Only One Team on the Field

"An obstacle that is not controlled by fire - is not an obstacle."[3]

***
Israel came up with a technical, rather than an adaptive solution, to the threat of cross-border tunnels - the construction of a sophisticated border obstacle. Close examination reveals that the accelerated development of tunneling from 2012-2014 benefited from Israeli policy, which during those years refrained from initiated offensive operations inside the Gaza Strip. The reason for this restraint that granted Hamas "the freedom to dig" was the threat of its rockets. Despite "Iron Dome", Hamas' high-trajectory array remains effective because it can disrupt daily lives on the home front, even if intercepted. The conclusion of this article is that as long as Hamas enjoys immunity to rearm itself and dig tunnels in the Gaza Strip, it will be able to learn the Israeli obstacle and eventually find ways to overcome it. The key was, and remains, dealing with the short-range rockets.

Introduction[4]

Israel and the IDF have been facing the challenge of cross-border tunnels in the Gaza Strip since the 1980s, but it was in the 1990s, and even more so in the following decade, that the IDF began to perceive this threat as significant. However, it was only after the disengagement from the Gaza Strip was completed, and particularly after the attack in which Corporal Gilad Shalit was captured and Operation Cast Lead in 2008- 2009, that the tunnels became an issue defined as a threat to Israel's ability to defend its borders.

In an internal study carried out at the IDF's Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies[5], several paradigm leaps were identified in Hamas's use of tunnels. Through this research, Eran Ortal and Dvir Peleg identified the enemy shifting from mainly dealing with illegal smuggling efforts to military build-up in the 1990s. In the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, Hamas reached two significant conclusions: the potential of the tunnels as a way to attack IDF outposts in the form of explosive-laden tunnels; and the ability of tunnels to counter Israel's advantage and superiority in firepower and intelligence by transferring entire combat arrays underground.

The disengagement from the Gaza Strip opened the door for tunneling to become a means of bypassing the border fence to reach into Israeli territory, one of which was used for the Shalit kidnapping in June 2006. The disengagement also led to the development of Hamas' offensive rocket array[6], which is partly based on the underground domain. A significant step was taken in 2007 after Hamas, which won the elections and took control of the Gaza Strip, turned tunneling into essentially a national strategic effort.

Another paradigm shift, which in hindsight had a decisive role during Operation Protective Edge, can be identified between 2012-2014. Even though the attack tunnels served Hamas well before this period, during these years the concept of tunnels as a main means of attack into Israel during a full-fledged conflict evolved. It was during this period that Hamas created a designated unit, the Nukhba Force, whose goal was to transfer the fight into Israeli territory through a series of special operations based on a complex array of cross-border tunnels. 

In this article, I will attempt to focus on what seems like a revolution in the Hamas paradigm from 2012-2014 and claim that this development was made possible because of Israel's restraint in employing military force during this period. The restraint developed gradually prior to Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, but was entirely apparent following the operation. Without diminishing the importance of operation "Pillar of Defense", the concept of attack tunnels already existed. The restraint allowed Hamas to maintain its tunneling project unhindered, while the IDF's efforts to discover the digging focused only on the Israeli side of the border. Thus, Israel's defensive activity did not serve as a critical constraint for Hamas's subterranean progress. In its most critical years, the project to build attack tunnels continued as if there was only one team on the playing field.

The restraint policy in force employment in these years was not coincidental. It did not come about because of an error in decision-making or a specific failure in policy. Israeli self-control, then and now, over an initiated strike against Hamas's developing offensive capabilities stems from a distinct Israeli strategy that seeks to reduce the enemy's influence on daily life in Israel, even at the cost of exacerbating the military threat. This observation is not meant to be a criticism - this is a reasonable policy. Israel has its entire eight million citizens living within rocket range from some border, and a prosperous country cannot manage its daily life in a constant state of emergency. However, in order to understand the need for this restrictive policy, it must be recognized that the stakes are high, as can be seen in the worsening conflicts between Israel and terror organizations in Gaza. How can Israel free itself from the horns of the dilemma on which its current strategy is caught?

The practical implications of this conclusion could be immediate and hold great importance. The IDF is currently building its formidable subterranean obstacle which is supposed to negate Hamas' attack abilities into Israel through tunnels. But from the perspective of the "freedom to dig", the question must be asked - will this obstacle deeply change the one-sided relationship between offensive digging and fixed border defense?

