By Land, by Sea, by Air. And by Cyber?

01.07.15
Roni Katzir

 

Introduction

“I have decided to establish a national authority for cyber affairs, which will take care of the cyber defense of Israel. Not only for the defense of important installations and defense facilities, but also to protect the citizens of Israel from attacks. This is a new authority; it is, in effect, the establishment of an Israeli Air Force against new threats... We are in a new world, preparing ourselves with new forces.”[1]

With these words, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu opened the cabinet meeting at which he announced his intention to establish a “National Cyber Defense Authority,” which would serve as the executive arm of the National Cyber Bureau.

A few months later, the government passed the decision establishing the Authority. The Authority’s role, once established, will be to defend Israel’s national realm within cyberspace. This will include formulating national situation assessments in the field, identifying threats and attacks, and dealing with attacks and incidents in real time. All this will take place in coordination with the relevant security entities.[2]

This decision puts an end (for now) to the ongoing dispute between the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shabak/Shin Bet) and the National Cyber Bureau over which of the two bodies would be entrusted with defending the civil sector from cyber threats.

Curiously, the voice of the IDF was absent from the debate. The decision makes it clear that the IDF will not bear responsibility (or authority) for defending Israel from threats in cyberspace. “A cyber force” will be established, but unlike the air, sea and land forces - it will be established and exist outside the IDF.

This article will discuss the practical implications of Israel's decision to establish a National Cyber Defense Authority and the IDF’s role in this field. It will critically examine the decision to snatch the responsibility for national defense in cyberspace from the IDF and place it in the hands of a new entity, which is to be entrusted with defending civilian interests in cyberspace.

To examine this issue, I will begin by examining the meaning of the term “cyber warfare,” and attempt to understand the type of threat facing Israel. I will also review the development of the Israeli institutions engaged in this field. This will serve us as the background for discussing the appropriate entity to bear responsibility for cyber defense, and I will relate, among others, to the role definition and function of the IDF, and to the difficulties inherent in the employment of the IDF by a civilian entity.

What Is Cyber Warfare?

The cyber threat is a multifaceted phenomenon, but to pose a strategic threat to a state like Israel with advanced cyber infrastructure, an attacker needs a combination of intent and means. Regardless of the intent, and assuming it exists, today the tools for action against an advanced state are primarily in the hands of world powers. However, these tools are likely to be obtained by terror organizations and states supporting terrorism against Israel in the future. Therefore, the main threat, even in cyberspace, is still the security threat, or more precisely the threat of cyber warfare.

The relationship between the development of the technology world and the evolution of the modern battlefield is clear. The flood of information and technologies that have penetrated the battlefield, and the accessibility of cyber-attack capabilities to anyone who has access to a personal computer, have led to a fundamental change in the characteristics of war[3] and gave birth to the term “cyber warfare.”

In the 1990s, the concept of “information warfare” was first developed.[4] Military thinkers and scholars led by Alvin and Heidi Toffler discussed the importance of information and the control of information on the battlefield. At the time, the prevailing assumption was that information warfare and cyber warfare were one phenomenon.[5] A conceptual debate arose when Arquilla and Ronfeldt, political scientists from the Rand Corporation, published an article with the ominous title, “Cyberwar is Coming!”[6] which foresaw a deep change in the structure of military organizations in view of the expected frequent occurrence of cyber warfare based entirely on electronically transmitted information.

From that moment on, the world has been divided into two groups - “the alarmists,” pessimists who predict that the development of cyber capabilities could bring down a modern state; and the skeptics, who understand that a cyber threat exists which may harm civilian or national infrastructure, but regard it as a mere nuisance, not a national threat.[7] Over the years, a debate has evolved along this axis relating to American policy for dealing with cyber threats. However, the experience gained in recent years has led to one general consensus: contrary to the concept espoused by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, most experts currently tend to accept the assertion that the cyber dimension is not an independent battlefield. Just as it is unlikely that on the modern battlefield warfare will take place in one dimension only - air, sea or land - so it is unlikely that warfare will occur in the cyber dimension only.

