Multi-Domain Defense - Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi

During the work process that preceded the IDF's "Tenufah" multi-year plan, I led the multi-domain defense team on behalf of the IDF Chief of the General Staff. I feel that the right thing to do at this time is to invest more in the various types of attack capabilities in order to adequately degrade the enemy during war, but the value of the achievements of anattackmaneuver are certainly dependentonthe qualityof defensive maneuvers conducted concurrently. In this article, I'll try to present an analysis of the existing threats and opportunities, and most importantly, the important complementarity that could ensue between offensive and defensive capabilities.[2]

American football is a complex game, especially to Israelis. To maximize their chances of success, teams tend to prepare offense teams, which specialize in moving the ball into their opponent's end zone in order to score a touchdown, alongside defense teams specializing in foiling their opponent's plays and preventing the opponent from scoring points. This high-quality group is the one capable of creating a large gap between its offensive achievements and its defensive failures. In other words, they ensure that the opponent's offense is as unsuccessful as possible, and foiled whenever possible, while their own team conducts

as many successful plays as they can. Our reality is immeasurably complex. We play both offense and defense simultaneously, and we can't replace the team in each play. There is an infinite number of tools and possibilities in war, and the cost of error affects troops engaged in combat and the civilian population on the homefront more than a scathing loss in a major sporting event. In the wars of the past, offense was the only part that counted, with defense was relegated to a marginal role. Considerations of ethos and organizational culture were added to operational and tactical considerations. In today's wars, when fighting terrorist armies, should this ratio be changed, and should more attention be devoted to defense as well?

Why defense?

"The Israel Defense Forces" was the name that was given to the fledgling country's military, based on a comprehensive concept of security meant to defend the state and use offense for the sake of defense. After all, we all know the cliché: "The best defense is offense." There is no shortage of clichés, but if there's one unequivocal truism in the art of war, it definitely isn't the recommendation to go to battle with a good cliché. Clichés are superficial. They nullify situation awareness and crucial in-depth processes in battle. A good, alert army prefers to take the initiative and attack. Combining initiative and defense is more complex. In this article, we'll assess why defense has become more important, in peacetime, and even more so in wartime. We'll assess the challenges we must face when conducting defense, and based on that, discuss the right way to create more effective defense nowadays, in light of what's needed and while maximizing the new potential in technological domains. We'll propose a way of

thinking about defense on two main axes – the scale axis , with the required diversity and synchronization, and the time axis, i.e., how the challenge will develop in the future, and what is the right way to prepare for it.

The change in the enemy: "Those S.O.B.s changed the rules of the game again".

Each time we need to contend with a new challenge that any of our enemies could pose, we feel somewhat frustrated with how sophisticated the enemy is, and with the enemy's ability to transform. However, if we take a closer look at these things, we'll discover that actually, these changes stem from our relative position of strength and superiority in the region, which we built for ourselves in several fields. In other words, the major changes in the enemy are due to our powerfulness and our past successes. Our military strength, as a maneuvering army, is precisely what turned our enemies into guerrilla armies, due to their unwillingness and inability to face off against us, army against army. The superiority we developed in our intel and aerial firepower has sent our enemy into hiding, taking it deep underground. Active defense systems developed by our brightest minds have led our enemy to the conclusion that merely shelling the Israeli homefront will not give them the achievement they seek, so the enemy has begun developing land attack capabilities. Though these may be somewhat simplistic inferences with plenty of reservations attached, which we won't elaborate on here, it is true that we must see security activities in their broader sense as an evolving and dialectic system on a timeline, where the enemy, too, is dynamic and is conducting a learning competition against us. When we grow stronger in one area, we should ask ourselves what our enemy would do in response.

It turns out that the phrase "necessity is the mother of invetion" has been translated into Arabic. Our current enemies – Hamas and Hezbollah, in particular – are planning land-based attacks into our territory. These operations aren't meant to hold onto territory for extended times. Rather, they're meant to cause damage, take captives, and beyond that, seriously affect the consciousness of the Israeli public and cause media buzz over something unprecedented that occurred. Terror aims to frighten people. It does not aim to win, in the classical sense of the word, and in this case, causing the state to lose control over the territory in which it exists, planting fear and causing instability are its achievement. The balance of power between us and our enemies is absolute. Every so often, we'll be hit with dreadful things that happen to us, but we'll still be able to recover quickly and regain control of the situation. I won't discuss how we deal with the cognitive-behaviorial-national challenge requiring us to refrain from showing those who wish to see that they've undermined us what they wish to see, and that that is how things truly are, but it's important to remember this point as well.

