Force Design as a Campaign

• The ratios of basic resources. When you are relatively poor in budget, in personnel and in technology, you cannot allow yourself a resource “escalation” in the race against the other party because eventually you are bound to lose. This case requires a careful and controlled management of "escalation" in force design. It goes without saying that our situation today vis-a-vis most of our opponents is completely different.

•  Types of objectives[21] set for the exercise of military power. If during Israel's first decades the common objective types were manifested in achievements such as the capture of a territory or the annihilation of a threatening military force, then in recent decades, Israel tends to set itself objectives such as achieving a lull of one kind or another, or, more generally, influencing the enemy’s behavior. The second type of objective is more conducive to the force design objectives of influencing the enemy’s behavior, for two reasons – as argued above, the link between a direct military achievement (destruction of forces, occupying territories, causing damage etc.) and the strategic outcome is tenuous in any case. Moreover, this kind of achievement, which does not necessarily involve physical destruction, can often be achieved without a conflict.

On optimization and strategy in force design

Different objectives require the adoption of varied approaches to the thinking, decision and development processes. Major decisions[22] about force design are routinely made through an optimization approach, while some of the objectives discussed require the adoption of a strategic approach.

What is optimization in the force design?

Optimization in force design is its planning, while striving to maximize the value of the “target function” which, though not explicitly defined,[23] usually describes the ability to “win” and achieve the maximum against opponents or certain scenarios[24] with the lowest possible costs. Given the resources (budget, technology, etc.) defining the constraints and the planning scope (usually a number of years) one can find the optimal resources allocation. In reality this process is immeasurably more complex, but this is basically the planning process we undertake (when indeed a process is taking place, and decisions are not derived from a collection of organizational, economic and other considerations). The optimal allocation defines the force design efforts for the coming years. In due course, probably in a year or several years, the issue will be re-examined in its entirety with reference to the change that occurred since the last examination, including changes in the opponent, changes in opportunities and constraints and of course, the new inflexibilities that may be known only a year or two from now, which are in fact the outcomes of decisions that were just made.

One of the regularly discussed failures is the difficulty of setting in motion paradigmatic revolutions with this approach. This subject will be dealt with later on, but we shall briefly argue here that, essentially, the optimization approach cannot by itself prevent such revolutions. The problem lies more with the mindset that accompanies it, and with limiting the debate to a too narrow optimization scope.[25]

What is strategy in force design?[26]

The strategic view of the force design refers to it as a campaign in itself, with its own logic and objectives. As said above, the main objectives are measured by the impact on the behavior and decisions of the opponent.[27] In contrast to the optimization approach, conceptual tools are required here for a multi-player game, where each one's choices would change the balance of considerations of the other party regarding its own strategies.

It is required, of course, to set concrete goals for force design, and to define achievements which will be considered a success (the equivalent of victory) in this campaign. One of these would strive for an optimal balance of power, and this is the logical equivalent of the entire optimization approach.[28] We have to consider the resources (which here are the development and production resources rather than the combat forces) and link activities and consequences. Also, we should think in advance about the possible effects of our activities on the opponent's force design, rather than about his current trends only. It is necessary to examine reactions and counter-reactions.[29] In an analogy to the world of operational content, what “reserves” do we have? When do we plan to use them? And so on.

There is a deep analogy between the conceptual system that accompanies strategic thinking in the content worlds of force employment, and those of force design, with one basic difference – the pace is slower by two or three magnitudes,[30] what takes hours somewhere else will take months here; and what takes a month there will take a decade here. Decision and navigation processes will be slower here, correspondingly.

Combining and balancing approaches

Both approaches are presented here separately and contrasted because they represent different disciplines. In practice when we want to have the ability to “win the war” we must combine[31] optimization and strategy. However, when we aim for the other families of objectives and consider force design as a campaign in itself, it is essential to adopt a strategic approach to force design as a leading approach. In practice, the optimization approach is much more common in the IDF, by far, while posing unnecessary constraints and rigidifying the scope of the debate.

Paradigmatic revolutions and their links to the basic approach- On conservatism and sticking with what exists.

