion of intelligence, I will present a different research discipline – Operations Research (O.R.) – which does generate analysis that greatly influences force design processes. I will attempt to discern the differences between that discipline and the intelligence discipline which could explain the different role that each plays in decision making processes. Finally, I will discuss the question of whether it is worthwhile and how to change the way that relevant intelligence assessments are formulated and assimilated into force design.

The Influence of Intelligence on Force design and Employment

Within force employment processes during combat, intelligence assessments are thought of as critical and are a central component of any situation assessment – from General Staff meetings to the planning teams in the field headquarters. Intelligence officers are a part of the General Staff and Regional Command planning staffs and the strategic staffs and influence their decisions. They provide a critical basis for decision making and present threat analyses, provide alerts, generate targets, present possible enemy actions and analyze the actions and responses of various influential actors.

In recent years the IDF has frequently updated its combat plans for the different arenas in light of the changes taking place in them, and intelligence is closely involved in these processes. Intelligence officers have in important role in shaping updated concepts and formulating their terminology and principles, as well as their role during specific planning processes. The involvement of intelligence in decisions on formulating operational concepts and their implementation stands out in light of the place that intelligence is given, the attention that commanders give to intelligence assessments' as well as the way that intelligence officers relate to their roles. The intelligence echelon that is involved in these processes comes from among the senior ranks from within the intelligence bodies; the Chief of Staff’s decision‐ making meetings on operational plans are attended by the head of the Operations Directorate, the heads of the Regional Commands and the different services as well as the head of the Intelligence Directorate, the head of the Intelligence Research Division and the heads of the different intelligence arenas and departments.

The involvement of intelligence and its role in force design processes are completely different. For example, in the design and planning of the “Gideon” multi‐year plan, intelligence had a much smaller role (as a supplier of intelligence assessments, not as a force design branch with a force design role in the multi‐year plan). Intelligence officers were not involved in shaping the new force design concept. This was done by the Policy and Plans Directorate, which formulated the updated primary capabilities and their subsidiary capabilities, and intelligence officers were not involved in choosing the principles of the procurement program concept. Of course' the designers of the concept and the planners did not ignore the knowledge of the enemy, is expressed in the intelligence assessments, but specialized intelligence assessments were barely provided at all, and there was no close involvement of intelligence officers in the design and planning. This is in clear contrast to intelligence assessments for force employment which are regularly reformulated in accord with operational requirements.

Not only at the senior decision‐making level is there a difference in the role of intelligence between force employment and generation, but also in the more junior ranks. In plans for an aerial attack on a building in order to neutralize a group of terrorists, intelligence has a decisive role to play: Intelligence assessments of enemy activity regarding the area, place and time that would enable an attack; assessments of the enemy’s capability to observe the preparations for an attack and to threaten the attacking aircraft or to alert the terror group about the attack are critical in the formulation of the attack plan and the tools to be used; and assessments of the expected response to the attack are the basis for a decision on whether to attack and how to prepare for after the attack. In contrast, intelligence is only slightly involved in decisions in developing the capabilities that enable the attack – purchasing aircraft, defining the types of armaments which are available for use in an attack or the training of the air crews.

There is a price for the minimal involvement of intelligence in force design processes, and the correspondingly limited influence of intelligence assessments. A clear example is the IDF’s preparations for the “Sagger” anti‐tank rocket threat before the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In this case there were intelligence assessments about the emerging threat but they were not integrated into force design in order to develop a response based on armaments, doctrine or training. A similar case occurred in the previous decade, which luckily had only a theoretical price that was never realized. There was delay in identifying the impact of the enemy’s acquisition of modern anti‐aircraft systems on Israel’s aerial superiority which caused a multi‐year delay in adapting force design to create a response to this emerging threat. These are just a few examples of a wider phenomenon of the notable absence of intelligence from most of the processes during which force design solutions are defined for operational problems.

There are of course other examples of extensive involvement, in particular in the interface between force design and technological intelligence on the enemy’s weapons systems. In developing electronic warfare systems, knowledge of the specific characteristics of the enemy’s radar systems has a decisive role and there is a strong connection between technological intelligence officers and force design officers in this field. Also in the development of missile defense systems, technological intelligence has a crucial role in defining the attributes of the missiles which the systems must deal with.