Figure 1: A defense team blocking the opponent's attack during a football game (photo: SteelCityHobbies)3

Another significant change that our enemies take advantage is technological change. In the past, technology-laden combat was the exclusive province of the militaries of technologically advanced countries. Technology was very expensive, and the dream of having a birds-eye view of the combat theater had become a reality solely for the countries that maintained costly air forces. The proliferation of technology and the the dramatic reduction of the price of technology has diversified the products, thanks to the ability to replicate and the flexibility that software provides to products, and mainly because the ability to transfer knowledge on production or assembling capabilities, has made the use of technology widespread, with these assets becoming household products for all terror organizations. For example,

humankind had dreamed of flying for centuries, and generals could only fantasize about how important a birds-eye view of the battlefield could be during battle. Is there anyone today who finds a photograph taken by a drone 100 meters above ground exciting? Technological change lets our enemy amass diverse attack capabilities, on land, in the air, at sea, underground, at low elevations, on the spectrum, and in cyberspace.

We have grown relatively stronger, the enemy wants to attain the achievement of spreading fear, which will be exploited for its psychological effect, and technology has become a flexible and highly available product. Thanks to these trends, our enemies plan attacks that are much more diverse, occurring in various domains. The challenge of defense has changed because it is more complex. The enemy harnesses additional capabilities that boost its attacks within our territory, and the defensive battle has become more important, since our enemies’ offensive achievements in our territory, which are well-leveraged for cognitive purposes, offset our offensive achievements. If the critical part of the definition of victory in classic warfare between states is “who dominated whom”, in a battle waged against terrorist armies, the scale of the margin plays a very important role because of the assymetry in capabilities and consciousness. The answer to the question of who's stronger is known even before the battle has begun. This isn't an outcome that should be accepted. We need to be able to attack in full force, lethally and incisively. The question is which defense team do we task to contend with this challenge so that the final outcome is clear and decisive, by a wide margin.

Defense during contingencies and routine times – same difference?

During routinetimes, we oftencontend with attack threats, and with terror attacks of various types and scales. The importance of routine defense stems primarily from the need to provide the best possible defense to the citizens of the State of Israel, who are consistently located adjacent to enemy forces. Routine defense is important for another reason, though. We tend to react severely to major terror attacks in order create deterrence that will stop these attacks from becoming a routine occurence. This is why successfully preventing an enemy's offensive action thwarts the attack itself and harms the enemy, while giving us more flexibility with the response we can choose, which is affected by the enemy's success. Had the abduction attemptsintheGaza Strip and Lebanon in 2006failed thanksto good defense on our part, deterrence wouldhave resulted simply because of the fact that we managed to prevent the abductions. In this way, we could afford to consider a differentresponse, either at adifferent timing or of a different nature and avoid entering a war under conditions dictated by the enemy. Thus, routine defense is extremely important, both to thwart enemy attacks whose results could prove disastrous to our civilians, and to control the timing and the reasons for escalations that carry a high price tag. The State of Israel wishes to choose its wars and initiatives, when required, rather than be coerced into going to war and responding to a successful enemy attack, though we need to be able to do that as well.

The importance of wartime defense is a more complex discussion. Let's revisit the discussion on the change that the enemy has experienced. Terrorist armies are hardly surprised or overwhelmed by the IDF's incursion into the territory of the state they are located in, or the damage dealt to their infrastructure, provided that they had managed to deal a tough blow to the Israeli hinterland with their firepower, and especially in the course of a ground attack. This is why we must find a way to having a stronger and more effective defense during wartime as well. Wartime defense is extremely important, but here,itmust knowhowto play"second fiddle". Concentrationof force must take precedence in attack offensive actions, but we must create a method of defense that will be able to prevent incursions and deal a heavy blow to our enemy when they make such attempts during wartime as well. This is so that defense can serve as a significant fulcrum point for a decisive attack.

