The Campaign for the Home Front

01.07.15
Munir Amar and Eli Michelson

 

Introduction

On the night of July 22, 2014, Sergeant Sean Carmeli, who was killed during Operation Protective Edge, was laid to rest in Haifa. Sean hailed from Texas, and immigrated to Israel without his family to serve in the IDF. The announcement of Sean's death in combat in Gaza as a lone soldier provoked strong public emotions, and more than 20,000 people attend the funeral.[1]

A mass event of this kind, during an emergency and within the range of enemy missiles, should not be taken lightly. It raises many questions regarding daily routine on the Israeli home front. For example, what tools enable those in charge of safety on the home front to exercise their responsibility? What could assist them in providing safety during such an event? What is the equilibrium between the desire to maintain normal daily routine and the duty to protect the public from possible mass casualties?

We must sharpen our focus on these questions, and investigate the appropriate calculations in providing protection during this type of event from the anticipated threats (mainly high trajectory fire), to determine what would allow us to act appropriately to meet the challenge.

Many dilemmas emerge in times of war, especially around the tension between a desire for full protection on the home front and the desire to maintain the fabric of daily life. Should we allow the opening of supermarkets and for what hours? Should schools open, and under which conditions? Should concerts be held? Should we allow cafés and pubs to operate? Should soccer games be held? Should seaports operate? These dilemmas land on a commander's desk at the Home Front Command during emergencies, requiring him to deal with the challenge of maintaining the public’s daily routine alongside the challenge of saving life. These dilemmas become more acute as an operation continues and the pressure and need build to go about one’s routine as much as possible.

Conflicts in recent years have been characterized by changes in the combat environment and by fire on the home front during relatively long periods of combat. The combination of this type of conflict and missile defense systems (and their future development) created a situation in which it is possible to identify the potential for a different policy. The gap between the intensity of conflicts (which is dropping) and the quality of defense (which is rising) now enables a continuation of daily routine during emergencies. In this context, different ways of coping and decision-making are required. This article will discuss the effect of this phenomenon, which enables us to operate differently when defending the home front, the opportunities that arise, and the accompanying challenges and expected future trends. The changing nature of conflicts, as reflected in recent years, and the development of active defense, are the basis of the following discussion.

Since the 1990s Israel’s enemies have employed a strategy that focuses on causing civilian casualties and paralyzing the Israeli home front. They continue to invest considerable effort in these attempts. In recent conflicts, and likely in future ones, success is measured by an accumulation of achievements (in points), not by a quick and unambiguous decisive defeat (a knockout). Therefore, the need is growing to succeed on several levels of simultaneous direct and indirect struggle - at the frontlines, in contact with the enemy, at the home front, in the media and in cyberspace. At the home front, there is a growing necessity to prevent casualties, while allowing the continuity of the populations’ daily routine and the functioning of the national and civil systems in a manner as close to normal as possible.

Although the importance of successful management of the home front during a security crisis is obvious, there are no clear definitions and metrics for such success. Some home front objectives are defined, like support for the war effort, providing maneuvering room for decision-makers and saving lives,[2] but they do not define success clearly and unambiguously. For example, great value is ascribed to the uninterrupted activity of the Israeli economy during emergencies. Damage to the Israeli economy during a confrontation can be measured in several respects, such as loss of gross national product (GDP) due to a decrease in productivity (absence from work by reservists, parents remaining at home with their children), a decline in labor productivity (business’ closing), reduction in demand (domestic and foreign tourism, dining and entertainment services), damage to infrastructure and buildings etc.[3]

Alongside the economic damage from the impact of rockets and missiles on property and human lives, there are great benefits to a campaign from continued economic activity. It benefits the prevailing narrative adopted by the public and the national security. Most noticeable is that public resilience depends largely on the ability to maintain a reasonable daily routine during a crisis, while enabling the public systems to function and provide the necessities of life - food, water and medicine and the full functioning of the economy. Thus, we may understand Isaac Ben-Israel’s argument that Israel's defense leadership failed to understand during the Second Lebanon War (2006), that the main damage caused to the home front was social and economic, and not human life or property.[4]

Achieving a high level of protection requires a shutdown of the civilian and public systems, and the evacuation of the population into protected spaces. In contrast, the desire to maintain routine activities and the need to enable the functioning of various systems entails risks during emergencies. It should be emphasized that success on the home front has a considerable influence which may contribute to the overall achievements in a campaign. This success is measured in two respects - seemingly contradictory but in fact complementary - in preventing casualties and in allowing civilian systems to function “normally,” even routinely.