The connection between technological intelligence and force design shows how intelligence is perceived in force design processes ‐ as a source of specific and accurate answers needed to characterize a specific capability, but not as something that is worthy of influencing systemic understandings or of shaping the force design concepts which the specific capabilities are a part of. As opposed to force employment, to which intelligence is tightly connected, most force design processes and in particular the design and conceptual layers take place without the support of specific intelligence assessments and without significant involvement of intelligence officers.

Why Does This Happen?

In my opinion, we are not talking about an accidental outcome. It is the result of the requirements and demands of force design on the one hand, and the characteristics of intelligence assessment processes on the other. These lead to a situation where, right from the start, there is a certain mismatch between intelligence assessments and the requirements of force design. To this we can add a history of a lack of cooperation, in which as a result, force design personnel became used to managing without the support of intelligence assessments. Similarly, intelligence officers did not need to develop the skills and knowledge needed to provide relevant intelligence assessments to force design and continued to upgrade their assessment tools only to the requirements of force employment.

How are force design requirements different from force employment requirements? Firstly, force employment is characterized by decisions implemented over short time frames – minutes, hours or days. Operational plans are indeed relevant for longer periods – for up to a few years (in the current exceptional circumstances for less) – but they are only plans which are then converted to operational orders shortly before their implementation. On the other hand, force design processes are long term. Many decisions will bear fruit only a few years down the track and other decisions such as the establishment of new bases or headquarters or the acquisition of new platforms and armaments will be implemented and have an impact on the state of affairs over many years. Intelligence assessments which are relevant to force design needs must describe in a more relevant fashion the expected state of affairs many years ahead, as opposed to intelligence for force employment.

Second, operational plans and decisions on force employment are prepared for a tangible context, and relate to a specific enemy and arena. Force design needs to enable force employment in a wide range of contexts. Advanced munitions are not developed or purchased, generally, in order to be used in a specific arena or against a specific target, but rather to enable their use against a wide range of targets and arenas for the period of up to 20‐30 years that they will remain in the order of battle. The acquisition of the Merkava Mark IV main battle tank was not intended for a specific arena, but rather to enable its use in all combat conditions. Consequently, when a decision is made to build a new base, to purchase F‐35 aircraft, to develop a new type of shell or to establish a new commando unit, the decision‐maker does not have one tangible combat context in mind. These are all intended to be relevant for the greatest breadth of operational contexts as possible.

A story is told that many years ago one senior intelligence officer was asked to present an intelligence assessment for the year 2020 and answered “Ask me in 2019.” What lies behind this approach, which even if it is said jokingly, contains a kernel of truth?

The methodology of intelligence assessments, as defined and implemented today, is more adapted to focused short term questions, and far less to broader questions about the distant future. The customary approach in intelligence assessments is inductive. The intelligence officer gathers information, analyzes it and strives to formulate an assessment derived, as much as possible, from firm facts. In the alternative approach customary in intelligence assessments – the competing alternatives approach – the intelligence officer gathers information, analyzes it and doesn’t use it to justify his assessment, but rather to reject the options that the information contradicts. Despite the large differences between these two approaches, from the perspective of our discussion, they are similar – both are clearly empirical approaches which instruct the intelligence officer to find solid and reliable information which can be directly connected to an assessment of the future (whether with a methodology of justification or refutation). In order that the assessment about the enemy be perceived as well founded, especially from an intelligence officer’s own perspective, the solid information needs to be perceived as relevant, and it therefore needs to be information specifically about the enemy and information which is close in location and time to the context which led to the intelligence assessment. In addition, the intelligence officer strives to arrive at the assessment through the minimum number of cognitive “steps” in order to rely more on information and less on presumption.

Not only is this methodology directed at responding to focused short term questions, but also the ethical rules for an intelligence officer lead to this result. Intelligence officers know that they work in an uncertain environment, but still they strive, as far as possible, to provide well founded assessments. The ethos of intelligence personnel is to uncover “hard” information – real facts – and to use them in order to formulate a “strong” assessment. Basing oneself on fact is thought to be more appropriate for intelligence assessments than basing oneself on presumptions (this approach, of course, reflects a severe epistemological problem, given that there is no way to decide that a piece of information is a fact without making presumptions about the way it was gathered and its reliability, and there is no way to connect pieces of information to an assessment without making presumptions. However, pieces of information that are perceived as fact enjoy a special status which is then projected on to any assessment that is based on them).