Why multi-domain?

There is something "unfair" about the challenge of defense. The defender must constantly be prepared and vigilant, while the attacker can train, rest, and get prepared once it has decided to attack. To correct this inequality, you need good intel to tell you when to concentrate your force, andyouneedto evaluate the differentdomains and the connection between them in order to increase your chances of being ready, at the right time, at the right place, and with the right abilities.

Before discussing the multi-domain battlefield (MDB) as a phenomenon, it behooves me to say a few words about the domains themselves. We're accustomed to contemplating the world and

dividing it into physical domains: ground, sea and air. For the defender, each of these domains can be divided roughly into two different sub-domains: ground and subterranean, air and low elevation, above-water and underwater. In recent years, we've added a fourth domain to our analysis: the cyber domain. It is fundamentally different from the previous three, since it's the one that is synthetic, the one that will continue being shaped by man. However, it is decidedly another domainthatcanbeattacked ordefended.There, too, we cantalkabout a rough distribution,which is not anexclusive distribution,betweenthe computernetworkdomain andthe spectrum domain, i.e.,variousradio bands andfrequencies. We now live in a world with greater integration. Through geolocation, our cellular phones expose us to different advertisements, and once we take interest in one product, we are immediately beset with advertisements for possible accessories. The same applies to combat. When the enemy attacks, it does so after having gathered intel before and during the attack. The enemy's technology remains active, both before and during the maneuver, in order to improve its attack capabilities. Naturally, the enemy will also want to jam our radio networks using operations targeting the radio spectrum.

Faced with this multi-domain threat, a response that create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts is in order. For us, combining defense and offense, and combining the different domains, creates the following:

Alerts on enemy attacks. A defense situation awareness that looks at all of the dimensions can identify an attack through a sign in one of the domains, even if it isn't the attack's main effort. Surprises might be reduced considerably by looking at all domains and the interfaces between them. If a sign is found in one domain, one must prepare all of them and ready them for battle.

Good defense. Defense abilities will be greatly enhanced through multi-domain defense and viewing the enemy through a multi-domain prism. A comprehensive picture will allow us to better understand the enemy's attack and thwart it more effectively and with greater certainty. Defense must find a solution for each domain, individually, and for when all dimensions are integrated operationally.

The best defense is offense. If you want your defensive battle to succeed, you must prepare offense capabilities from among your defensive forces, which will deal a heavy blow to the enemy's attack effort. A good defender needs to be able to carry out cross-domain attacks, and foil them from other domains as well, i.e., to attack the enemy's assets in one domain from a different domain.

As we see from this section, it goes without saying that we must maintain defense assets to counter enemy preparations for attack in any and all domains. Yet there's another, more interesting insight here, which presents a greater potential for making achievements: those who wish to have a strong defense must have a comprehensive picture of all of the domains and how they affect each other, alongside cross-domain mutually-assisting defensive and offensive action assets. How, then, should this be done?

The principles of multi-domain defense: two development axes

To articulate the principles of multi-domain defense, we must contemplate two different axes. The first is the domain axis – how we look at all domains and arenas and at the interaction between them. The second axis is the time axis. The defense challenge must be seen as adynamicallyevolvingproblem. Now, let's assess two assumptions:
In five years, the enemy will possess assets that it doesn't have today. Any new asset of ours that our enemy learns of will generate an enemy reaction, beginning with learning, and ending with transformation of force design as well.