The attack on Iran, known as Stuxnet, strengthened this approach. This attack is considered one of the most advanced in history, and it was the first to cause substantial physical damage.[8] However, though great efforts were clearly invested in the attack, its result was, at best, a slight bump in the road for the Iranian nuclear program.[9]

Therefore, in the military context, cyber capabilities are a sophisticated addition to the tools of the combat forces, as were the airplane, the submarine, and the nuclear bomb. This understanding of the cyber threat should underlie the debate about how to defend against it.

The Development of Cyber Defense Institutions in Israel

Israel was among the first states to identify the emerging challenges presented by cyberspace. In 1997, The Tehila Project (Government Infrastructure for the Internet Age) was established to secure government ministry links to the Internet. In 2002, the Information Security National Authority was established within the Israel Security Agency (ISA).[10] It supplies professional guidance on computer infrastructure security to entities of national importance, against threats of terrorism, espionage and exposure.[11]

With increasing threats in cyberspace,[12] a special team was established in November 2010 to engage in formulating a national program aimed at placing Israel among the five leading states in terms of activity in cyberspace.

Following its work, which was titled “The National Cyber Initiative,” the government decided on August 2011 to establish a National Cyber Bureau in the Prime Minister’s Office. The mission of the Bureau is to formulate Israel’s defensive concept in cyberspace and to promote cooperation among government entities, academia, industry and the private sector. The Bureau is also entrusted with establishing a program for the development of cyber infrastructure technologies and research.[13] The Cyber Bureau was established on the recommendation of a team headed by the Chairman of the National Council for Research and Development, Maj. Gen. (res.) Professor Yitzhak Ben Israel. The establishment of the headquarters was meant to create a “strategic roof” for all operational units providing cyber defense (ISA, IDF, Israel Police etc.).[14]

The next step in the development of the national cyber defense infrastructure was the establishment of the National Cyberspace Defense Authority. Following the declaration of the Prime Minister quoted at the beginning of this article, on February 15, 2015, the Cabinet approved a comprehensive plan for national readiness in cyberspace. The decision stipulates that a National Cyber Defense Authority will be established within the Prime Minister’s Office which will have overall national responsibility for cyber defense. The Authority’s primary role is to “direct, operate, and execute as needed all defensive and operational efforts at the national level in cyberspace, based on a systemic approach, to allow a full and ongoing defensive response to cyber-attacks, including the handling of cyberspace threats and cyber events in real time...”[15]

It was also decided that the Authority will operate a Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT-IL), whose functions will be similar to equivalent entities around the world - coordinate relevant cyber defense information, and share it with all parties in the economy (including civilian) in a manner that will improve national preparedness for dealing with cyber-attacks. The Authority is also entrusted with the design, implementation, and integration of a national cyber defense doctrine; with the preparation and readiness of the Israel economy for cyberspace activity; and with the promulgation of regulations which enable the direction of the economy and of the cyber defense services market.

The significance of this decision is that alongside the Cyber Bureau, an operational arm will be established, bearing responsibility, authority and the capabilities to carry out proactive activities in cyberspace for the benefit of the national defense. The responsibility of the Authority will encompass all defense efforts in cyberspace, and it emerges from the decision that all other agencies operating in this field, even though they will retain their independence in specific fields, will operate according to the guidelines and doctrine as decided by the Authority. 

Alongside the national bodies, the IDF has also established cyber entities. The IDF Cyber Bureau is subordinate to IDF SIGINT Unit 8200 and is primarily entrusted with the operational aspects of cyber warfare.[16] Another entity is the Cyber Defense Department, within the C4I Directorate. The main task of this department is to thwart intelligence attacks and prevent disruptions and damage to components of the IDF’s computing systems, in order to ensure the continuous operation, availability and integrity of the IDF’s computing processes. The Department employs the most advanced technological capabilities, and has developed groundbreaking warfare concepts. However, the Department’s mission indicates that its main tasks are those doctrinally defined as “security,” comparable to the securing of IDF bases. It does not deal with operational or national defense, meaning the defense of the borders of the state and the security of its citizens from enemy threats.[17]

Defense in Cyberspace Versus Defense From Cyber Warfare

There are many definitions of the term cyberspace, whose common denominator is that it is a complex and evolving dimension, and any attempt to define it is almost doomed to failure from the start. Therefore, I will not discuss a definition of cyberspace. However, I will try to evaluate what kind of defense is required in this dimension, and to distinguish between threats to cyberspace and threats originating from cyber warfare.

