Editor's Preface
04.06.17
0
“If we look back through history, at Operation Focus in the Six-Day War, at Operation Mole Cricket 19 in the First Lebanon War, and at Operation Density in the Second Lebanon War, the Israeli Air Force has executed significant operations that were built over many years, they were executed in the first days of combat and influenced events to come...”
Gen. Eliezer Shkedi[1]
It is hard to overstate the importance of the Six-Day War in Israel's history, and the stature of Operation Focus (Moked) as one of the key moments of that war. Even after the years of attrition, the Yom Kippur War, the First Lebanon War and the long years in the Lebanon mud that followed, the Six-Day War was a formative moment in the life of the country and the IDF.
This special double issue of the Dado Center Journal is dedicated to that formative moment. What is a formative moment? It is a powerful event in the life of an individual that has pivotal influence on the shaping of their personality, awareness or behavior.[2] There is no doubt that the Six-Day War in general, and Operation Focus in particular, branded the importance of the Air Force and air superiority into the IDF's operational concept.
In keeping with the goal of the Dado Center Journal, which strives to develop operational-level critical knowledge, we embarked on a journey to clarify the term “airpower” as it has been inscribed in IDF awareness since Operation Focus, and as it is expressed in current and future strategic environments.
“We must continue to play,” says Gen. Benny Peled,[3] former IAF Commander, quoting the famous song following the Yom Kippur War.[4] However, the melody itself may be required to become more sophisticated, and even change from time to time.
We divided this double issue into two smaller parts, each with a particular focus. Part I deals with the essence of airpower in the broader Israeli and IDF context. Part II examines the way we design and employ airpower, especially in the IDF.
Part I: The Essence of Airpower in the context of Israel and IDF
“I estimate, that in the case of escalation, the Air Force will be the most important player in everything relating to the provision of an operational solution.”
Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz[5]
Part I opens with an article written by Colonel (res.) Prof. Alon Kadish, the former Head of the IDF History Department, and currently a professor in the History Department at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Kadish chooses to actually emphasize some of the aspects of the Air Force that cause it to self-segregate from the rest of the IDF. After examining documentation from the period of the war, but mainly from the reexamination of the book written by Ezer Weizman, Kadish claims that Operation Focus was over-appreciated in the analysis of victory in the Six-Day War. Even more importantly, Kadish makes the connection between this over-assessment and the establishment of a separatist operational concept in the Air Force, and the IDF’s underestimation of the written concept of providing air assistance to ground troops.
In the second article, Major General Ya'akov (Kobi) Barak, the Commander of the Ground Forces, critiques the relationship between the Ground Forces and the Air Force. According to General Barak, the changes that have occurred in the strategic and operational environment obligate ground forces to take the emergence of a new air threat into consideration. This threat is not solved by the IDF's traditional concept of air superiority. The acclimation of ground forces to what Barak coins the “spherical threat” will be the result of the establishment of ground-based air assets - to be established for the first time in the IDF. Barak claims that current military threats require what technology can provide - the establishment of a new air realm that is mainly robotic in nature, and whose service affiliation is to the Ground Forces.
Barak and Kadish, each from a different perspective, offer a discussion concerning the role of the Air Force for the main mission that the entire military establishment was built to fulfill – battlefield decision (hachra’a). Another interesting perspective on this subject is provided by the Commander of the Dado Center, Brigadier General (res.) Dr. Meir Finkel. According to Finkel, Israel has developed repetitive behavior when facing Hezbollah and Hamas, in the form of a preliminary air campaign. This can be seen in the IDF's opening efforts in the Second Lebanon War and in Operation Cast Lead.
In his article, the third of this issue, the author claims that the concept of a preliminary air campaign has passed its peak relevance. Tactical improvements, as successful as they may be, will not prevent the decline of its strategic effectiveness. Finkel provides us with a contemporary critical view that is supported by a theoretical perspective and by assessing previous conclusions of the formative moment of Operation Focus. He clarifies Kadish's view, which considers Focus the beginning of a process that prioritizes the air campaign over the integration into a joint campaign, and is an excellent preface to articles by Brigadier General (res.) Ephraim Segoli and Lt. Colonel (res.) Dr. Rafi Rudnik in Part II, that deal with the pattern of opening air strikes as a habit that inhibits systemic learning.