We mustregard these assumptions as workingassumptions, which will, in all likelihood, materialize. These assumptions must cause us to reflect on the evolution of the problem in the temporal dimension and prepare a defense that will be able to develop and advance in this learning competition. Force design processes takea long time and cost a lot of money. If, at the very outset, we approach force design with the assumption that assets will be upgraded in the future, we'll ensure that our situation will be considerably better in another five years, in terms of our assets and budget management. Furthermore, this time-oriented planning will allow us to set aside certain defense capabilities to be used only in war, to avoid eroding these capabilities during routine times. If we constantly make themistake of thinking that the next invention will be the perfect solution for all time, we'll find ourselves developing new capabilities each time anew, so we musttake the approach of "open force design". Planning modestly, assuming that improvements will be needed, allows us to maintain continuous

defense over time, to save money during when integrating the next upgrades to our existing ability, and more generally, it will lead us to a better achievement over time. These are the main principles for planning defense and defense capabilities operating in all domains, in a way that keeps them relevant over time:

1.Intelligence

It's hard to imagine good defense without good intel. As the saying goes, "The line of contact will always be breached". The word"always" is aninfinite delineationoftime, butone thing that can certainly help constantly delay the breaching of the line of contact is good intel. Though it won't ever be omniscient, it can move defense efforts to your adversary's territory by handling attack vehicles for thwarting or disrupting. The main components needed for intel are as follows: Multi-disciplinary intel collection togaina basic familiarity with the enemy's abilities and intentions for a particular period of time A continuously updating picture of the enemy with respect to enemy preparations and infrastructure Targeting intel that will allow us to degrade the enemy's attack capabilities, when needed Warning models, to allow us to concentrate our force for certain scenarios, based on their likelihood and the severity of the outcome, should those scenarios materialize (benefit-risk ratio) The ability to process large quantities of data into knowledge that benefits the defense (a discussion of monitoring appears in the next item)

2.Monitoring and maintaining the domains

We live in a technological world filled with sensors, in which people are growing stronger at accumulating data, processing it into knowledge and using that knowledge in the right setting. To obtain a complete picture of what is transpiring at any point in time, and to be able to provide the warning on time, all of the domains must be monitored nowadays – everything happening at sea, on land, in the air and in the spectrum, along with the sub-domains I referred to earlier. Over time, this monitoring will allow us to convert information into knowledge, using the appropriate algorithms, and it will allow us to identify deviationsfrom thebaseline and create tell-tale indicationsthat would otherwise be difficult to identify. Once we "record" the defensive theater,downto each bitandpixelineach domain, and feed this recording into the right machine, one that can identify the slightest changes and deviations from the baseline, we'll be able to issue warnings of attacks within a particular theater and preparefor them. This monitoring is importantforeachindividual domain, but it's much more useful when it's done at one point, where alloftheinformation fromalldomainsisconsolidated,and where all of this information can be cross-checked. We become more effective when we assume a stance that integrates these domains. If our enemy operates in multiple domains, collects intel before attacking, operates on the spectrum, and prepares special arrays, there is a slim chance that the enemy will make a mistake and get exposed early on, with all of its assets. Exposing the enemy in one domain, without taking a multi-domain perspective, may not be enough to take us out of our routine.

We'll only notice a small part of the "elephant” and may not understand that it's an elephant we're seeing. However, with a multi-domain perspective, any sign in one of the domains will be assessed in the other domains, as well, and this will greatly improve the chances that we'll understand the full picture and foil the enemy's plan.

This is how we can achieve advantages over our enemies: When I know something aboutthe enemy, andthe enemy doesn't know that I know this, that puts me in a position of power, giving me a diverse set of possible courses of action, and allowing my defense to be lethal with respect to enemy activities and to take the enemy by surprise. Once the enemy has decidedto launchattacks on our territory, the enemy has endangered itself. Here, the enemy can't blend into the civilian population, and this should be fully exploited to identify and degrade the enemy.

Monitoring in defense is extremely important, both during routine times and during wartime. The more domains we monitor, the more effective our monitoring, allowing us to store data on monitored domains over time and use them to assess any phenomenon or change.

3.Transformation

Enemies are ring a system of learning and information gathering, each in their own way. They, too, have an advantage gained through studying our routine. When we begin planning our defense, a significant part of that defense planning should

be transformation, which makes it harder for our enemy to identify our routine and form a clear situation awareness of our forces. At this point, I'll anayze two different facets of transformation we need.

The first facet of transformation concerns things that transpire at a particular point in time. Fundamentally speaking, defense transformation is a hard thing to create. Lines of defense are fixed, and the activity is iterative, making this a well-known, age-old challenge for the defender. The multi-domain battlefield creates new possibilities for creating safe and high-quality transformation. Once we have a diverse, multi-domain "toolbox", we can plan a change that diverts assets in the defense routine in a particular domain over a particular period of time, and compensate with assets taken from another domain. This is transformation at a specific point in time, by diversifying the tools and changing the response to avoid creating a clear routine.

