Introduction

In an article I wrote in 2008 titled “The Paradox of Air Power: More Accurate, Less Effective,” I argued that even with the dramatic increase in the efficiency of air power – thanks to smart bombs and improved air intelligence – countermeasures employed by the enemy are forcing its demise. The article then focused on the decrease of the effectiveness of air power against state militaries (the focus on force design then was Syria). The article reviewed the transformation in air power’s efficiency and effectiveness from the First Gulf War (1991), through the Kosovo War (1999), to Afghanistan (2001) and the Second Gulf War (2003) through the Second Lebanon War (2006). The article argued that even as air power has become more effective – mainly because of the increase in the accuracy of individual bombs and in the percentage of smart bombs used – the enemy has employed tactical countermeasures in the form of camouflage, decoys, entrenchments and more that have all reduced the effectiveness of air operations. The conclusion was that in order to boost the effectiveness of fires, one needs to integrate it better with ground maneuver, which will force the enemy to expose himself and increase his vulnerability to targeting from the air.

Since the article was published, the IDF has used aerial campaigns three times at the beginning of campaigns -  Operation Cast Lead (2008-9), Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). The argument in this article is that even though there has been an increase in accuracy (during these operations only precisions bombs were used), an increase in the number of intelligence-based targets (as we can see by comparing these operations), systemic damage to Hezbollah and Hamas (a result of hitting their weapons, combatants and mainly important commanders)  has declined with time. The article will argue that not only has operational success been declining, but on a parallel strategic level, the form of fires applied by the IDF for the past decade has actually been creating strategic damage at the conflict’s onset, damage which has been difficult to fix later in the campaign.

Graphically, we can illustrate the problem as follows: Even as the IDF thinks it is at point A - which shows an improvement in the amount and capacity of attack targets and rising strategic effectiveness - in reality it is already at point B, where the effectiveness of these campaigns is already in decline.

In the words of Edward Luttwak, as stated in his book Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace: the pattern of employing fire campaigns used four times since (and including) the Second Lebanon War, has passed their “culminating point of success.”[2]

The peak of tactical effectiveness – The airplane, armaments and intelligence

Ever since the airplane was invented – 114 years ago – airpower has developed quickly and has turned into a key element of the power of every modern military. Since World War I airplanes serve in diverse missions – from supporting forces on the ground to strategic bombings – and essentially one cannot think of achieving hachra'a[3] today, during military conflicts, without the use of airpower.

In the last few decades air forces have improved in many aspects: the range and resolution of aerial observation, bombing accuracy, operating range of aircrafts and the armaments they carry, the variety of armaments, and more. A real revolution has involved the increasing usage of unmanned aerial vehicles. Another area that has recently developed has been the IAF's attack capabilities, which according to IAF commander Major General Amir Eshel, can reach thousands of targets a day.[4]

Another revolution has been the impressive development of intelligence in the IDF,[5] and which has come to fruition in what the IDF terms “target bank,”[6] growing dramatically in the last few years.

Without a doubt the IDF’s tactical effectiveness has very much improved as a result of the combination between accurate and widespread intelligence, and the capabilities of the IAF in the areas of accuracy, quantity and capacity. It is still possible to improve, but it looks as if the IDF is a leader when it comes to global capabilities and the majority of improvement on this matter has already been reached.[7]

Why has tactical effectiveness struggled to maintain operational value against Hamas and Hezbollah?

Over the last few years, Hamas has experienced a swift evolutionary change with the help of the IDF. The recent  operations in Gaza allowed Hamas to recover from each round and to improve for the next. The cumulative result of the first two operations was seen in Operation Protective Edge which, even though occurring over a relatively small territory, the number of launchers and rockets, widely dispersed in urban areas, rendered it difficult to suppress rocket fire from the air.

Targeting senior commanders has also become more complex, because of their awareness and the countermeasures they have taken. Bombing tunnels from the air is limited. The combined effect of all the fire-intelligence components during Operation Protective Edge demonstrated the operational limits in significantly damaging the Hamas military organization.

