Taking the First Step: The Transformation of the IDF Home Front Command

 “Faith is taking the first step even when you don’t see the whole staircase”

(Martin Luther King)

 Introduction

Friday afternoon.  A massive torrent of water and mud hit a dam in the lead mine near the village of Brumadinho in Brazil, causing it to collapse. It then washed across the worksite, trapping hundreds of workers. The next day, Israel's prime minister offered search and rescue assistance to the president of Brazil, who quickly accepted. From the moment the order was given late Saturday night, the members of the contingent gathered, conducted a situation assessment and prepared for a mission on the other side of the world. This was to be another overseas assistance mission for the Home Front Command, one of many. However, this contingent was organized in a different manner than in the past.

While the main force conducted preparations before the flight, the newly-established Operations Branch in the Home Front Command (HFC) staff was already working hard to create a special website and to build an up-to-date situational picture using information from the Internet, social networks, news sites in Brazil that were reporting from the disaster site, and the United Nations website. This up-to-date information was integrated into a specialized application and significantly shortened preparation time in Israel. After formulating the situational picture, the tools were updated based on aerial and satellite photographs, and hardcopies of maps were printed to enable the contingent to orient itself. In parallel, a ‘network of connections’ was built with officials in Brazil. The IDF Defense Attaché, local security, firefighters, rescue personnel, and Jewish community members were recruited prior to their arrival and were turned into local guides. Additionally, these actors helped to build an up-to-date situational picture that allowed the force to prepare relevant manpower and equipment for the mission. The information continued to flow to and  be processed in the Operations Branch while the contingent was on the long journey to Brazil.

The briefing at the airport prior to the departure of the contingent to Brazil (credit: IDF Spokespersons Unit)

After the IDF force landed, the data gathered by the Home Front Command began to flow directly to the contingent’s cell phones through a special app. A computerized comparison of satellite photos before and after the collapse of the dam enabled the search and rescue operations to focus on specific areas. A computer model that simulated the flood enabled rescuers to focus their actions and to significantly minimize risks. Systems to locate cell phones, special cameras and dogs supplemented the efforts to gather data, which was processed thousands of miles away. The Israeli contingent soon turned into a magnet for other rescue forces, who came to learn about the Israeli practices.

This event opened our eyes. We had received official recognition that our information revolution had worked, and that it could be executed based on our new operational concept and the tactical capabilities that we had assembled in the Home Front Command. This article will deal with the process of the conceptual and organizational transformation, based on information technology, that the Home Front Command underwent in recent years. Part one of the article will lay out the key milestones during the design process upon which our conceptual change was based; in part two, I will describe the information revolution within the Command; and part three will deal with my personal insights about the design process and a summary of the significance for the IDF.

Part One: The Design Process, the Relevance Gap and Identifying the Potential

 When everything seems to be going against you, remember that the airplane takes off against the wind, not with it. (Henry Ford)

Conceptual paralysis – cutting the Gordian knot

In February 2017, on the eve of my entry as Commander of the Home Front Command, the HFC marked 25 years since its founding in 1992. The command that I encountered was largely shaped by the lessons of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, a formative event during which the HFC experienced a crisis. Since then, the HFC had focused on learning lessons from the war. Self-examination and conceptual design became routine in the HFC. My predecessors greatly improved the command mechanisms, increased the number of forces and strived to improve coordination between the different emergency authorities. The question remained - What else should be done?

At the start of my role I initiated a strategic learning process, with the assistance and support of the Dado Center team. It was already clear at the outset that in parallel to the important work being done in the HFC, there was a key obstacle that blocked further conceptual breakthroughs: the Second Lebanon War oriented discussions in the HFC around the dilemma of “broadened responsibility.” The essence of the discussion was the extent to which the HFC should plan to replace failing civilian authorities in an emergency. Furthermore, a question arose during the discussion: Was the willingness of the HFC to accept responsibility for possible failures of civilian authorities likely to turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy?