Currently, the understanding is growing that due to changes in the reality of war, both in terms of the challenge and response, the importance of the local dimension to the success of the home front is increasing. In this article, we wish to refine and emphasize this argument: there is a necessity to manage the tension between protection levels and the maintenance of routine activities by strengthening and providing tools to the local echelon of the Home Front Command (District level). These tools do not yet exist. This is based on the understanding that this is the level that bridges the national context and interests, and the tactical challenges.

We will discuss this on two levels - at the operational level - the challenge and potential in developing the operational level of home front defense, and at the strategic level - the link between defending the home front and the national security concept, and possible achievements in future conflicts. We will deal with this issue while looking at several aspects of home front defense. We will discuss the current and developing challenges to the home front, present the tensions between protection and maintaining routine, evaluate which institutional level within the home front would enable the management of these tensions, and finally discuss the growing context between defending the home front, and Israel’s national security concept.

The Israeli Home Front as an Element in the Enemy’s Combat Concept

Attacking the home front is not a new phenomenon in the history of war in general, and Israel isn’t an exception. During the War of Independence (1948), aircraft from Iraq, Syria, and primarily Egypt, attacked the Israeli home front. Many cities were attacked, including Haifa, Jerusalem, Ramat Gan and Tel Aviv. In total, 172 soldiers and civilians were killed on the home front and 321 were injured.[5] Attacks on the home front continued, such as the firing of Katyusha rockets at Kiryat Shmona from 1969, but in Israel’s campaigns, from the 1956 Sinai War to the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee, this type of fire was relatively insignificant. The main objective of attacking the home front was to motivate the civilian population to influence decision-makers. Nevertheless, during the War of Independence and in the other wars, attacking the home front was relatively a secondary objective, and the enemies’ main efforts focused on combat at the front. 

In recent years, we have seen the development of a reverse situation, turning the home front into a major target. An analysis of the approaches to confronting Israel demonstrates that the fundamental principle is winning by not losing. In practical terms, these approaches have led to a focus on two key combat elements - continuous rocket fire and systematic holding actions which cause the attrition of our forces.[6] These approaches are based largely on the understanding that the Israeli home front encompasses national assets, like every state, coupled with the understanding that Israel is sensitive to casualties.[7] A central element in the other side’s concept is the prolongation of the fighting while paralyzing basic services, thus influencing decision-makers by causing civilian unrest. The combination of these elements - damaging national assets on the home front, alongside our sensitivity to casualties and the prolongation of the conflict - allows our opponents to produce a “victory image,” which serves them in the construction of a general narrative about their achievements during the campaign.

Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, described in 2003 the way that this conceptual change occurred:

“The first time we shot at the Israeli settlements was the day that our Secretary General, Abbas al-Moussawi was killed [16 February 1992]. The first blow we landed on them was very painful, because it was a surprise to the Israelis. On our part, we discovered that after launching Katyusha rockets at the settlements, the enemy stopped attacking us and from that day we understood the lesson of that event...”[8]

The firing of rockets at the home front and the integration of new offensive elements[9] in the opponent's strategy, are designed to serve several possible concepts, such as an accumulation of achievements by taking a toll in life and property, disrupting the fabric of life by damaging societal life (for instance the closure of learning institutions), disruption of the economy, damage to strategic assets, etc. Furthermore, one can identify in recent years and conflicts a prolongation of the fighting, thus exhausting Israel in general (attrition) and the home front in particular.[10] This combination of a threat to the home front and the prolongation of hostilities creates a real challenge to the home front and to national security. As the campaign continues, the need to return to routine becomes stronger, although the conflict is continuing.