This article's main claim is that as long as the enemy maintains deterrent firepower towards Israel, it will enjoy "freedom of action", which includes the freedom to dig tunnels and strengthen itself militarily. This claim has two supporting arguments. First, Iron Dome has not materially changed the balance of deterrence between Israel and its enemy, and second, any concept of border defense that does not actively cope, in offensive-disruptive ways, with tunneling suffers from an inherent weakness.

Hamas's (and Hezbollah's) Disruption Strategy

Much has been written on the nature of asymmetric warfare between a strong modern military and a weak underdog. Some of these studies discuss the methods adopted by the weaker side to offset the advantages of the stronger actor. Avoiding armored combat offsets the advantages of a conventional military. Due to their absence of, the conventional military can't achieve the destruction of enemy tanks. Beyond preventing the armored force from taking advantage of its strengths, anti-tank ambushes by the weaker side also exact a heavy price in war. Of course, these types of limitations are also valid for other tactical examples - the decision by the weaker side not to build a traditional air force and navy, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles in a coastal region, etc.[7]

The development of asymmetric warfare represents, in general terms, most of the test cases of the relationship between the asymmetric subversive side against a conventional military. This is related to the tactical and operational levels. However, in the case of Israel, the way the two sides developed in relationship to each other over the years facilitated the development of an especially disruptive relationship between Israel and Hamas - including on the strategic level.

In order to explain, it is important to point out that since the 1990s there have been three critical elements that define Israeli strategy toward Gaza and Lebanon. The same is true for the West Bank, but is less consistent. The strategic trend is clear, and includes operational lines of effort. Israel seeks to geographically separate itself from the hostile population, if possible, under the auspices of an agreement recognized by the international community.

The withdrawal from Lebanon (2000), the disengagement from the Gaza Strip (2005) and the construction of the separation fence along the West Bank (2002-2017) all are separate incidents, and each has its own unique aspects. But the common thread between all these developments is the Israeli desire to avoid, as much as possible, combat and friction with the terror organizations on the other side. The two lines of operational effort completing this strategy are the ground obstacle on one hand, and the intelligence and stand-off fires approach on the other. Israel left Lebanon in 2000, received UN recognition for its international borders, built a new ground obstacle along the border and boldly declared its policy. "If one hair on the head of one of our soldiers is harmed, Lebanese soil will burn," promised Prime Minister Ehud Barak following the withdrawal from Lebanon.[8]

In the West Bank, the security fence began to be built following Operation Defensive Shield (2002), but the circumstances across the Green Line did not allow the total withdrawal of military forces.

The Gaza Strip, on the other hand, appeared to be very similar to Lebanon. In 2005, Israel carried out the disengagement plan based on the exact same idea: avoiding military and political friction with the Gaza Strip by physical disengagement, building an obstacle and employing IDF fires to deter the threat from there.[9]

The Israeli idea in Lebanon and Gaza was similar. The removal of Israeli presence was intended "pull the rug out" from under Hezbollah's and Hamas's legitimacy for acts of "resistance" that had expanded to the shelling of Israeli communities inside the Gaza Strip and in Israel proper. Reality proved otherwise. Hezbollah continued to attack Israel from 2000-2006, the peak of which was the kidnapping attack in July 2006. Hamas, which violently took control over the Gaza Strip less than two years after Israel's withdrawal, drastically increased its rocket attacks on neighboring Jewish communities inside Israel. The organization also initiated its own kidnapping attack in June 2006 and turned the Gaza Strip, just like Hezbollah's south Lebanon, into a fortified fire base aimed at the Israeli home front.

This analysis is empirical. We have no intention of criticizing the essence of Israeli strategy regarding separation and deterrence, which again, is legitimate. Nevertheless, the article does intend to point out a significant failure in the way the strategy was implemented, which was expressed in the scope of immunity awarded to the enemy to learn IDF behavior and prepare for war undisturbed. As time went by, Hamas's and Hezbollah's fires capabilities became formidable, up to the point where it seemed that Israel had no choice but to refrain from directly and overtly interfering militarily with their force building efforts.[10]

Hamas and Hezbollah's disruption strategy did not only evolve as a reaction to the Israeli military advantage, but also as a response to the Israeli strategy of separation that threatened to undermine the legitimacy of their struggle. Their answer was simple. On the political level, causes for continued struggle were identified, such as marginal border disputes like the Sheba'a Farms on the Lebanon border, or in the Gazan case, the claim that Israel's control over most of Gaza's borders constituted "continued occupation."

If Israel's strategic goal was a complete termination of the violent conflict between the sides, two ideas developed by Hamas were meant to undermine these efforts. The first was turning its high-trajectory missiles into a strategic threat. The second was the conceptual development of raids into Israel as the underlying logic that would cripple Israeli attempts to deprive the violent conflict of oxygen by a separation of forces. This is what Hezbollah did in the kidnapping incident on the Sheba'a Farms (2000), in the Meztuva attack (2002), in the attempted kidnapping in Ghajar (2005), in the kidnapping incident in the Zarit region (2006), and what Hamas achieved in the Gilad Shalit kidnapping (2006).[11]

It is important to understand that Hezbollah's and Hamas' strategy of disruption was not designed around the two separate elements of high-trajectory fire and raids into Israel. It was designed as one entity where these two elements comprise one strategic system and complement one another. The element of fires was intended to be massive and sufficiently resilient in the face of Israel attacks so a significant price could be exacted from Israel if war broke out. In other words, deterrence. Under the umbrella of this deterrence, Hezbollah and Hamas were supposed to continue their resistance activities against the IDF by carrying out raids into Israel. The nature of Gaza's terrain dictated, that tunneling would be the main element of their offensive efforts.

To summarize this section, Hezbollah and Hamas both developed, simultaneously, a strategy to counter Israel's strategy - disruption. If Israel was interested in legitimacy, they would find reasons for war; if Israel was interested in a separation of forces, they would strike back in its territory by overcoming the ground obstacle; if Israel threatened them with its immense firepower, they would balance this threat with their own. They would maintain their fires arrays against Israeli attacks by redundancy, integration into civilian population and underground concealment facilities.[12]

(Iron Dome Battery Launching Interceptor. IDF Spokesperson's Unit)

High-Trajectory Fire as a Central Element is What Enables the Tunneling Project

In this section we will try to present the Gordian knot intractably connecting Hamas' ability to promote the tunneling project and its other attack element - high-trajectory fire. We will first clarify why the idea of attack tunnels as part of a war plan was actually developed in 2012-2014. We then will present two explanations and ask the question why Israel chose the policy it did during those years.

Why did the tunneling element appear in 2012-2014 of all periods? Up until Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012) it appeared that the main attack capability developed by Hamas against Israel was based on a broad and complex rocket array constructed inside the Gaza Strip. The tunneling element was not generally seen as a central component of Hamas strategy. It was considered a complementary element whose role was to support Hamas fires. The tunnel infrastructure that was widely used for smuggling from the Sinai slowly developed in the Gaza Strip as a way to reinforce Hamas's abilities to protect its fires arrays. It is important to emphasize that since the disengagement, the subject of cross- border tunnels has become a key issue in IDF discourse on border security. However, it was just one of a long list of threats along the border. An example is the lead-up to Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, which began from a series of border incidents, one of which was the detonation of an explosive-laden tunnel under Israeli territory. Other incidents included an explosion along the border fence (November 8) which started the spiral toward war, and anti-tank fire at IDF forces from within the Gaza Strip (November 10).[13]

It was between November 2012 and July 2014 that the underground domain in general, and tunneling in particular, became the main effort in Hamas' operational concept. There is no arguing the fact that simultaneously digging several tunnels that penetrate into Israeli territory, and the staffing of these tunnels with a designated elite force (Nukhba), made significant progress during these years.

However, a deeper look requires an explanation for these phenomena. What did Hamas understand in November 2012 about the tunnels' potential that it had failed to realize up to that point? Did Operation Pillar of Defense dramatically accelerate Hamas's learning?

There are two separate and complementary answers to this question:

Explanation I - Tunnels as a replacement high-trajectory rockets - This explanation, the more popular of the two, is that attack tunnels are one of the lessons learned by Hamas following Pillar of Defense. According to this perspective, Hamas finally realized that Iron Dome could protect the Israeli home front on a broad scale. This led to the understanding that it required additional capabilities to enable it to bring the combat back to Israeli soil. Under critical examination, this explanation is certainly justified, but struggles to stand by itself. Did Hamas notice nothing during the development of the Iron Dome's since 2006? Did it not understand the essence of this capability when it first appeared in 2011? Moreover, Hamas never gave up on the continued improvement and construction of its missile arrays, as seen in Protective Edge in the summer of 2014.

The development of its fires capabilities was carried out under their understanding that they must overcome the expected defense capabilities of the IDF. For example, ranges were extended (which made it possible to hit unprotected areas), large salvos were launched (intended to push Iron Dome to its limits) and an array of mortars and short-range fires was established to strike areas adjacent to the borders that are less protected by Israel's missile defense. Therefore, Hamas did not build capabilities to replace the rocket array. It built additional capabilities, so the first explanation is incomplete.

Explanation II - "The freedom to dig" - This explanation is related more to changes of circumstance than Hamas' learning system. In other words, between the winter of 2012 and the summer of 2014, more than in any other period, Hamas enjoyed complete freedom to work on its tunneling infrastructure, to organize its designated tunnel force and create more than 30 cross-border attack tunnels. If one were to look at the IDF operations between 2005-2012, they would find a long list of ground and air raids against Hamas tunnels. To be more precise, between 2007-2009, the IDF carried out 78 cross-border operations. At least six were ground raids of digging sites of cross-border tunnels into Israel (and the rest were operations against tunnels on the Egyptian border).

In 2009, raids by the IDF into the Gaza Strip began to decrease, and a gradual increase in aerial precision attacks by the IAF against infrastructure and tunneling targets began. In 2010 there were 15 such attacks, in 2011 there were 25, and in 2012 until Pillar of Defense in November, there were 31 such strikes against tunneling targets - the most ever.

There was also a sharp change in Israel's policy around targeted killing of Hamas leaders. In fact, there was almost a complete halt in one of the IDF's most accepted courses of action at the time. Between 2006 and November 2012, Israel media reported no less than eight targeted killings by the IDF against terrorists in the Gaza Strip.[14] On the other hand, between Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge, only two operations of this kind were reported - and one of them was not directed against activists of Hamas, Israel's main enemy in the Gaza Strip.

What can be learned from these numbers? First, tunneling efforts, especially those reaching Israeli territory, were already substantial and ongoing from 2009-2012, which was the reason for the IDF's operations to disrupt the digging.

Second, Israel was aware of these efforts,[15] and as previously mentioned, steps were taken to disrupt them.[16] Finally, and despite the three years that had passed between Operation Cast Lead and Operation Pillar of Defense, the threat of tunnels had not become a dominant aspect of the IDF campaign. The tunnels would only evolve and become an imminent threat during Operation Protective Edge, which would take place a year and eight months later. The main variable between the period before Pillar of Defense and the 20 months until Protective Edge was the immunity Hamas enjoyed. There were no disruptive steps taken by the IDF, and there were almost no targeted killings.

To summarize this point, Hamas's freedom of action - the freedom to dig - is an important explanation for the appearance of attack tunnels in Protective Edge, and it is equally important as the first explanation.

And now to the second question - Why did Israel make such a drastic change in its policy towards the Gaza Strip? What moved Israel to suspend its disruptive actions towards the tunnels even though it was aware of their existence? The Southern Command and other officials who were aware of intelligence reports at the time provided warnings of the severe ramifications posed by the tunneling project long before Operation Protective Edge. How did these warnings affect Israel's actual policies?

Ostensibly, the answer is "Pillar of Defense understandings." Even though they were never made official, media reports of understandings reached in Cairo, the basis for both sides to end hostilities in November 2012, claimed that Israel expanded the Palestinian fishing zone in the Mediterranean Sea, ceased its initiated operations along the Gaza Strip's security perimeter (a 300-meter wide strip in which the IDF operated to neutralize threats until then) and stopped its targeted killings in Gaza.[17]

However, this answer is insufficient. Throughout this period Israel had plenty of reasons to withdraw from these understandings if it desired. Starting in December 2012, mortar fire and rockets from the Gaza Strip again became the daily routine of Israeli border towns. In March and April 2013, the shooting from Gaza became even more severe. In October 2013, there was already escalation and tactical friction along the border fence - an escalation that included buried IEDs against IDF forces, sabotage of the border fence and rocket fire into Israel. During that same month, IDF forces uncovered a large and sophisticated attack tunnel near Kibbutz Ein Hashlosha, the type of which had never been seen before in Israeli territory. A week later, a booby-trapped explosive tunnel was also discovered. IDF actions to destroy these tunnels caused further deterioration resulting in a small round of escalation in which several IDF soldiers were wounded and several Hamas fighters were killed. In March-April 2014, following provocations by Islamic Jihad, another more significant round of violence began, during which more than 80 rockets and mortars were shot into Israel, and another terror tunnel leading into Israel was discovered.[18]

All these events were an opportunity for Israel, if it had wanted, to withdraw from the Pillar of Defense understandings and return to offensive operations in the Gaza Strip to disrupt the tunneling project and Hamas' stockpiling of rockets. It is important to emphasize that these two efforts did not escape the attention of Israeli intelligence, as can be seen by the discovery of tunnels along the border, and statements by intelligence officials like Head of the J2 Research Division, BG Itai Brun, in June 2014: "The number of rockets in the hands of terror organizations in the Gaza Strip has doubled since Pillar of Defense."[19] So why did Israel refrain from this course of action?

The answer is clear. The Pillar of Defense understandings were reached in order to end the combat. The operation, which was the first time "Iron Dome" was used in large-scale operational situations, also saw an impressive expansion of shooting distances by Hamas and other terror organizations. This was the first time that sirens were heard in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem since the Yom Kippur War (1973). For eight days, schools within a 40 km radius of the Gaza Strip were closed - an area where hundreds of thousands of Israelis make their home. In other words, even after Iron Dome had made its appearance, Israel still found it difficult to withstand continued and significant disruption of daily life on the homefront.

Based on this clear priority, it can now be understood why Israel did not renounce the understandings of Pillar of Defense, even after one of the many rounds of escalations between November 2012 and July 2014. Despite the ongoing development of Israeli defensive capabilities, especially the accelerated procurement of Iron Dome batteries, and despite the clear and present threat from the Gaza Strip, Israel's decision makers preferred to avoid any policy that would mean returning much of the country to a reality of sirens and disrupted daily routines. In other words, the arms war between the developers of Israel's rocket defense and Hamas' rocket array was undertaken at the expense of the combat competition between the Gaza tunnel-diggers and the raids to disrupt them.

The bottom line is that Iron Dome did not essentially change the strategic situation. The more fires capabilities developed in the Gaza Strip, the more terror organizations were able to hold the daily lives of Israelis hostage and restrain Israel's retaliatory operations against it. Israel's active defense during that time, as important as it is, still did not allow Israel to initiate a change in the status quo. The deterrence of Israel by means of its improved fires capabilities enabled Hamas to maintain its massive tunneling project and create designated raid units unimpeded in the period leading up to the summer of 2014.

Why wasn't the substantial operational achievement of Iron Dome translated into a strategic achievement that was far more important than Israel's freedom of operation in the Gaza Strip? The answer to this question is related to several variables. First, just like all other operational systems, Iron Dome is not perfect. The enemy is learning it and developing its own methods to challenge it, while decision-makers recognize the fact that Israel is not hermetically protected. The second, the enormous cost in deploying batteries around Israel and operating them substantially hinders Israel's ability in an extended cycle of violence. The third, and apparently the most important variable, is that as long as rockets are intercepted over Israel and not the Gaza Strip, the Israeli home front must continue to suffer through sirens, hunkering down in their safe rooms and bomb shelters while having their daily routines interrupted. This means that even perfect success of "Iron Dome" in intercepting incoming rockets, the daily lives of Israelis continued to be held hostage by the terror organizations in the Gaza Strip.

The tunneling project, which was considered a huge surprise by the Israeli public in the summer of 2014, was possible not because the enemy suddenly formulated it near the end of 2012. The project was mainly made possible because of Israel's own policy of restraint. The most important explanation for that policy is the deterrent effect of the rocket array, despite the "Iron Dome" significant defensive capabilities.

What has changed since?

Throughout the years, Israel has invested much effort in developing technologies to discover cross-border tunnels. Technological projects, engineering efforts, excavation and drilling along the border, in addition to intelligence efforts, have been an integral part of the ongoing conflict on the Gaza border since the 2005 disengagement, even before. In 2016, Israel decided to establish an underground obstacle with sophisticated integrated sensors against tunnels along the border.

Will the obstacle along the Gaza Strip, dozens of meters deep and six meters high,[20] be sufficient to neutralize the underground component in Hamas' offensive array against Israel?

We will first ask whether the decision to build the obstacle marks a change in Israeli policy. The obstacle currently being built on the Gaza border is the third border project Israel has embarked on since the Palestinian Authority was established in 1993. In the 1990s, Israel built its first border obstacle around the Gaza Strip. In 2005, as part of the disengagement, Israel again invested significant resources in making the obstacle more sophisticated and building outposts and observation points around the Gaza Strip. The current obstacle under construction, Israel's third in the last three decades, is the largest ever undertaken. If we recall Israel's basic strategy - total separation and removal of friction under the auspices of military deterrence based mainly on IDF firepower - it appears that the current obstacle is nothing more than another stage in the same strategy.

What are the other military aspects of this strategy?

We have, in fact, already mentioned them:

The increasing sophistication of the obstacle - This is one of the trademarks of Israeli strategy over the last several decades.

Deterrence - This component is mainly based on Israel's intelligence and fires superiority. History shows that over recent decades most operations were based on stand-off fires.[21] Ground maneuver, if conducted, appears in later stages of the campaign after the options of stand-off fires have been exhausted, and is as minimal as possible. In operations such as these, even if ground attacks into enemy territory occur, they are not intended to achieve decisive-victory over the enemy. Instead, they are meant to maintain military pressure as part of the concept of "renewal of deterrence" (as in the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead) or to obtain a limited concrete military achievement (removing the tunnel threats in 2014). Over the years there has been much criticism of deterrence operations as the IDF's main operational method[22]. Today there is criticism that emphasizes the IDF's official strategy that, as a rule, aims for battlefield "decision" or decisive-victory (meaning not only deterrence).[23]

Missile Defense - Iron Dome received substantial development efforts following the Second Lebanon War, and made its inaugural appearance in 2011. The system had impressive results in intercepting rockets and was the only one of its kind in the world. When eight Iron Dome batteries were deployed during Operation Protective Edge,[24] the component that had been missing to protect the Israeli home front against the rocket threat had been completed.[25]

This is a mixed blessing, however. As we saw in the review of 2012-2014, the appearance of Iron Dome and the completion of the military aspects in Israeli strategy, initiated the development of the most serious threat posed so far from the Gaza Strip.

These three operational elements of Israeli strategy have been with us for some time. Why then, do we believe that a new defensive obstacle – sophisticated though it might be - will fundamentally change the ever-expanding threat from the Gaza Strip?

The conclusion could be that despite the enormous investment in the new obstacle, in addition to those that preceded it, fundamentally not enough has changed. Israel is still seeking complete geographical separation on the strategic level to extend the period of quiet as much as possible, and to entirely separate periods of peace and those of war. This strategy, which means the reduction of friction between the sides to a minimum, leaves the enemy free to plan, arm and learn Israel's newest defense capabilities. An enemy that engages Israeli forces along the border and is freely able to learn about the IDF will eventually find a way to circumvent it. Understanding that the line of engagement will eventually be breached has taught the IDF and Israel to repeatedly make its lines of engagement more sophisticated every few decades. Yet, it finds itself facing them being overcome again and again. Every round of conflict is usually longer and more violent than the one that preceded it.

Could it be that in retrospect, we will discover that the current obstacle that is being constructed around the Gaza Strip is nothing more than a new "line of engagement" that will eventually be breached?

Is there potential for something else?

First, it is important to understand the scale of the distortion. Digging a tunnel into Israeli territory is actually a type of tactical advance or infiltration. A tactical advance, whose goal is to bring the main force (the enemy's raiding force) to its destination (into Israel's vital areas) with minimum delay and attrition, is characterized by the commander looking for the point of least friction with defending forces. A capable commander who leads the advance will occasionally assess the defensive array and observation points and will modify his efforts accordingly. Advance tactic, like most of what we do, is a continuous learning process.[26]

The defender, strong and sophisticated though he may be, whose defensive actions are exposed and routine, who does not force the enemy to deal with constraints and surprises, and who does not resort to disruptive actions and counter and preemptive attacks, will eventually be flanked and penetrated. This is what we learned from 32 tunnels that were dug into Israeli territory between November 2012 and July 2014. This simple doctrinal insight, based on centuries of war, will be hard to overcome.

Tunneling, a quiet tactical advance into Israel, should not be understood as standing alone. It is covered, quietly but significantly, by Hamas' enormous rocket capabilities. Iron Dome did not nullify this cover. As long as Hamas can disrupt the lives of millions of Israelis, Israel will continue to choose non- friction over the reduction of the threat by war.

But things can be different. The Israeli strategy presented here is not predestined. It seeks separation and reduced friction as long as it perceives that its enemies have veto power over the normalcy of Israeli lives. When things are different, such as in the Syrian sector in recent years, Israel takes action through creativity and flexibility, overtly and covertly, to prevent serious threats from developing across the border.[27] So what does the IDF need to do in order to return its freedom of action in the Gaza Strip?

In theory, the answer is clear. The enemy's arrays of high-trajectory rockets are what is keeping Israel's home front hostage. If they were to be neutralized, then Israel could return and operate in the Gaza Strip as it did up until 2012, or as it has done along the Syrian front when it took the initiative to act to preserve Israeli interests (according to foreign sources).[28]

But in practice, things are less simple. From the offensive perspective, Israel has been fighting various launch arrays for several decades. Even though there have been many local successes, the rocket threat has actually expanded over the years. And from the defensive perspective? We have already reached the conclusion that the enormous success of Iron Dome on the tactical level has not translated into routine freedom of action for Israel on the strategic level. The weak point of the offensive option is that not all rockets can be located ahead of time, which means that every attack on Hamas will result in a response against the Israeli home front with the rockets that remain in the enemy's arsenal. The weak point of the defensive option is that despite the ability to successfully intercept missiles shot at Israel's home front, civilian routine stops, Israelis must take shelter in safe areas, and the strategic discourse between Hamas and Israel still occurs.

Israel must develop a third option. This response must be sufficiently offensive to prevent the enemy from taking the tactical initiative and maintaining a conflict of stand-off fires inside Israeli territory, but at the same time is sufficiently defensive in nature to substantially reduce the disruption of Israeli lives. This is a riddle whose answer could generate a dramatic turn of events concerning the balance of force between Israel and its enemies - and provide an advantage to Israel. The implications would go beyond the rocket threat alone.

Summary

From a bird's eye view, it seems that Israeli strategy over the last two decades in general, and towards Gaza in particular, suffers from significant internal contradictions. The desire to geographically separate from its enemies and avoid friction with them has provided Hamas immunity. The terror organization has utilized this to undermine Israel's strategy in more ways than one. The frequent operations in the Gaza Strip prove the strategy of separation and deterrence is too sensitive to the enemy's initiatives. This strategy will only become sustainable if the IDF maintains its ability to effectively and powerfully hamper the enemy's empowerment while protecting daily lifestyles inside Israel.

A more concrete look at the case of the Gaza Strip shows that Israel has established tremendous arrays of obstacles along its borders and made these systems more sophisticated over time. It would be incorrect to assume that the obstacle that is currently being built around the Gaza Strip will be more resistant that those that preceded it. Every obstacle needs to be controlled by the defender through observation and fire. In the case of the challenge of tunneling, control by observation and fire means the IDF being able to disrupt digging activities and preventing the establishment of enabling infrastructure ahead of time.

The restriction that has constrained Israel's policy around force employment in the Gaza Strip is the lack of desire to expose the Israeli home front to additional rounds of escalation. Despite Iron Dome, millions of Israelis are exposed to the threat of enemy rocket fire, or at the very least, of having their lives disrupted by the sirens and warnings.

As long as we do not sever the direct relationship between Hamas' rocket array (and that of our other adversaries that are also using this method of operation), and the idea of aggression into Israeli territory through their use of tunneling, we are destined to be bystanders observing Hamas' continuous military build-up. This disconnection, when achieved, will enable Israel to prevent the strengthening of its enemies, will prevent them from achieving an advantage on the battlefield, and will allow us to continue to maintain the principle of initiative while preserving the daily routine of Israel's citizens.

With all of Israel's human capital and technological and economic innovation, is this idea truly beyond our reach?

[1] Translated, by Lt. Col. (Res.) Marshall Grant.

[2] Brigadier General Eran Ortal was the Head of the Dado Center Think Tank.

[3] "Every obstacle must be controlled by fire and observation of a combat force. If this is not the case, its efficiency will be measured in the engineering efforts required by the enemy to cross it and by the temporary and limited disruption of its advance." Ground Forces Command, Ground Forces' Operations, Volume III - Defensive Operations,(January 2012), 42-43.

[4] Clarification: the IDF documents that serve as the basis of this article are internal documents, and as such, they are not necessarily available for public viewing.

[5] Eran Ortal and Dvir Peleg, 'That Which is Small Will Become Large': Missed Opportunities in the General Staff - The Tunneling Threat as a Test Case ( Dado Center, 2016.)

[6] Which even then, was partially based on the first underground element - launch pits.

[7] Michael Milstein, Mukawama: The Challenge of Resistance to Israel's National Society Concept, (Institute for National Security Studies, Memo 102, 2009), 44.