One of the main shapers of state strategy in cyberspace is the recognition that, on the one hand, this is a crucial space for the ongoing functioning of the modern state and on the other, it is exposed to varied threats, some of which are different from the classical threats to state entities. For example, a single anonymous attacker in cyberspace striking at civil institutions (such as banks) for criminal motives, can cause strategic and even tangible security damage to a state lacking proper defenses. Consequently, appropriate cyber defense preparation by a state requires the integration of governmental and civilian systems to establish defensive systems, gather information and deal with threats in real time.

One can distinguish between three cyberspace defense areas. The defense of critical infrastructure (with which the ISA is currently entrusted)[18]; the government - civil arena, currently defended by the government’s ICT Authority; and the defense/security arena, in which each organization defends its own sector.

In addition, it is imperative to prepare a dedicated cross- sector defense. For example, in the criminal field a comprehensive package is required, including prevention, investigation, and enforcement of cybercrimes, currently entrusted to the Israel Police. However, cross-sectorial defense requires intelligence gathering for warning and interception, and a national center to identify, investigate and manage the campaign. The intelligence-gathering tasks should be consolidated through a special department to be established at the National Cyber Bureau.

As for a national center to manage such a campaign, a Cyber Command should be established within the IDF, which would serve as the cyber operational arm in emergencies. The reasons for this are mainly practical. Cyberspace is a dimension of war and the IDF is the only organization able to respond rapidly and effectively to developing threats, while utilizing the existing budgetary resources and personnel at its disposal. Also, the IDF has the operational flexibility to act in all areas of warfare. At the same time, an understanding that responsibility for defending the civil sector should be in the hands of a civilian entity operating under the National Cyber Bureau is reflected in government decisions.[19]

The establishment of a National Cyber Defense Authority, whose functions were described above, shows that the concept adopted by the Israeli government is a unified response to civilian and security threats, through a civilian authority, which will also direct the activities of the security forces. The Authority will be required “to manage, operate and perform” all defense operations in cyberspace. It seems that the Authority is intended to spread its wings over all the defense circles, and will even lead the cross-sectorial defense - both in terms of intelligence collection and the management aspects of the campaign.[20]

The proposed response requires a holistic approach to the threats in cyberspace and to Israeli infrastructure, and is consistent with the approach that considers cyberspace a new warfare dimension, requiring a unique response.

The Israel Defense Forces - Also Defending in Cyberspace

One of the main reasons for establishing a civil Cyber Defense Authority is that a substantial proportion of the threats involve civilian targets. Consequently, and considering the nature of the cyber warfare dimension, exercising responsibility in this field necessarily involves exercising of authority over civilian entities.

My understanding of the term cyber warfare, as noted, subverts these insights. If we perceive cyberspace as a unique and holistic warfare theater, the claim that it requires a unique response makes sense. But if we accept that cyber warfare is not a stand-alone concept, but an extension of the existing battlefield, then dealing with this threat should form a part of dealing with the entire network of threats leveled against the State. This concept returns military issues to center stage.

In Israel, the IDF is the entity entrusted with defending the state’s borders from external threats. Its status is anchored in the Basic Law: The Army, which states that “the IDF is the State’s army.”[21] The Law and Administration Ordinance stipulates that the army “shall have authority to do all lawful and necessary acts for the defense of the State.”[22] The IDF's mission is also derived from this Ordinance which states that: “Subject to the competent authorities of the State of Israel and its decisions, the IDF is designated (...) to defend the State of Israel as founded, its territorial integrity and the borders of its territory (...), the safety of its citizens (...), and any other national interest (...) against any enemy or threat, external and internal.”

