Active Defense as the Fourth Pillar of the Israeli Security Concept

The Balance Between Defense and Offense in the IDF’s Operational Concept Compared to Its Execution During Operation Protective Edge

In this section, we will review the IDF’s official approach[9] when dealing with the defensive pillar, and compare it to the orders which were written and distributed during Operation Protective Edge.

The IDF’s approach, as it was developed prior to Protective Edge, reveals the crystallization of an understanding of the role of defense in relation to the security challenges. It supports the centrality of defense in the changing battlefield and the need to augment this element. On the other hand, this approach emphasizes the importance of a balanced security concept, while doubly emphasizing the roles of deterrence and decisive defeat. It concludes that the defensive pillar accompanies offensive action and in fact enables its implementation, therefore a necessary balance must be maintained between offensive and defensive responses.

This approach makes clear the (current) need to continue examining the defensive pillar’s influence on the other three pillars of the concept - deterrence, early warning and decisive defeat. This examination, which has not been satisfactorily performed, exists in the shadow of the presumption that the role of defense is to enable the realization of the offensive concept.

Furthermore, the secondary role of defense as a supporting element to the offensive effort is perceived by some of the shapers of this approach as not only secondary to the other components of the security concept, but as a component which could actually become a heavy burden. They fear that it could prevent further development of the other components and damage, even weaken, Israel’s offensive response.

In conclusion, underlying the IDF’s approach is the assumption that the defensive pillar plays a lesser role than the role it actually played during Protective Edge (as we will show below). This approach even views the defensive pillar as a “stepson” of the security concept, which was born to live in the shadow of its two dominant brothers - deterrence and decisive defeat.

In reality, during Protective Edge, defense received a very different type of treatment. The massive aerial bombardment and limited ground maneuver which specifically targeted the offensive tunnels gave the fighting the appearance of an offensive operation. However, Protective Edge’s rationale was conservatively defensive, with limited objectives, focused on returning calm to the south of Israel and removing threats. Examination of the General Staff’s operational idea demonstrates the same rationale - the defensive effort as the priority, even during the offensive stage of the ground maneuver. This rational was also shared by the political echelon, prior to and during the operation, whose main objective was to thwart and prevent injury to the Israeli home front.

This examination exposes a growing gap concerning the defensive element between the IDF’s concept and attitudes prior to the operation and the actual approach adopted during Protective Edge. Prior to the operation, the prevailing concept in the IDF viewed the defensive pillar, in the best case, as an element supporting the offensive, which was supposed to assist the other three pillars, primarily the offensive (decisive defeat) one; or in the worst case as a delaying factor which would hinder the proper employment of the other elements. In fact, it is clear that during Protective Edge, the defensive pillar acquired a central importance, even gaining dominance over the other elements of the classic security concept.

Why was such a wide gap created between perceptions of defense prior to the operation (as well as during other operations) and its actual implementation?

There are three possible reasons, which in combination created this gap. First, the lack of study of the influence of the defensive pillar, a pillar that has strengthened over the years, on the other security concept elements. Second, the hostilities that led to the writing of the General Staff and conceptual position papers were major operations, in which the offense was the primary component, while defense played only a supporting role. An operation directed at achieving limited objectives, such as Protective Edge, was not mentioned in these position papers, and therefore the defensive element, which was central to the operation, did not find expression in them. The third reason relates to the IDF’s ethos. The offensive ethos of the IDF is clearly expressed in these conceptual papers, as part of an outlook that emphasizes the centrality of offensive force design. In the current reality, this is not the sole consideration and other non-military considerations play a significant role too.

Despite the gap between the defense concept and its implementation, it seems that the centrality of defense within the Israeli security concept, and in the totality of its practical tools, is not in doubt. Still, the question remains, why not develop defense to the maximum?

A partial answer to this question was presented in the first part of the present article, which noted the struggle over resources, the balance among the security concept components, and flexibility of force design, as considerable and counterbalancing factors against the desire to invest greater resources in defense. However, it is important to note two points within the IDF discourse, which hint at dilemmas arising from apprehension about an over-reliance on the defensive pillar.

The first is linked to the psychological-cognitive characteristic associated with defensive capabilities and to a possible failure of defense. We have already mentioned the basic tenet of ground warfare that “a defensive line is bound to break,” as a basic principle of defense. This accurate observation has one more implication that is directly connected to the Israeli active defense systems. Israeli expectations, both military and civil, as were reflected in Operations Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge, are for a perfect defense.

However, we should remember that there is a technological aspect to Israel’s struggle with its opponents.[11] It is entirely conceivable that Israel’s enemies are working on a response to its defensive advantage, and by finding a way to breach the defensive systems, will strike, even partially, at its home front. Such a strike may considerably reduce the effectiveness of Israel’s defensive systems. There is an apprehension that an over-reliance on defensive systems exposes Israel, given the sense that each blow to the home front, even if only amounting to a few rockets and casualties, would be considered a major failure.

A good demonstration of this was the media's attitude about the closure of Ben Gurion Airport following the landing of a single rocket in a nearby town,[12] and the resentment of the residents of the Gaza border towns due to the IDF’s failure to intercept mortar shells.[13] Such a concept, which relies on the dominance of the defense, may create an unachievable benchmark during a conflict, thus generating public, psychological and operational disappointment.

The second point is associated with the required balance between defense, offense and decisive defeat in relation to the length of a campaign. The success of the active defense systems in Protective Edge, both the Iron Dome interceptions and the early warning, identification and location system, provided political and military decision makers with a longer period to make decisions, due to the reduced impact on the Israeli home front. Massive damage to the Israeli home front would have forced a shortening of the campaign, involving a ground maneuver, a massive employment of aerial strikes and wide collateral damage to civilians on the other side.

This breathing room, unlike the situation in the Second Lebanon War, had a real impact on the campaign’s length. An examination of the strategic objectives of the operation raises an essential question about the role of the defensive system in influencing the operational rationale of the campaign. The limited strategic objectives which did not seek to achieve a decisive defeat pushed the offensive effort into second place and considerably eroded the prevailing understanding of the need for a short campaign. The apprehension that arises is connected to a desire to balance defense and offense when determining the strategic objectives of future operations, and with the need to conduct a systemic analysis of the influences of all defensive systems on all types of IDF operations.