Also, in relation to the IDF, I found issues that demanded clarification. While the home front was defined as an “arena of secondary importance in war,” a sensitivity within the IDF to the possibility that critical functions in the home front would be paralyzed, as well as other critical issues, were not reflected in the situation analyses in the IDF war exercises. The HFC had almost no influence on the General Staff situation assessments and lacked adequate channels of communication with the other primary commands. Similar gaps were identified between the HFC and critical civilian bodies.

During the analytical process, it became clear that the HFC found itself in a kind of ‘conceptual paralysis,’ that derived from the endless and unsolvable discussion about the limits of its responsibility and legal authority, the responsibilities of other government authorities, and related issues that were outside the HFC’s sphere of influence. This situation prevailed despite the extensive energy that was invested in deep conceptual thinking over the years. This Gordian knot needed to be cut.

The Changing Threat

It quickly became clear that even though trends related to the changing threat to the home front were well known within the HFC and the IDF, the cumulative change in the threat had not been properly defined. The extensive implications of this change were defined by us as follows:

• The home front as the soft underbelly of the State of Israel – Since 2006, the enemy has developed large rocket arrays, that are able to launch heavy and persistent barrages targeting all of Israel. These capabilities have led the enemy to develop a concept in which fire is deployed not just for terror and intimidation, but also to paralyze the home front by forcing the population into shelters, by paralyzing airports, seaports and other sensitive functions for the duration of warning sirens, as well as by penetrating the aerial defenses of the IDF and causing injuries and casualties. These goals are expected, from the perspective of the enemy, to have a significant influence on the ‘victory picture’ at the conclusion of a war.

Exercise involving a missile with an unconventional warhead (photo credit: IDF spokesperson)

• Moving combat to Israeli territory – Based on the enemy’s plans, a considerable proportion of the combat would take place within Israel, through the use of both fire and ground attacks in the Galilee (Hezbollah) and the Negev (Hamas/Islamic Jihad), such that IDF forces would be confined to defense. This enemy concept had converted the military front and the civilian communities in proximity to it into an area under a double threat – both from fire and enemy ground attack.
• Precision fire – In addition to the familiar statistical fire, the terror armies around us are developing precision fire capabilities. These capabilities are intended to paralyze critical targets in both the civilian sector (electricity and water for example) as well as the military rear (intelligence sites, aerial defense units).
• Cyber efforts – The enemy is also active in this field with the intention of paralyzing critical functions in the civilian economy in real-time, as well as critical military functions.
• The multidimensional multi-arena threat – A combat scenario in several arenas concurrently (both Gaza and the North) has become, even more than in the past, a realistic scenario that we must prepare for.

Analysis of the environment, identifying the gaps and defining the ‘relevance gap’

The new capabilities of the enemy, both in terms of quantity and quality, also dictate the development of its combat doctrine – from a concept based on using fire to create fear and terror to a doctrine of paralyzing critical functions in the home front. Focused barrages and precision capabilities are expected to enable the enemy to systematically challenge and target Israel’s aerial defense ‘shell’ and to penetrate precision missiles through the aerial defenses toward high quality Israeli targets.

The enemy’s ability to fire large barrages and to launch continuous fire, which would lead to continuous rocket sirens in the home front, enables it to think in terms of concepts such as forcing a ‘closure’, ‘curfew’ and ‘economic paralysis’ on Israel, even without expecting real physical damage. These effects would also enable the enemy to plan ground attacks - from local raids to a limited incursion into our territory. This combination of capabilities is intended to damage the IDF’s ability to move from routine to emergency modes, to disrupt continuous civilian and military functioning and over time, to psychologically influence the resilience of Israeli society.

Home Front Command rescuers during an exercise simulating a rocket strike (photo credit: IDF Spokesperson)

The enemy intends to activate this new threat during the initial stages of a war and throughout all of  Israel. This leads to two important implications: first, there will be a blurring between the military rear and the civilian home front, and as a result, a blurring of the boundaries between the HFC and the regional commands; second, there is a lack of congruence between the threat and the manner in which we are organized today. Both the cycle of continuous military functioning and the cycle of civilian defense are clearly defined, but despite this they function in parallel lines of effort that do not meet.

Significant damage to the home front would overshadow any IDF military achievement in the enemy’s territory. Accordingly, more than ever, the functioning and achievements of the IDF are dependent, to a large extent, on the continuous functioning of the state, and vice versa. The traditional division of effort, according to which the HFC will deal with the home front and the IDF will achieve victory at the front, is no longer valid. The capability of the civilian theater to deal with an emergency situation has a direct and important influence on Israel’s deterrence.

A situation had been created where, if the HFC did not make significant changes to its search and rescue response, as well as its ability to prevent the collapse of civilian systems during emergencies, the HFC was liable to become irrelevant during the main war scenario for which it was preparing.

Part Two: The Information Revolution in the Home Front Command

“Progress is impossible without change.” (George Bernard Shaw)

Missed Potential?

After we identified the gaps that had developed in the HFC’s concept and sought potential ways to deal with them, I felt it would be appropriate to clarify the opportunities presented by the technological era and the far-reaching changes that technology had created in the field of management techniques, and the business models that had become standard. We quickly reached several key insights:

• The relevance of the information age – The information revolution in the era of big data is also relevant to the functioning of the home front. The ability to process large quantities of data from multiple sources and of different types in real time can to lead to a significant improvement in situational analysis processes, understanding reality and reaching decisions in the HFC and other civilian emergency bodies during an emergency. A sophisticated situational analysis, based on very large volumes of data can shorten response times and enable significant optimization of the quality of the response, such that a better response is achieved with fewer resources. In addition, Artificial Intelligence (AI) - another derivative of data science - is likely to greatly improve the work of the HFC. The automation of patrol drones, for example, would allow the development of situational assessments and understandings based on a picture formed from data from multiple sensors and robotic means in the field. This is likely to not only to make the processes of understanding and decision making more efficient, but also to enable the implementation of real operational missions, including those that were impossible in the past. For example, locating persons trapped in a destroyed building even before rescue teams arrive.
• The need for advanced work and management methods – Maximizing the technological potential of the information age was dependent on significant change to our management methods. In order to maximize the advantages of information technology, we needed to change the situation assessment and decision-making processes of the HFC, which were sequential and hierarchical in nature. Furthermore, in order to build relevant technological systems, there was a need to adapt to the extreme the way that the HFC, as a military organization, managed projects. The essence of these adaptations was to adjust our management methods to the agile management method that is accepted in the civilian technology sector, instead of the waterfall method that is customary in the military.
• The sharing economy – The essence of the sharing economy is the more efficient maximization of resources through technology-based allocation to different users based on need and availability. During emergencies, there is an in-built challenge to the HFC related to a shortage of military resources on the one hand, and the relative availability of civilian resources on the other. This leads us to the enormous relevance of the sharing economy. The sharing of physical resources - forces, equipment, experts - and information resources between commercial companies, government offices and different authorities is likely to be a dramatic force multiplier.
• Economies of scale – The HFC - its officers, soldiers, capabilities and resources - is several times larger than the combined size of all the other emergency organizations in the state. Due to its size, multiple fields of expertise, knowledge and skills, the HFC can conduct activities at a lower cost than the smaller organizations. This advantage is even clearer in the world of information: an organization that is present and active in the entire field and has information systems that can document its activity, can generate a greater number and better insights than organizations whose work is defined and limited. The HFC can serve as a center, an intersection, a “network of networks” and can leverage its capabilities and resources to improve the capabilities of all the emergency organizations in Israel.

Initial insights on the strategy

As opposed to the IDF's offensive units of the IDF, which are built to maneuver in enemy territory in the presence of the enemy, the HFC provides services to the citizens of Israel, including emergency services. The HFC can base itself, to a large extent, on communication networks, databases, sensors, resources and tools that are available in its combat zone, the civilian home front. The HFC should not be the last body in the IDF to adopt innovative battle approaches, it can also be a pioneer.

The more we understood the potential, the more keenly we felt the missed opportunities to date. Within the IDF, talk had already begun in 2014-2015 about a ‘revolution in military affairs’ based on the fourth industrial age, within the framework of the Ground Forces' ‘Land Ahead’ transformation.[2] Approaches based on information technology such as the J2 ‘Ma'asei Aman’[3] had sprouted up within IDF conceptual discourse for many years. However, these ignored the HFC’s thought patterns, combat doctrine, techniques and training exercises as well as its organizational structure. The HFC was busy contending with the growing gap between the size of the threat to the home front and the size of the life-saving force required by the traditional processes that were created over a decade earlier. In light of this, I formulated three key principles for the implementation of the concept:

• First solutions, then formal arrangements afterwards – Organizing cooperation with the civilian field, while harnessing the prestige of the HFC and its unity of purpose, without combining these organizational activities into a preliminary solution filled with the complex questions of legal responsibility and authority.

The Israeli contingent works in full cooperation with local forces in Brazil to retrieve bodies from a bus that was trapped during the flooding. (Photo credit: IDF Spokespersons Unit)

• Standardization, the civilian home front and the military rear – The foundation of all effective systems, certainly those based on cooperation between different organizations and the technological space, is the standardization of technology and operational language. The HFC formulated a standard for continuous functioning, both for the home front and military functions: organization of the military rear as a system, from the brigade level to the General Staff; defining interfaces and reciprocal relations; and creating special frameworks within the HFC. All of these will enhance the response of the IDF for the civilian home front.
• Change strategy – The unique situation of the HFC did not enable the allocation of specific resources. Progress needed to be made during the initial stages based on internal resources, improvisations and volunteers, in the hope that additional resources would be allocated when new value was revealed. In parallel, change agents needed to be recruited and trained, among both the professional bodies in the home front as well as the IDF command.

From concept to implementation

In light of this, in the middle of 2017, the HFC began to plan and implement a digital transformation. It sought to initiate the conceptual, organizational and technological creation of a national civilian and military functional network, which would maximize all the power of the civilian and governmental sectors to provide a response for the home front during emergencies. Additionally, it was decided that the HFC would strengthen its own capabilities by maximizing technological potential. IIt would work to understand the enemy’s logic and would activate tools available to the home front to match this understanding, while serving the IDF’s offensive aims and ensuring ongoing military function.

The next stage after defining the strategy was to build a series of projects based on it within the different divisions of the HFC. This stage began with a workshop in the summer of 2017 with participants from the different home front authorities and from tech companies. Its objective was to define a series of military operational, logistical and C4I questions, and questions related to the civilian population. The answers to these questions would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of the emergency response and decision-making processes, would streamline the size of the resources required and would help build as broad and full a situational picture as possible. At the end of the workshop, 150 different questions were defined which were divided into a hierarchy between ‘primary questions’ and ‘secondary questions.’ The series of questions was written and built based on the HFC structure and its operational priorities. The questions were at the heart of the initial characterization of the ‘HFC Operations’ system, which became the Operations Branch – the same branch that was at the center of preparations for the Brazil mission and remains at the center of the HFC’s transformation today.

Several months after the workshop, the Operations Branch was established in the HFC’s Intelligence Division, and a branch commander was recruited to lead the implementation of its vision within the HFC, and with civilian actors and information sources. The purpose of the new body was to ensure the supremacy of data throughout the organization, structuring and maximizing all existing and developing data within the civilian market, emergency organizations and the HFC and its sub-units. This was done to facilitate the definition and coordination of the actions that are required to ensure ongoing functioning and to ensure that assistance is provided to all population groups during a war. This capability was built by developing a professional knowledge and information body whose purpose was to study the ‘language of the home front’ and to translate it into the language of data using advanced analytics and new big data technologies. The new body was also meant to gather and process data to formulate a home front situational picture, and to support decision-making during emergencies. It would base itself upon ‘pools of data’ that would be created from data received from government offices, local authorities, infrastructure companies and commercial companies, including operational IDF data.

Data-based management is not a trivial matter even in the business world, and even less so in the public and military sectors. There was a need to make a large investment that would quickly highlight its value in order to convince people, both at home and among the HFC’s partners, that the technological, conceptual, and primarily organizational effort would indeed be worth it.

One of the first missions of the Operations Branch was to map the independent information systems (‘silos’) and all of the human interfaces that existed between the systems. The development of advanced technological interfaces, which connected these systems, enabled the creation of an ‘information highway’ – in which the information would not flow slowly due to delays or human mistakes, but rapidly in a manner that freed up manpower for intellectual pursuits that create real value.