Tensions in Home Front Defense

The underlying imperative behind the Israeli home front civil defense effort is saving lives. The idea is to minimize the damage caused by enemy attacks on the population, based on a multi-tiered response whose main components are preventing assaults by attacking threat sources, active defense, and personal protection. Concurrently, efforts are made to maintain an “emergency routine,” the essence of which is to allow a basic daily routine for civil society during conflicts. This effort contributes to the national strength by “augmenting the resilience of the economy locally and nationally, and by creating a functional continuity...”[11] 

These efforts create a tension whose essence is in risk-taking - between conservation of life (defense and avoidance) and maintaining the fabric of daily life. As the level of protection decreases, restrictions on the functioning of the home front increase. As shown in the diagram below, two opposing forces influence the functional range of possibilities during emergencies. On the one hand (the green arrow) the desire to protect and safeguard life calls for “taking cover,” and on the other hand (the purple arrow) the desire for freedom of action and daily routine encourages a continuation of normal life and the taking of risks.

This range of possibilities includes all the normal activities of daily life - from medical services to entertainment and leisure. Of course, there can be no comparison between various normal activities and the proper functioning of the health system, which is immeasurably more important than the broadcasting of reality programs (such as the television show Big Brother during Operation Protective Edge). However, one should not underestimate any of the public activities because together they comprise the complete package known as societal resilience. The Israeli home front’s steadfastness during Operation Protective Edge was characterized by societal resilience allowing it to effectively cope with a long attrition campaign.[12] Societal resilience was reflected in the ability to “respond flexibly to serious disturbances (...), to allow a proportional and temporary functional withdrawal, to bring about a quick, with local changes and occasional adaptations, functional recovery to the original level of societal identity and conduct.”[13]

Facing the fire on the home front, active defense systems were developed, reducing damage to the home front, but exacerbating the tension between routine and protection due to their ability to reduce the likelihood of damages to the home front. As the level of defense increases the sense grows among the public that it is possible to maintain daily routine life during an emergency. Defensive systems indeed reduce the risk, thereby increasing the need to enable routine activities and the taking of calculated risks. These defensive systems, which, as noted, serve as a protective layer in the effort to save lives, affect the decision-makers and the public on both sides. The influence of the defensive systems is in increasing the leeway and calculated risks that can be taken to enable daily routine life and civilian activities, in addition to those necessitated during war.[14]

During ongoing conflicts, whose essence is attrition, decision-making becomes more complicated, and a dilemma arises between preserving life and maintaining the fabric of life. As the conflict continues and the level of the home front protection rises, the tension between saving lives and efforts to preserve routine life increases. This intensifies the need to grapple with a relatively new type of dilemma, requiring decisions that will contribute to success in both aspects, while understanding the interest and the national context, as well as the tactical challenge of this type of defense.

This tension between self-protection and the enabling of the fabric of daily life allows an escape from the rigid framework of self- protection (which is in essence unambiguous and apparently presents no dilemmas), and allows a dialogue about the space where one can maintain the fabric of daily life. A discussion of the latter type requires an understanding of the broader context - the enemy’s will, our own will and the circumstances - and of what it can contribute to national resilience, therefore leading to a freedom of action and to promoting our own interests, as well as to an adaptation to local needs and challenges - this will be discussed below.

The Operational Level of Home Front Defense

Success in preserving daily routine alongside reducing injury to life and property may lead to an important achievement for Israel, by removing the sting from enemy actions. Operation Protective Edge, which lasted 50 days, demonstrated (with reservations and limitations) success in home front defense, whose strategic significance was in neutralizing the central element of the opponent's strategy - causing injury to the home front.[15]

Active defense systems played a crucial role in this achievement. But this impressive achievement is not the essence. Alongside defense, the ability to function in emergencies and perform routine activities is another major factor that should be given consideration. In conflicts where achievements are cumulative (points) and not a decisive defeat (knockout), reducing the enemy's achievements is highly valuable. Prevention of damage on the home front is one important motive, but it is not the only one. Preventing the obstruction of daily life is a supplementary one. The ability to maintain a relatively reasonable daily routine is a genuine force multiplier, gaining “points” in this type of campaign. Another important fact to keep in mind is that failure on the home front, measured in casualties and dysfunction, may cause the whole campaign to be considered a failure, regardless of the successes at the front.

The ability to maintain a relatively reasonable daily life, as was evident during Operation Protective Edge, was based on a differential defense policy setting (distinct and tailored to the threat), on the exercises and implementation of defensive procedures, on increasing the number of warning areas and improving warning capabilities through additional measures (such as cellular phones). This practice reduces the frequency of disturbances to citizens’ lives and harm to the economy, as well as contributing to overall conduct during the emergency.[16] The combination of physical protection and the contribution of active defense systems generated a reality that allowed the maintenance of almost routine activity. This combination neutralized the central operational element of the enemy’s campaign - causing injury to the home front by firing missiles and rockets.