There is a similar reality against Hezbollah, expressed through what then head of the Military Intelligence Directorate Aviv Kochavi termed in 2011 “a sixth of fires” – more launchers are firing and hitting Israeli territory, and are placed and spread out deeper in enemy territory, all the while firing more heavily and accurately.[8] The solution for this is to expand the target bank as described earlier. In light of this, the IDF is working to expand its target bank. The IDF said in late 2016 that it has some 10,000 targets in Lebanon,[9] and that it is able to attack thousands of targets a day.[10]

The problem stems from the fact that the ratio between the huge quantity of Hezbollah rockets and the number of targets, as well as the armaments and attack capacity, is one that will allow Hezbollah, despite all the improvements mentioned above (and despite Iron Dome) to continue to fire at Israel a considerable amount of rockets for some time in the next war.

On an operational level, a large-scale air operation (with use of limited ground fire) will impact the enemy, but will not achieve operational success resulting in strategic victory. For many days during Operation Protective Edge, there was a hope that the Hamas leadership would look to end the war on favorable terms for Israel when it saw the extent of the damage caused by IDF attacks against Hamas combatants and infrastructure.  But this hope turned out to be problematic. One can assume that when Hamas enters a conflict (Hezbollah too), it knows the likely damage that it will suffer ahead of time due to its past experience with Israel. This damage is taken into account, and as such does not surprise or shock the organization.[11]

Why tactical effectiveness creates a strategic vacuum at the campaign’s onset

It is here that the strategic weapon called real-time communications comes into play. Significant weapon stockpiles in both Gaza and Lebanon are located within urban and populated areas. For years the IDF has been making great efforts, with significant creativity, to reduce then number of civilian casualties during fighting, including those from air attacks. Experience has shown that success is limited. The enemy takes advantage of civilian casualties, even if the ratio of civilian to enemy combatant casualties is low (when compared to other foreign militaries), to tarnish Israel politically. Even if previous investigations (Goldstone after Operation Cast Lead and the United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry after Operation Protective Edge) are less significant as we have thought, and the war in Syria and the relatively permissive Trump and Putin governments have led to international apathy, choosing to hit thousands of civilians, as a result of the amount of targets and the aforementioned attack capabilities, will put Israel into a very problematic strategic reality after the air campaign. The IDF, understands this reality and tries to face it in various ways. Nevertheless, it has not officially admitted to its importance, and as such as an organization it is pushing back on the fact that air campaigns at the onset of wars is a tool with increasing drawbacks.

There are those who argue that all of this can change with regards to Hezbollah in Lebanon, if Israel decides in the next war to attack targets belonging to Lebanon in order to pressure Hezbollah (as suggested by the Chief of Staff Halutz during the Second Lebanon War and as discussed recently again in the media). But one needs to remember that this approach has a number of political limits because in the eyes of the world there is still a significant difference between Lebanon, supported by France and the US with has many foreign investors, and the Hezbollah organization. One needs to also remember that if this approach is executed to pressure the Hezbollah leadership, there is no guarantee it will be effective, nor will any “leverage” approach that doesn’t target the enemy directly.[12]

Air campaigns at the outset of a war and its culminating point

Luttwak argues that “when the paradoxical logic of strategy assumes a dynamic form, it becomes the coming together, even the reversal, of opposites.” He adds:

 In the entire realm of strategy, therefore, a course of action cannot persist indefinitely. It will instead tend to evolve into its opposite, unless the entire logic of strategy is outweighed by some externally induced change in the circumstances of the participants.  Without such change, the logic will induce a self-negating evolution, which may reach the extreme of a full reversal, undoing war and peace, victory and defeat.[13]

 As examples he notes how a victorious army advances into enemy territory and, due to its success, has its supply lines extended (while for the losing enemy these lines shorten), becomes vulnerable, and the enemy population becomes a source of resistance. Clear examples from ground warfare are the German invasion of the Soviet Union in WWII and the Chinese offensive during the Korean War, where the attack was exhausted and reached in culmination point. Another case that illustrates the trend of passing the peak of success due to enemy response is the fight between the German air defenses and Allied bombers during World War II.