There is no dispute that as part of its purpose and function, the IDF is also responsible for defending civilian institutions, such as the electric and water companies and the banks, from external threats. It is clear to all that the IDF is responsible for intercepting attacks from the air, sea and land, even when they are directed at civilians. If so, what is different about the cyber dimension? An understanding of cyber warfare as a part of classic warfare supports the conclusion that the overall responsibility for defending from cyber threats should be entrusted to the IDF.

Furthermore, to fulfill its responsibilities, the IDF was given the authority to act in the civilian sector during emergencies. The IDF still has powers originating from the Defense Regulations which allow, for example, the closure of areas within the state (which is activated routinely), the removal of people from certain areas, the closure of roads, and even the directing of civilians. Therefore, there is no impediment in principle to entrusting the army with the authority necessary to fulfill its responsibilities in cyberspace, even if its implementation would involve certain violations of individual freedoms.[23]

The law regulating the establishment of the IDF as the sole armed force in the State of Israel enshrines the basic democratic principle that on the one hand, the state is entitled to defend its existence, including through force, and on the other hand, the armed forces are concentrated in the hands of one entity and are limited solely to performing the necessary actions in defense of the country. Also, the Basic Law: The Army, specifies that “no armed forces should be established or maintained, outside the Israel Defense Forces, except by law.” Therefore, it seems that the intention to establish a new operational entity, requiring powers involving the use of force against foreign entities, raises fundamental constitutional difficulties.

Unity of Command: Between Cyber and the Home Front

I argued above that the cyber threat is a part of the military campaign, therefore it is appropriate to entrust the IDF with the response. Some claim that the unique characteristics of cyber warfare, including the anonymity of the attackers, the possibility that anyone with a computer can carry out an attack, and the virtual outcomes of an attack, justify the establishment of a civil authority, while retaining the operational capabilities and the power to use force, in the hands of the IDF, to be applied if necessary by the Authority.[24]

This option could undermine the fundamental principle of unity of command, under which each office holder in the IDF is responsible to the authority of a single commander. This splitting of command would undermine military discipline. According to this principle, no civilian authority should be given jurisdiction over IDF soldiers, who are concurrently subject to military command.[25] We may illustrate this difficulty by two possible scenarios.

One such scenario is the threat of an arbitrary cyber-attack against critical civil infrastructure. In response, the Authority might order immediate action to be taken by a military unit. Of course, as long as the unit is subject to military command, this instruction raises a difficulty. How will the unit choose between tasks imposed on it by its military command and the civilian mission? Who will prioritize among the missions and resource allocation?

It can be argued that this difficulty would be resolved if the military unit was completely subjugated to the Authority. However, this solution leads to a second scenario, the integration of a cyber threat within a total war. A cyber-attack could be, for example, a preliminary attack to a kinetic one. In this case, which entity will lead the management of the event? The Authority - responsible for cyber defense, or the IDF - responsible for defending from other theaters of war? How would the two “armed forces” be integrated? Who would decide whether the cyber warriors, under the command of the Authority, will be employed in defense or offense?

A similar attempt was recently made in the home front domain. With the establishment of the Ministry of Home Front Defense, an attempt was made to endow it with authority to directly employ the Home Front Command. The IDF’s position on this issue was firm and unequivocal: The Head of the Home Front Command has a single commander - the IDF Chief of Staff. The IDF also insisted that in an emergency, it is impossible to separate the front from the rear, and that the Ministry of Defense and the IDF should be granted full authority to manage emergency incidents. As for the Ministry of Home Front Defense, it was proposed that it would focus mainly on coordination between the government and additional entities and local authorities and on the preparation of local authorities for emergencies.