Decision-makers engaged with the home front should discuss the challenges and unique local needs of each district. These requirements vary per region and the nature of the campaign, with defensive steps needing to be adjusted to a region’s character.

At the local level, it is possible to provide an appropriate response to the tension between the need to protect in order to safeguard lives and the need for routine activities and the functioning of the system. The local level of the Home Front Command (District) can best provide an interpretation of the national interest whose essence is the success of two efforts - preserving life and maintaining the daily routine - by understanding both local challenges and opportunities. As with any operational entity, influenced by the unique-strategic context and concrete circumstances, each sub-command must act in accord with its unique conditions, which vary with the type of conflict and the circumstances. In this context, the head of each Home Front District is required to act in the space between the national (strategic) and the local (tactical) contexts, bridging the levels and the requirements of each.

In the 1991 Gulf War, only two levels of control were identified for managing challenges on the home front - the strategic level, where decisions were made on a nationwide scale (defense rules, institutions closures, evacuation etc.) and the tactical level, where the troops acted to save lives. This was apparently also the case in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The changes, manifested during the Second Lebanon War in the intensity of the threat to the home front, alongside other developments that have taken place in recent years in active defense capabilities, necessitate the development of another layer of thinking to cope with the challenge. Such a layer level should combine national needs with local challenges, leading to the achievement of local successes, with implications for national achievement.

The operational-local home front defense level is the appropriate one for managing the tension between lifesaving and routine maintenance. In emergencies, the strategic level can work towards achieving maximum protection. However, without understanding unique local challenges and variables, it will struggle to even meet this one-dimensional challenge. Adding the need to maintain daily routine and the dilemmas which arise from it necessarily leads to the development of the local level, which can understand the wider context and the need to maintain daily routine alongside the capability to maneuver defensively.

In order to realize this, implementable and practical tools are required to protect the home front. These tools for the local level, that is the district commander, are analytical - providing a good understanding of the context- as well as practical - enabling the improvement of defensive actions, and a concentration of effort to deal with a developing threat or a local event (such as an inevitable mass gathering similar to the funeral mentioned in the introduction to this article).

Despite all this, it is important to clarify that currently district commanders lack tools which would enable them to influence the defense of their sector. The defense situation changes constantly and a district commander is required to influence all the defensive elements in their sector, but they are limited in their capabilities and therefore cannot implement their significant insights about defensive needs. This limitation stands out especially in relation to the ability to influence air defense in terms of time and space, and the ability to affect actions on the front which may improve the home front defense (to be further discussed below).

The local point of view, as reflected in the perspective of the district commander, is relatively broad (more than one city or several communities). This broad perspective allows the tackling of defensive challenges in the district, through an integrated examination of all the threats and needs, as well as through differential actions. For example, within a single district one might define several different protection levels, in relation to different threat levels and the need to maintain daily routine. The District Command can analyze the defensive needs of different sub-districts, assigning each one an appropriate defense level, while maintaining routine in less threatened sub-sectors. Within a district, one can analyze the concrete threats to each sub-district, in relation to the complexity of its population and the means of protection at its disposal, the strength of the local leadership, etc. This analysis is made possible by the deep personal familiarity, formal and informal, of the commander with his district. A district commander may concentrate his efforts on a certain sub-district, thus reducing the personal protection level, while increasing the freedom of action of his residents. This situation might not only permit some residents to return to their daily routine, but it might also positively affect the whole district.

Sometimes, in tactical defensive operations, a community is defined as so vital as to be held at all costs. If evacuated by its residents, it would no longer be defined as crucial. In an analogy to home front defense, a distinct thinking may lead to defining certain areas as vital, thus determining the levels of protection and defense assigned to them. As appropriate in each situation, the District Command might change these levels, for example, following the departure of residents or their evacuation, or following the removal of a dangerous industrial component.

The operational level dealing with home front defense has another channel of influence, a channel that should be further developed, which influences the discourse about military action at the front. Strengthening the relationship between action taken at the front and defensive measures on the home front is vital to both sides, because it may reduce threats to the home front while promoting operations at the front, achieving significant influence over the opponent and their achievements. This can be achieved by converting threats that accurately target certain home front sectors into military objectives at the front. An example occurred during the Second Lebanon War, when the Galilee Division under the command of Gal Hirsch employed the elite Maglan unit to silence the fire from the Tyre area towards the Western Galilee. The Maglan unit succeeded in neutralizing about 70 Hezbollah targets.[17]

Defense of the Home Front and Its Contribution to the Overall Achievements in a Conflict

In this part of the article we will present another perspective on this issue. We will argue that success in defending the home front - preventing casualties and maintaining daily routine - contributes directly to success in the conflict. Consequently, defense in general and home front defense in particular, must be integrated within the security concept discourse.

Events on the home front in the War of Independence, especially the bombing of Tel Aviv, deeply affected the founder of the Israeli national security concept, David Ben-Gurion. Ben-Gurion feared that attacks on the home front, to which he was personally exposed, would lead to the abandonment of settlements, and saw them as an “enormous danger.”[18] The problem as he saw it was related to national, social, and personal strength, and the solutions he proposed were not necessarily military, but social and economic, similar to other elements in his security concept. In Ben-Gurion's view, the physical damage to the home front (life and property) was not the main issue, and could not subdue Israel. The primary damage was collateral, to the economy and morale.

In the development of the Israeli security concept over the years, and in accord with its relevance during the different confrontations (from the Sinai War to the 1982 Lebanon War), it is apparent that defending the home front was not central to the security concept and discourse.[19] In fact, until the early 1990s, the front was hit only in an extremely limited way, as a secondary objective only. But in 1992, in the wake of the First Gulf War, during which the home front was hit and the threat intensified, the Home Front Command was established.

The call to address the threat to the home front and understand its importance to national security was formalized in 2006. In its report on Israeli defense doctrine, the Meridor Committee argued that the element of defense should be added to the Israeli national security concept. Today, it is clear that the outcomes of the struggle between Israel and its enemies will also be determined to a large extent in the home front theater, and that “success on the home front is essential for a national victory in future conflicts.”[20] This success will be measured in casualties, but in other respects as well, such as economic, including damage to national infrastructure, to the Israeli economy, to the gross national product (GDP), to tourism and to other determinants of success. It is clear that extensive injury to life has a significant impact on success or failure in the home front theater, and on the public narrative that develops after a war. The effort to save lives is the central one, but a paralysis of civilian systems and various other damage can undermine success, both inwardly and outwardly.

Recently we have witnessed an increase in the importance of home front defense, and its impact on confrontation outcomes is increasing. In an era where clear-cut victories at the front are not achieved, and Israel must deal with non-state organizations firing at the home front, every aspect of civil activity has a great value. Efficient management, functioning civil systems and “business as usual,” may well forestall enemy achievements.

The Second Lebanon War was a major turning point in our understanding of the importance of home front defense. In that war, which lasted 34 days, 160 Israelis were killed, including 41 civilians, thousands were injured, hundreds of houses were damaged, and hundreds of thousands of citizens were forced to leave their homes. Many were required to stay in shelters and protected areas for long periods of time and found it difficult to maintain a normal daily routine. Economic activity was disrupted and affected, small and medium businesses collapsed and daily activity in northern Israel was substantially reduced. About 300,000 inhabitants of the north left their homes and moved temporarily to the south. The State Comptroller, who investigated in depth the functioning of home front defense during the war, pointed to numerous flaws in the functioning of the home front authorities during the emergency.[21]

Local initiatives led by individuals, such as the tent city set up by (then) Israeli businessman Arcadi Gaydamak, testified to the loss of control by the authorities, and to their being situated on the lowest rung of the hierarchy of needs in the home front - security and a desire to survive.[22] At the end of 2006, when rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip towards the South, and another civilian initiative to evacuate residents was put on the table, Defense Minister Amir Peretz attacked the initiative, explaining that: “We should prepare an orderly program to assist residents, so that they won’t need to knock on the doors of philanthropists.”[23]

Furthermore, in May 2007, in response to Gaydamak’s request to establish a tent city in Tel Aviv, the Deputy Defense Minister, Efraim Sneh, retorted: “Gaydamak is serving Israel's worst enemies with his actions.”[24] It seems that these statements reflect lessons learnt from the conduct of the home front in the Second Lebanon War, and an internalization by the authorities of their responsibility to the home front.

The ability to navigate crises on the home front and to deal with them successfully adds to Israel's national security in general and to its deterrence in particular. Success of this kind generates social resilience, projecting to the public and the civil systems that it is possible to cope with the challenge. Such success radiates outwards as well, to the enemy, emphasizing that we have the ability to get through the crisis, and that their attacks on the home front have a negligible effect, despite their increasing and growing investment in attempts to strike at it.

Success on the home front has several levels. At the basic level is the prevention of human casualties. Furthermore, the basic civilian system must continue to function properly in the fields of law enforcement, medicine, energy, food, water and other services. The upper level includes the functioning of the economy and all civilian systems in a manner close to normal. A functioning of all systems and success on all levels would contribute significantly to the general success of a campaign.

These levels may be described as a pyramid analogous to Maslow’s pyramid of needs, representing the aspiration during emergencies for a restoration of all systems, and to their return to normal activity. In a military campaign, we wish to position ourselves as close as possible to the top of the pyramid, symbolizing greater achievement. Greater success on the home front means that we are positioned at a higher level. Each level of the pyramid rests on its predecessor, and it is difficult (although sometimes possible) to skip levels. Each home front district has its own pyramid, which corresponds to its ability to function, and each one should aspire to a full recovery of all systems. The pyramid may represent, post factum, each district’s success in maintaining routine.

For example, during the Gulf War learning institutions were closed in many areas of the country, people were evacuated from their residences and cultural and leisure events were canceled. Thus, we may understand that during that conflict, the engagement was primarily at the first level of needs, and the second functioned because the threat was limited. However, in examining Operation Protective Edge, for example, we can distinguish between conflict areas where the realization of the needs was mainly at the first level, and others where activities were close to the topmost level.

It is important to emphasize that the scenario involving an attrition campaign as part of a long conflict, in which the rate and effectiveness of fire on the home front are declining, is not the only conceivable one. It is possible to imagine campaigns with intense fire, having a widespread impact over a short timeframe. Such situations would produce a sharp and clear challenge to the home front, primarily around the saving of lives. Such cases present no dilemma for the defensive forces at the home front: all their energy, and efforts, would be invested in the immediate challenge.

These are complex situations, especially in terms of the physical challenge, requiring a capability to deal with multiple strikes within a short time. Dealing with these situations is very similar to coping with a natural disaster (a blizzard or huge fires), where the struggle is mainly physical in facing the immediate challenge (rescuing the injured, maintaining open rescue routes, etc.). During national challenges of this type (an existential threat or another major threat), the steadfastness of the Israeli home front, which is based on a general mobilization, cohesion, and a faith in the righteousness of our path, is realized in a clear and admirable manner.

Conclusions and a View to the Future

Due to the changes in warfare - from total to limited wars, involving smaller forces, from wars involving decisive victories to wars of attrition - the importance of the home front has changed. Today, due to the nature of war and the conversion of the home front into a central objective for our enemies, defending the home front requires saving life, while simultaneously allowing the civilian system to function at various levels - social, economic, and more. The functioning of the civilian system at all levels, in a manner allowing routine daily activities to take place, is an important achievement, neutralizing the operational purpose of our enemies.

In conclusion, we understand that in order to bridge the tension between the need for protection and the saving of lives, and the need to conduct routine activities, a local level is required, in the person of the District Commander, who must mediate between these tensions while managing risks and continuously exploring what can possibly be maintained of daily routine. The challenge at each level of home front defense is in saving life (the basic level of the hierarchy of needs), but also in climbing the pyramid of needs to reach the higher levels of functioning. It is important to understand that the challenges vary between the geographical districts, and for each an appropriate response is required. Alongside the understanding that the district commander is able to best integrate strategic insights together with local challenges and to optimally implement both in his sector, we also appreciate that they lack the tools to influence the defense of their sector, especially in the context of the fighting at the front and air defenses.

[1] Moshe David-Ahikam, “20 Thousand People at Lone Soldier Sean Carmeli's Funeral,Walla news (July 22, 2012), news.walla.co.il/item/2767842 [Hebrew]

[2] Reut Institute, Civil Resilience Network - Conceptual Framework for Israel's Local & National Resilience (Version B), Reut Institute, August 2009.

[3] Yashiv, Eran, Operation Protective Edge: Economic Summary,in Kurtz, Anat and Brom, Shlomo (eds). The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014, pp. 127-130.

[4] Isaac Ben-Israel, Israels Defense Doctrine, Modan and the Ministry of Defense, 2013, pp. 71- 73. [Hebrew]

[5] Moshe Naor, Social Mobilization in the Arab/Israeli War of 1948: On the Israeli Home Front, Routledge, 1st edition (April 16, 2013), pp. 161-162. It is important to note that many settlements near the confrontation lines, among them Jerusalem, were under artillery fire for a long time.

[6] Itai Brun, The Development of the Combat Concept of the Other Side’ (1979-2009)” Tatzpit 50, IDF Operations Directorate - Doctrine and Training Division, 2010, p. 58. [Hebrew]

[7] Michael Milstein, Muqawama: The Challenge of Resistance to Israel's National Security Concept,Memorandum No. 102, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, December 2009. [Hebrew]

[8] Interview with Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Jazeera, 27 May 2003, quoted in Brun, op. cit. p. 70. The effect of the fire on the home front was already a point of discussion in 1981 among the PLO in Lebanon, when it recognized the significant impact the fire had on the Israeli population. See also: Isaac Ben-Israel, op. cit., p. 71.

[9] LTC N., Third Lebanon War - Toward a Change in the Systemic Concept of Hezbollah,Ma’arachot, 454, April 2014, pp. 4-8. The combat during operation Operation “Protective Edge” demonstrated that Hamas has intensified the basic elements of the strategy - firing of rockets and holding actions - while developing an additional offensive element, an offensive array whose purpose was to achieve psychological warfare achievements and which focused on raids whose objectives were not to seize territory, but rather to cause damage and casualties. It is discernible that Hezbollah has undergone similar changes, leading to the development of offensive elements.

[10] Attritionhas been the subject of many debates: whether it is a tactic of the strong or the weak side to a conflict. It worth noting that attrition in campaigns of this kind, is not solely a tactic used by our opponents, but it could also serve IDF strategy.

[11] Home Front Command, Basic Concept, IDF internal document, p. 93. [Hebrew]

[12] Meir Elran and Alex Altshuler. “Lessons from the Civilian Front - Interim Summary,” INSS Insight 581, July 31, 2014.

[13] Meir Elran and Alex Altshuler. The Civilian Front in Operation Protective Edge,in Anat Kurtz and Shlomo Brom (eds). The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014.

[14] On the potential of defensive systems, read the article by Brig. Gen. Shahar Shohat, Commander of the Air Defense Division and Yaniv Friedman, a researcher at the Dado Center in this volume.

[15] Meir Elran and Alex Altshuler. The Civilian Front in Operation Protective Edge,op. cit., pp. 110-111.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff. 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Chen Kotas-Bar. “You See the Launcher Fire Ten Rockets - And You Blow It Up,” Maariv, September 12, 2007.

[18] David Ben Gurion. "Security Review," Ma’arachot, 279-280, May 1981, p. 11. [Hebrew] The review was originally written in October 1953 and published in 1981.

[19] It is important to qualify this statement and note that in Ben-Gurion's view, perhaps because of his personal experiences in London during WW II, defending the home front loomed large, therefore he demanded that during the Sinai War the French deploy a squadron of aircraft in Israel, and prior to the Six Day war, he was angry at the Chief of Staff Rabin for neglecting the home front.

[20] Reut Institute, op. cit., p. 20.

[21] Israel State Comptroller, Preparations of the Home Front and Its Functioning in the Second Lebanon War (Summary), 2007. [Hebrew]

[22] Eli Bernstein, Gaydamak Establishes Another Tent City,Maariv, July 24, 2006. [Hebrew]

[23] Michael Greenberg. Tent City? Arcadi Gaydamak Takes the Residents of Sderot for a Weekend in Eilat as a Result of the Increased Rocket Attacks on the City.” The Marker, November 16, 2006. [Hebrew]

[24] IDF Radio quoted in “Gaydamak's Tent City Moves to Tel Aviv,” Globes, May 22, 2007. [Hebrew]

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