It seems that most of the authors mentioned so far would generally agree with main idea presented by J.F.C. Fuller concerning the inclination of the Allies to use concentrated and excessive airpower during WWII, which, in his view, became a ready-made formula for all offensive operations, at the expense of imaginative thinking and leadership.[6]
Major A., an Air Force fighter pilot, offers an opposing view in the fourth article. While it is correct, in his opinion, that militaries find it difficult to achieve decision solely through air attacks, campaigns against non-state actors need to be executed as “wars of deterrence,” not “wars of decision.” The former are better suited for non-state entities, and they go hand in hand with the method of force employment preferred by Israel - the exclusive employment of airpower. Major A. adapts conventional philosophies that focus on airpower (Douhet, Harris, Deptula and others) for contemporary circumstances. However, it appears he ignores criticism raised by the very approach of “deterrence operations” as presented in articles published in this issue and others he himself cites.[7] Nevertheless, Major A.'s article is important as it presents an obscure, yet powerful, line of thought concerning contemporary Israeli thought on the advantages of airpower.
Another pilot, Lt. Colonel Y., the Head of the Force Design Branch in the General Staff's Operations Directorate, partially continues Finkel's and Kadish's line of reasoning. In this issue's fifth article, Y. discerns between a number of paradoxes that, according to him, hamper Israel's basic air capabilities from being translated into strategical effectiveness. These paradoxes include the strategic, self-incurred harm affiliated with collateral damage that is often part of air attacks, the phenomenon of extended air wars, and more. These all obligate the Air Force to become better accustomed to the present. This acclimation needs to be carried out through several adaptations in concepts, planning, training and weapon systems. In essence, these adaptations are intended to enable the Air Force to be more effective on the strategic level, in addition to being more efficacious in air-ground combat.
Y.'s words regarding the resulting operational effectiveness, or even following the concept of deterrence presented outlined in Major A.'s article, leave the reader no choice but to reconsider a new version of Fuller's warning.
All of the authors so far have addressed the term “airpower” and its affiliation to war. The sixth author, who concludes Part I, is written by Lt. Colonel (res.) Ron Tira, a reservist serving in the Campaign Planning Department of the Air Force. Tira chooses to present a different approach that deals with the relevance of airpower. Under the title “The Third Strategic Environment,” Tira lists four factors shaping Israel's strategic environment. All of these factors, according to the author, emphasize the Air Force's relevance in the context of flexibility, secrecy, projection of airpower and deterring modern countries that could become enemies in the future. The new strategic environment is more ambiguous than what was prevalent in previous high-intensity conflicts that involved conquering an enemy within a country's borders. The challenges presented by Hezbollah and Hamas, as showcased by Finkel, Barak, A., and Y. in their articles, are defined by Tira as a second strategic environment that Israel needs to be aware of and find a solution for, especially the threat of precision weapons. However, these threats do not sit at the center of the relative advantages of the Air Force analyzed in Tira's article.
So what is the leading context that we use to examine the relevance of Israel's airpower today? Is it the war of deterrence or the ability to achieve decision against the military forces of the new enemies? Do we consider airpower a tool that stands alone, or a tool whose main contribution is its integration with ground combat? Is it prudent to continue and develop the long arm of the Air Force when understanding “the third strategic environment,” or would it be advantageous to develop new air-ground power, as Barak claims, to facilitate decisiveness in a combat environment of the “second strategic era,” in Tira’s terminology?
And maybe the answer is hidden in a combination of these approaches? If so, how much of each, and how many resources need to be diverted?
Part II: Designing and Operating Airpower
“Every time a service debriefs correctly, develops operational abilities correctly and does so in a structured process of continuous progress, as the Air Force has done for years, it takes another step forward.”
Gen. Eliezer Shkedi[8]
Part I of this issue focused on the question of the relevance and effectiveness of airpower. We did this by presenting uncertainty in important conceptual arguments - jointness, independence, force projection, and more. Part II focuses on the question of efficiency in its broader concept. The articles in this part will deal mainly, but not exclusively, with the Israeli Air Force as a learning, planning, execution and force designing organization.
In preparation for, and following, Operation Focus, the idea of air superiority was awarded unique status in the IDF's concept of airpower. The first four articles in this section deal with this issue from several perspectives.