Past experience has shown that the strategic and military environments change, sometimes to such an extent that a serious paradigmatic revolution of the doctrine and force design is necessary, or at least desirable.[32] Often the change is gradual and slow, but without constant adjustment, ultimately the change will grow incrementally to a considerable gap. In force design, every army is basically a cautious organization, and, to a certain extent, rightly so, due to the risks at stake in the event of a shock too large and irresponsible. Several reasons enhance the required responsibility and caution, mutating them sometimes into real conservatism.

A perceptual anchor relying on past experience - Adherence to existing concepts and current reasoning about victory and how to achieve it. Since the wars of the past are in many cases their formative experiences, armies prepare often for challenges that look like the future challenges of past wars.[33] Therefore, they cling to existing capabilities, which seem to be assets even when their value has in fact dropped (and in extreme cases they have turned into millstones). All these stem from the same perceptual anchor. 

A gap between the time required for the maturation of lengthy development processes and a short observation horizon – it is easier for armies to adopt changes when they are concrete and when substantial operational contributions might be realized within a few years. Efforts of procurement of existing means and building an order of battle, are usually among these, thus, they are assigned inherent priority over going in a completely new direction; certainly if it involves the removal of a vital part of the order of battle. However, changes that would allow real paradigmatic modifications usually take longer, and therefore require higher risk-taking.[34]

The need to bridge the inherent tension between readiness and buildup - These two are competing not only on resources, but on essence and concept. Readiness, by definition, is based on what exists. An army cannot be prepared for war with future capabilities. However, to allow for a future buildup to facilitate a real change, it needs to significantly exceed what exists.

Psychological - Sir Basil Liddell Hart explains very skillfully why a commander must have faith in his abilities, in the abilities of his men and in the ability of his tools to carry out their duties. Once he does, the chances of his embracing a revolution calling to dispense with these tools dwindle to zero. He is more likely to try improving his tools as part of the existing concept,[35] so they will become faster, more lethal and more protected. But everything will stay within the framework which, experience shows, occasionally, perhaps once every few decades, will become irrelevant.

The IDF is not free of these difficulties either. Past experience shows that the great revolutions in the IDF’s force design (which, by the way, have yielded remarkable results) were imposed on it, sometimes due to constraints of resources, or have waited a long time to be adopted, and were certainly not pondered upon during routine processes.[36] (The same processes that shape work plans, multi-year plans etc.). To some extent, a high rate of wars in the distant past "protected" the IDF from excessive conservatism.[37] But it is doubtful whether this protection is currently valid, since the repeated confrontations do not challenge the main force design elements. Even a real war like the Second Lebanon War did not constitute an actual test case for the most important order of battle elements.

One interesting example, which might constitute a “control group” (partially at least) is the operational adoption of technological opportunities inherent in precision weapon systems, and their interweaving with appropriate intelligence and control systems. The opportunity was there and relevant capabilities matured in the defense industry for at least a decade before the IDF adopted them and formulated the appropriate operational concept during the 1990s. Parallel processes in the Air Force were riper by that time, by far, having been initiated more than a decade earlier. Extensive historical research is probably required in order to explain this gap. Some might say, for instance, that the Air Force is a technology- biased service, or alternatively that it is resource-rich, that learning cycles are shorter and that the aerial battlefield is simpler than the ground battle field. All of these causes are possible, but there is yet another main reason – following the Yom Kippur War it became clear as day that the existing concept of achieving air superiority collapsed, and thus the barrier, which made the disposing of the present capabilities difficult, was crossed.[38] A vast amount of thinking, attention and resources – which no organization is ever happy to expend, unless it thinks that it is vital - was invested in this regeneration. Without the awareness of this great gap, made clear in 1973, the IAF might have reached these solutions later, and perhaps would have remained with the same irrelevant approach for years to come. In the context of this debate we will ask – do we really need a major war to make us realize our current lack of solutions to certain challenges, for which we know we do not have answers (but still hope that minor changes within the framework of the existing concept will bear fruit)?