This is the place for a short personal story. In 2002 I wrote two research papers that were based, among other information, on many presumptions (using an approach that I will describe later in this article). One paper dealt with the way that the Syrian army was likely to use its chemical weapons (which have been neutralized in the interim) during war with Israel, and it was intended to serve as the intelligence basis for an updated operational concept which needed to make presumptions about the enemy. The second paper was about the future Syrian SSM formation (which in the interim was created and then destroyed) – the characteristics of the missiles and their launchers, the structure of the formation and its method of operations in combat – the paper’s purpose was to serve as the basis for force design plans. Both papers were distributed, but the head of the organization where they were written refused to distribute them as regular intelligence updates, but rather they were distributed under the heading “food for thought.”

As the head of a serious intelligence organization, he did not allow himself to distribute assessments that were not based on information, but rather on presumptions. There is a structural problem here: My aspiration to influence force design processes required the presentation of an assessment which was not based on solid information, not because of a gap in intelligence gathering, but due to the fact that the information did not exist anywhere at that time, not even in the enemy’s head. Accordingly, the assessments needed for force design processes cannot be delivered as standard established intelligence assessments.

An additional characteristic of intelligence assessments is that the intelligence officer tries to present intelligence assessments on “red” (the enemy) without integrating “blue” (our forces). ‘What will the blue do?’ is a question which is thought to be outside the area of interest of an intelligence officer. In the typical relations between an intelligence officer and his commander, the first is responsible for describing the red and the second for understanding the blue and undertaking all of the integration between red and blue in order to get the whole picture. The attempt to formulate assessments from the red perspective alone, without the blue side, drags intelligences officers to primarily focus their assessments on red activity in the first act. Sometimes, an intelligence officer will also describe red activity in the second act, in response to a future action by the blue forces, but this assessment is usually hazy and general. Only in rare cases does an intelligence officer try and describe more complicated developments. This approach makes it difficult, of course, to create intelligence assessments for scenarios in the distant future. Indeed it goes without saying that future scenarios are dependent on both sides – both red and blue and of course when generating combat capabilities one also needs to make presumptions about developments in warfare and it is not enough to describe just the first and second acts.

From the above it is clear why the methodology and ethics of intelligence assessments make providing a response to the needs of force design difficult. Intelligence for force design needs to tell something about the distant future in order to be relevant but it is difficult to find information about the enemy which can help to establish, on the traditional standards of intelligence, an assessment on a future scenario in ten years' time. Of course one cannot tell a relevant story about the next decade without answering the question of what we will do during that time. Even if we have a complete picture of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities, who can guarantee that it will remain relevant to events in another decade, or even to the end of the IDF’s multi‐ year plan. Even if we have a complete intelligence picture of the Islamic State, who can say if it will even exist in another decade and if so – what it will look like? Indeed, its existence and condition are dependent not only on it but also on those fighting it.

And how will the other organizations that are active in the Middle East and shape our strategic and operational environments look? With traditional methods of intelligence assessment and the way that intelligence personnel understand themselves and their roles, we have little to say about the state of these organizations and the Islamic State in another decade or at the end of the multi‐year plan. However, building the required capabilities to fight them sometimes takes a period of time equal to a multi‐year plan or two to develop or acquire the capabilities and to make them operational. As a result of gaps in adapting the intelligence methodology to the requirements of force design, intelligence officers and force design personnel do not usually work together, aside from several specific examples dealing with, as noted above, primarily precise questions and answers about the tangible characteristics of enemy armaments. As a result of the lack of mutual connections, intelligence officers have limited exposure to force design processes and force design personnel have little exposure to intelligence processes.

In contrast, joint work by intelligence officers and force employment personnel has created a rich dialogue based on mutual understandings. In this dialogue intelligence officers continuously sharpen and polish their understanding of the requirements of force employment processes. They better understands the language used by force employment personnel, the requirements that drive them to ask particular questions and not others, their constraints and their assumptions. As a result, intelligence officers know how to formulate an intelligence assessment appropriate to their needs. Similarly, through dialogue, force employment personnel polish their understanding of intelligence assessments, on their capabilities and limitations and the language used by intelligence personnel. Operations personnel learn how to use intelligence thanks to their dialogue with intelligence personnel, and intelligence personnel learn to create more relevant intelligence thanks to that dialogue.