The second aspect of transformation is transformation over time. We must design our force and our defense capabilities ahead of time such that we've ensured that we'll be able to develop and upgrade those capabilities over the years. By way of analogy, we should design a train capable of mounting the railroad and travelling. However, from time to time, while the train is traveling, or during short stops at stations, it will change form – the structure of the train cars will change, the locomotive's capabilities will be altered, and so on. Clearly, if we anticipate the changes that will occur, we'll design the train differently, and

prepare it for future enhancement processes ahead of time. We'll determine standards for the couplers between the train cars, we'll create components that will allow for modular replacement, and accordingly, we'll instruct those planning the upgrades on how to prepare an upgrade that can be done quickly and integrate seamlessly, while traveling, as soon as it's connected. As I mentioned previously, we must make the reasonable assumption that the enemy will change its abilities, learn, and improve. If we plan our abilities as an open system fromthevery beginning,a systemthatisprimed forupgrades and anticipates the need for those upgrades, we'll be able to add elements to our existing assets instead of constantly replacing the entire system, which would cause us to incur costs that we could never afford.

Thus, in our learning competition against the enemy, we can surprise the enemy in the present with a diverse set of capabilities, and by transforming our defense operations. We'll also consistentlysurprise the enemy in the future by creating an adaptive defense system that transforms and gets upgraded, one that can continuously maintain our edge over that enemy.

4.Preventive capabilities and the resilience of the defense

First, we must bear in mind that the goal of defense is to prevent the enemy from making achievements, but defense will be much more effective  if, besides merely preventing enemy achievements, we also degrade the enemy's attack capabilities and kill enemy attack operatives.

Hamas and Hezbullah are using their best operatives as part of their attack assets, and they place a lot of hope in using them to score significant achievements. If we prevent this, and take those assets from them, we'll create significant deterrence against the enemy, who will think twice before attacking our territory. Therefore, we need to plan integral attack elements within our defense capabilities. Combining monitoring and intel capabilities,thereby creatingabilitiesused for "closing loops"and rapid attacks, will bring us those achievements. There are rapid and flexible internal attack capabilities, such as attack drones deployed in the sector immediately and as needed, or external attack capabilities that can join the defensive battle through a quick and accurate process. This is how we can build "lethal defense"; enemy operatives who attempt to operate on our territory will fail their mission, and pay a high price for that attempt in terms of human lives.

To effectively and continuously employ all of these capabilities, for both defense and offense, we must plan a defense array that is survivable and robust, enabling multi-domain actions made possible through the very high interconnectivity between all capabilities. This interconnectivity is a conceptual requirement in multi-domain defense, and it is manifested through the technological capabilities that put it into practice. When we couple our operational abilities with technology, we must be certain that they will be available to us in any situation. That means that we need to invest a great deal in planning the campaigns such that they are monitored, deny our enemy the ability to enter and degrade our capabilities, and are equipped with adequate levels of redundancy.

The sub-components of the various domains

In this section, I'll briefly review, on a purely fundamental level, general guidelines on required components for various areas. If I were to elaborate on these components and illustrate them here, in this section, it could be detrimental and give our enemies a glimpse of what may await them should they choose to attack, so I will be concise.

Defending against indirect fire: Indirect fire is one of the main assets in our enemies' arsenals. Currently, we defend ourselves using active defense systems that are constantly being improved. To allow ourselves to defend againt indirect fire, we must strengthen three aspects of these assets:
Monitoring launch sites: strengthening spatial monitoring abilities to instantly obtain the accurate locations of launch sites, as part of the development and analysis of knowledge that will boost the effectiveness of our actions.
Offensive capability: Aside from active defense, we should strengthen our ability to strike at enemy fire assets before they are fired, by both degrading artillery operatives and degrading the indirect fire assets themselves.
Strengthening our point defense capability: With respect to strategic sites, we should plan and create denser defense with more redundancy, to ensure the survivability of these sites when defending against any type of attack.
Active defense: Defense capabilities should be developed while creating surprise capabilities for wartime, and maintaining a significant and permanent qualitative edge over the enemy's developing capabilities.