An example closer to the IDF is the transformation of the Syrian army after it understood (indirectly as a result of observing global development and the impact on the IDF) the capability of precision weaponry in Israeli hands. Use of precision munitions in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003) showed Syria what they presumed the IDF possessed and caused them to change their operational tactics – from using armor to attack, to countering with firing short-range projectiles combined with defense based on obstacles, explosive devices, and anti-tank rockets against Israeli maneuver, as well as the use of camouflage and other countermeasures in the face of precise Israeli munitions.

The repeated usage of an air campaign at the outset of an operation (2006-2014), which has been thoroughly improved on a tactical level (intelligence, accuracy, capacity), has passed the peak of its success due to the enemy’s countermeasures noted earlier. Both on a tactical level (decentralization, excessiveness – a “sixth of a fire” - with the hiding of organization leaders), and on a strategic level, severe collateral damage at the start of an operation helps the enemy turn Israel into a loser on the international news stage. The variety of surprises that our rivals develop are designed to weaken our strategic effectiveness during an operation, mainly through their use of mass casualty events about which Israeli society is very sensitive. It is important to note that usage of a fires campaign is quite popular with the political leadership, for a number of reasons that have previously been discussed, and has become a habit. Still, it is possible that the political echelon is developing an understanding described herein. If the IDF recognizes that the effectiveness of air campaigns at the start of operations is declining, it will constitute significant progress, and will allow a diversion of material and manpower for the development of new operational tactics that will surprise the enemy.

 Bibliography

Ben David, Alon. Interview with Amir Eshel. Independence Day interview. Channel 10. 23.4.2015.

Dvori, Nir. “The target bank the IDF will attack in Lebanon.” Channel 2 News. 6.12.2016.

Halifa, Aharon. “More of the same – on the need for a perceptual leap in force design.” Bein Haktavim. Issue 9. IDF: Dado Center. December 2016: 9-23.

Kochavi, Aviv, and Ortal, Eran. “The Hand of Aman – Permanent Change in a Changing Reality,” Bein Haktavim. Issue 2. IDF: Dado Center. July 2014: 9-57.

Lish, Gur. “These are not the targets.” Maarachot 439. October 2011: 56-59.

Luttwak, Edward. Strategy of War and Peace. Maarachot, 2002.

Shelach, Ofer. “In support, in retrospect,” NRG Website. 30.12.2011.

Yadi, Tamir and Ortal, Eran. “The Paradigm of Deterrence Cycles – Strategic Method and a Dead-end Doctrine.” Eshtonot 1. January 2013.

[1] Brig. General (Res) Dr. Meir Finkel is a past commander of the Dado Center

[2] Edward Luttwak, The Logic of War and Peace, (Maarachot, 2002), 55.

[3] A central term in IDF thought that can be defined as victory in a war or the return of deterrence vis-à-vis the enemy.

[4] Alon Ben David interview with Amir Eshel, Independence Day interview, Channel 10, (23.4.2015)

[5] Aviv Kochavi and Eran Ortal, “The Hand of Aman – Permanent Change in a Changing Reality,” Dado Center Journal, vol. 2 (IDF: Dado Center, July 2014): 9-57.

[6] Gur Lish, “These are not the targets,” Maarachot 439, (October 2011): 56-59.

[7] Aharon Halifa, “More of the same – on the need for a perceptual leap in force design,” Bein Haktavim, Issue 9, (IDF: Dado Center, December 2016): 9-23.

[8] Ofer Shelach, “In support, in retrospect,” NRG Website. 30.12.2011

[9] Nir Dvori, “The target bank the IDF will attack in Lebanon,” Channel 2 News, 6.12.2016.

[10] Alon Ben David interview with Amir Eshel, Independence Day interview, Channel 10, (23.4.2015)

[11]  Tamir Yadi and Eran Ortal, “The Paradigm of Deterrence Cycles – Strategic Method and a Dead-end Doctrine,” Eshtonot 1 (January 2013).

[12] An in-depth analysis of the difficulty in enforcing side A’s will on side B using air power can be found in Robert A. Pape’s book, Bombinb to Win, which will soon be released in Hebrew by Maarachot.

[13] Luttwak, Strategy, 16.