This type of interface is rare between intelligence officers and force design personnel, and as a result the vast majority of intelligence officers – junior and senior – do not understand force design. They do not understand the considerations that drive force design personnel which are derived from the way that projects are managed, from technological and engineering uncertainty, from analyses of future improvements to systems under development, from contractual commitments and budgetary issues. Consequently, they do not understand the considerations that lead force design personnel to compromise on certain points and not on others or which cause them to either adopt or reject an intelligence assessment as a basis for decision making. Equally, force design personnel are not used to a dialogue with intelligence personnel and mostly, they do not know how to use intelligence assessments sufficiently well and do not know how to best integrate intelligence assessments into their decisions.

The situation is somewhat better in the air and naval forces. In these services intelligence is involved primarily in force employment processes, but intelligence officers also maintain contact with the force design personnel who are located within the same service and are close to the force employment personnel.

The situation is less good at the General Staff level. There is no intelligence officer devoted to the body that plans force design, nor in the ground forces.

Have we reached a dead end, or are there possible solutions to improve the capability to provide relevant intelligence for force design?

(IDF Collecting Field Intelligence. IDF Spokesperson's Unit)

Integration of Operations Research and Systems Analysis into Force design as an Example

Operations research and systems analysis bodies exist in the Policy and Plans Directorate, in the air and naval forces and in MAFAT (the Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure). While they are younger than the intelligence bodies established at the same time as the IDF, they have been in existence for decades. As opposed to the intelligence assessment bodies, they are closely involved with force design processes, which make up a significant proportion of their work – support for acquisition planning as a part of the multi‐year plan, assistance in prioritizing projects, assistance in defining operational requirements for armaments and even support for prioritization and compromise during the lifespan of projects. Like intelligence assessment bodies, they generate assessments about the future and recommendations for action to be taken by the blue side.

Therefore a comparison of these bodies could create a relevant viewpoint to address the question of the connection between intelligence assessments and force design. Like intelligence, O.R. bodies deal not only with supporting force design but also with formulating assessments to support force employment and it is therefore a convenient and effective playing field to compare between the two disciplines. Before the comparison, I will briefly describe the O.R. discipline.

Operations research, in the way it is implemented in the IDF, is intended to support decision making in conditions of uncertainty, by providing tools for the organized analysis of the issue under discussion. A typical O.R. analysis begins with identifying and formulating the right questions and the answers needed to provide a basis for a decision, and in identifying alternatives for the decision‐maker.

The purpose of the analysis is to assist in the characterization of the alternative and in reaching a decision on which to choose by evaluating the expected results of the different decisions and what they depend on. For example, evaluating the alternatives for different operational plans in Lebanon in light of expected damage to the home front (even if there are other considerations in choosing a plan). The researcher would formulate several relevant alternatives from the perspective of the operational planner, and then estimate the damage to the home front expected from each of them. How do they do this? They develop a quantitative model to describe the scenario which is expected in the war. They integrate estimates of Hezbollah’s fire plan, the technical capabilities of the different fire systems, the achievements of the IDF fire plan and maneuver, their expected influence on Hezbollah’s plans, the IDF’s defensive capabilities and the behavior of the civilian home front etc.

Of course one cannot know with certainty which plan Hezbollah will choose to use in a future war, which fire systems it will use, how successful the IDF’s plans will be, how will Hezbollah behave in light of developments on the battlefield and how the civilian population will behave on the home front.

The O.R. methodology responds to this challenge by basing their assessment on a set of presumptions and analyzing the sensitivities to changes in those presumptions. The presumptions are based on different sources including intelligence assessments, the combined experience of different actors in relevant contexts (How did the civilian population behave during the Second Lebanon War and during the operations in Gaza? How did Hezbollah act after our strikes in the past? What were our accomplishments in locating launchers during war and in operational models?) and technical assessments (What is the expected efficiency of the Iron Dome system in light of lessons learned from previous action and the improvements which have been implemented? What was the level of use of SSRs in the past? How resistant are Israeli buildings to warheads?) The varied presumptions make up a model with logical connections between them and enables us to reach conclusions about different scenarios and their sensitivity to changes in the presumptions. In this way the model allows a complex picture, whose results are hard to assess intuitively, to be broken down into smaller pieces which can be analyzed and examined.