Brigadier General (res.) Ephraim Segoli and Lt. Colonel (res.) Dr. Rafi Rudnik claim in their article that Operation Focus was so formative for the Air Force that the desire to recreate it as the epitome of success overshadowed defining a more relevant concept for airpower in dynamic strategic contexts. In the issue's seventh article, Segoli and Rudnick claim that Operation Focus is what may have led to the Air Force's fixation on air strikes in a campaign's initial stages, or in their words, a “preliminary attack.” A preliminary attack to achieve air superiority is one thing, but the term is obviously relevant in other contexts, such as operations against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip. This over-obsession resulted in overlooking potential concepts that were more important and had more relevance, such as the integration of airpower in ground operations, which was demonstrated just once in Operation Days of Penitence in the spring of 2004. The authors conclude that the role of the Air Force as a strategic entity needs to be fulfilled by broader systemic learning and investigative abilities, and not only by repeating tactical behavior that was successful in the past.
In the eighth article, Brigadier General Ori Oron, the Head of Air Force Intelligence, describes the learning process and organizational changes the Air Force is currently implementing to realize the operative intelligence element for air superiority on the new field of battle. While using Operation Focus as a benchmark to describe changes in the environment, Oron provides us a glimpse in the way the IAF currently analyzes the threat environment and the gaps that have been exposed in its “classic” combat concept. This allows him to briefly address questions of the very need of the term “air superiority” in warfare against organizations that do not even have an air force. The answer to the question of need lies, in eyes of the author, first and foremost in intelligence collection. The main challenge the enemy presents to the Air Force and the IDF in general is the issue of disappearing from gunsights while continuing to inundate Israel's home front with a constant barrage of rockets. The Air Force is a formidable source of fire power, but a condition for its employment is precise intelligence. Intelligence collection is contingent on freedom of movement in the air dimension, which leads Oron to tie “air superiority” - the removal of the main threats of operation in the air dimension - and the ability to influence the enemy through fire power and then finally vanquish it. Oron critically discusses the fusion of operative intelligence for modern warfare, which changes conventional balances. This leads the reader to conclude that if in 1967 it was excellent operative intelligence that was required to achieve air superiority, then today, air superiority is required to achieve an even more critical element - operative intelligence.
The next two articles serve as a historical warning. In the two cases that will be presented, modern air forces had to recognize, in hindsight, their failure to turn quantitative and technological advantages into air superiority on the battle field.
The ninth article, written by Mr. Saul Bronfeld, a research fellow in the Dado Center, deals with the IDF's learning challenges in the three-year period between the War of Attrition and the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The loss of air superiority against the threat of Soviet SAM missiles did not lead to the development of new ways to deal with air defense, and the Sinai defense concept was not compatible to the new developments of the time. The writer claims that both the Air Force and Ground Forces were influenced by Operation Focus's euphoria, in addition to the normal inter-service learning deficiencies.
Bronfeld steers his article towards the broader context of the West's coping with Soviet SAM missiles in the Vietnam War. A glimpse of this affair is presented by Major Dan Barak from the IAF's Doctrine Branch. In the tenth article, Barak reviews the roots of the American failure to achieve air superiority in the Vietnam War. Barak places responsibility for this failure on several factors, the main ones being the United States Air Force focusing almost exclusively on a single operational scenario centered on the mission of dropping an atomic bomb (both long and short distances); giving too much credibility for technological solutions - in this case the development of air-to-air missiles, without becoming acclimated in other dimensions; the lack of correctly learning from the success in the Korean War; and finally, inter-organizational tensions regarding the distribution of resources between the American military services which blocked learning and made the previous failures even more substantial. This one-dimensional scrutiny resulted in the strongest airpower in the world failing to achieve its mission objectives in the war against a significantly weaker opponent.
The collection of articles in Part II have dealt until now with air superiority in general, and the terms “air superiority” and “preliminary strike” as terms that promote or hinder learning in particular. The eleventh article by Colonel (res.) Gideon Hoshen deals with the power of the Air Force as an organization, and as a learning organization. Col. Hoshen puts to print the gut feelings of many Israelis - the Air Force is an organization whose inner strength is not only the sum of the quality of its human assets, air platforms, weapon systems and technology that comprise it. The IAF is an organization that has succeeded over the years to adopt the correct qualities that will allow it to better utilize everything that facilitates airpower (systemic outlook, operational planning, clarity of centralized control, etc.) and to reduce its sensitivity to “power mitigation” that are mentioned in the article. The Israeli Air Force is a very tight-knit organization; it utilizes its resources well; its missions are clear and shared; it is able to carry out methodical analysis and above everything else - it is able to pick itself up off the floor and start over again. Hoshen deftly illustrates the IAF's organizational excellence, and the fact that it is an organization that knows what it is doing. Having these qualities does not contradict the articles by Kadish and by Seguli and Rudnick, but it certainly does present executional prowess that has yet to be properly addressed in the current discussion.