The basic approach, the attitude and their effects

As stated, paradigmatic revolutions are basically possible with the optimization approach as well, but in a deeper sense, the constant use of the optimization approach bequeaths a way of thinking that tends to stay within the limits of the current concept, even when it is not required. This approach is accompanied by a mostly industrial mindset and attitude, usually striving to quantify achievements. Usually, if not always, a yardstick is applied for this purpose, conceived in view of the existing conceptual system, whose tools we can measure, more or less.

Another difficulty is the limitation of the debate and the artificial reduction of the optimization scope deriving from the same perceptual anchor (and sometimes also due to organizational considerations and others). No paradigmatic revolution is possible while the optimization stays within the framework of the existing concept, and implicit assumptions occupy a central place.

The strategic approach, by its nature, sees reality and opponents as continuously changing variables and does not need the paradigmatic yardstick. That is why it is basically more open to break through the boundaries of the existing paradigm. Also, the attitude accompanying this type of thinking, which considers weapons tools whose functional dimension[39] is more pronounced, makes it easier to be released from existing anchors.

Therefore, in order to break the paradigmatic cycle, it is best to integrate challenging viewpoints, external to the organization, to make a greater use of the strategic approach to force design – which allows a different viewpoint – and, first and foremost, to reduce the weight of current operational reasoning,[40] limiting it to issues of short-term force design only.[41]

Why is the strategic approach so rare in Israeli thinking about force design?

Apart from these phenomena that probably accompany force design processes wherever they are, it is no coincidence that the strategic approach is rare in Israeli thinking about force design. The Israeli reality in the 50s, 60s and 70s was such that the main weight had to be given to other approaches. This reality, in tandem with Israel's strategic culture, led to the shaping of processes which - for evolutionary reasons - survived to this day, though they no longer fit current reality. The two main factors that hinder the adoption of a strategic approach are the same factors preventing a paradigmatic debate, and will be presented first. The other two reasons weaken the strategic approach while strengthening the optimization approach.

The concept of force design as secondary to the use of force – An army born into a real war for survival, which for years has dealt with an ultimate (or understood as such) existential threat, became accustomed to absolute preference of action over buildup. Israeli culture, as reflected in the military experience, favors action over thinking, thus, present capabilities and operational plans over any other effort. We refuse to internalize[42] the fact that the debate about long-range force design (especially in the main order of battle and major projects) is actually the debate about the possible scope of the future operational concept. We consider force design to be a complementary or auxiliary effort to the “real” thing, and as such, of course it cannot be considered as having its own logic. This difficulty finds its expression in the conceptual system, in work processes, in the attention of the highest echelon, in the prestige ascribed to positions and more. But above all this difficulty precludes the consideration of force design as a campaign, in the same way that no other auxiliary effort is perceived as a campaign in itself.

To illustrate the problem and the difficulty of maintaining a paradigmatic debate, we may examine the broad interpretation given sometimes to the term “Operational Dominance.” An army is an organization whose purpose is operational and this is its way of thinking. In this sense the operational approach and viewpoint are indeed dominant. However, there is no reason that a current operational activity or some existing operational plan should have a significant weight in decisions about long-range force design embodying an operational thinking on a different time range. On the contrary, the “current operational dominance” only hinders and harms this debate.[43]

A rigid organization of force design – The organization of the force design processes, generates much inflexibility that allows no deep debate, only a partial one, sometimes sterilizing it altogether. Most of the difficulties lie in the general level of force design, and not in specific fields. The various services know, more or less, how to change within, are able to face their challenges and to try to find optimal solutions to their tasks, which they wholly understand in the frame of their resources. A strategic approach to force design can also be found sometimes within the services and mini- revolutions sometimes occur there. However, in inter-service issues, in the huge amounts of resources invested in the main order of battle and in issues requiring the lead of the General Staff, a variety of inter-service, and service-General Staff problems are revealed. At this level, there is no full and open debate.