Of course, choosing an alternative for an operational plan also relies on intelligence assessments. However, between an intelligence assessment and an O.R. assessment as the basis for decision making, there are significant differences in the nature of the answer and the method of reaching it:

•  Intelligences assessments seek to answer the question what is expected or likely to happen (what will the enemy do and what does it depend on?) while O.R. seeks to answer the question what decision should be made and what does it depend on. O.R. personnel try to adopt, as far as possible, the perspective of the decision‐maker and to take into account their dilemmas. The intelligence officer focuses his assessment primarily on the enemy (even if he must, of course, look at the enemy through the blue glasses).

• The intelligence officer asks himself what can be known about the enemy, based on accurate information. The O.R. researcher asks himself what can reasonably be presumed in order enable a correct decision. Focusing attention on the question “What do we need to presume?” and not on “What can we know?” enables the formulation of an assessment even in a situation where we are missing “hard” information about the enemy.

• Intelligence assessments are mainly based on information relating to the enemy, while O.R. personnel allow themselves to use analogies to other information. Let’s take a reasonable question which might need an answer in the framework of operational planning: How long would it take to fill a shaft that leads to a tunnel that was attacked? An intelligence officer would first turn to the enemy’s doctrine manuals and orders and if he couldn’t find an answer, he would file a request to collect the critical information and in the meantime leave the question open. The O.R. researcher would ask the intelligence officer what heavy equipment is available near the site which was attacked and would check with the operators of similar equipment in Israel or would compare it to relevant tests which took place in Israel or elsewhere around the globe.

• Intelligence assessments ostensibly avoid describing the blue side, aside from answering the question of how the enemy would respond to IDF action. O.R. assessments necessarily mix the decisions and capabilities of the red and blue sides together, otherwise it would be impossible to fully describe the scenario.

  The O.R. perspective generates a broader and more balanced picture than an intelligence assessment from the decision‐maker's perspective. Striking examples of this can be found in joint research that was conducted by intelligence officers and O.R. researchers over the last year. During the ongoing war in Syria, SSRs converted to carry an unusually large warhead have begun to be used. The rockets are converted (as can be seen in many videos on YouTube) to carry warheads weighing dozens or even hundreds of kilograms, far more than the weight of their original warheads, which compromises the range and accuracy of these rockets. Thus, less accurate rockets with a shorter range were created, but with far greater damage potential. Intelligence assessments pointed out the severity of the threat ‐ if and when they end up in Hezbollah’s hands and if they are used in a future war ‐ in light of the greater damage they are capable of causing when compared to regular SSRs. The conclusion of this assessment was that these extra weight SSRs should be seen as a threat which has the potential to cause significant change and which would require extensive preparations by Israel.

  Mistakes in information naturally lead to mistakes in intelligence assessments. A broader view is likely to overcome gaps in the assessment as we can see from the following example. When SA‐8 antiaircraft systems appeared in the Middle East, a question arose as to the range of the missiles. A broad analysis, as is the norm in O.R. analysis reached the conclusion that in light of the purpose of the system (mobile protection for forces) and in light of their similarity to other systems around the world (such as the Crotale and Roland) the system’s range would apparently be around 10km. This approach is not suited to the intelligence research methodology which seeks hard information as the basis for analysis and not on reasonable presumptions in a relevant context, but in this case it produced the better assessment.

  This analysis of the analogy between intelligence assessments and O.R. assessments is not intended to recommend that intelligence officers engage in O.R. research. That would not be efficient or correct. The purpose of this analysis was to identify what makes the O.R. discipline more relevant to force design personnel than intelligence, with the intention to deduce how it would be possible to make intelligence research more relevant for force design than it is today.