The heart of the system was built to enable the management of a variety of data and to create practical integrative knowledge from it. The system is capable of processing, analyzing and presenting all types of data, including geographical, textual and visual data, as well as audio and video files. Different actors can derive knowledge that is relevant to them from the system. Capabilities, data sources, algorithms and operational problems can be fed into the system and added to it without significant changes, due to strength of its open systems architecture. Initially, a complete mapping was conducted, and connections were built between physical civilian data, public data, commercial data and data about the population.

 
‘Network of Networks’

This method would, for example, enable the connection of information sources from the cellular companies and the power grid, and would enable the HFC to determine during an emergency the size of the population that had remained in or left a particular area, the direction of movement of the population, road congestion, and more. It should be clear that privacy is respected according to the law. The HFC has no interest in personal information, except when locating individuals trapped in destroyed buildings, by pinpointing their cellular signal. These types of information are not available today in any other manner.

Under the new concept, it became clear that information about the provision of electricity and power failures across the country, which was not available in the past to the HFC, is a highly valuable information source for the activities of the HFC.  First, the cross-checking of population numbers in an area and the level of power demand can serve the Israel Electric Company in prioritizing repair work on the network. Secondly, the general damage picture, including the electrical supply, will improve the HFC’s and local authorities’ response capabilities for the population in need. This, for example, could include the sick who are dependent on electronic medical devices in their homes or hospitals, which can be mapped in a database before it is too late. The integration of data from the Israel Electric Company in real time can constitute an important factor in understanding public sentiment, especially when additional information sources are connected from the HFC’s Population Department.

Given that most of the HFC’s work is of a regional-geographic nature, the main information system of the Operations Branch is a geographic information system (GIS). This type of system is based on the presentation of layers of information overlaid on a map. One of the great advantages of a GIS system is the time dimension. The system can map changes in the data in a geographical area, and therefore enables the analysis of trends. This allows the HFC to analyze trends during an emergency, as well as learning about the routine behavioral patterns of the population, and therefore the earlier identification of clear deviations from the routine or ‘distress signals.’ During an emergency, the HFC can allocate resources based on data and with reduced influence from the dominating personal characteristics of representatives of particular communities.

The new concept revealed some of its virtues during the round of fighting  with Hamas that took place in May 2019. During this round, which threatened to continue into the Israel's Memorial Day, the HFC managed to provide a national home front situational picture that mapped all the public events planned for the approaching Memorial and Independence Days within a few hours. Concrete recommendations for protection guidelines for each of the thousands of events planned for Israel were delivered to the commanders of the HFC regions and subdistricts via a smartphone app.

The sky is the limit in this field. Real-time data from sensors, such as street and traffic cameras, smart cities and real time data from the Israel Electric Corporations, supermarket chains, and cellular operators could enable a level of effectiveness that was unimaginable in the past.

As noted, a combat concept based on data also requires appropriate management techniques from the agile management family. An organization that fuses data from different bodies in order to make interdisciplinary decisions in real time, cannot continue to use slow, sequential and hierarchical staff work practices based on many layers of controls and approvals.

A cultural change of this type is still at the initial stages in the HFC. At least in the Operations Branch and the content worlds that overlap with its functions, long and complex “operational demand” and “operational characterization” processes are no longer customary. As a part of this approach, there is constant friction between the operational demands and the information intelligence officers/developers, both in the Branch and in the field, given the clear commitment to provide an operational response within a time frame of a few hours up to two weeks.

As with any front, the digital front also has flanks that require defense. In order to maintain the survivability and functioning of the system during a crisis, the work is conducted at all levels under the direction of the cyber defense bodies.

While the Operations Branch is at the center of the Command's change, it is not alone. Performance based on data will grow and spread. It will also strengthen its grip within the HFC regions and subdistricts. In parallel, the technological tools used by the HFC tactical forces will be improved. The sources of data and sharing of resources with other relevant bodies will be broadened (see Metcalfe’s law[4]). This is significant because, among others, a critical mass is required for something to become viral: as the number of users grows, the value of the service grows (for example, a telephone or fax are only useful if other users also own them).

Part Three: The Commander’s Role in the Process – Personal Insights

At first, I felt that I had inherited an excellent organization that had been prepared for its mission to the highest standards by its previous commanders, through the investment of serious conceptual effort in the process. Despite these efforts, and despite the clear improvement in the size and readiness of the HFC’s forces  - especially in the number of regular soldiers (a regular Search and Rescue Brigade was established), it was clear that the gap between the threat and the capabilities continued to grow. With the help of the Dado Center, I started a process of designing a new HFC strategy – not a process of improvement, but rather a process of fundamental self-assessment.

The following are several insights from the design process and its results that I have chosen to share:

• “The penny drops” – Recognizing that we cannot fulfill our missions using the current approach was a disturbing, even daunting experience. On the other hand, without this experience, the likelihood of harnessing all of one’s leadership, intellectual and organizational efforts to seek a new horizon is small. The most significant challenge for a commander in this situation is to manage the tension between pervasive inquiry and the change process and between the ongoing functioning and readiness of the existing organization. 

• The role of the commander in design – My personal presence in the design and planning meetings was critical; it was essential for my own deep learning. Although I had learned about the HFC during the handover process with my predecessor, I reached new understandings in the meetings that were part of the process of finding a new strategy. My personal presence was also critical to the senior HFC staff who participated in the process. Advocating for open discussion, rescuing the discussion from known futile rabbit holes and the dismissal of veiled cynicism and conservatism could only be achieved with the direct intervention of the commander. As with any conceptual organization change at this level, one knows how it will start, but not where or how it will end. One needs to be certain that change is preferable to the existing situation. The digital revolution as described above is a central element of the HFC’s strategy, after we understood that the world had changed and “if you are not there, you don’t exist.” We understood that we needed to be “part of the story.” 

• The role of the commander in change planning and implementation – Opposition and obstacles come in many forms. All those who serve strive to contribute from their capabilities. However, an organization should never strive to simply continue providing the product it was built to deliver. The C4I Directorate was happy to assist the HFC with the development and procurement processes that are customary in the IDF. However, these proved to be slow, complex and mostly too expensive for the HFC. The Command's officers were happy to take part in the strategic change, but were fearful about their direct areas of responsibility as a result of changes to their authority. The IDF Manpower Directorate was devoted to the maximization of manpower, and therefore would not allocate programmers to the HFC, given that it had not previously been defined as a technological body. Only a personal and continuous process of oversight, week after week, enabled me to ensure that the strategy stayed on track. On the way, we replaced the IDF procurement process with volunteers from academia and hi-tech, such as Dr. Tomer Simon and others. We convinced the IDF Military Intelligence Directorate to provide technological experts to fill intelligence positions in the HFC, and we created a special connection between the Operations Branch and the Military Intelligence Directorate. Soldiers with a background in programming, who were filling administrative positions in the HFC and elsewhere in the IDF, were located and transferred to the HFC through a series of “personal favors.” A training system was built both inside the HFC and within civilian companies. On more than one occasion, the firm use of a general’s authority was required to overcome stubborn opposition. 

• “The Home Front Command on Steroids” - The information that the HFC provides today influences two planes of action during both routine and emergency – force design and force employment. This was enabled by the information revolution, which allowed the HFC to enact paradigmatic change. The more its architecture is built in a joint fashion, together with partners both within and outside the HFC, the greater the practical understanding, from which greater value and synergy can be produced over time for a range of future needs.

A digital concept cannot be evaluated immediately. One must act wisely and remember that the most important rule of the revolution is the need, or even the necessity, to remain focused. From the beginning objectives and goals must be clearly sketched out, alongside the interests and priorities of the organization. Napoleon told his commanders: “You can ask me for anything you like, except time.” It seems to me that the digital revolution added an additional dimension for military leaders. Today the military leader would say: “There is time, just be focused.”

The digital revolution, as described in this article, enables a significant shortening of the planning, preparation and implementation stages, and the bottom line is that it enables well-grounded decision-making and a more efficient maximization of resources. A typical fear, which derives from the quantity and scope of the information, is that the opposite will occur – paralysis of the commander due to a surfeit of information and of the HQs with a glut of data. This fear can be overcome by changing the command and control processes, proving the real worth of data-based decision making, and more than anything, proven results. For example, this achievement enabled the dispatch of the HFC contingent to Brazil and their work there.

We must move to a ‘service’ concept and abandon the ‘ownership’ concept that was customary in the past. We must internalize that we are “all one corporation.” If we adopt this approach, we can break down the walls and better maximize the power of the HFC, the IDF and the state. It is important to understand that there are no shortcuts to realizing strategy and vision, but the correct structuring of data will enable a dramatic leap for all the participants in a short timeframe. While the civilian authorities are not required by law to share their data with us, naturally when the value is clear to them and shared by all parties, it turns out that joint momentum is created.

Conclusion

“We must continue walking and we must continue marching, and the road continues. ”

(Israeli musician and songwriter Naomi Shemer)

The lyrics above include a key message for the IDF. The HFC is indeed unique within the IDF in its capability to work in the civilian space and to rely on technologies that are open to all, such as the internet and its derivatives. Nevertheless, the principle of breaking down walls and cooperation is valid not just for the home front.

The HFC concept has not yet solved all the problems or provided a response to all the gaps. There is still a long road ahead and it should be walked with the required modesty. Nevertheless, the direction of travel is clear, and the fact that we are moving forward together with many partners, is also very clear.

The HFC Operations Branch enjoys the advantage of being a blank slate. As opposed to information systems within the IDF that must deal with the tangle of overlapping systems that were built over time, in different places and without coordination, architecture or standardization, the Operations Branch can benefit from all the ideas that have enabled the civilian internet. This fact explains its technical success, but not its fundamental success. The fundamental success – the ability to harness government organizations, local authorities and commercial organizations to the Branch – is connected to its demonstrated added value for all. For this, we needed to move forward first and to explain afterwards.

The information age is not just a force multiplier opportunity; it also enables a relatively low entry level. The process of bringing the HFC into the digital age was initiated and developed, at least until now, with no assistance from external resources.  We cannot do everything, but we can and must promote steps across the IDF, even without the allocation of the large resources that are customary for large projects.

The important change that was initiated in the HFC was not technological, but rather conceptual. A clear recognition, almost brutal in nature, of the urgent need to both genuinely change and to generate a change mindset and constant flexibility was required. Uncompromising determination was also needed to implement the change, due to a long list of reservations, opposition and foot dragging. These factors defined my primary role as commander of the HFC.

One can imagine that there is a new digital space in the IDF. The value embodied in this space will cause other IDF bodies to wish to connect to it, despite the great effort required and the entirety of reasons known as ‘why not?’ Networked combat systems in a mobile tactical space are likely to be the blank slate that could also enable the IDF to ‘start afresh’ and to bring, with the help of the digital space, additional, immediate and dramatic value, whose need is undisputed. All that is needed now is the first step.

 Bibliography

• Kochavi, Aviv and Ortal, Eran, “Ma'asei Aman: Permanent Change in a Changing Reality,” Dado Center Journal, Vol. 2., July 2014.
• Ortal, Eran, “We're Confused, Too: A historical perspective for Discussion of 'Land Ahead',” Military Review, March-April 2019.

Schwab, Klaus, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: How will it influence us?” Globes 22 January 2016. [Hebrew] https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001097376

[1] The author would like to thank MAJ (res.) Tomer Simon and LTC Rave Galili for their contributions to this article.

[2] For more information on the fourth industrial revolution see E. Ortal’s article: “Confused? So Are We!: A historical perspective to the debate over Land Ahead,” Military Review, March-April 2019; See also, K. Schwab, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution: How will it influence us?” Globes 22 January 2016. [Hebrew] https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001097376 Schwab is the founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum.

[3] Ma'asei Aman was a process of strategic thought and organizational change in IDF Military Intelligence Directorate. See A. Kochavi and E. Ortal, “Ma'asei Aman: Permanent Change in a Changing Reality,” Dado Center Journal, Vol. 2., July 2014.

[4] Metcalfe’s law describes, among others, the power of social and organizational networks. He argues that while network components develop linearly, the reciprocal relations between them develop exponentially.