The rigidity peaked at the various administrations. These are not responsible at all for activating the capabilities created by them, and they also lack a wider perspective,[44] since, being technologically-professional entities they are defined through a cross-section of Israeli abilities in the technological-means of warfare dimension and not through an assignment cross-section. Thus, it transpires that the intention, a good one to start with, to assign a professional element to lead substantial development processes, protecting at the same time the resources allocated to the buildup,[45] is like a fly in the ointment. Since from the moment an administration is set up, it seems like a decree of fate to allocate huge resources to the sector for which it is responsible – whether relevant or not. In order not to mention any specific administration (and since the problem lies basically with the overall organization of the defense system, and not with a decision of any administration), just imagine what would have happened if in 1948 a cavalry administration was set up. We might still be developing protected stables and energizing hay.

More seriously, establishing an administration has its own logic and justification, and it can promote development much better than an entity from within the army. However, as the years go by, this logic weakens, even disappear, while the administration remains. Since its very existence depends on the projects for which it is responsible, there ensues an organizational vested interest feeding itself.[46]

Since the enemy is learning and changing, it is impossible to adopt a strategic approach and to realize nearly full optimization if we are still bound to force design efforts, embodied in organizational structures that reflect decisions in relation to past environment and challenges. Without the organizational ability to cut off past efforts and not continue with them forever, no real changes will occur.

Industrial culture – As a society with a significant part of its culture Western, Israeli society has a strong belief in technology, in fundamentally industrial thinking, in results-oriented planning and, to a certain extent, in viewing the opponent as technologically, not to say sometimes even intellectually, inferior. That is why the force design race is not considered a learning race against opponents, but more of a race against “technological constraints.” Thus, we are convinced that doing more, better and more efficiently than we did before, will yield the desired results.

Failure to internalize the changing strategic environment and balance of power – Our thinking and our processes were shaped according to past conditions – into a preventive approach against large opposing armies,[47] and as such, ruled out the adoption of broader objectives of force design beyond achieving an operational edge. Regarding force design, the current reality is different from the reality in the distant past in two essential points. Firstly, Israel is stronger than most of its enemies in money, in technology and in manpower – a balance of power that allows a different mode of thinking and its exploitation accordingly.[48] Secondly, from an attitude favoring the use-of-force to prevent immediate threats (in practice, not potentially), the objectives for the use of force are more varied today. The processional required change has not yet occurred.

Adopting a strategic approach and conducting force design as a campaign – what is to be done?

Now we can describe what needs to be done to conduct force design as a campaign in a strategic approach. It should be emphasized that it is not right and not fitting that the processes described later will cancel existing ones, most specifically the following processes:

• Short-term force design elements (affecting preparedness, including training, stocks, etc.) are required to rely mainly on the assessment of the situation, on the concept and on existing plans.
• Decisions concerning long-term force design elements (force buildup – multi-year plans, especially) should incorporate considerations from both approaches.

A basic condition for change is the adoption of the concept of force design as a campaign, development of an appropriate conceptual system,[49] a definition of concrete objectives for it, and a complete removal (literally) from the debate of any discourse of the existing operational concepts, and their organizational and operational expressions. Concrete changes are required both in terms of the organization and of the rationale of the force design efforts.

(IDF General Staff Headquarters . IDF Spokesperson's Unit) 

Organization and decision processes

A campaign needs a commander who has the power to decide, enabling him to lead and steer it (from the moment the objectives are determined). In theory, this should be the Deputy Chief of Staff - no position is more suitable for the job.[50] In fact, many of the big issues concerning long-term force design are decided within the services or in the administrations at the Defense Ministry, and the Deputy Chief of Staff does not have sufficient leeway to shaping the campaign. It is necessary to provide him with a wider decision scope, while relaxing organizational and resource inflexibilities. In fact, in the long term – beyond the overall resource limits of the IDF and the defense system – all internal constraints could become more flexible, if so decided.

A planning body and an appropriate planning process are required. This should be the Planning Directorate in the IDF, but the relevant process does not exist. The most important thing is to define objectives and achievements required for force design (exactly like the one defined for an operation) in terms of its influence on the enemy’s force design and on its decisions. If this is unclear, let us think what would happen if we defined the objectives of our plans and operation orders in a language, that ignored the existence of the other party and the desired results relating to them. One can start planning from these objectives, thus, planning will be similar to operational plans as we know them, and less like tables and spreadsheets (whose turn will arrive in later stages). It would be preferable to use tools similar to those used in strategic and operational planning, including war games. The same entity is required, beyond planning, to lead the campaign in question, and since its output is not necessarily visible, it is vitally important to develop a monitoring system for its achievements and failures while defining metrics of success; which, even if not be quantifiable, may certainly be evaluated.