Cyber and Spectrum Defense: In the past, the enemy has already tried adding cyber operations to kinetic combat events. We must improve ourcapabilitiesformaintainingcyberspace andbuildingour campaign's capabilities robustly, so that the capability can't be hacked and disrupted during operations. The same holds true for the spectrum: our operations, which use radio frequencies, must be robust and protected against enemy capabilities.

Aerial defense (low elevation): Developing capabilities in this area is challenging because of the rate at which the threats are developing. The clearest and most effective point of application is comprised of two elements: The ability to detect low altitude objects and plot them accurately in three-dimensional space through radar detection, and the ability to hit the object kineticly. To attain this, we must pack in more radar assets in border areas and link them to offensive assets to close the loop in a short time. Defensive or offensive forces engaged in combat must also be able to hit drones or similar vehicles acting against our forces. The rule of thumb should be clear: any drone hovering above our force will be shot down, unless it is clear and coordinated that it is a blue force drone.

Defense against subterranean attacks: The subterranean domain is emerging as a domain teeming with sensors and capabilities. We must monitor every movement and every change in this domain and be capable of seizing subterranean infrastructure from the enemy from time to time, during routine times. Most of all, we must prepare surprises for the enemy and a strong and robust response to the enemy's subterranean attack domains during contingencies.

Maritime defense: This involves maritime and sub-aquatic monitoring with investigation and attack capabilities with respect to the identified activities. In this area, the intel envelope will allow us to attack these assets – both the attacker and its infrastructure – at the very beginning of combat.Radarand sonar able to accuratelydetect movementshould be strengthened,and defense andoffenseassets waiting for the enemy on the coast should be guided accordingly. If the enemy's offensive effort in the maritime theater is degraded, or if the enemy gets ambushed through a well-planned operation on the coastline, quality defense will be possible in this domain.

The connection between the domains: As I noted earlier, the greatest potential is achieved when combining the various domains. In this section, I avoided providing details on the assets themselves, and sufficed with a partial and simplified description, for obvious reasons. However, the section that connects the assets in the various domains is the most innovative and important of them all, and it serves as the synergetic operational element. I'll briefly relate to it in the section on force design.

Force design

Today, as well, we are ready for combat, with good defensive capabilities, but the real question is what are those key factors that should be changed to end up with better multi-domain defense, based on what I described and defined in this article. I won't relate to specific capabilities in the various domains here, but rather to the conceptual tier that connects between domains.

Multi-domain command and control: During routine times, we are built such that each domain operates under a separate C2 chain. The first condition that must be fulfilled for multi-domain defense to exist is that a single, uniform C2 system is created. Seemingly, this isn't a classic system with superiors and subordinates, because of the numerous disciplines and factors involved, but one element is on the rise: partnerships.

Multi-domain defense war room: To obtain a single picture that contains everything done in all domains and the connections between them, all of the defense system data from all domains should be consolidated. The connection between the domains, the ability to provide warnings, and the ability to attack and foil enemy attacks will all be created in such a defense war room. This war room needs to be within a territorial division that can develop knowledge, and it also needs to be located very close to planning and control for defense operations occurring during contingencies and during routine times.

Figure 2: The linkage between the domains will be created in the war room

Uniform intel core: All of the data from the monitoring systems should be entered into a single knowledge base, which can work alongside with the intel systems to turn this information into knowledge in context. This is one of the biggest leaps that can be made, thanks to technological developments that have occurred in the past few years.

The structure of the defense forces: If we were to assess the past twenty years of defense, we'd notice an increase in the number of forces specializing in defense, with respect to the forces "being hosted", forces that had come to carry out a defensive task for only a few months, after which they are replaced. This mainly manifests in surveillance and reconnaissance forces. This trend should be strengthened even more. The challenge of defense increasingly requires employing complex systems and unique knowledge. Therefore, ORBAT specializing in defense should be increased, in all domains – forming a partnership of experts, of sorts – and the presence of "hosted" forces engaged in a defensive task should be maintained mainly for reserves and special activities.