The analogy to the tasks of the Home Front Command leads to two important conclusions. One conclusion concerns the issue of responsibility. The rationale, according to which the IDF should be given complete responsibility for the management of emergency incidents, is also valid for emergencies in cyberspace, all the more so when concerning integrated warfare events. This is also true regarding instructions to the population at the home front. The IDF was given responsibility in this field, due to an understanding that it would have the most up-to-date information about the nature of the latest threats, the chances of their occurrence and the proper way to defend against them. Likewise, the army has the ability to determine, subject to political guidance, which actions of the population would best serve the objectives of the entire campaign. It is quite possible that in future wars, involving cyber warfare, it will be necessary to guide the population on how to behave in cyberspace (such as guidelines restricting Internet or computer use). Recognition that the cyber and kinetic campaigns are one and the same supports the conclusion that this responsibility should also be entrusted to the entity dealing with the entire management of the campaign, the IDF.

The second conclusion concerns the issue of authority. If it was found to be possible to give the IDF the authority required to engage in the emergency management of the home front, a task which by its nature involves exercising authority over civilians,[26] there is no impediment in principle to granting the IDF similar powers to deal with the threat of cyber warfare.

The Palmach and Cyberspace

Finally, I would like to present a slightly different angle on the issue. Dr. Alexander Vacca, an expert in information systems security and Director of Strategy at the Northrop Grumman Corporation, claims that the manner in which a combat doctrine is formed is strongly influenced by the culture of the organization forming it.[27] Organizational culture is reflected in the unique language common to all members of the organization; in the system of analogies and metaphors which allow us to understand what motivates the members of an organization; and the causal contexts that explain phenomena and traditions within the organization; and especially, shape the way that new information is processed.

According to Vacca's approach, it is too early to define the nature of the cyber threat and consequently, too early to decide on the correct way to deal with it. Therefore, he proposes a “cultural tool” to predict how combat doctrine would evolve in the cyber world, according to the entity responsible for its implementation. Using this tool, he tries to predict the development of the cyber warfare concept of the US Navy’s Cyber Command, in contrast to its development by the US Air Force Cyber Command.

The combat culture of the American Navy is based largely on the writings of Alfred Mahan, an admiral in the American Navy, a military historian and thinker, termed “the most important American strategist of the 19th century.” Mahan argued that the Navy was crucial to maintaining global trade and the ability to deploy forces from one place to another, in a manner permitting intervention in military conflicts, thereby increasing the armed force’s influence beyond their actual power. Thus, he developed the military doctrine of the US Navy, based in part on powerful vessels balancing offense and defense - capable of defeating any enemy at sea and difficult to defeat; on a proactive approach, rather than the passive concept of creating deterrence; and based on the concept that defeating the enemy at sea would indirectly bring victory in the war. Vacca claims that these characteristics would also shape the combat doctrine of the Cyber Command, which would be based on securing cyberspace and its maintenance as a means of trade and the transmission of military information.

Compared to the Navy, the Air Force's combat doctrine is influenced by the writings of the military thinker Giulio Douhet, one of the first thinkers in the field of exercising airpower, at the beginning of the 20th century. Douhet believed that the best defense is offense, and saw in the Air Force an offensive machine, whose enormous power would produce deterrence, but which could also decide wars by itself, not least through the considerable moral influence of the offensive. Within this culture, the Air Force has evolved, as expected, a concept of cyber warfare based on a powerful offensive capability, synchronized with existing kinetic capabilities, and capable of producing real psychological effects that could help to defeat the enemy.

This cultural tool may also be helpful in demarcating the boundaries of responsibility for cyberspace defense in Israel. Indeed, unlike the situation in the United States, the number of entities dealing with the subject is not large, and it would presumably be difficult to trace the military reasoning underlying the establishment of the IDF Cyber Bureau, or the thinking underlying the establishment of the National Cyber Defense Authority, which is currently underway.