  Intelligence retains a different role than O.R. in force design. The O.R. discipline does not fully meet the needs of force design. The main gap is in the systemic discussion about force design. With the O.R. approach, efforts to quantitatively estimate the worthwhileness of different alternatives and the attempt to present an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of the decision making dilemma conclude with a recommendation for action. This approach creates a process where O.R. research is an independent process and is relatively isolated from the decision‐makers who only see its products at the end of the process and after its conclusions have been summarized into an organized thesis. O.R. research is not a dialogue which creates a conceptual framework, but rather it is mainly a research process that examines alternatives within a defined conceptual framework – whether this was defined in advance as one of the working assumptions or whether the researchers formulated the framework themselves. This is the key place that intelligence should join the force design processes, and it is similar to the place that intelligence occupies in the discourse shaping force employment.

  Returning to Intelligence Assessments and Force design

  The argument that intelligence only has a secondary role in force design leads to the conclusion that there is no need to act differently. Intelligence has enough missions, and investing resources in entering force design has an opportunity cost. I will not discuss the question of how much it is worthwhile to divert intelligence efforts to this issue, but I will try to argue why it is important to integrate intelligence into force design processes. How can force design benefit from the involvement of intelligence?

  Force employment is based on the attempt to create a systemic analysis of the encounter between red and blue. In contrast, in force design the interaction between blue and red in the strategic layer and the operational layer are analyzed in a superficial manner, in which in many cases the red plays only an abstract role. There is systemic analysis in force design but the factors which are involved in it are not blue and red, but rather operational forces, resources and technology. This analysis is no less complicated than the systemic analysis used in force employment but it includes different components. As a result, a partial worldview is created that is missing the influence of the enemy on the future battlefield and on the way that our capabilities will be influenced by it in the future. The integration of the enemy viewpoint into the dialogue that shapes force design would enable the formulation of a plan that provides a more considered response to the future. One example of the effect of this lack of integration, which was presented above, dealt with the delay in adapting force design to the development of modern air defense systems in our region. There are also current disturbing examples, but due to information security considerations, I will not elaborate.

  The questions that are appropriate to present to intelligence are dependent on the type of discussion taking place in force design. In general, the dominant factor relating to the required intelligence product is the length of the horizon of the topic at hand. Discussions about force design concepts, about the acquisition of platforms or the development of key technological systems deal with timeframes set many years into the future. At the other end of the spectrum are discussions on training, exercises and to a certain extent the acquisition of spare parts and munition stocks, which deal with timeframes spanning only a few years.

  Intelligence for formulating force design concepts needs to describe the future battlefield and the expected capabilities of the enemy and the way they will employ force as well as the elements of the future environment (population, foreign forces etc.). In addition, formulating long term concepts for force design require intelligence assessments on the enemy’s force design strategy and their force design infrastructure (industry, academia, resources and international connections) which can teach us about the potential for changes in the trend line of the enemy’s capabilities development – to which technologies are they likely to turn? Is their academic infrastructure suitable to this? Which acquisition channels are available to them? What budget could they allocate to force design? And many others.

  The involvement of intelligence in force design has a special importance when analyzing force design not only as a process that builds future capabilities, but as a process that also shapes the enemy's decisions – their force design, their level of confidence in their capabilities and the level of deterrence created in their eyes. The enemy’s decisions about force design can be influenced by our actual force design as well as by the way our force design is presented. Without integrating the intelligence perspective in force design it will be very hard to create a comprehensive systemic understanding of the influence of force design on shaping our environment and on our enemies’ approach to us.

  Intelligence for assisting in decision making on the characteristics of projects and acquisitions needs to include a description of the future battlefield, specific descriptions of the technical characteristics of the enemy’s weapons systems and a description of the potential scale of acquisitions by the enemy in the future. Currently, the primary contribution of intelligence to force design is concentrated on responding to focused questions about the scale of acquisition and the characteristics of enemy weapons. But the answers to these questions, as important as they might be, provide only part of the broad requirements of intelligence for force design.

  Intelligence work focused on force design will lead to information gathering and knowledge development, which will not happen without these leading questions. Thus, for example, our intelligence understanding of the enemy’s force design principles, of their speed of weapons development and operational adaption, of the stage of development at which weapons become operational, and of the usability of their weapons, all these need to influence the development of our response. Similarly with regard to conceptual developments from around the world that are likely to arrive at our region and which could influence the development of concepts and capabilities in this area. Information gathering and analysis of wars around the globe, like the aerial campaign in Kosovo or the Syrian‐Russian‐Iranian campaign against the rebels in Syria, need to serve as a basis for our understanding of opportunities and risks and to help create force design that will enable us to better cope with the future reality. In some of these fields important knowledge has been developed, in others it is missing. Without an ongoing and rich dialogue with force design personnel, intelligence cannot know which questions are relevant and which relevant answers could contribute to decisions making.