Territorial battalions: For this change to defensive forces to materialize,territorial battalions shouldbecreated. They wouldbe able to carry out the necessary activities against low-elevation and subterranean threats, and to employ the monitoring systems, robotics systems, and all of thedefensive systems that require unique expertise. In defense, combat forces will serve as a backup force, and will be employed for special operations that require a specific composition of ground combat troops.

Robotic assets: To improve monitoring and defense capabilities, and to reduce the chances that the enemy will harm our forces, operational capabilities should be bolstered with robots and autonomous/semi-autonomous systems. These robots could scan an area with a specific sensor, which would be a tedious activity for a human force and cause burnout. However, it's a simple risk-mitigating operation if it's automated. With regard to whether autonomous systems that "make decisions" on the ground regarding specific actions shouldbe procured, I suggest that this be done gradually. It goes without saying that human beings should be in the loop, alongside the robots, with regard to making decisions on attacking an identified enemy. A semi-autonomous system can identify objects, prepare courses of action for attack, and prepare for the attack, but final approval will be given by a human being, though perhaps that won't even be necessary in several years from now. Personally, I believe that human wisdom will be required when making these types of decisions, for many years to come.
Another facet that comes into play with regard to the advantages of combining combatants and technology is the level of alertness and handling the burnout associated with defense operations. The multi-domain battlefield enhances the activity and diversifies the routine. Additionally, automated actions allow human forces to keep themselves more alert for the critical stages and receive warnings from an automated system if the situation has changed. This is how technology can also contribute to keeping defensive forces focused at the right time and make them more ready and alert if surprises occur.

Technology and defense

Due to the significance of the technological change, it should be discussed in a section of its own. Even though technology is more accessible to our enemies than it was in the past, we have a considerable advantage over them that we must preserve. We are a country that is able to develop and manufacture – and not merely use things that already exist. This advantage should help us find solutions andhelp uswith our ability tocreate substantial surprisesduringbattle. Technology should be integrated into both our offense and our defense, but since this article is about defense, the advantages of integrating technology into defense should be stated here. The combat arena along the countries borders is one we are all too familiar with. When we discuss permanent monitoring, optimal intel, and assets that allow us to destroy enemy assets, it's simpler to prepare all of these in a domain with which we are already familiar. That is why the connection with the military industries and contemplating the issue with a long-term perspective that involves assessing the threats, studying the enemy, and assessing our current capabilities and how they will develop in the future is so important. Quite often, discussions on investment in defense technology center around the argument that investing in technology will allow us to reduce spending on human resources, which will be replaced by some type of technological capability. I'd like to introduce a different perspective on this argument.

Can tchnology truly lead to savings in HR costs?

Any time we're presented with the opportunity to evaluate the introduction of a technological change, when discussing the pros and cons, one "pro" that always comes up is the opportunity to save on human resources thanks to the use of technology. "If we have a more advanced system with autonomous capabilities,” we say, “we can reduce the ORBAT that had carried out this task in the past". We've all heard that argument many times. We may have even used it ourselves. I feel that this claim is incorrect, or rather, it's correct in theory, but in practice, when assessed more broadly, it always fails.

The printing revolution changed mankind. Among all of the impacts that were analyzed, it was claimed that many people would lose their jobs. Scribes who, until the invention of the printing press, had copied books by hand would now be unemployed. Indeed, the "book copier" profession no longer exists. Yet if we take a broader look at this, we'll see that the invention of the printing press caused a dramatic increase in the number of people working in the field, though many of them needed to be retrained. Books became more accessible, and that dramatically reduced the global illiteracy rate. In the past, only the rich were able to read, but following the printing revolution, reading