Force design entities too will have to adopt - with regard to some of the projects (those more pertaining to that matter) - an approach with a strategic dimension in parallel with the technological and operational ones. To some extent, as noted above, such an approach already exists with regard to the micro level of specific projects. The Administration for Weapons Development and Technological Infrastructure (MAFAT) is of particular importance in this context, leading a large part of the development of long-term capabilities in the defense system, and having the know-how needed to draw a relatively wide picture (beyond being actually the administrative and executing entity of a significant share of the decisions).

In order to plan a campaign, appropriate intelligence is required. At present nothing is done concerning the intelligence required for conducting force design as a campaign. There is a wealth of intelligence activities oriented toward two fields supporting force design – detailed technological intelligence for various projects, and a more general intelligence on force design and build up processes of the adversaries. These two are not enough. There is a lack of understanding of the range of possibilities and the technological infrastructure of the other party – a reasoning based on a recognition of its way of thinking and its buildup processes, in order to evaluate future developments regarding moves which we have not yet made. It is also necessary to analyze the critical resources and bottlenecks of the other side, and their interactions with their own force design. This claim is not directed against the intelligence services – when no questions are asked, it’s no wonder that there are no answers.[51]

In terms of content, the intelligence required for planning,[52] not collected at all, relates mainly to the long term – technological infrastructures and current dilemmas concerning long -term projects. A familiar arrangement of the range of influence on decisions over the time axis will reveal, in the immediate term, an influence on decisions, on operations and on alertness; in the medium range of several months, there will be an impact on preparedness, then decisions concerning the order of battle will appear, later still on means of warfare and projects and, in the long range – on new technologies.

Now we should ask: Which decisions of the other party are we trying to uncover? If we are very busy with its short-term decisions and know nothing about its technological infrastructure decisions, then we shouldn’t be surprised to find out about a new project already underway, for which we do not have enough time to prepare. This is the meaning of a “run-in” in force design.

Special attention should be given to overt and covert management in force design.[53] It would be a mistake to stick with the status-quo, where it is perceived as a professional matter of information security. This is, first of all, a strategic decision, made at the same time as the decision to embark on the effort. It is necessary to decide what we want the enemy to know (usually, many efforts should be known to the enemy in general, while keeping the technical details in secret). From there on it one may entrust the planning and implementation of the security, exposure and deception with a skillful entity, specializing in the necessary channels.

Adjusting the decision and management processes to the rhythm of the campaign – Like any other campaign, this one too has its own rhythms and time-constants, derived from the (different) time constants of the opponent’s decisions and actions. Naturally the time-constants for decisions of this type are measured in many cases by long weeks and even months, and the realization of force design processes may take years. Therefore, intelligence-decision cycles require time-constants of a magnitude of weeks-months, while acting requires time constants of months-years.

On the one hand, it is impossible to act here in development cycles taking many years and on the other hand, when we are dealing with “timing” or “impact on decision” time constants characterizing operational activities will not do. It is particularly important, as with any learning race, to establish study and implementation cycles quicker than those of the other side.

[54]Rationales of Force Design Efforts

The development of force design efforts is designed to squeeze critical resources from the opponent. This requires an analysis of its resources and economy. Resources in this context are not just money and people, but also technological capabilities, industrial bottlenecks and dependence on other countries and means of warfare suppliers. For instance, against an enemy with serious shortages of manpower, it is necessary to examine those capabilities that we can develop, to force the other side to develop a manpower-intensive response.

In an analogous manner to reserves and their management in the operational content realm, it is required to maintain flexibility in force design. This is doubly true when one wishes to conduct a prolonged campaign. It does not mean building flexible means for various scenarios,[55] but constructing an infrastructure[56] permitting force design in a shorter time (such an infrastructure indeed costs money and does not generate an operational capability, but it can be very profitable), or postponing decisions to advanced stages while conserving options. This is done currently, but only partly, not for strategic reasons, but for reasons of development risks.