However, it is certainly possible to try predicting through the cultural tool the benefits (and drawbacks) that would be derived from entrusting the IDF with the responsibility for cyber defense. There is not enough space here to fully discuss the possible influences of the IDF’s culture on the development of cyber warfare doctrine. One can only assume that the fighting spirit of the IDF, its combat principles and doctrine, rooted in the spirit of the Etzel since the days of the Palmach pre-state paramilitary organization, would all be revealed in a cyber warfare doctrine. In the changing cyber environment, where it is difficult to determine what will develop and when the next attack will occur or how, it seems that the strong values of the IDF would certainly help to rapidly develop the required capabilities in cyberspace.

Conclusion

The national threats in cyberspace are many and varied. They range from an independent hacker breaking into a bank's computers and stealing a database of credit card numbers; through organized groups operating across the network to achieve global objectives; to state or quasi-state organizations using the cyber world as a weapon for all intents and purposes. The Government of Israel recently decided that the operational response to these threats should be provided by a civilian cyber force - an operational authority which will operate under the National Cyber Bureau, whose function will be to perform and manage all operational tasks to defend cyberspace. This is based on a recognition of the need to provide a uniform and comprehensive response to the unique threats directed against Israel in cyberspace.

This article introduced another viewpoint, which sees the mission to defend cyberspace from within the primary security threat, that of a cyberwar. This threat does not exist on its own, but is another tier in the network of threats arising from the conflict in which the State of Israel has found itself since its foundation.

This understanding of the cyber threat casts doubt on the argument that it should be dealt with by a civilian authority. Just as the invention of the airplane, the nuclear weapon and the development of submarines required a realignment of existing armed forces - including the defensive systems which protected civilian installations - but did not lead to the establishment of civilian armies, the cyber threat should be treated similarly, and all the more so in Israel’s case. Unlike the states for whom cyberwar is a modern form of the Cold War between superpowers with no physical confrontation between them,[28] for Israel, the cyber security threat originates primarily from states and terror organizations with whom we are in an ongoing armed conflict.

Therefore, it is appropriate that the response to cyberwar be given in the same manner as the responses to other security threats, i.e., through the IDF’s might. Entrusting responsibility and authority to the IDF is in line with the democratic principles underlying the establishment of the IDF as a single armed force in the state, it implements correctly the IDF’s mission and vision, while preventing a conflict with the basic principle of unity of command. Aside from these arguments, there is also the military tradition - bringing with it a legacy, combat doctrines and crystallized concepts which may also contribute to the faster development of capabilities in cyberspace. There are other benefits, which due to the limitations of space were not reviewed here, such as the advantages of the IDF in recruiting and developing human resources, and the structural and technological advantages of the IDF.

The decision to establish a National Cyber Defense Authority is another expression of Israel’s responsibility, as a world leader in this field over years. However, it does not absolve us from asking: is this indeed the most suitable response to a future cyberwar, would it not be more appropriate to entrust the IDF - as defender of the state’s borders in the air, on land and at sea - with this in cyberspace too?

Epilogue

Shortly before the publication of this article, the decision of the IDF’s Chief of Staff to establish a cyber arm was made public.[29] It seems that this decision reflects an understanding among military leaders of the IDF's role, among others, in defending Israel from cyberwar threats. However, it seems that this decision is inconsistent with the Government's decision. It may create a struggle over authority between the civilian cyber branch, which “will have overall national responsibility for cyber defense, and will oversee cyber defense activities,” in the operational space and the military cyber branch. It seems that to fulfill the Chief of Staff’s vision, it will be necessary to re-examine the functions and responsibilities of the recently established Cyber Defense Authority.

[1] Excerpts from the Government meeting of September 21, 2014. See: Moti Bassok, “Netanyahu: National Cyber Defense Authority to be Established,” The Marker, September 21, 2014. [Hebrew]

[2] Government of Israel, Cabinet Decision 2444, February 15, 2015.

[3] See, for example: Rex Hughes, “Towards a Global Regime for Cyber Warfare,” in Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers (eds.), The Virtual Battlefield: Perspectives on Cyber Warfare, 2009, pp. 106-117.