The next two articles question the ability of the Air Force to remain the same organization so familiar to Gidon Hoshen.
Major Ophir Cherniak, a behavioral science officer serving in the IAF Palmahim air base, addresses the issue of the culture of the Air Force in the context of the human element often referred to as Generation Y. The twelfth article deals with the evolving changes in the nature of air warfare and the characteristics of air crews. If readers closely follow the cultural and colorful description presented by Ophir, they will have to ask themselves, “How will an organization that was built on the ethos of ‘the best become pilots’ adapt?” This ethos was acted out by Tom Cruise in the movie Top Gun geared for Generation Y audiences, and is presented in several articles and other sources cited in the article.
This special project is concluded with an article by Lt. Colonel Nurit Cohen-Unger from the Computer Services Directorate and Captain Lior Zichron from the Air Force. The thirteenth and last article in this issue introduces a new variable into the equation of our systemic discussion of airpower - artificial intelligence. The authors review the way the technological potential of artificial intelligence (AI) can be used to change process of planning, intelligence processing, attack execution, control and more. In their review, the authors reinforce the organizational- cultural questions raised in the previous article by Cherniak and add their own speculations. Is the essence of the age of technology in general, and AI in particular, an additional technological advancement to the traditional guidelines of employing “classic” airpower, or do they represent a change of a completely different magnitude?
Ever since the Wright brothers first lifted off, improvements and generational leaps in air platforms have been the center of discussion for advancement. Fighter jets and bombs have always been the center of the discourse of airpower. Can the information revolution change this as well?
The two parts of this double issue both briefly address a number of questions. Do we need to continue to strive for better jointness between the Air Force and Ground Forces? Several articles emphasize the IDF's traditional abstention from this real integration. The Head of the Ground Forces calls for the establishment of robotic-ground air assets alongside the Air Force. Several other authors think differently, such as Tira and Lt. Col Y., who stress the tension between an appropriate realization of the Air Force's strategic role and tighter jointness. Is it prudent to continue to measure airpower in the context of its capacity for destruction and attacking targets? Several articles raise various approaches that support flexibility and force projection while others believe that battlefield availability and intelligence superiority are more important.
Is the current conceptual discourse currently in the IDF around these questions productive, and does it surpass the discussions held in the years between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War? The lack of shared conceptual discussions between the IAF and Ground Forces, and on the results of this shortfall, were presented by Bronfeld and Kadish.
Can there be groundbreaking systemic learning that is deeply rooted in the contemporary strategic context while there exists an inclination for independence that have characterized Western air forces since their inception? Does a solution for ground-based drones, as offered by the Head of the Ground Forces, actually threaten the Air Force? Or is it an opportunity? Where is technology and where is the human element in the development of our concepts for military power in general, and airpower in particular?
Is it appropriate to conclude this issue that is dedicated to the operational prowess of the IAF with disturbing questions such as these? As far as we are concerned - of course. IDF soldiers and the Air Force, the planners, the intelligence researchers, the force designers and everyone in these fields - all of them pioneered Israel's future on that historic morning on June 5, 1967. They enabled a small third-world country to suddenly emerge as a regional power whose existence would no longer be in question. They did this through their physical courage and efforts that included brave decision making, precise preparations and impressive attention to details. They achieved this through their conceptual courage - their groundbreaking dreams and refusal to accept the eternal truths that preceded them.
We dedicate this issue to the battle-seasoned soldiers, the planners and all those participants of Operation Focus. They have taught us that the way we perceive, think, learn and execute must be enhanced, developed and changed.
Because “we must continue to play.”
Col. Eran Ortal Head of Think Tank
[1] IAF Magazine 230, August 2016. Gen. Eliezer Shkedi served as Commander of the Israeli Air Force from April 2004-May 2008.
[2] www.morfix.co.il.
[3] Gen. Benny Peled served as Commander of the Israeli Air Force from 1973-1977.
[4] A song of the IAF Entertainment Troupe, lyrics by Oded Feldman based on a speech by Moti Hod at and IAF conference, 1974.
[5] May 2000, interview to the IAF Magazine, 132. Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz served as IDF Chief of Staff from 2005-2007, and as a Commander of the Israeli Air Force from 2000-2004.
[6] J. F. C. Fuller: The Second World War, 1939-1945: A Strategical and Tactical History (Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1948).
[7] For example, by Ida'i and Ortal, Eshtonot 1, the IDF Colleges.
[8] IAF Magazine 230, August 2016.