Influencing decision points of the opponent’s force design - In many cases, the difficulty is to even decide where we want to divert or channel the opponent’s efforts. In any event, it is required to identify these points well in advance[57] and to affect considerations, by either building capabilities or using them.[58] Of special importance in this context are demonstration in trials,[59] and first operational clashes, especially in families of capabilities that have never been tried before. If, hypothetically, in 1991 the image created of the Iraqi missiles was that of a complete failure, then it is very probable that the motivation of our enemies to develop a variety of missiles and rockets would not have grown as it did – surface-to-surface missiles have indeed existed in our area for decades, but have received very little prior attention. If we have reached such a confrontation without a means of warfare solution, even an operational behavior can turn the event into a total failure.[60] True, there is no telling the occurrence of the first clash,[61] but there are fields where it is clear that this first clash will come eventually. One should prepare for such a clash even without knowing its future timing.[62]

In order to influence an opponent’s decision, it is necessary to analyze, within the framework of our considerations, its strategic culture and decision-making psychology. There is a very broad and developed literature on decision making, and I will limit myself to two brief examples. Exploiting an opponent’s "aversion to defeat" turns out to be an additional consideration for prioritizing the development of relative advantages over closing gaps,[63] since opening a gap affects the situation assessment of an opponent more than closing a gap of the same size. Another psychological aspect concerns the human difficulty in dealing with uncertainty and assigning heavy weight to extreme cases of low probability. Hence, introducing a small degree of uncertainty can be a huge contribution when it comes to a critical capability in terms of the enemy (an example of this will shortly be provided).

Creating uncertainty within the enemy’s ranks, in reference to its capabilities, persuading it to invest more and more in means of warfare and operational solutions. It is important to remember the tendency to suppress difficulties until they become tangible. Therefore, hiding our capabilities would achieve the opposite result, and the enemy must be made to realize that he has to tackle existing Israeli capabilities. There is an absolute priority for new capabilities[64] over the expansion, even by magnitudes, of existing capabilities in order to create uncertainty. Very "lean" formations are quite sufficient to produce the dilemma. In cases of defensive capabilities, for example, a second, even partially completed defensive layer, based on a completely different system, has a larger influence over the force design of an enemy, than doubling or tripling the existing order of battle of interception systems and interceptors. The need to overcome two independent challenges constitutes a new type of difficulty level, requiring a significant adaptation of the offensive formation, and might impose too many operational constraints.[65]

By the same example we can illustrate another principle – thinking about, and timing of, the next steps in relation to the enemy’ decisions and in relation to the ripening of follow-up technologies, rather than the quickest development and procurement.[66] In the same example, the appropriate time for making the enemy realize that there is a second layer, is when it has already fixed its responses (either technological or doctrinal) to the first layer, and is in the implementation stages from which it is difficult to back down. At this stage our time gain is maximal. A premature realization does not allow an exploitation of the time bought by the first layer, and furthermore it will give the enemy the time needed to find an integrated solution to both challenges. Our flexibility on the timeline, can be determined by the pace of development, the pace of procurement, or most simple, by the extent of exposure.

Summary

This article discusses three difficulties, nested one within the other,[67] characteristic of the thought and decision processes of the IDF’s force design:

First, we are content to settle for very narrow objectives for our force design, while the relative advantages and resources of Israel allow us, through force design, to directly affect the strategic environment and the enemy's force design.

Second, even in achieving the narrow objectives we do adopt, we give too much weight to the optimization approach, by that missing out on the option of exhausting the enemy’s resources and of diverting them into areas more convenient to us, in a way that will eventually widen our operational edge.

Third, even within the framework of the optimization, supposed to exploit our resources optimally in order to achieve an operational advantage, we adhere too much to the existing concept and capacities and are generally satisfied with improvements within their framework.

These difficulties did not stand out fifty years ago. When Israel’s resources were small relative to its enemies’ and when big military engagements were more frequent and were about the removal of existential threats – or were perceived as such, it was more proper to settle for narrow objectives for force design and to adopt an optimization approach. Today the situation is essentially different: