Defense – The Other Face of Mars - Mr. Bronfeld

01.07.15

Saul Bronfeld

Introduction

The ancient Romans worshipped a two-faced deity, Janus, the God of beginnings and ends. Perhaps Mars, their God of war, should have also been depicted with two faces, representing offense and defense.

The relationship between these two forms of warfare has long been the subject of debate. “We must not shield ourselves to death,” some have argued. Others have insisted that “the best defense is a good offense.” In Israel, a common position is that the country’s defensive doctrine manifests itself in offensive measures. In practice, security concepts and warfare doctrines define the relationship between the two and determine the level of resources to be assigned to each.

This article will argue that military requirements, learning and experience led the IDF, in two cases, to invest significant resources in defensive systems. The case studies show that IDF learning was flexible enough to allocate substantial resources to defense, which was, in the past as well as today, “the fourth pillar” of the classical security concept. This was a concept that advocated offensive action in order to defend. It prioritized offensive capabilities that would lead to decisive victory, preferably following a preemptive strike. The concept was derived from the broad and chronic asymmetry that existed between Israel and its enemies - in geography and size of the regular army - and from the realization that it is impossible to achieve a decisive victory through defense alone. However, when the circumstances necessitated it, even in the past, tremendous resources were invested in defensive capabilities.

The proper combination of defense and offense has been a major question for security concepts from time immemorial, but this study will refrain from diving into this doctrinal sea. This article will discuss two events during which the military leadership decided to adopt new operational concepts that required a heavy investment in defense. The first event, in the field of airpower, was the acquisition of these surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in the early 1960s, which competed for resources with jet fighter procurement. The second event, relating to ground warfare, was the establishment of a line of reinforced fortifications on the western bank of the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition.

Both events occurred against the backdrop of turning points in Israel’s security reality, which compelled the IDF General Staff to contend with a new type of war. This article will describe the political, operational-economic and other considerations which shaped both events as well as the sharp controversies that accompanied the decisions to invest in defensive tools. Both events involved symmetric warfare against regular Arab armies, but they may provide us with insights and lessons on learning, and on dealing with change, which is currently required in our warfare doctrines.[1]

Airpower: Defense Through Surface-to-Air Missiles

In September 1962, President John F. Kennedy announced his willingness to provide Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. Five batteries were acquired prior to the 1967 Six Day War, at a cost of $30 million. This was an unprecedented investment in a defensive system designed to protect air force bases, the nuclear reactor in Dimona, and the home front. Below I describe the arguments which took place prior to the decision to procure surface-to-air missiles, which was a deviation from the classic concept that had guided the Israeli Air Force (IAF) since the 1950s - achieving air superiority - as well as the conclusion of the incident and the lessons learned.[2]

1. The Operational-Economic Considerations

The combat doctrine of the IAF in the 1950s was based on a combination of fighter aircraft squadrons (and air traffic control units), three airfields and anti-aircraft artillery battalions - all designed to protect the country's skies, to control airspace over the battlefield and to participate in the ground battle. The IAF sought to increase the size of its fighter jet force and to construct more airfields. Improving air defense capabilities was its lowest priority.

However, toward the end of the decade, the General Staff began considering reinforcement of Israel’s air defenses with surface-to-air missiles. The motivation for this new thinking was the improvement in the attack capabilities of the Arab air forces (Tupolev-16 bombers and MIG-19 ground attack jets) and the assessment of the General Staff’s Staff-Armaments Directorate regarding the severity of the threat: “The worst-case scenario for the defense establishment is an attack from the air instigated by the enemy on our airfields and population centers. There is no way to completely hold back such an attack with aircraft only... Surface-to-air missiles are a better defensive means against faster aircraft than interceptors.”[3]

The General Staff perception was spurred by an important operational issue - the need to protect the Dimona reactor from low altitude, hit-and-run incursions from Egyptian airfields in Sinai. Operational considerations of time and space indicated that it would be impossible to prevent such an attack only through aerial interception of the MIGs, and economic considerations prevented constant defensive air patrols.

The IAF commander, Maj. Gen. Ezer Weizman, objected to the acquistion of surface-to-air missiles from the US for several reasons. First, procurement of good air defense capabilities would stengthen arguments against a preventive air strike. “I feared that when the senior leadership would need to approve an air offensive,” Weizman revealed, “the presence in Israel of Hawk missiles would actually block a fast-affirmative decision [to strike first].”[4]

Second, he reasoned, surface-to-air missile batteries would use a large slice of the IAF budget (even though the operational yield would be higher than if the funds were invested to procure another Mirage Squadron or build a fourth airfield). “One should not forget that surface-to-air missiles are static and a missile is a single-use weapon,” argued IAF headquarters, “while a jet fighter is flexible, it may continue attacking the enemy and is able to handle more than one target in a single sortie.”[5]

Third, another important but implicit consideration is identifiable in the Air Force position over the years. The organizational culture of the Air Force was not enthusiastic about weapons systems not operated by pilots. Weizman did not like surface-to-air missiles, his replacement Maj. Gen. Moti Hod did not like drones and their successors did not like military satellites or the Iron Dome system.

In internal discussions, Israel never raised concerns about the potential for escalation, in contrast to concerns raised by the US State Department in objecting to the sale of the Hawks to Israel. American diplomats argued that equipping the IDF with surface-to- air missiles would lead the Soviets to supply Egypt with long range surface-to-surface missiles (SSM), which would expose Israel to significant threats.[6] In Israel this consideration was not deemed relevant, because in the 50s and 60s it was the Soviets who were introducing advanced air and ground-based weapon systems into the Middle East, and the prevailing Israeli opinion was that they were leading the arms race, not reacting.

2. Political Considerations

From the mid-1950s, France was the IDF’s main weapons supplier. Israel procured tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, various types of missiles and a nuclear reactor from France. The love affair between the defense establishments reached new heights in the early 1960s after France began to supply modern Mirage fighters, and continued to help in many other ways. The French billed Israel heavily, but had no political inhibitions and gladly consented to any purchase request. And the Americans “are inquisitive and garrulous,” reflected Ezer Weizman. “The French never questioned us this way, and we had a feeling that if we asked to buy 300 Mirages instead of 72, they would have complied after merely clarifying the terms of payment. And here [in Washington, when presenting the shopping list for the Air Force in October 1965] there are cross-examinations and intricate inquiries.”[7]

At the end of the 1950s, the United States produced the Hawk, a surface-to-air missile, considered by the IAF “the most sophisticated of its kind,” as well as other weapon systems that Israel longed to acquire (primarily tanks and fighter-bomber jets). But the Americans refused to provide the IDF with weapons of any kind. To their credit, the Americans were aware of the threats to Israel, but limited themselves to financial assistance, facilitating the procurement of weapons systems from France and Britain. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol called the American policy an “elegant embargo,” and the policy could be referred to as “the IDF are moving up a class, but not in the American school.” Accordingly, the debate on the operational need and effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles (in cost-benefit terms) was intertwined with what is known in Israeli historiography as the debate between the “European school” and the “American school.”[8]

Weizman, supported by Shimon Peres, then the Deputy Minister of Defense, preferred to procure another Mirage squadron instead of the Hawk batteries. This position stemmed from both the operational-economic considerations described above, and from the rationale that the acquisition of the additional Mirages would strengthen Israel's status as an important client of the French industries, thus intensifying the collaboration between France and the Israeli defense establishments.

Their opponents, Generals Haim Laskov, Tzvi Tzur and Yitzhak Rabin, as well as David Ben Gurion, and later Golda Meir and Levi Eshkol, believed that with resolute and ongoing political efforts, Israel could break into the coveted American arsenal. The tactic chosen by the prime ministers and chiefs of staff at the time advocated applying pressure to obtain approvals for purchasing defensive weapon systems to be followed by aircraft and armored vehicles. The initial stage was successful in 1960, when President Dwight Eisenhower consented to Ben Gurion's request to provide the IAF with advanced air control and command (non-firing) systems, followed by requests to procure the Hawk (a defensive fire system), and later by requests to purchase aircraft and tanks (offensive fire systems).

The complexity of the web of arguments of the various parties is also reflected in the difficulty in separating relevant considerations (operational, political and economic) from ones driven by personality/organizational rivalries and interests. It's hard to believe that the strained relationships between Golda Meir and Shimon Peres, and between Rabin and Peres, did not influence the debate, since purchasing more in France, instead of purchasing the Hawk from the US, would have strengthened Peres position vis-à-vis the Israeli Foreign Ministry as well as the General Staff.

Yitzhak Rabin described Peres' 1982 objection to the arms purchases in the US, from the air control systems to the Hawks:

“Of course, Peres argued [in 1960] that there was no need to go to the Americans, but in the end, Ben Gurion decided and returned with Eisenhower's approval to purchase the aerial warning systems. Then Peres, influenced by Weizman, who commanded the air force, tried to torpedo it. We already had approval to make the purchase, but nothing was done in order to advance the acquisition, because Peres claimed that there was an up-to-date radar system in France, better than that of the Americans, and they appointed a Committee. In short, they dragged the matter on for a year or a year and a half before actually starting, and miraculously we reached the Six Day War with one fully functioning warning station, and on Mt. Canaan only an improvised one, because we did not manage, since we had wasted time. But it [the American system] is, to this day, in fact, the backbone of all our aerial warning and control systems. Later, in the second stage, the issue of the Hawk missiles arose, and Tsera [Tzvi Tzur], the Chief of Staff, and I were in favor, and once again Weizman and Peres nearly tried to torpedo it. Weitzman argued in principle that it was not necessary, that it was a waste of money. But Eshkol and Golda, as soon as Eshkol entered office, they made the radical shift to the American issue.”[9]

Similar claims were raised by Yoash Sidon, Chief of the Armaments and Planning Division at Air Force Headquarters (Air Group 2) in the early 1960s, who accused Peres and Weizman of fully identifying with Marcel Dassault, owner of the big French aircraft manufacturing company, and of consequently introducing erroneous considerations into the purchase of fighter jets.[10]

It does not matter here how accurately Rabin's and Sidon's memories reflect Peres's and Weizman's considerations. Obviously, personal alliances on the one hand, and sour personal relationships on the other, lead to mistakes.

3. Organizational Considerations

In the 1950s, direct responsibility for anti-aircraft systems was entrusted to the Artillery Corps, and the beginning of the missile era sharpened the organizational dispute between the two services. Initially, the dispute was over surface-to-surface missiles which were developed in France for the IDF, and later over locally developed Luz missiles. When the decision was made to purchase the Hawk missiles, Weizman demanded responsibility for those batteries. The Air Force arguments related, initially, to the operational need to coordinate the employment of the anti-aircraft systems with fighter jets, an issue which was always important, and which became critical in the era of surface-to-air missiles. Furthermore, the technological infrastructure required to run and maintain a SAM array was very advanced, much greater than that at the disposal of the anti-aircraft cannons. The Artillery Corps objected, of course, with professional and morale-based arguments, but at the end of a long debate the IAF carried the day.[11]

Chief of Staff Tzur’s decision to entrust the Air Force with the surface-to-air missiles was an important step in transferring responsibility for the whole air defense array from the Artillery Corps to the IAF, as part of an operational-organizational concept that later concentrated under Air Force wings “anything that flies” - jets, helicopters, drones, anti-aircraft guns, missile defense systems, surface-to-air missiles and rocket and mortar defense systems (the anti-aircraft units were transferred in November 1970). At the General Staff meetings where the organizational implications of the Hawk’s acquisition were discussed, other options arose. Rabin (then Deputy Chief of staff), for example, supported the establishment of a missile command, directly under the Chief of Staff. Other concerns were that transferring the surface-to-air missiles to the Air Force’s responsibility would deprive the artillery corps and other entities in the IDF, and would further augment the importance of the Air Force.

In debates about purchasing expensive weapon systems like the Hawk, the first question that arises is always from which budget would the funding be drawn.[12] It is not surprising that a service that desired a certain weapon’s platform would plot to finance the purchase at someone else’s expense. The best option was a special allowance from the USA. Otherwise, through increases to the defense budget, and as a last resort, at the expense of one’s colleagues on the General Staff. The worst-case scenario for a service was cutbacks in one’s budget. Commanders throughout the ages, in the IDF and other armies, would demonstrate great creativity to avoid encountering a worst-case scenario.[13]

Weizman understood that the $30 million invested in the Hawks (although spread over several years) would come at the expense of purchasing aircraft. He feared that the many requirements of the ground forces - especially tanks, armored personnel carriers and modern artillery - would prevent an increase in the Air Force’s share of the defense budget, and that a serious shortage of foreign currency for procurement needs would also be a problem.[14]

4. Epilogue - Purchase of the Hawk Surface-to-Air Missile

The decision to purchase the Hawks despite IAF opposition stemmed primarily from an immediate operational need, which could not be fulfilled in any other way. Anti-aircraft guns and fighter jet patrols and even an additional airfield could not guarantee the continuous functioning of the Air Force bases and the defense of the Dimona reactor (nor the home front). Weizman suppressed the operational problem, whereas Chiefs of Staff Laskov and Tzur (and Deputy Chief of Staff Rabin) identified the new need and were even prepared to invest significant resources in a defensive response. Weizman's resistance to purchasing the Hawks rested on two levels, related to the IDF’s decisive defeat doctrine. At the strategic level, there was an apprehension that the defensive capability would augment the political echelon’s tendency towards containment, which would likely refuse authorization for a preemptive airstrike. At the operational level, there was a fear that purchasing the missiles would come at the expense of purchasing fighter jets designed to achieve air superiority, according to classical combat doctrine. Weizmann regarded the purchase of the surface-to-air missiles - defensive by nature - as an impairment of the ability to attain a decisive defeat, and he therefore opposed it (gaining the support of Peres, who wanted to increase procurement from France). Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir on the other hand, alongside the chiefs of staff, decided in favor of the Hawks, both on operational grounds and from a political desire to break into the American arsenal.

Hindsight suggests that Weizman had neither operational nor organizational reasons to lament that his position was rejected. His fear that defensive improvements would prevent the political echelon from approving a preemptive strike against the Egyptian airfields in the Six Day War was proven wrong. In June 1967 approval was indeed granted for Operation Moked, which was a resounding success. Moreover, the willingness to take risks and leave only a few Mirages to defend Israel's skies in the morning of Operation Focus was influenced by the existence of the Hawk batteries. Weizman's budgetary concern was also proven wrong. In 1965 Eshkol approved the procurement of an additional 50 Mirages and 48 Skyhawks, concurrent with the procurement of 250 Centurions and 150 M-48s, and after the Six Day War, there was effectively no budgetary limit on the procurement of jet fighters.

Furthermore, the Air Force succeeded in developing a combat doctrine for the anti-aircraft missiles, integrating them with the fighter jets, as was demonstrated during the War of Attrition and the 1973 Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War. Affirming this fact was Brig. Gen. Benny Peled, the Head of the Air Division during the War of Attrition, who complained that the Air Force had insufficient Hawk batteries.[15] Introducing the Hawks to the IDF’s order of battle in the mid-1960s was the first step in establishing a modern air defense array - anti- aircraft systems and later anti-missile and anti-rocket systems - whose importance grew from the 1990s onwards. Furthermore, the Hawk array was very technologically advanced, and it helped the Air Force advance in rocket, air traffic control and radar capabilities. Finally, the Chief of Staff accepted Weizman's demand to subordinate the surface-to-air missiles to the Air Force which intensified Air Force control over “anything that flies.”

On the political front, it became apparent that were no reasons to lament the rejection of Weizman's position against the procurement of the Hawks. Later came the M-48 and M-60 tanks, Skyhawk aircraft, Sikorsky CH-53 helicopters, F-4 phantom aircraft and missiles of various types and from the late 1960s the US became Israel's main weapons supplier. The many reasons for the gradual reversal in US policy are complex, but it is clear that the transition from stingy American consent for the sale of recoilless cannons in 1959 to the supply of the F-4s late in 1968 had to be gradual and that the sale of the Hawks was an important stop along this long and winding road. Finally, the embargo imposed by the French president following the Six Day War proved that Israel's important status vis- à-vis the French defense industry rested on shifting sands. The purchase, before the Six Day War, of a few additional Mirage squadrons from the French would not have changed the scope of the damage they inflicted.

5. What Can Be Learned?

First, don't put all your eggs in one basket. During the events in question, Chiefs of Staff Laskov and Tzur decided not to rely on fighter jets alone for air defense, meaning that air warfare would have to be conducted using an integrated combat approach in which both aircraft and sophisticated air defense systems would participate. Ostensibly, this principle goes without saying in the development of military doctrine, in investment management and in other fields. But history teaches us that there is always a strong temptation to ignore it.[16]

Second, the event highlights a problem inherent in the IDF General Staff (and beyond), exacerbated in the context of technological issues in general and aviation in particular. “In our twisted organizational structure, the Air Force commander is the only source of knowledge to the Chief of Staff, and through him to the Government, in everything relating to military aviation,” Sidon described the situation in the years when he headed Air Branch 2, under Weizman as Air Force commander. “He is service commander and staff officer at once... A definite conflict of interests that is worsening as the level of specialization in the service is deepening, making things more difficult for the uninitiated to understand.”[17] The technological leaps in various types of weapon systems since the 1960s exacerbated the need for General Staff planning entities, headed by commanders with technological and operational knowledge, and able to cope with the demands of the services.

The need for such professional entities was prominent in other events related to the Air Force, characterized by a bias against systems not operated by a human pilot. The resistance of the Air Force to drone development in the 1970s, to the development of military satellites in the 1980s and to the development of the Iron Dome in 2000s is no secret. Less widely known is the unsophisticated use of drones during the Yom Kippur war and the resistance to the development of surface-to-surface missiles for use by the ground forces.

The need to develop General Staff capabilities to handle complex technological issues exists not only in relation to the Air Force. It also especially concerns cyber warfare, command and control systems, intelligence, unmanned systems and robotics and many other issues that have developed over the last generation.

One hopes that today, with senior Air Force officers filling key positions in the General Staff directorates, matters had improved in comparison to the 1960s. However, the American experience teaches us that even following the Goldwater-Nichols Act revolution in 1986, which, inter alia, improved integration between headquarters and the commands, it is not easy to uproot narrow thought patterns and allegiance to one’s own corps.

Land Warfare: Defense Through Fortified Outposts ("Strongholds")

On September 8, 1968, Egypt launched a war of a type entirely new to the IDF - a war of attrition. The Egyptians shelled the Israeli line along the Suez Canal, leaving dozens of soldiers killed and wounded. At the same time, under the cover of darkness and shelling, Egyptian commando units successfully crossed the canal, planted mines, set ambushes and even attacked IDF positions, causing additional casualties. The novelty in the War of Attrition was the deadly combination, the likes of which the IDF had never encountered before - fierce artillery fire and commando raids conducted by a state army - determined and properly equipped. The scope was infinitely larger than that of the incidents which took place on the Jordanian and Syrian borders prior to the Six Day War, and in the Jordan and Beit Shean Valleys after the war.

For political and military considerations, Israel decided to keep a military presence along the Suez Canal’s eastern bank, and not to retreat eastward. This meant that IDF forces would remain within range of Egyptian artillery. For the same reasons, Israel decided against pushing Egyptian artillery back by seizing the western bank of the canal. Furthermore, retaliatory actions carried out by the IDF, initially the destruction of Egyptian cities along the canal and deep raids inside Egypt later, did not deter Nasser nor put an end to the fire (though they did cause him much embarrassment). As time went by, it became clear that this was a costly type of warfare, which would last for a long time - several months, perhaps even years - and that it was impossible to end it in one stroke.

The shelling and commando raids were an important element in the strategy to drive the IDF from the Sinai Peninsula. They were part of the Soviet-Arab effort to force Israel's retreat by constantly igniting the theater, designed to secure US support for a retreat, as had happened after the 1956 Sinai War. In addition, the losses caused by the attrition, in blood and money, were meant to soften Israel's opposition to retreating. The attrition was also seen in Egypt as a stage that would prepare their armed forces for an all-out war and the reoccupation of the Sinai, if international pressures failed, as well as serving the Egyptian government on the domestic front. It came as a response to a craving for revenge by the army and the people, wishing to erase the shame of defeat from the Six Day War.

Until September 1968, the IDF was deployed in western Sinai in a thin green line, with few troops and minimal fortifications. As soon as the shelling began, the General Staff took emergency measures, including sending reinforcements, distancing some of them beyond the range of the Egyptian artillery, new combat procedures and fortifying the outposts with additional layers of earth. On October 26, the Egyptians launched another round of shelling, again causing dozens of casualties. After the second bombardment, the General Staff understood that the steps already taken were insufficient and the IDF must prepare for a new type of war. This study limits itself to the learning processes and the formation of the IDF's response during the first, formative, phase of the War of Attrition until July 1969, when the Air Force joined the campaign.

The changes in the political and military circumstances after the Six Day War forced the General Staff to revise its security concept and to adapt to the new reality. The transition from an offensive mindset, at the heart of the military discourse for many decades, to trench warfare in the autumn of 1968, was not easy and was accompanied by pointed debates, not always presented accurately in the historiography of the period.[18]

1. Political Considerations

In the period immediately following the Six Day War, political considerations played an important role in decisions around plans to defend the Sinai Peninsula, and the necessary investments. On policy issues, there were no real differences of opinion between the government and the General Staff, which perceived a great deal of military logic in the political directives. The first directive was to not retreat from the canal unless a political agreement was achieved. This was accepted by the General Staff, which felt comfortable in deploying behind a water barrier, 180 meters wide.

Similarly, there was hardly any protest against the second directive, to maintain the status quo on the canal while not pushing the fire back by seizing territory to the west of the canal. This directive came from the fear of intervention by Soviet forces should the IDF endanger the Nasser regime, and the fear that igniting the canal would cool relations with the US, which was deterred from confronting the Soviets because of the Vietnam quagmire. The American consideration had another aspect, a fear that the US would not supply the F-4s and Skyhawks, leading to a decision to refrain from employing the Air Force to suppress Egyptian fire until July 1969. The Israeli government and the General Staff also agreed on the necessity to avoid endangering the acquisition of more fighter jets.

In addition, the government and the IDF had to consider the effect on national morale a new war would have. After the elation brought about by the victory in the Six Day War, the Israeli public descended into a sort of depression, not having expected another war and so many casualties on the eastern and canal fronts. The public was frustrated that they couldn’t enjoy quiet for even forty days, and the persistence of the War of Attrition and the accumulation of casualties on both fronts created a painful atmosphere. The need to do everything possible to minimize casualties increased. On both fronts, the IDF patrolled with armored vehicles only, converted tanks to evacuate casualties, placed physicians in the strongholds, and acquired bulletproof vests.

2. The Operational-Economic Considerations

The operational significance of the policy directives was that the IDF was stuck on the banks of the Suez, exposed to the Egyptians. It was not allowed to (nor did it necessarily want to) cross the canal, nor withdraw to the east. Moreover, the IDF artillery order of battle was smaller, by an order of magnitude, than that of the Egyptians, and was unable to silence the shelling.[19] The General Staff understood that this difficult situation was expected to persist. Therefore, the IDF prepared for an extended stay on the Suez, while readying itself for two types of threats - an all-out war started by Egyptian initiative aiming to reconquer the Sinai, and a limited war, a “war of attrition” in Nasser’s parlance, in the form of heavy shelling and commando raids on the eastern bank, which could develop into a land grab.[20]

This section will describe the considerations of the IDF in defending the canal line in the first six months of the War of Attrition, from early September 1968 (when the first shell fell) to early March 1969 (when the war entered its intensive, continuous phase)[21]. There is a special interest in the learning processes and dilemmas of this period, and in the gradual disengagement of the General Staff from the memories of the Six Day War and classical security concepts.

In addition to the emergency measures taken from September 1968, the General Staff quickly prepared along several lines of effort for the new type of warfare. A cross-service planning team headed by Brig. Gen. Avraham Adan, Deputy Commander of the Armored Corps, prepared a comprehensive new program to defend the Sinai - the “Stronghold” Plan - which was implemented immediately, even before its final approval, in December 1968. The prompt construction of fortifications was spurred by an intelligence report that Egypt was about to launch a full-scale war in the spring of 1969, and by the contribution ascribed to the strongholds in successfully parrying an expected crossing.[22] In early March 1969, construction of the first phase of the Bar Lev Line was completed. An array of 32 well-protected outposts stood ready, some intended for actual combat, others for early warning and observation. The outposts, nicknamed strongholds, boasted effective protection against artillery, were surrounded by fences and mines, and came with access roads and firing positions for tanks protecting the line. The strongholds were constructed to provide reasonable amenities to the soldiers manning them, not an easy achievement in the Sinai desert. This represented an investment of approximately 52 million Israeli Lira on the canal line, not an overwhelming sum, comparable to the cost of three F-4s or a hundred upgraded Patton tanks, but more than the IDF had ever spent on fortifications.[23] The cost of the strongholds themselves only amounted to approximately 12 million IL, and the remaining sums were invested in paving roads and other infrastructure required for a defensive line.

The Southern Command’s Stronghold Program was an operational plan for the defense of the Sinai during an all-out war as well as in routine operations, integrated within the General Staff’s “Sela” (Rock) plan, and included deployment and warfare methods, assignment of troops and construction of operational infrastructure.

It was prepared under two constraints - preventing any Egyptian achievements, political or military, both in a limited and in an all-out war, and avoiding casualties and costs as much as possible (manpower, engine hours, fuel, spare parts, etc.).

There was a close link between the two constraints. After the Six Day War, the IDF was required to deal with a limited but intense conflict, while preparing for all-out war. Therefore, the need to conserve power in the canal zone became a major guideline. Moreover, the IDF was burdened with many more demanding tasks - combat on the eastern front, controlling and managing the territories occupied during the Six Day War, fighting terrorism within the Green Line and overseas, increasing and improving the order of battle, developing new capabilities (helicopter-borne attacks in depth, water crossings, intelligence gathering, defense against non- conventional threats), organizational changes, establishing an operational infrastructure for road construction, and the establishment of defense industries. The General Staff realized that intensive attrition could last far longer than in the past, and demanded that ongoing routine defense not curtail training, nor wear down the order of battle designated for an all-out war.

In his memoirs, Adan described the constraint guiding the Stronghold plan as the desire to invest in “operational employment the minimum number of troops,” in order to “train the maximum troops uninterruptedly, wearing down fewer tanks and artillery pieces [and half-tracks, of which there was a critical shortage] while conserving the troops.” The chosen solution consisted of static strongholds and deterrence - and not a mobile and reinforced warning screen - with the addition of ambushes.[24]

Adan phrased his argument in military terms, but with his degree in economics, he could have done so in economic ones as well. Establishment of the line was performed using a type of “production actor” of which, relatively, there was no shortage: construction and civil engineering entities and a non-professional workforce (new recruits and reservists). In addition, necessary special warning systems could be purchased abroad or developed in the country. This one-time investment in fortifications was designed to conserve the resources employed in routine security patrols, and primarily to conserve the two “production actors” of which acute shortages were felt after the Six Day War, combat forces and armored vehicles. Combat forces - the strongholds and warning measures - made it possible to hold the line with less regular and reserve personnel. And for the armored vehicles (engine hours, spare parts and tracks), the strongholds helped reduce the scope of patrols and operational movements required.

The lack of routine security resources was largely “real,” and not merely financial. That is, because of the multiplicity of tasks imposed on the IDF after the Six Day War, there was a severe lack of combat forces, rather than budgetary resources. This is despite Israel extending mandatory service to 36 months, and recruiting reservists for 30 to 60 days a year. But many of those days were sucked into routine security activities, thus curtailing training and exercises of both regular and reserve units, constantly impacting the readiness of armored vehicles and the equipment in the emergency supply depots (while the Six Day War generated extensive operational experience, as time passed the need to return to an investment in training increased).

In the minutes of the General Staff meetings in the autumn of 1968, we find broad agreement that attrition warfare required proper fortification of the existing outposts and an increase in their number. Even Maj. Gen. Israel Tal and Maj. Gen. Ariel Sharon said that for the purpose of the routine security patrols, “it [the Stronghold plan] is very good,” and that “a very thorough job had been done.”[25]

In the learning processes, the Generals were dealing not only with defense, but also with developing offensive responses to incidents initiated by the Egyptians. In keeping with its classical security concept, the IDF carried out retaliatory acts designed to dissuade Nasser - shelling and destroying high value targets in the cities near the Suez, raids and ambushes across the canal, deep raids into the heart of Egypt and more. But the General Staff had no illusion that these would stop the shelling, nor did it consider increasing the artillery order of battle, nor an attempt to stop the shelling by firing at the Egyptian batteries.

A dispute between the generals broke out concerning the multiplicity of missions inherent in the investment in the Bar Lev Line, missions that were designed for two substantially different types of warfare - the ongoing limited war, which might last a long time, and a future all-out war, in which the IDF would have to contain the enemy using only the regular troops deployed in the Sinai, before attacking and achieving a decisive victory with reserve divisions.

The first round of the opposing stance taken by Tal and Sharon dealt with these two types of combat and was heard during the discussions immediately after the first round of shelling in September 1968. Sharon proposed to evacuate the outposts on the Suez and to construct a new line at a distance of 30 km to the east, beyond the range of the Egyptian artillery. He proposed to perform routine security activities using tanks, a minority on the bank of the canal, and mostly in the rear at a distance of 10-20 km to the east.

Sharon would have used the infantry to only defend the bottlenecks behind the line, at the Mitla and Gidi passes. Bar-Lev reported Sharon's proposal to Moshe Dayan, saying that he and the rest of the General Staff opposed it (he said Sharon was “in splendid isolation”). Dayan accepted Bar-Lev's opinion, noting that infantry posts on the canal were important for routine security activity, adding that their evacuation would have “a negative demonstrative effect.” However, he did not rule out the possibility that in an all-out war it would be preferable to evacuate the outposts and conduct a destructive battle using the armored divisions.[26]

The second stage in the dispute took place in November 1968, after a deadly bombardment in October, when the General Staff ordered Adan and the planning team to maintain a continuous presence on the canal and to properly fortify the posts. At the same time the controversy focused on the contribution of the strongholds to preventing a crossing in an all-out war, but it also had repercussions on defensive investment for routine security. At this stage, Tal and Sharon praised the strongholds for their expected contribution to routine security, but they added that they would contribute nothing in the holding action phase of an all-out war. They presented dangerous scenarios in which even the well-defended strongholds would not withstand the destructive fire likely to precede a crossing. Furthermore, they indicated that the firepower provided by the strongholds towards the canal area would be too weak to stop a crossing.

Bar-Lev rejected their opinion (and was joined by Adan and Yeshayahu Gavish, head of the Southern Command) and explained that the scenarios presented by Tal and Sharon about the destruction of the strongholds in the initial shelling were exaggerated. He added that stopping the crossing would be done by tanks deployed on three lines, and fighter jets, assisted by fire from the clusters of strongholds constructed on the six entry axes into the Sinai. In other words, according to Bar-Lev’s concept, although the strongholds would contribute to stopping the Egyptian crossing, most of the work would be done by the tanks and aircraft.

Although there was already no disagreement regarding the benefits of well-fortified strongholds during the War of Attrition, Tal and Sharon's opinion was that it was unnecessary to invest a lot of money in their fortification. They claimed that for the purposes of routine security, strongholds made up of two bunkers should suffice (not four, as suggested by the planning team), or bunkers placed as “rear positions” (behind, not in the front of a rampart). They also believed that observation towers were not necessary, nor were heavy investment in mines and fencing. Their position was that even “thin” strongholds would meet the needs of routine security and that large and expensive strongholds would not contribute to preventing a crossing; that would be done by tanks placed on the first line and those in the reserve. Tal's and Sharon's position was supported by the Brigadier Generals, Rafael Eitan, Chief Paratroopers Officer, Asher Levy, Head of the Southern Command and Isaac Hofi, Deputy Chief of Operations.[27]

Bar-Lev rejected these objections due to a combination of economic and operational considerations. He calculated that constructing thin strongholds, as proposed by the objectors, would only save a small percentage of the budget, because most of the expenses were not directly related to the number of bunkers in a stronghold, but to the logistics infrastructure of the strongholds, roads to be paved, and the communications and observation systems. Furthermore, it was important to maintain the possibility of preparations for war, and to deploy larger infantry forces in the posts along the line, because in his opinion the strongholds located on the access roads into the heart of the Sinai would play an important role - both in deterring the Egyptians and in blocking the crossing should deterrence fail (he did not believe that the strongholds should serve as an assembly area from which to cross into Egypt). The intelligence assessments at the time were that, in an all-out war, the Egyptians would seek to occupy the Sinai, at least the area between the canal and the line between the Mitla and Gidi passes. Thus, the combat outposts along the roads leading into Sinai were designed to play an important role in its defense.

Bar-Lev's approach was practical. He believed that the strongholds would provide a good response during the War of Attrition and could also offer a greater range of courses of action for Israeli troops in an all-out war. In his opinion, the strongholds would effectively resolve the acute problem of routine security operations and in case of an all-out war, which was not expected soon, would likely assist the tanks and aircraft in intercepting the enemy. Moreover, until an all-out war broke out, it would be possible to address the vulnerabilities of the strongholds by special measures of various kinds and to increase their firepower.[28]

Bar-Lev's intellectual flexibility was especially apparent in the middle of the War of Attrition, about six months after the establishment of the strongholds. The Southern Command requested to add strongholds at a distance of 1,000 meters from the canal, to deepen the line. Bar-Lev rejected the request. He said that depth would not serve routine security operations, nor would additional strongholds contribute to the holding action phase in an all-out war, depth would be provided by tanks, not by more strongholds. One could justify the construction of more strongholds only for observation purposes or in areas inaccessible by tanks. In his opinion, the establishment of additional strongholds, especially under fire, was unjustified, given the limited benefits anticipated from them.[29]

There were important conclusions about the order of battle that arose in the discussion about the defense of Sinai by the regular forces. The new and distant frontiers of the period following the Six Day War, and the accumulation of Egyptian divisions along the Canal, required an increase in the regular forces deployed opposite the Egyptians. The regular armored force prior to the Six Day War was primarily the 7th Brigade, to which were gradually added, after the war, the 14th and 401st brigades, deployed in western Sinai. At the outbreak of the War of Attrition, the 7th Brigade was deployed on the Golan Heights, and the immediate reinforcement of western Sinai with regular troops was supposed to be supplied by battalions from the Armor School (later the 460th Brigade) which could deploy within 12-14 hours. During the Stronghold Plan discussions, General Tal argued that for the holding action phase, all regular tanks would be required, about 300 in all, while the reserve tank formations should be employed only to carry out a counteroffensive against forces that penetrated the defensive lineups of the 14th and 401st Brigades. Only thus would it be possible to prevent any significant achievements by the Egyptians before the arrival of the reserve brigades. Thus, was born, in late 1968 and early 1969, the magic number of 300 tanks that accompanied IDF planning and war games until the Yom Kippur War.[30]

3. Epilogue - The Establishment of the Bar Lev Line

At the beginning of the War of Attrition the IDF was a rapid learning organization - finding a response to the challenges posed by the Egyptians, while setting correct priorities, at a time when a large gap had opened between its many considerable tasks and the resources at its disposal. The General Staff judged correctly that an all-out war against Egypt was not expected in the near future, and therefore allocated considerable resources to routine security on both fronts, while making an effort to continue training and prepare the forces for all-out war, while minimizing wear and tear on armaments and weapons systems. The Bar Lev stronghold line enabled the army to maintain a presence on the Suez while investing relatively few resources. Also, the timing of the deployment on the canal was consistent with the principle of economy of force - the line was reinforced and fortified only after it became clear, in the fall of 1968, that the Egyptians could and wished to engage in a land grab on the eastern bank, and that the green line deployed on the canal was too thin.

The development of the War of Attrition, following the renewal of the Egyptian bombardments in March 1969 until the ceasefire in August 1970, is another fascinating example of learning competition. The long duration of the war brought about an intellectual and operational dynamic on both sides of the canal, which is deserving of a broader and separate review. It is sufficient to mention here the following stages of the war: in July 1969, the IDF began to employ the Air Force as air artillery, after it became clear that holding the line had become very difficult despite the significant reinforcement of the strongholds. In the second half of 1969, the IAF systematically destroyed the Egyptian air defense array, and gradually crushed the Egyptian artillery near the Canal, while simultaneously conducting successful raids in Egypt.

In January 1970, Israel intensified the fighting and began strategic bombing of the Egyptian hinterland. These were small scale raids, but their political significance was great, because the US opposed them and the Egyptians presented them as grounds to deploy the Soviet Air Defense Division (advanced ground-to-air missile units and MIG squadrons) on the Egyptian side. Following the Soviet entry, the IDF stopped the attacks deep in Egypt, but the rollout eastward of the Soviet-Egyptian air defense system continued until the ceasefire. During the final stage, Israeli F-4s were shot down by the air defense and MIGS, and Soviet pilots were shot down by the IAF.

On August 8, 1970, both sides responded positively to the ceasefire initiative from the American Secretary of State, William Rogers. The night the ceasefire went into effect, the Egyptians violated it by deploying surface-to-air missile batteries in the Canal area. Israel decided to ignore the violation, and the US government compensated the IDF with modern ground and air weapons.

In the War of Attrition, the IDF won the race of determination and learning in the operational domain. “The Egyptians didn't achieve any goal in the War of Attrition,” argued Bar-Lev as he painted a picture of an Israeli victory. “They received neither land, nor the political support which would have brought them the desired result. They were forced to accept a ceasefire after seventeen months of warfare [March 1969 to August 1970] while Israel had achieved all its goals. It succeeded in preventing the Egyptian goals and in ending the war with the minimum casualties. The Egyptians wanted to push the IDF out of the Suez, but it remained under our control.”[31]

However, political assessments of the situation were problematic. Israel was mistaken in its assessment of Soviet- Egyptian determination to act in the aftermath of the crushing of Egypt’s air defenses and the subsequent air raids deep into Egypt.[32] The government and the General Staff did not believe that the Soviet Union would send combat troops (as opposed to advisors) to Egypt, which would not hesitate to clash with the Israel Air Force and neutralize its capabilities. This mistaken assessment stemmed from there being no precedent of the Soviets employing forces outside of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Israel discovered that what the Soviet Union was unwilling to do in Korea and North Vietnam against American attacks, it was ready to do in Egypt in response to Israeli raids. This mistaken political assessment did not bring Israel to the brink of the abyss, for, as pointed out by Bar-Lev, the IDF succeeded in wearing down the Egyptians, and in August 1970 a ceasefire agreement was signed when both sides were well exhausted and after the Soviet Union and the United States applied pressure on its own ally to agree to a ceasefire.

However, it appears that during the ceasefire period until the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the learning competition favored the Egyptian side, which derived the strategic, operational and tactical lessons from the War of Attrition and was properly prepared for the 1973 War, in comparison to the IDF, which increased and improved its order of battle, but did not do its homework properly.

Maj. Gen. Amnon Reshef described the IDF planning deadlock. “The only obvious conclusion is that the operational orders 'Dovecote' and 'Rock' were not defensive plans in the deep and broad meaning of an operational plan,” he lamented. “These were vague orders, shallow and lacking in real content. They lacked the basic elements that constitute an integral part of a defensive plan. The enemy's modus operandi was known and clear, and against this background, the plans did not include a thorough professional analysis of the combat zone, and consequently no 'critical areas,' 'key terrain,' 'kill zones,' etc., were defined. They had no depth, to allow management of the defense. They did not have any definition of what the 'end state' is. There was no counterattack plan, and worst of all - they were not practical!”[33]

Some believe that Reshef's judgment, which represented the opinion of many, was overly harsh, and that the main reasons for the failures in the Sinai at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War are different (the intelligence failure and surprise, the Air Force problem, structure of the order of battle, the functioning of senior commanders, the scope of the deployed forces). Between the end of the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War three whole years passed, a period long enough to properly re-examine the Sinai defensive plans for an all-out war, and to detach oneself from concepts intended for a limited war. In particular, it was important to reexamine the detailed plan for the holding action phase by regular units, which was not done properly, as noted by the Agranat Commission and by many thereafter.

4. What can we learn?

The first lesson is positive: The General Staff determined the correct priorities during a very tense period, and quickly formulated and implemented the Stronghold Plan. Following the Six Day War, a new kind of situation was created, requiring the IDF to engage in attrition warfare on two fronts, while preparing for all-out war of a new kind (new from temporal and spatial considerations, and political restrictions).

Based on this description, Chief of Staff Bar-Lev's priorities were correct. His first priority was routine security at the Suez, and under his leadership a fortified line was established, within a surprisingly short time, providing reasonable protection to the troops and deterring the Egyptians from attempting to take over outposts on the eastern bank of the canal. The new deployment included, in addition to the strongholds and the infrastructure, the establishment and deployment of regular forces in western Sinai, at a level appropriate to the new situation.

At the same time, he made sure to improve preparations for an all-out war: To pursue training and exercises, to increase the order of battle, to develop and improve weapons systems, to develop new combat tactics (for water crossings, covering fire and deep incursions, and even protection from non-conventional weapons). All of these issues cannot be produced with a stroke of a pen. Bar- Lev saw the stronghold line as a dual-purpose system, necessary for attrition and useful in an all-out war. He did not accept Sharon and Tal's views that the strongholds would not contribute to holding the enemy, arguing that a proper deployment, integrating mobile armored forces, fighter jets and infantry in the strongholds, would definitely thwart an Egyptian attempt to cross the canal.

IDF plans and exercises indeed focused on crossing the canal into Egypt and subduing its army west of it. But Bar-Lev and Adan are entitled to the benefit of the doubt, assuming that the neglect of defensive plans at the time expressed primarily an assumption that an all-out war was not expected in the near future (it is hard to argue that neither general understood the benefits of a mobile defense). According to this hypothesis, the critical defensive needs during the War of Attrition focused the General Staff's attention on the establishment of the Bar Lev Line and its employment in deep raids (and from July 1969 employment of the air force), while delaying the preparation of detailed plans for the employment of the line during an all-out war. This hypothesis facilitates a rationalization for why detailed plans for an all-out war were not prepared until August 1970, although it cannot explain why these were not prepared in the three years until the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War.[34]

This criticism is intensified due to the fact that the IDF was well prepared materially for an all-out war. The order of battle had grown tremendously, the troops were properly trained and weapons were substantially improved, mainly due to the US “compensation” to Israel following the forward deployment of Egyptian air defenses. The only thing missing was a doctrinal effort to reexamine the defensive plans and adapt them to the new Egyptian warfare doctrine, especially in anti-tank and air defense - an effort that wouldn’t have cost money and was not limited by political, economic or other constraints.

The second lesson relates to the need to periodically challenge conventions and to discover whether there is still a need for investments previously made in systems and doctrines. The painful issue of the fighting on and around the strongholds at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War is testimony to that. Many see this issue as one of the major failures of the war, and there is a systematic intellectual bias that could lead to similar failures in the future.[35]

Experience in many fields suggests that the human psyche has difficulty moving on from sunk costs, because in doing so there is a certain admission of past mistakes and despair that the investment will never justify itself. In the military world, an argument is occasionally heard that “it is unthinkable to withdraw from an area whose occupation cost so much blood” (for example, the Gallipoli Peninsula in World War I). Similarly, investors are often hesitant to sell a stock which was purchased for a lot of money, even though the company is in deep trouble.

The strongholds functioned well during the War of Attrition, and immediately after the ceasefire large sums were invested in preparing them to withstand renewed shelling. The attrition did not resume, but prior to 1973, fears of an all-out war increased. How should the operational plans have been updated after August 1970, and especially after the clouds of war gathered over the Sinai?

In a 2013 article, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel describes the contrasting defensive plans of Sharon and Gonen and highlighted the unfortunate timing, with the Egyptians catching the IDF dithering between the different plans in 1973. Finkel also proposed lessons to be learned from such situations. In his opinion, an alternative plan to “Dovecote” should have been formulated and exercised, because the friction with an alternative plan would have created insights about points of failure inherent in the existing operational concept.[37]

Therefore, it is possible that serious friction with alternative plans of various kinds would have emphasized the gap between the existing plans and the air force's ability to participate in repelling the Egyptian crossing, as well as emphasizing other failures which were exposed during the Yom Kippur War.

This approach would have also generated friction with the holding action plans that presumed there would be no combat strongholds, only those used for observation and warning. This would have been in effect a conceptual write-off of the investment in the strongholds, and a drafting of an alternative defense plan.

The third lesson concerns the human tendency to rest on ones’ laurels after a substantial achievement, which can be dangerous in the multi-round wars waged by Israel (and the Jewish population in Mandatory Palestine before that) against Arab forces for more than a hundred years.

The classic security concept holds that in the absence of a political settlement a round of war is to be expected periodically. The period leading up to the Yom Kippur War proved that one should not rest between rounds, even if we believe that we were victorious in an important round. The IDF won the War of Attrition due to rapid and effective learning, but was not sufficiently prepared for the next round (with the exception of the Navy), while the Egyptians did wonders in their preparations for the Ramadan War.

The incident is underscores two important truths. First, one has to assume that the enemy will learn, therefore the IDF must too. Second, victory in a specific round does not guarantee a victory in the next one. This was true when the IDF fought the Arab armies, and is no less true in the warfare against the Hamas and Hezbollah. This might seem obvious, not to mention trivial, but perhaps because of this, there is a tendency to forget the lesson.

The fourth lesson is also not new - never underestimate the enemy. Throughout the War of Attrition and in the period after, IDF senior officers regularly dismissed Arab armies in meetings, debriefings, lectures and reports to the Government. There is not enough space here to describe all of these, but it is enough to say that there was overwhelming consensus regarding the inferiority of the Arab armies. Even Bar-Lev and Gen. Aharon Yariv, Head of Military Intelligence, who were generally cool-headed, joined in. Plans to defend Sinai, approved after the Six Day War, during the War of Attrition and afterwards, were all based on the presumed pitiful state of the Egyptian army and the superiority of the IDF, both during the holding action phase and in counterattacking. Therefore, a significant portion of the criticism of the IDF concerns the result of this contempt for the enemy from which many planning failures issued.

Although IDF learning patterns following the Six Day War and during the first stage of the War of Attrition were prompt and effective, subsequent events raise questions about the political- military strategy that escalated the fighting from July 1969 to August 1970, and much more about what happened in the three years between the ceasefire and the Yom Kippur War. These important questions are unresolved to this day.

Conclusion

Two events of different types were described above. But they have much in common as both deal with the IDF responses to a substantial change of circumstances, requiring a greater investment in defensive measures, in addition to the reinforcement of offensive capabilities. The lack of a satisfying offensive response to the increasing threat of the Arab air forces in the early 1960s, and the political directives and military thinking that bound the IDF to the Suez Canal during the War of Attrition, required creative learning and a search for solutions which deviated from the classical offensive security concept.

Decisions in both events were affected by a complex web of political, operational-economic, organizational and personal considerations, and in hindsight we may say that these were good decisions.

In purchasing surface-to-air missiles, military professionalism carried the day. Determined chiefs of staff, backed up by staff work, overwhelmed the parochial interests of the IAF chief, while contributing to the effort to convert the United States into an important weapons supplier. The chiefs of staff were aided by the prime minister and foreign minister, who saw political advantages in purchasing a modern weapons system from the United States.

The establishment of the Bar Lev Line is harder to evaluate, largely because of the link between the War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War. The historiography of both wars - from the 1974 Agranat Commission report, to Amnon Reshef's 2013 book - analyzed the establishment of the Bar Lev Line in hindsight, in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, and a large part of it was written by those who managed the war or commanded troops, or were otherwise linked to it. This work is not intended to deal with the important question of the strongholds’ contribution to the crisis of the early days of the Yom Kippur War, or whether it was possible to more effectively plan the defense of the Sinai against an Egyptian offensive. It is sufficient here to conclude that the Bar Lev Line was an effective solution in the War of Attrition, and that from the war’s end to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, there was more than enough time to properly plan the defense of the Sinai in an all-out war, based on a realistic estimate of the strengths and weaknesses of the strongholds, and of the enemy’s plans and capabilities.

[1] The events described in this study can serve as historical background to studies dealing with intellectual renewal. See: Eran Ortal, “Is the IDF Capable of an Intellectual Breakthrough?”, Ma’arachot, February 2013. [Hebrew] In order to emphasize the scope of this paper, I will point out that this study only deals with weapons systems that did not have a direct role in offensive action and the achievement of decisive victory. Also, this study does not deal with investments in home front protection, cyber defense, “second strike” capabilities and armored vehicle protection. Finally, investment in protecting combatants’ lives has always played a central role in security concepts, and is therefore outside the scope of the present study.

[2] This chapter relies to a large extent on Stuart Cohen's study: “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Acquired,” in Ze'ev Lachish and Meir Amitai (eds). Non-Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956 - 1967. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1995. [Hebrew] See also Chapter three of Saul Bronfeld. “From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational Friendship,” Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, 2011. [Hebrew], or the summary of the book in the article Saul Bronfeld. “Wise Statesmanship: Levi Eshkol and Arms Procurement in the 60s,” Ma’arachot. No. 437 (Sivan 5771 - June 2011). [Hebrew]

The threat to Dimona jumpstarted the IDF’s capabilities and not only in the SAM interception field. Between 1966 and 1967 the “Senator” initiative was established by the Unit 8200 unit in the IDF J2, assisted by Air Force Intelligence, which was designed “to supply an early warning of an Egyptian air force attack on Dimona.” The intelligence that was gathered was very helpful in planning the attacks on the Egyptian airfields in the Six Day War. See Amos Gilboa. “Mr. Intelligence - Ahara'le, General Aaron Yariv, Head of Military Intelligence,” Yediot Ahronot and Hemed books, 2013, pp. 185, 192-193, 214-215. [Hebrew]

[3] A document from September 10, 1959, quoted by Stuart Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How the Hawk Missiles Were Acquired,” pp. 255-256. Already during the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, it had become clear that over time it is impossible defend land assets using interceptor patrols. The large contribution of the radar-detection network deployed by the Royal Air Force allowed the British Spitfires and Hurricanes to be launched just in time to intercept the German bombers, preventing the interception squadrons from having to perform grinding patrols. At that time, the United Kingdom's small air force was unable to continuously patrol its skies, but the radar network and the reporting and control system based on it, allowed the RAF to launch fighter planes just in time. The British made early use of a system that the Toyota vehicle manufacturing company brought into industry in the 1950s. See Edward Luttwak. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 235-236.

[4] Ezer Weizman. On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., pp. 183-186.

[5] A document from September 23rd, 1959 quoted in Stuart Cohen, "Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How the Hawk Missiles Were Acquired,” in Lachish Ze'ev and Amitai, Meir (eds). Non-Peaceful Decade: Chapters in the History of the Air Force, 1956 - 1967. Tel Aviv:The Ministry of Defense, 1995, p. 255. [Hebrew]

[6] Ibid, pp. 269-270

[7] Weizman, On Eagles' Wings: The Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force?” p. 302. His comments described the enormous political difficulty in purchasing weapons in the US, compared to the political ease of purchasing from France (and the economic difficulties in funding the acquisition).

[8] Bronfeld, “From A-4 to F-4: The Beginning of an Aviational Friendship,” Fisher Institute of Strategic Air and Space Research, pp. 15-16; Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Aquired,” pp. 264-267.

[9] Avi Shlaim, “Interview with Yitzhak Rabin,” Iyunim Bitkumat Israel (Studies in Israeli and Modern Jewish society). Vol. 8, Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1998, pp. 688-681. [Hebrew] Rabin “forgot” to mention that after Israel made the decision to request the Hawk, Peres acted energetically to persuade President Kennedy's administration of the vitality of the missiles to Israel's security.

[10] Sidon, Joash. Day and Night in Fog. Jerusalem: Ma'ariv Library, 1995 pp. 350-367. [Hebrew] Yaakov Hefetz, who was financial advisor to the Chief of Staff, said in an interview with Sidon: “There were ‘transactions’ between Ezer [Weizman] and Shimon Peres, then between Ezer and Keshet [Moshe, Director of the Ministry of Defense]. You support this and we shall support here... [Weizman and Hod who replaced him] were in direct contact with the Ministry of Defense and all sorts of partnerships in crime... unknown to the IDF Chief of Staff.” Quoted in Yitzhak Greenberg. Accounting and Power: The Defense Budget from War to War. Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1997, p. 113. [Hebrew]

[11] Cohen, “Who Needs Ground-Air Missiles? How Were the Hawk Missiles Aquired,” pp. 275- 281.

[12] In another example, during the discussion of the “Goshen” multi-year plan, in 1968 and 1969, Maj. Gen. Hod opposed financing the procurement of the many helicopters required for vertical flanking “at his expense.”

[13] I will limit myself to pointing out the tactic known as “the Cheech Method” named after its creator Maj. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo (Cheech) Lahat, Mayor of Tel Aviv 1974-1993. General Lahat commanded the Sinai Division during the War of Attrition, but the method was given its nickname when he served as Mayor, developing it greatly while creating large budget deficits. When Lahat was required to cut back on expenses, he would agree immediately, and then announce that the cutbacks would be achieved by closing down services provided to the elderly in distress. “Cheech” had many imitators in the civil and defense sectors, as is evidenced by recent threats to cut back on training for combat forces, following the refusal of the Ministry of Finance to increase the defense budget.

[14] Greenberg, “Accounting and Power: The Defense Budget from War to War,” p. 112.

[15] The need for sophisticated air defense measures in the War of Attrition was due to the proximity of Israeli forces in Western Sinai to the Egyptian airfields, inviting air incursions that the Mirages were unable to intercept.

[16] The relevancy of this lesson can also be learnt from the fighting in the Sinai during the first days of the Yom Kippur War. The shortages in artillery, mortars, modern armored infantry carriers and tank transports are a painful example of a deviation from the principle.

[17] Sidon, “Day and Night in Fog,” p. 352.

[18] Here we shall mainly use sources from the period, and refrain from using insights generated after the Yom Kippur War.

[19] According to Haim Bar-Lev, the ratio between their barrels and ours was 1:20 or 1:30, and no one proposed to change that by acquiring more artillery pieces.

[20] The IDF also prepared for intermediate scenarios, such as a seizure of Sharm-al-Sheikh or Northen Sinai, but due to space limitations, we will not discuss them here.

[21] From November 1968 to early March 1969, the fire was temporarily halted since Egypt was forced to organize its rear defense, following a successful raid by the Israeli Paratroopers Brigade’s Reconnaissance Unit on the relay stations and bridges in the area of Nag-Hammadi (Operation “Shock”). In this article, as in the literature of the period and its historiography, the limited war which took place on the banks of the Suez Canal is referred to as the “War of Attrition,” and also occasionally as routine security activity.

[22] See the General Staff meeting, 21/11/1968, IDF archives 10/10/2013.

[23] The retrospective pricing of the stronghold line at the beginning of the War of Attrition is not simple. On the one hand, the figures cited do not include the full economic cost (not even the budgetary) of the many military personnel and heavy construction equipment involved in the construction project. On the other hand, the stronghold line’s budget contains sums, which would have been spent anyway by the IDF, even if an alternative defensive method were chosen. It is important to note that the heaviest expenditures on the Bar Lev Line were invested after the ceasefire in August 1970, when 150 million IL were spent in strengthening the line, bringing about the “infamous enrichment of the contractors.” These figures are rough estimates - 250 million IL according to Haim Laskov testifying at the Agranat Commission meeting of January 10, 1974, or 300 million as stated by Abraham Zohar in his book - of the costs of constructing the line. In any case, these figures are smaller by an order of magnitude than the refuted figures presented by David Arbel and Uri Neeman, approximately the equivalent of 100 fighter jets and 1,000 tanks, i.e. above 2,000 million IL. See Arbel and Neeman, “Unforgivable Delusion,” Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 2005. p. 150. [Hebrew]; Ami Shamir, “History of the Army Engineering Corps,” Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1978, pp. 79-91. [Hebrew]

[24] Avraham Adan. On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem: Presidio Press, 1980, pp. 54-68.

[25] General Staff meeting, December 19, 1968, quoted in Amnon Reshef, We Will Never Cease! The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War. Dvir Publishers, 2013, pp. 33-34 [Hebrew].

[26] See Reshef, We Will Never Cease! The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, Dvir Publishers, 2013. [Hebrew]

[27] The meager and cheap strongholds, “pillboxes,” proposed by Sharon, were also rejected because their shielding was based on pouring concrete which was impossible to construct in such a short time while under fire.

[28] The “Strongholds” file, General staff preliminary debate, November 4, 7, 1968, IDF archives file 315-717/1977.

[29] Summary of the debate of General Staff, September 19, 1969, IDF archives file 34-829/1971.

[30] See “Stronghold” file, operational debate in the Situation Room, December 19, 1968, IDF Archive, file 560/381-73. Tal's position was only gradually accepted, because it meant shifting the 7th Armored Brigade from the North to Central Israel, and the establishment of a regular tank formation in the North, which later became the 188th division. In addition, it was necessary to add to the Armor School’s battalions a support and logistics layer which would enable them in wartime to completely operate as a brigade, and to establish a brigade emergency storage unit in Bir-el-Thamada (Sinai).

[31] Haim Bar-Lev, “The War and Its Goals in Light of the IDF’s Wars,” Ma’arachot. No. 266, November 1978 [Hebrew]. These are the remarks that Bar-Lev made to students at the Staff and Command College, 1978. Gen. Tal saw things differently, arguing that in the War of Attrition the ground forces failed to cope with the Egyptian army, and thus the Air Force was called upon to come to their aid. He claimed that the result of this “original sin” was the establishment of a heavy Air Defense Command by the Egyptians, which wore down the IAF at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. Israel Tal. National Security: The Israeli Experience. Praeger Security International, 2000, pp. 173-180.

[32] Dima Adamsky. Operation Caucasus - The Soviet Involvement and the Israeli Surprise in the War of Attrition. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot Press and the Israeli Ministry of Defense, 2006, pp. 34- 47 [Hebrew]. The research shows that the Soviet decision to intervene had already been taken by the end of 1969, before the bombing raids deep in Egypt which began in January 1970.

[33] Reshef, We Will Never Cease! - The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, p. 56.

[34] See the description of the war games “Strike” in January 1971 and “Battering Ram,” July - August 1972 and the “Dovecote” and “Rock” plans, in Reshef, We Will Never Cease! - The 14th Brigade in the Yom Kippur War, pp. 62, 74; Sakal: Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War, pp. 54-78. Meir Finkel researched in depth the harmful impact of combat patterns learnt during routine security operations on capabilities for an all-out war, and concluded that as far as combat training and increasing and improving the order of battle “routine security activities [after the Six Day War] did not influence the preparations for [all-out] war.” However, he too (like the Agranat Commission and many others) indicates a doctrinal regression as a factor affecting the functioning of the IDF in the Yom Kippur War. See Meir Finkel, “The Tension Between Success in Routine Security Operations and the Risk of Assuming them to be War Capabilities” in Meir Finkel, Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation. Tel Aviv: Ma’arachot, 2013, pp. 79-98 [Hebrew]. Note that in the three years prior to the Yom Kippur War, Israel enjoyed “quiet” (relatively), on both the Eastern and Western fronts, and routine security operations did not dominate the General Staff’s focus.

[35] Sakal dedicated a substantial part of his study to “the contribution” of the strongholds to the erosion of most of the 252nd Division in the first days of the war: Soldier in the Sinai: A General's Account of the Yom Kippur War, pp. 169-175.

[37] “The outbreak of war during a conceptual disagreement,” wrote Finkel in “Challenges and Tensions in Force Generation,” p. 178.

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