[8] The quote is taken from "Managing the Conflict is Like Consulting a Terminal Patient - an Interview with Uri Sagi", Haaretz, December 18, 2014.

[9] Atila Shumpelby, "Document: This is the Disengagement Plan" ,Ynet, April 15, 2004.

[10] This draft is intended to clarify the difference between clear and effective military interference of the enemey's preparations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and covert actions taking place in the campaign between wars. The scope and achievements of these actions are not covered in this article.

[11] Reuven Erlich, The Road to the Second Lebanon War 2000-2006: The Lebanese Arena 2000-2006 (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2007), 11; Gal Hirsch, A War Story, A Love Story, (Yedioth Ahronoth, 2009), 210; Amir Rappaport, Our Forces Under Fire: How We Tripped Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War, (Ma'ariv, 2013) 16-17, 96.

[12] Avi Issacharoff, “Gaza prepares for war,” The Times of Israel, January 26, 2016; Jeffrey White, “The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014,” The Washington Institute 7, issue 9, (2014): 9-13.

[13] Zeev Ziton and Elior Levy, "Four Soldiers Wounded from Anti-Tank Missile Fired From Gaza Strip", Ynet,10.11.12 ; Ahikam Moshe David, "The Chief of the General Staff's Diversion Tactics: How Gantz Prepared for Pillar of Defense", NRG, November 16, 2012.

[14] See for example: Barak Ravid and Amir Bochbut, "IDF Kills Jamal Abu Samhadana", nrg, June 9, 2006; Amir Buchbot, "The IDF Admits: the Air Force Killed a Senior Member of the Islamic Army", nrg, November 3, 2010; Elior Levy and Hannan Greenberg, "Israel's Response: a Senior Member of the Resistance Committee Was Killed", Ynet, August 19, 2011; "The IDF Attacks Team That Planned to Kidnap Israelis to the Gaza Strip; Hamas: The Enemy Will Bear the Results", Haaretz, April 2, 2011.

[15] Mickey Edelstein, then Commande of the Gaza Division. and the author identified the developing threat in 2013. The author was struck by the profundity of the threat and the lack of Israel’s capability to respond, and thus its ability to protect its citizens: MG (Res.) Turjeman Sami (commander of IDF southern Command) "The Road to Protective Edge Israel-Hamas Confrontation in Gaza" –, Policy Notes for The Trump Administration Policy Near East Policy (2018 ,PN47): P- 9

[16] ISA ,"Hamas Actions of Empowerment since Pillar of Defense", July 8, 2014:https://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/Pages/study/Skira090714.aspx

[17] Giora Eiland. "Operation Pillar of Defense - Strategic Aspects", from After Operation Pillar of Defense, Shlomo Brom (Editor), INSS, 2012, 12-13.

[18] ISA ,"Summary of high-trajectory shooting from the Gaza Strip into Israel from 2005 until Today", July 15, 2014: https://www.shabak.gov.il/publications/Pages/study/Skira160714.aspx

[19] "Situation Picture - the threat of Rockets from the Gaza Strip on Israel", (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center) July 8, 2014.

[20] Nahum Barnea, "The Tunnel Solution: A Cement Wall Above and Below Ground", Ynet, June 6, 2016.

[21] Itai Brun, "Where has the Maneuver Gone?", Ma'arachot, 420-421, (2008).

[22] Tamir Yadai and Eran Ortal, "The Paradigm Surrounding Deterrence - Strategic Conduct at a Dead End", Eshtonot, (Israel National Defense College, 2013).

[23] IDF Strategy (IDF, 2015), 15.

[24] Yoav Ziton,"90% Success Rate for Iron Dome, Ten Mortars Intercepted Over the Gaza Strip", Ynet, August 13, 2017.

[25] "In wars characterized by standoff fires, an important advantage can be achieved not only from offensive capabilities but also from the ability to neutralize the effectiveness of the adversary’s attack", Turjeman p-9

[26] The Dictionary of Doctrinal Terms, (Operations Directorate-Doctrine and Training Division, 1996), 118, 253.

[27] Amir Rappaport, "The War Between the Wars", Israel Defense, January 31, 2013.

[28] Peter Beaumont, “Israeli Jets Attack Anti-Aircraft Battery in Syria in Retaliatory Strike,” The Guardian, October 17, 2017; Sarah Dadouch, Jeffrey Heller, ”Israel Hits Syrian Site Said to be Linked to Chemical Weapons,” Reuters, September 7, 2017.

Bibliography