became a basic skill for any individual. Demand changed drastically, as did the number of people who worked in the manufacture of reading products, which rose dramatically after the invention of technology that was supposed to reduce that number. The same goes for laundry machines, which led to the dismissal of many launderers who were on their way to their local stream. Yet many more people began working in the laundry business, since the laundry machine led to a change in human behavior. Before the age of the laundry machine, your average person would own very few articles of clothing and wouldn't change clothes very often. The laundry machine revolution greatly increased the consumption of clothing, and laundry was being washed at a pace that was far greater than ever before. What are we to learn from this? When advanced intel collection systems are introduced, it's safe to assume that at first, the number of field observers will go down. However, if these are good systems, the upgrade will also change demand. The new product will be better and more comprehensive than the previous one, but that means that we'll have to go back and increase the number of field observers, since we are now able to see things that are farther away, and we now see them better, too. Invariably, that would increase the number of people tasked with maintaining the new system, constantly upgrading its software and handling its integration with other systems we put into our arsenal. If we use robots for defense during routine times, soldiers will spend less time patrolling the fence. They would then be available for other tasks, such as maintaining their combat fitness. That is a tremendous gain. In parallel, we'll drive up the number of people operating, maintaining, and upgrading the array of robots. And we haven't even begun to analyze how the enemy will change following this upgrade, since we don't expect the enemy to simply tread water.

The conclusion is that the right thing to go is go forward. Progress makes us more effective, thanks to the value that these actions create, and this improvement won't necessarily lead to savings in HR. New systems should be introduced thanks to the improvement they are expected to provide, and it would be a mistake to use the argument of saving HR to convince people to do so. Usually, when taking a broader perspective, we'd reach the opposite outcome.

When a change occurs in the way our enemies prepare for war against us, we are beset with a defense challenge that is both old and new. In the first few decades after the State of Israel was established, the IDF protected the state from the invading armies of enemy states, but today, we're facing terror organizations planning to attack our territory in order to score tactical achievements to exploit in the war over the hearts and minds, and to increase their strategic impact. That is the nature of terror and assymetry.

The IDF must invest a great deal in its offensive capabilities, but these substantial capabilities must rely on strong defense capabilities, to ensure that offensive achievements aren't offset by enemy achievements on our territory. Operational plans are founded on diverse and surprising offensive capabilities on various scales. Still, the defense component is very developed, following the logic that good defensive achievements will greatly strengthen offensive achievements. When technology, intel and operational capabilities work hand in hand, a different kind of defense can be planned and implemented. This type of defense contemplates all of the domains:

ground, air, sea, and cyber. It also looks at the various theaters and the connections between them. This kind of force design can provide us with better warnings against attacks, both in wartime and during routine operations (though we don't use the provision of warnings when at war, but with respect to attacks on our territory, this paradigm should be preserved for wartime as well). It will allow us to identify enemy activity through monitoring, and to foil attacks with attack capabilities that span across different domains and lead to a focused and incisive operation that foils the enemy's attack and degrades its operatives and capabilities. This is how we'll create defense superiority, andthis is howwe'll build"lethaldefense". Anycapability that the enemy places high hopes in will encounter a strong andlethal response. Taking the initiative in defense, in wartime and during routineoperations, doesn't cometous naturally, but it's nowinorder, more so that ever before, and it's possible, thanks to the diversification of existing capabilities.

In this article, I analyzed the change that the enemy has undergone, and the change that we need to create on our side, in order to convert the risk into an opportunity. I also analyzed the enemy's tendency to develop new things every time we advance in any specific field. Thus, it behooves us to grapple with the question of what our enemy will develop, afterwe'vedeployedhigh-qualitymulti-domaindefense along our borders. That is a question that is hard to answer, but one thing is certain: we must never assume that we've found a solution that won't be challenged, so we must take care to maintain a constant quality gap between us and our enemies. They say that defense is a sisyphean task. Sisyphus' fate was to a roll a boulder up the mountain, without it

benefiting anyone. Good defense clearly has its benefits, so we should embrace what Albert Camus said about Sisyphus: "One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”

And now, back to the football team. Whereas a good coach knows the game schedule and knows when the decisive game will occur, for which his team must be at its best, we must be constantly prepared for the decisive game of our lives, and assume that we'll never know when it will occur...

footnote:

[1] This article is based on a paperwritten by the multi-domain defense team in the framework of "Tenufah" multi-year plan teams. Brigadier General Amir Avstein, the Chief Combat Intelligence Collection Officer, worked closely with me in this team, and many of the insights that appear here were developed with him and thanks to him.