  How can intelligence connect to force design processes? Firstly, intelligence needs to influence the processes that shape the IDF’s future capabilities. As long as intelligence is not significantly involved in and contributing to these processes, its influence on the future will be limited and its main impact will be short term only.

  Beyond that, dealing with intelligence assessments of the type needed for force design would make the assessment bodies’ tools more sophisticated for all types of missions. Development of capabilities to formulate long term assessments, based on presumptions and not just what are thought of as facts, integration of non‐intelligence information sources and “playing” with complex scenarios of blue and red activity – all these would also facilitate improved capabilities for intelligence personnel to supply intelligence assessments for force employment as well and not just for force design. The type of discourse and thinking that are needed for force design planning are similar to the type of discourse and thinking needed to formulate intelligence assessments for a developing scenario in which the red and blue decisions impact one another. However, current intelligence research tools are only suitable for providing assessments one or two acts forward.

  Accordingly, in my opinion it is important to improve our capability to provide intelligence assessments to force design processes. What actions should be taken to achieve this?

  1. In order to provide relevant intelligence assessments, intelligence officers need to adapt their methodology. The current methodology is only somewhat suited to the type of answers that force design processes require. In addition, intelligence officers need to adapt their criterion for “good” intelligence assessments. As long as an intelligence assessment is thought of as good only if it is well founded on solid facts, it will not make a substantial contribution to force design processes which extend over a multi‐year plan or two. Assessments about the future require a degree of imagination and extrapolation, and require the formulation of presumptions, which must then be rigorously examined as an alternative to basing an assessment on facts. A new type of methodology is needed to achieve this.

  2. In a similar fashion to the interface between intelligence and force employment, the connection between intelligence and force design personnel needs to be institutionalized, given that the ability to supply relevant intelligence is based on mutual understanding. The integration of intelligence officers in significant force design processes, such as formulating concepts or preparing master plans, would enable the utilization of intelligence insights in the process of shaping force design.

  3. It is important to maintain intelligence officers’ abilities to provide technical intelligence based on solid facts. However, it is also important that the dialogue with intelligence officers in the force design field not be a discourse based on technical questions and answers in which the intelligence officers provide the missing building blocks within a closed and sealed concept such as: What is the missile’s range? Or how many rockets does the enemy have? The discourse with intelligence officers must take place at a much earlier stage in the process in which intelligence officers needs to be a part of the group that shapes the concept and plan.

  4. Another important question that arises from time to time is whether a dedicated intelligence function be created for force design. That is, should intelligence officers be assigned to the departments that deal with force design? It is clear that this would provide a solution to the need to develop an ongoing discourse between intelligence officers and force design personnel. However, this structure would not guarantee that this requirement is met, and the experience of the dedicated intelligence body in the Ground Forces service is an example of this. Therefore, this is not the best solution in my eyes and is certainly not the best solution with which to start these changes. At least at the start, and in my estimation also in the future, it is best to base the connection between intelligence and the force design on intelligence officers who routinely serve within our assessment bodies and who would participate from time to time in defined processes within the force design bodies. This solution can be implemented not only in the services, but also in the connection between the Intelligence Research Division and the Planning Division in the Policy and Plans Directorate and between the Research Division and MAFAT. It would be appropriate to engage in a trial period in which the connection is institutionalized in a systematic manner and afterwards lessons could be learnt for improvement.

  The entry of intelligence into force design may lead to costs. In addition to the inputs that will come at the expense of other missions and the changes in methodology and ethics, it is likely that there will also be influences in other areas. In my opinion, there is also the potential for a positive contribution provided that we are able to ensure that intelligence officers maintain their unique “red” outlook for which there is no replacement. There are many “blue” thinkers, and the intelligence officer needs to be capable of seeing the world through the eyes of the enemy. Experience, maturity and mentoring will be needed order to provide intelligence for force design.

  [1] Col. Asaf currently serves as the Deputy Head of the IDF Research Division in the Intelligence Directorate. In the past, he served as the Head of the Research Department and as Head of the Operations Research Branch in the Israel Air Force.