[4] To analyze the implications of information warfare from the perspective of the end of the 1990’s, see: Yitzhak Ben-Israel. “Information Warfare,” Ma’arachot, 369 (2000), p. 18. [Hebrew]

[5] See, for example: Gil Baram, “Cyber war preparedness,” Ma’arachot, 456 (2014), pp. 22-27. [Hebrew]

[6] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is coming,” Comparative Studies, 12: (1993), pp. 141-165.

[7] See: Jean-Loup Sammaan, “Cyber Command, The Rift in US Cyber Training Strategy,” RUSI Journal, 155: 16-21 (2010); Ryan Singel, “White House Cyber Czar: There Is No Cyberwar,” Wired.com, 4 March 2010.

[8] See, for example: David Kushner, “The Real Story of Stuxnet,” IEEE Spectrum (26 February 2013), downloaded from Spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet.

[9] Jon R. Lindsay, “Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare,” Security Studies, 22 (2013), pp. 365-404.

[10] Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs Decision B/84 of 11 December 2002.

[11] The powers of the ISA in this regard are derived from the “Law Regulating Security in Public Institutions – 1998.”

[12] Since 2007 the world has witnessed several attacks in cyberspace during disputes between states, such as Russia’s attacks on Estonia and Georgia, attacks by China on the United States and the Stuxnet attack in Iran that was mentioned above. Recently, Kaspersky Labs released documentation of attacks performed against states involved in the search for the Malaysian plane which went missing, which were immediately responded to by one of the states attacked. Costin Raiu and Maxim Golovkin. “The Chronicles of the Hellsing APT: The Empire Strikes Back,” Securelist (15 April 2015). For an in-depth overview of attacks that have been publicized see: Sharon Afek, “Breaking the Rules and Joining in - on the Encounter between Cyberspace and International Law,” Bein Haktavim, Vol. 3 (2014), pp. 45-75.

[13] A broad overview on the development of the Israeli engagement the cyber research area appears in an internal study conducted by the IDF.

[14] See also: Shmuel Even and David Siman-Tov, “Cyber Warfare: Concepts and Strategic Trends,” Memorandum 117, Institute for National Security Studies, May 2012, p. 79.

[15] Government of Israel, Cabinet Decision 2444, February 15, 2015 (author’s emphasis).

[16] Sagi Cohen, “8200: Not Only Looking for Geeks with Eyeglasses,” Ynet, 23 October 2012.

[17] For example, “defensive operations” are defined as “blocking enemy attacks and preventing the capture of the defended area...” (Operations Division, Basic Operational Doctrine, p. 77). A defensive battle is defined as “a tactical form of battle, intended to block enemy attacks and to prevent the capture of the defended area, or to prevent injury to people and equipment found in the area being defended and for who’s safety the defender is responsible.” (Ground Forces, Ground Forces Operations, vol. 3, defensive operations, p. 3).

[18] The Government decision states that the responsibility for cyberspace will be transferred within three years from the ISA to the “National Cyber Defense Authority.”

[19] Internal IDF research.

[20] Internal IDF research.

[21] State of Israel, Israeli Basic Law: The Army, 1976.

[22] State of Israel, Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948.

[23] It is understood that this would involve the implementation of a constitutional balancing between the purpose for which the authority was given and its impact on the individual. However, this balancing is the same whether the authority is military or civilian. In any case, the exercise of authority should be made for proper purposes and to no greater extent than required.

[24] It is reasonable to assume that this was one of the courses of action examined prior to implementing the decision to establish the authority, if only for the practical reasons mentioned above.

[25] All of this is relevant, even without a discussion of the source of the civilian authority to give orders to a soldier, and the consequences of failure to comply with the order in this case.

[26] The powers of the home front are primarily defined in the Civil Defense Act, 1951.

[27] W. Alexander Vacca, “Military Culture and Cyber Security,” Survival (53 (6)), (2011-12), pp. 159-176.

[28] For example, the confrontation between the United States and China and Russia.

[29] Yoav Zitun, “IDF establishes new cyber branch,” Ynet, 15 June 2015. [Hebrew]

Bibliography

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